communist revolutionary tutelage. They either remained in Ghana for guerilla training by the Soviets and later the Chinese or they were sent on for more intensive instruction elsewhere. In all cases they were indoctrinated by foreigners in a foreign ideology.

Who were these people and where did they come from?"These 'political refugees' included many members of parties in other African States that had been declared illegal and banned because they planned to use, or were already employing force in order to overturn elected governments . . . 'Refugees' also included members of legal parties who were to be sent back to their countries to act as agents for Ghana within these parties."*

These so-called refugees did not straggle into Ghana by accident or haphazardly. They were encouraged to come with promises of financial assistance and guerilla warfare training. Nkrumah, in his determination to gain control of and use dissident forces in Africa to spread his own form of subversion, was lavish in his hospitality to them. As early as 1959 he began erecting a large complex of buildings known as the African Affairs Centre where "political refugees" were housed and fed until such time as they entered guerilla training camps.

To those who have suggested that Nkrumah was concentrating his efforts on legitimate freedom fighters from fighters from colonial territories, it will be enlightening to learn the names of some of the houses at this African Affairs Centre. There were two Sawaba Houses (for

*Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa. Ghana Ministry of Information, November, 1966, page 5.

malcontents from Niger), but there was no South African House; a Cameroon House, but no Rhodesian House; and an Ethiopian House, but no Angolan House. And is it not ironic that Nkrumah saw fit to succour and encourage "freedom fighters" from Ethiopiathe single country in Africa with a history of independence that stretches back three thousand years.

But, as in so many other cases, Nkrumah's determination as to which were and which were not independent African nations was based on the purely personal criterion of whether the leaders of their governments did or did not kotow to the name Nkrumah. Those who did not, no matter how objectively impeccable was the escutcheon of their independence, became in Nkrumah's lexicon "neo-colonial" and thus targets for his subversion.

Who can doubt the credentials of Jomo Kenyatta either as a freedom fighter or as the elected leader of a truly independent African Nation? Yet Nkrumah's off-centre view of African affairs permitted him to train dissident members of the Kamba tribe who were to form a guerilla cadre loyal to Oginga Odinga, Kenyatta's chief antagonist in Kenya.

The end result of Nkrumah's egocentric view of African realities is that his guerilla warfare camps trained more nationals from independent countries than they did from the imperialist and colonial areas of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa combined.

NKRU

JKRUMAH'S training camps were shrouded in such secrecy that it has been impossible

to reconstruct complete information on the numbers, nationalities and identities of all who were trained there. Dossiers do exist on large numbers of Nigerian, Togolese, Nigerien and Cameroonian guerilla warfare trainees. There is less complete but firm evidence that "refugees" from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Congo (Kinshasa) and Burundi were also enrolled in these courses.

This evidence is more fragmentary because in some cases files on "freedom fighters" were destroyed once the men had been reinfiltrated into their own countries or sent on to communist nations for further training. In other cases, freedom fighters from independent countries used false names and therefore all that is known about them is their nationality. In still other cases, both false names and nationalities were used from the time the trainee arrived in Ghana until he was exfiltrated. In these latter cases, one can only hazard the surmise that the individuals involved occupied such politically sensitive positions in their own countries that extraordinary precautions had to be taken to protect Nkrumah from charges that he was meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign governments.

In any event, there is ample evidence that Nkrumah's obsessive drive to dominate a Continental Union Government of Africa led him increasingly to support subversion against African governments opposed to him and to

pay little attention to the genuine freedom. movements of colonial areas.

On November 2, 1965, shortly after the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) summit conference was held in Accra, Nkrumah received and approved the following proposal from his Special African Service (SAS), the BAA branch charged with subversion in Africa:

*"The results of the O.A.U. Summit Conference have clearly shown that those O.C.A.M. States surrounding Ghana present the main danger to the establishment of a Continental Union Government of Africa. A careful analysis of the activities of the O.C.A.M. States clearly indicated that these states form the best organised group of states within the O.A.U. because neither the radical states nor the reactionary ones ever meet to plan a concerted action. If an early action is not taken towards the controlling of these states within the O.A.U. then there is every likelihood of these states ultimately wielding a great influence over the affairs of the O.A.U.

