Special attention was devoted to some of these delegates who were thought to be critical of Nkrumah. Mr. Germain Mba from Gabon, a former Secretary-General of the Afro-Malagasy Union stayed on in bugged Chalet B-4 after the close of the conference. He was placed under constant physical surveillance, and unfavourable reports were made about him. For example: "Mr. Mba is known to be violently opposed to socialism and is a bitter critic of Guinea, Mali, U.S.S.R. and China . . . I am convinced that Mr. Mba is not a man of ordinary intelligence. If he is in this country to do mischief then he is going about his business with phenomenal intelligence."

Chalet C-2 at the Star Hotel was occupied by Abu A. Koroma, a delegate from Sierra Leone, and a distinguished specialist in international law. He was, at the time of the conference, Senior Crown Counsel for International Relation.

Chalet B-4 housed Henry Meebelo, the Senior Principal Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zambia and the Director of the Department of African Affairs in that Ministry.

Another delegate from Zambia was Dunstan W. Kamana, the Presidential Press Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Defence, who was put up in the same chalet.

Chalet C-4, one of the largest on the grounds of the Star Hotel, also housed Emilio Charles Mzena, a delegate from Tanzania. At the time of the conference Mr. Mzena was Director of Intelligence, while later he was named as Head of the Security Service of Tanzania. At the conference President Nyerere was attended by his personal physician, Dr. A. Nhonoli, who was also an occupant of Chalet C-4.

Another bugging operation was carried out by TU 3 at the Burma Camp and the files include a sketch showing where overhearing devices were installed in the camp buildings. These bugged rooms were to be used when interrogating Nkrumah's political prisoners.

In February 1966 TU 3 was making secret arrangements to tap the telephone lines in Accra. It requested that eight private lines be laid from different exchanges in Accra to TU 3 headquarters, and that 33 different cable pairs be placed. A brief report stated: "It is agreed that since cables are to be obtained from overseas, this service will have to provide the necessary facilities for the transfer of money, the private lines will be used for tapping and the cables are

required for various operations." Had this operation been carried out, no resident of Accra would have been able to talk over the telephone without being overheard.

Technical Unit 4

Technical Unit 4 was the criminalistic department, responsible for the collection, examination, and use of evidence for legal proceedings and also included the forensic laboratories.

TU 4 had one office reserved for a Russian "expert" who was to be employed full time. While awaiting his arrival, Nikolay Ivanovich Turov was temporarily assigned to TU 4. As noted elsewhere, Turov aided Andreyev in the overhearing operations at the Ambassador and Star Hotels carried out by TU 3.

Turov conducted an on-the-job training course from 9 August until 1 December, 1965 which covered all aspects of forensic work including secret writing. In addition, those attending the course were compelled to listen to lectures on such subjects as Classics and the Class Struggle, the Great October Revolution, and Marx and Lenin on Revolution.

In a report written by Turov before his departure for Moscow he made comprehensive recommendations on the organisation and functions of each TU 4 branch. This report stressed especially the need for additional trained personnel and for more specialisations. The most significant recommendations in Turov's report are:

1. "The Special Branch Police photographic bureau should be closed down. The photographer and his equipment should be transferred to TU 4 immediately.

2. "All cases involving falsification of signature, alterations in government documents, banks, State co-operatives, universities and all State institutions must go to TU 4 for examination and analysis with a view to exposing criminals.

3. "The fingerprints of all staff of the security service and of all important officers in the ministries, corporations, etc., should be collected and classified."

From this report it is clear that duties and functions earlier carried out by other agencies of the government were to be the exclusive property to TU 4, in line with Nkrumah's wishes.

The inventory of the equipment at TU 4 reveals that the laboratory equipment was predominantly Russian. There is evidence that the Russians provided inferior equipment, as one report stated: "Copying camera from Russia to be replaced by better machine. We need contact printing machine, that sent from Moscow is outmoded." Some of this equipment had seen a great deal of use in Russia, while all of it was sold to Ghana at high prices.

