SELECTED ACTIVITIES AND ASPECTS OF ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION German Democratic Republic Intelligence Trainers

In 1964, A. K. Barden, then Director of the Bureau of African Affairs, approached the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) Trade Mission in Accra requesting intelligence training for members of his staff.

The East Germans, instead of granting scholarships for study in the G.D.R., elected to send two security officers to Ghana to ascertain the exact needs of the B.A.A. and to see if it would be possible to accomplish the intelligence training on-the-spot in Accra.

In November 1964, Major Jurgen Kruger, an officer of the G.D.R. Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit) arrived in Ghana accompanied by another East German Security Service official to assess the intelligence training requirements of the Bureau of African Affairs.

After consultations with Barden, it was decided that Major Kruger would remain in Accra and inaugurate an intelligence training course while the other member of the mission returned to the G.D.R. to inform his government of the B.A.A.'s intelligence requirements.

Major Kruger immediately drew up a programme for training and began the instruction based on his own hand-written notes. Seven members of the B.A.A. started the course.

Classes were held in a converted dormitory at the African Affairs Centre. Lectures were given from 0900 to 1200 hours Monday to Friday and students used the afternoons and Saturday mornings to compile their notes, do written exercises and discuss points they had not fully understood from the lectures.

On 17 December, 1964, Kruger returned to the G.D.R. and made arrangements for his wife and daughter to join him later in Accra (they arrived in March 1965). On 10 January, 1965 Kruger was back in Accra armed with typed notes to continue the course on "Secret Service and Intelligence Work" which lasted until May 1965.

A second course-"Intelligence Work Under Diplomatic Cover"-was given by Kruger from May to July 1965 for six B.A.A. staff members who were to be assigned to various African countries, including Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Burundi.

Kruger's courses covered all aspects of intelligence work from the rudiments of how to recruit and run agents to such subjects as sabotage and terror. The following excerpts from student note-books give an insight into the type of instruction Kruger gave:

"Our informants must be educated in such a way as to be able to meet new and dangerous situations; e.g. there is a sudden outbreak of war started by Nigeria against Ghana. We must have informants ready in Nigeria who know how to blast to start blasting certain important places in Nigeria immediately."

or

"The refugees who stay in our country can be sent back to their countries and organise themselves into responsible positions so that they become our informants and sources in the future. We can also win drivers from enemy countries and send them to their respective countries to pave their ways toward being used by very important persons in the government as drivers. Such drivers if they live with such persons will be our sources because they will be living within the object! For our purpose too we can organise Ghanaians to go abroad and work as teachers, drivers, nurses, etc. They have false passports, i.e. 'false flag' . Organisations like the Ghana Legion which can recommend to us very good cooks we can infiltrate into the enemies set-up, e.g. sending such a good cook to Nigeria to seek job with any influential and important minister like foreign affairs to be the cook."

Kruger's first intelligence course was followed by practical training operations in which spying assignments were undertaken by the five students who had completed the course. The original list of targets for such operations included the American, West German, Ivory Coast and Niger Embassies and the Nigerian High Commission. However, Kruger, who evinced a special interest in the activities of West Germans in Ghana, later concentrated on the West German Embassy and the German-run Gliding School for these operations. One team worked against the West German Embassy while another worked against the Gliding School. Later there were secret enquiries about the activities of the West German television team.

Kruger's intelligence activities in Ghana were not limited to teaching tradecraft and directing operations against West Germans. He was also chief adviser to Barden on the organisation of

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intelligence activities within the B.A.A. In midJanuary 1965, Barden asked Kruger to draw up plans for a new intelligence section of the B.A.A. and in mid-March Barden held discussions in the G.D.R. with the Minister of State Security which resulted in Kruger's secondment to the B.A.A. to set up the new intelligence section. This agreement also covered the secondment to the B.A.A. of another G.D.R. Ministry of State Security Officer, Captain Rolf Stollmeyer. When Barden was removed from the B.A.A., Nkrumah himself directed that a new agreement be drawn up covering the secondment of Kruger and Stollmeyer. Kruger obtained G.D.R. approval of the new agreement in August 1965 and in it his stay in Ghana was extended for another year.