It is therefore proposed that the S.A.S. should identify its activities and give priority to work on the O.C.A.M. front and to give secondary attention to work on the liberation struggle."

It is interesting to note that nowhere in this SECRET document is there any suggestion that the reason Nkrumah intends to concentrate his subversion against the O.C.A.M. states is because he considers them to be "neo-colonial." In his public speeches and in his prolific quasiphilosophical writings, Nkrumah exploited the

*Appendix, Exhibit A.

phrase "neo-colonial" to stigmatise independent governments in Africa which stood as stumbling blocks in his way to pan-African dominance. Many people were deceived by Nkrumah's incessant fulminations against neo-colonialism. But this document makes it clear that Nkrumah, himself, was perfectly able to separate his public fancies from private fact. In this SECRET document, Nkrumah makes no pretence that he is opposed to the O.C.A.M. states for any philosophical reasons. Quite the contrary. His opposition to them is a simple matter of power politics: they are viable, they are independent and they are "the best organised group of states within the O.A.U." capable of "ultimately wielding a great influence over the affairs of Africa." This, Nkrumah could not tolerate, for in his vision of African reality there was no room for anyone, other than himself, to wield great influence in Africa.

In diametrical opposition to his public pronouncements, he is actually perfectly willing to tolerate "reactionary" states simply because, in his view, they are unable "to plan a concerted action" and therefore constitute no threat to

his ambitions in Africa. Thus Nkrumah proves himself in reality to be not in the least concerned with neo-colonialism. In fact he privately dismisses "reactionary" states because they are ineffectual and their disorganisation prevents them from frustrating his plans for African dominance. It is amusing to note that he also privately dismisses the "Radical" states with whom he is so closely identified publicly for the same reasons.

It is not, however, in the least amusing to learn that Nkrumah shunts the real "liberation struggle" to a siding because it can gain him no immediate returns in influence within the O.A.U. It is clear that Nkrumah's private priorities diverged dramatically from his publicly announced ones. And one can only wonder at Nkrumah's ability to subscribe to the Charter of the O.A.U. which proscribes "any subversion originating in our countries again st another Member State of the Organisation of African Unity" and his secret determination that the full thrust of the subversive wing of his burgeoning security forces should be directed against his independent neighbours, the O.C.A.M. st.tes.

*Charter, Organisation of African Unity, Article 3, paragraph 5.

HAD Africans been privy to this secret policy

of Nkrumah's, it would have come as no surprise to them to learn that guerilla warfare trainees from Niger and Cameroon were the so-called freedom fighters discovered at Obenemasi Camp after Nkrumah's downfall. But this policy of Nkrumah's had been skilfully masked and hidden from view by a billowing smoke screen of public statements designed to portray Nkrumah as fully occupied with and in the vanguard of the anti-colonial liberation movement. On the few occasions when the smoke cleared a bit and Nkrumah's activities against independent African nations glimmered through, Nkrumah and his subordinates were quick to issue categorical denials that any such subversive activity was taking place.

Nkrumah's dealings with Niger provide an interesting case in point. On October 16, 1964, the Research Bureau of Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted to Nkrumah (with a copy to A. K. Barden then chief of subversion in the B.A.A.) a complaint about Ghana's subversive activities in Niger made by President Hamani Diori of the Republic of Niger.* The report is headed "NIGER GOVERNMENT ACCUSES GHANA GOVERNMENT FOR ALLOWING HER GROUNDS TO BE USED FOR TRAINING GUERILLAS TO ATTACK NIGER". It details a confrontation between the Niger President, "other Ministers. and Diplomatic Corps accredited to Niger" and the Ghana Chargé d'Affaires to Niger during which "some of the arms, ammunitions and documents that were seized from the guerillas were displayed on the Palace first corridor."

Appendix, Exhibit B.

The report continues: "the President in his speech gave the history of how the present government was formed and how the Sawaba Government fell... he mentioned how Mr. Jibo Bakare (Bakary Djibo) went to Accra... how so many arms were seized with the people arrested, how they were planning to overthrow the Government... The President said that at the moment it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Niger guerillas are stationed in Accra as their headquarters. The training centre is at Mampong ... These men were first trained in China by Communist China and later they came to Accra where they are organising themselves at Mampong. He also disclosed that they are using the Chinese method of attack.”