Finally, TU 4 played an active role at the O.A.U. Conference of October 1965. Sixteen staff members were provided with passes which permitted them to attend the sessions and to mingle with the delegates.

Bureau for Technical Assistance (Special African Service)

In 1962 Nkrumah asked the Bureau to prepare a plan for an All-African Intelligence Service. It was his idea that while the Bureau itself would conduct espionage in many African countries, this separate organisation would penetrate the intelligence services of these same countries. That is to say, it would recruit agents within these intelligence services who would acquire the most intimate secrets of these States. Such secrets would be of great value to Nkrumah in his plans to dominate or to overthrow these governments. (See Appendix C2).

The first report on the All-African Intelligence Service reached Nkrumah in June, 1962, but it was not until many months later that he gave orders for the establishment of such an organisation. The sequence of events was as follows.

When the Director of the Bureau was in the German Democratic Republic in March 1965 he discussed Nkrumah's plan for the new organisation with the Minister of State Security and it was agreed that Major Kruger and Captain Stollmeyer should play an active part in setting up the organisation. As has been pointed out, Kruger and Stollmeyer had been giving courses for the Bureau since January 1965, initially training five officers who were to be assigned to Ghanaian missions in independent African countries under diplomatic cover.

Kruger drew up a plan for the new organisation that was to have eight departments. It was explicitly understood that one of its duties was to work for the overthrow of those independent African governments that Nkrumah regarded as "not progressive." This proposal was submitted to Nkrumah on 15 April, 1965 and included an initial cost estimate of £60,000. On 26 April, 1965, on instructions from Nkrumah, a formal

agreement covering the services of Kruger and Stollmeyer was signed at Accra by the Representative of the Minister of State Security of the German Democratic Republic and by the head of the Central Bureau.

Not only did Nkrumah approve the Kruger plan, but he ordered that it should begin work at once. On Nkrumah's order, this organisation was to report directly to the Office of the President, not through the Bureau of African Affairs.

In June 1965 Nkrumah sent a notice to the Bureau of African Affairs confirming the separate existence of this organisation, giving it the name of the Special African Service. However, its true name was not to be used even within the confines of the National Security Service where it was to be referred to as Technical Unit 5. As a result, the correspondence of this unit. employed the reference heading S.A.S. in correspondence with other elements of the Security Service. In all cases in which its staff or its activities might come to public attention its activity was to be concealed under the cover name of the Bureau for Technical Assistance.

All the appointments to the staff of the Special African Service were approved by the Principal Secretary of Nkrumah. Although it did not have formal status until 1 October, 1965, by 1966 its staff had grown from forty to sixtyseven. The budget for 1966 included C207,290.00 for general expenses and C289,920.00 for operating expenses.

Following the original plan of Kruger, only slightly modified, the eight Departments of the Special African Service came under an Overall Department. Two Deputy Chiefs assisted the Chief in this Department. Detailed plans for the operational and support activities of the eight Departments were prepared, as described in the following paragraphs:

1. Department for O.C.A.M. (Organisation Commune de l'Afrique et Malagasy) States.— These States included former French colonies, with the addition of French-speaking Congo/ Kinshasa: a total of thirteen States.

With O.C.A.M. headquarters in Cameroon, that country was a principal target for agents and staff of the Special African Service. There was to be penetration of the O.C.A.M. organisation, of the office of the country's president and of the foreign ministry. Also, agents were to be developed within the outlawed U.P.C. group. As regards such States as the Ivory

Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Togo, local agents were to be recruited within the offices of the Heads of State and the foreign ministries, at military installations, within opposition parties, and among Ghanaian political refugees.

In the Congo/Kinshasa agents were to be placed among the rival political leaders, whether conservative or extremist. A staff member under diplomatic cover was to control the espionage network within the country.