The original agreement specified that Kruger would be:

"liaison officer of the M.F.S. of the G.D.R to the B.A.A. in Ghana.

instructor on problems of intelligence and counter-intelligence on the basis of experiences and knowledge of the M.F.S. of the G.D.R.

adviser on problems of maintaining the security of the office of the B.A.A. and the establishment of secret offices, departments, etc., which are functioning under the B.A.A.

adviser in security questions which are being put to him by the head or his deputies of the B.A.A."

Kruger's original assignment was from November 1964 to December 1965 and the second, Nkrumah dictated agreement, extended this to 1966.

The agreement specified that Stollmeyer would

act as:

"instructor and adviser of the M.F.S. to the B.A.A. for all technical equipment which has been installed at the Bureau;

adviser in problems of implementing and using technical and laboratory equipment as far as it is thought necessary by the Bureau." The assignment of Stollmeyer began in midMarch 1965 and the agreement specified he was to stay in Ghana "as long as the B.A.A. thinks it necessary."

The agreement further specified that "the assigned officers and their families will be given the same rights as all other diplomats

and will be dealt with as diplomats. These officers are having diplomatic passports of the G.D.R. with which they are legitimated members of the Representations of the G.D.R. in Ghana." (See Appendix I).

Since the true nature of Kruger and Stollmeyer's activities were to be concealed from the people of Ghana the agreement specified: "Their activities in the Republic of Ghana will be covered against all institutions and persons who are not connected with and related to security work as advisers of the G.D.R. Government in Ghana. Their responsibilities and designations in Ghana will be made public as follows:

"Major Kruger: Juridical problems of the National Liberation Movements;

Capt. Stollmeyer: Documentation and archives expert."

The ousting of Nkrumah spelled an end to the espionage activities of Kruger and Stollmeyer which the latter was quick to realise as evidenced by his precipitant departure from Ghana on 25 February. Kruger, however, did not manage such an expeditious escape and was arrested by the Ghanaian authorities on 26 February.

The value placed on Kruger's services by the G.D.R. Ministry for State Security can be seen by the fact that East German authorities held 350 Ghanaian students and eight diplomats as hostages in order to arrange Kruger's release. On 25 May, 1966, the Ghana Government announced that it had released Kruger in exchange for the Ghanaians being held by the G.D.R. authorities. Kruger had been formally charged with "illegal entry into Ghana, impersonating a diplomat and using his privileged position to conduct espionage against countries with which Ghana had friendly relations."

Prior to his release Kruger confessed to the charges against him and further admitted that he had been living in Ghana under an assumed name and that his real name was Jurgen Rogalla. The official announcement of Kruger's release stated "The Government of Ghana feels it has sufficient evidence to try Kruger, alias Rogalla, in a court of law. However, it is felt the safety and well-being of 350 Ghanaian sons and daughters are much more precious than one East German impostor."

Since Kruger's release biographic information has appeared in the Ghana press indicating he was a “fanatical East German Youth official and member of the SED before entering the

Ministry for State Security." He served six years in Schwerin and was then selected for a foreign espionage assignment and given three months' special training. The story continues "State Security First Lieutenant Gunter Mannel, who later fled to the West, took the young spy under his wing and went to Rostock to train him . . . His final test assignments were in Paris and Switzerland. Even Mrs. Rogalla was trained in espionage and the couple became known as 'Mr. and Mrs. Mende'."

The article explains that in Ghana the "Security Major" played a double role. He educated the Secret Police in the refinements of persuasion at Ussher Fort Prison and also used his proximity to Nkrumah to assist East German espionage. Rogalla, who was Nkrumah's Security Adviser for a year, was a notorious interrogator (in his own words) 'if people who are thrown in prison get loose my life is not worth much"."

Kruger, or Rogalla, was born in Rostock on 14 October, 1931.

Stollmeyer was born in Lichtentanns on 10 October, 1930.

Espionage Training

The Bureau of African Affairs files reveal that its employees participated in one guerilla warfare training course in the People's Republic of China, two espionage training courses in the U.S.S.R., and one specialised espionage course in the German Democratic Republic.

Within Ghana individuals were trained in guerilla warfare by Russians at the Mankrong Camp and by Chinese at the Half-Assini/ Obenemasi Camps. In addition, as noted elsewhere, two on-the-job training courses were given to employees in Accra by Major Kruger. The first "Secret Service and Intelligence Work"-was given from November 1964 until May 1965, and the second-"Intelligence Work Under Diplomatic Cover"-from May until June 1965.