According to the report President Diori did not publicise this incident "in an effort to avoid a complete misunderstanding with the Government of Ghana" despite the fact that "in his opinion Ghana is helping the Sawaba by allowing them to use her ground for training in guerilla affairs. And Communist China is helping them financially". In fact, President Diori stated: "President Nkrumah of course told him at Addis Ababa that he will not allow the Sawaba to plan any subversion on his ground against him". The writer of the report then adds that President Diori suggested that perhaps Nkrumah did not know about the subversive activities of the Sawaba in Ghana and requested that he be informed of them.

Let us see how President Diori was rewarded for his courtesy in keeping this matter private and for his gentlemanly suggestion that Nkrumah might be unaware to these matters. First,

out of hand, the writer denied the charges saying “Ghana cannot in any way help in illegal Government to overthrow a legal Government in Africa." At the same time, the writer states "Clandestinely, I am moving fast to get copy of the letter from the Sawaba men in Russia seeking financial aid from the Russian Embassy in Accra, photostat copies of samples of all arms found and persons arrested especially the man who said they were being trained in Mampong".

So we see that the immediate reaction of this Nkrumah appointee was to deny these serious charges without any investigation while at the same time launching a small-scale espionage operation of his own in order to procure the Niger government documents on which the charges were based.

Next, on October 26, 1964, the Research Bureau is advised by Mr. Barden of the B.A.A. as follows:-*

"I would suggest that our Chargé d'Affaires in Niger be strongly advised to approach this matter with circumspection and to deny in the most strongest terms the alleged Ghana's complicity in the present political events in the country."

This would seem a perfectly reasonable response from a Government innocent of the charges. But it is a curious one in light of another paragraph in this same letter from Barden which states:

"I am in regular touch with Bakary Djibo, the Secretary-General of the Sawaba Party in Niger, who keeps me informed about the day-to-day events and developments of his Party's struggle in Niger".

And it is an exceedingly curious response from a man who on July 23, 1962, had addressed a SECRET memorandum to Nkrumah detailing plans for Ghana's support of Djibo Bakary and his Sawaba Party.** Among the undertakings in support of the Sawaba Party proposed by Mr. Barden and endorsed by Nkrumah were:

to obtain a residence for Mr. Djibo Bakary ... "the cost of the rent which is not to exceed £1,000 a year should be met from the contingencies vote."

Appendix, Exhibit C **Appendix, Exhibit D.

...

...

a car should be purchased for Mr. Bakary.

"a grant of £1,500 a year should be made to Mr. Djibo Bakary for his keep and for the running of his office."

Activities in Niger itself

"Mr. Barden has this in hand and he should continue to handle this problem under Osagyefo's direction. No block vote should be given Mr. Bakary for activities in Niger. Money should be provided as and when needed. Absolute secrecy should characterise all activities, each of which should be sanctioned by Osagyefo."

This document alone is sufficient to expose the blatant hypocrisy of Nkrumah's denial of involvement in subversive activities against the Republic of Niger. A second document, however, should be cited since it proves beyond doubt Nkrumah's deep personal involvement with the Sawaba Party which led him to rely on its members to serve as spies for him in French-speaking Africa. On April 28, 1964, Nkrumah received, at his own request, a plan from Mr. Barden for using Sawaba Party activists against neighbouring French African states. .* Pertinent portions of this document follow:

"Osagyefo informed me a fortnight ago that you have had discussions with Mr. Bakary Djibo about events and developments in the neighbouring French-speaking African States. The extent of information you elicited during the discussions convinced you that the activities of the Bureau within these areas were not effective and immediate action should be taken to remedy the situation in co-operation with Mr. Bakary Djibo and if necessary to supplement our manpower resources from the cadre of activists as he Bakary may be disposed to spare.

"I have since then had consultations with Mr. Bakary Djibo and he has agreed to my suggestions that in the meantime we should concentrate on sending activists to the following countries:

Cameroons
Ivory Coast
Senegal
Dahomey

• Appendix, Exhibit E.