2. Department for Freedom Movements in Dependent Countries.-Some fifteen areas came under this Department, areas that included Rhodesia, Rhodesia, the Portuguese and Spanish colonies, and island colonies. With the objective of bringing all the so-called freedom movements under the guidance of Ghana, all the political parties were to be effectively penetrated. Such parties included the ZAPU and ZANU of Rhodesia, the UPA and MPLA of Angola, FRELIMO and UDENAMO of Mozambique, and PAIGC and FLING of Portuguese Guinea. The fact that the Bureau of African Affairs had built up exhaustive files on all these parties and had trained many of their members at the secret camps and at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute greatly facilitated the plans. In addition, the Special African Service was to rely on those leaders who were amenable to direction from Ghana and, in general, these were the extremists with limited followers. However, they were to be brought forward as replacements for such men as Holden Roberto of Angola and Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique whom Nkrumah had branded as reactionaries.

3. Department for Former British and American Territories.-This Department was carrying on activities in eight states: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Gambia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. A major effort was to be concentrated against Nigeria, under a staff member resident at Lagos under diplomatic cover. There was to be penetration of all the political parties in Nigeria and of the groups of Ghanaian refugees.

The territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were to be developed as bases for offensives against the Union of South

Africa. In addition, agents were to operate in Bechuanaland.

4. Department for South Africa and Southwest Africa. This Department was to penetrate and to assess the underground groups in these areas, with particular reference to their willingness and ability to begin guerilla operations and to their feelings toward Ghana. As noted elsewhere, the National Security Service had given consideration to training 500 guerillas within these actual areas.

5. Department for Other African States.The sixteen States covered by this Department included those of East Africa, North Africa, Congo/Brazzaville, Mali and Guinea. Tanzania was marked as the most important target for espionage efforts, but in order to avoid any reaction of the Government of Tanzania against Ghana, agents in that country were to be recruited under a "false flag", i.e. they were to be told they were working for Kenya or for Uganda. Agents were to be sought who were close to the President and the Vice-President of the country, and both the TANU and the AfroShirazi parties were to be penetrated.

In Malawi and Zambia a special effort was to be made to recruit agents, again under a "false flag", who were in contact with the heads of these nations. Also, opposition elements were to be cultivated. In Congo/Brazzaville, Burundi and Rwanda agents were to be recruited in all political parties, both those in power and those in opposition to the govern

ments.

6. General Department. This section handled administration of the Special African Services and related matters such as transport, security guards, and the maintenance of safe houses in Accra.

7. Technical Department.-This section was concerned with codes and ciphers, with photography and communication by radio. In effect, it duplicated some of the duties of the Technical Units described earlier.

8. Department for Information and Analysis. This section seems to have been intended to deal with agent reporting and with the analysis and indexing of these reports.

The Special African Service was dissolved, after the dismissal of Nkrumah, before it had time to carry through its plans for continental espionage and subversion. It did, however, work on one special assignment in Accra, as described below.

Prior to the meeting of the Organisation of African Unity at Accra in October 1965, Nkrumah assigned various tasks to elements of the National Security Service. The Special African Service was given two specific assignments. First, it was to obtain information on the views held by delegates to the meeting. Some such information was to be collected in the countries from which the delegates came in advance of the date of the meeting. Then, at the meetings the members of the S.A.S., provided with official credentials, were to mingle with the delegates and to draw them out as to their opinions, especially any views that were unfavourable to Nkrumah. Also, trusted Freedom Fighters were to be briefed and told to gain access to the delegates for this same purpose. Second, the S.A.S. was to carry out surveillance of the

delegates while they were in Accra, and to report immediately to Nkrumah as to the persons with whom they were meeting and talking.

This assignment proved difficult to carry out, since the Director of the Bureau of African Affairs felt that the S.A.S. was intruding on his field of responsibility, and he had his own staff members place obstacles in the way of those individuals, even to the extent of trying to keep them from contacts with the delegates.

There is no record as to Nkrumah's reaction to the friction between the Special African Service and the Bureau of African Affairs. However, he did inform its head that he was to consider himself Acting Chief of the S.A.S. and that he would name someone who was a "political activist" to head it. It may be assumed that he intended to appoint a high ranking member of the Convention People's Party to this post, and to put the facilities of the C.P.P. and of the All-African Trade Unions Federation at the disposal of the Special African Service.