The course in China lasted from 7 October, 1964 until 13 February 1965 and was described by one of the participants from Ghana as "a 90-day course in theory and practice... arduous and intensive."

Four employees attended the first espionage training course in the U.S.S.R. which was held from December 1964 until June 1965. While this first course was in progress, the Director of the Bureau of African Affairs 'wrote to the

First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Accra asking for "eight additional Soviet intelligence scholarships because we need to step up spy activities as a result of the Nouakchott Conference." The Russians were only too willing to train spies to operate in the O.C.A.M. States, since in May 1965 eight more people did go to Moscow. They remained there for six months.

A letter from the Director of the Bureau to the Deputy Trade Representative of the German Democratic Republic, dated 11 November, 1964, gives the names of seven staff members chosen to attend a specialised espionage course. They attended the course from 14 December, 1964 until 8 March, 1965.

Subversion against Independent African States

Efforts to overthrow independent African governments and to replace them with regimes that would be subservient to the policies of Nkrumah began as early as 1961. At this time the leaders of the so-called Pan-African Movement in Nigeria asked the Bureau of African Affairs for aid in overthrowing the legitimate government. The files of the Bureau contained a great deal of correspondence on this subject, including offers of support. (See Appendix C2).

Early relations between the Bureau and opposition elements in Togo are not well documented. By April 1963, however, agents of the Bureau were actively interfering in the political situation there. One report included the statement: '. . . I came to find a very serious situation in Togo, to be precise, in Lome where our friends are on the move."

In 1964 Kwame Nkrumah's programme of espionage in the independent African States was sharply stepped up. On 28 April the Director of the Bureau of African Affairs sent a secret letter to Nkrumah, excerpts from this letter follow:

"Osagyefo informed me a fortnight ago that you have had discussions with Mr. Djibo Bakary about events and development in the neighbouring French-speaking African States. The extent of the information you elicited during the discussions convinced you that the activities of the Bureau within these areas were not effective and that immediate action should be taken to remedy the situation on co-operation with Mr. Djibo Bakary and if necessary to supplement our manpower resources from the cadre of activists as he, Bakary may be disposed to spare.

"I have since then had consultations with Mr. Djibo Bakary and he has agreed to my suggestion that in the meantime we should concentrate on sending activists to the following countries: Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, Ouagadougou, Algeria, Togo and Brazzaville.

"The total expenditure needed for this exercise will be in the neighbourhood of £6,000."

The Djibo Bakary of this letter was a traitor from Niger and the Secretary-General of the outlawed Sawaba party. He had been summoned to Accra in 1962 and remained there throughout 1965. In these years he was closer to Nkrumah than were Ghanaian officials. He set up a network of agents in the Niger which recruited Nigeriens for training in the secret camps in Ghana. These recruits were then sent back to Niger to engage in terrorism and guerilla warfare. Djibo Bakary was particularly effective in obtaining Ghanaian passports for terrorists. He obtained one for S. Moumouni, a Nigerien, who went to China.

In May 1964 the Bureau prepared a series of "Political Questionnaires for Activists." Each questionnaire covered a single country and listed in great detail the subjects on which secret

information must be obtained. Secret documents and papers of these governments were given a high priority. Information was required on any plans for federations of two or more countries and ways were to be found to oppose such plans-Nkrumah was bitterly opposed to any such plans. Ways were to be found to influence, or to replace, the leadership of these States. For example, for Kenya the instructions were as follows: "Kenyatta is ageing-there is a scramble for a successor: Find out whether Murumbi, Tom Mboya and Odinga Oginga have, any of them, plans for a take-over bid of the government." Also, "Has Ghana to do some lobbying in Sierra Leone for choice of leadership?"

The material contained in the separate political questionnaires was put into less specific form in a printed pamphlet of four pages entitled, A Guide to Activists in Foreign Countries. This pamphlet was a concise outline of targets of espionage in independent African countries. One paragraph reads: "CONTACTS: Carefully builtup agents in all fields of the visiting countries (Party, Youth Movements, etc.)", and another: "INFILTRATION: Close liaison with ruling party officials in target country." Several paragraphs are concerned with collecting material from various sources as to local policies and actions hostile to the aims of Nkrumah.