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little more time, a little more consideration, and I think that certainly is the kind of response that the ninth circuit decision requires.

Senator DECONCINI. One last question, just out of curiosity for myself. I would like to have your views. Would you explain to us as a professor of law what you believe the ultimate purpose behind the copyright laws were? What is your legal perception of what was behind that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The constitutional provision says that Congress has the power to pass laws to give to authors and scientists for a limited time the benefit of their writings and inventions. So ultimately the copyright law is there to give to the author of a creative work some economic benefit from his labor for a limited time.

Senator DECONCINI. How is that best effectuated in your opinion? What is the best way to do just that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The copyright law has provided an elaborate mechanism for protecting the authors or the creators of any of these works. They do get the benefit of their contracts with producers when their show goes on television. They write a book, and that becomes a movie. They will get the benefit of the dollars from the movie producer.

I will say this: The movie producers are not running to give authors a share of the video cassette market. So the idea that the authors would share in this is simply not the case. We just saw that there were a couple of strikes in which both the writers and directors got only a minimal share of this market.

There has not been a mechanism for giving anything to the author, the original creator of this. Of course the directors do share in that; they do make their own creative contribution, but they are getting their money from deals with the networks, and the idea that they must reap a huge benefit-a much greater benefit-out of the exploitation of the video cassette recorder does not follow at all from the constitutional requirement.

It seems to me this would be a huge windfall for the producers in this area, the markets that actually create the movies, and not contemplated by the law at all.

As to the way in which this could be enforced, with huge amounts of money going either from the consumer or from Sony, the contributory infringer, as the court said, it seems to me the authors are getting their share from the initial production of the film and it is not fair for the producer to whom they sold their right to get this huge windfall that the ninth circuit case contemplates.

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you very much, Professor Friedman. We appreciate having you here.

Senator D'Amato, do you have any questions?

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for the record to note that neither the chairman, Senator DeConcini, nor Senator D'Amato attended Hofstra Law School.

Professor, there have been those who have said that this legislation is premature, that indeed before Congress acts we should wait until the Supreme Court reviews this matter. Would you care to comment in respect to those who allege that this is precipitous, that S. 1758 should not be advanced until the Supreme Court has acted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As Senator DeConcini said, we already have a situation where the statutory materials are really not available. It is a guess one way or another: Did Congress intend that video recording would be an infringement, or did they intend that the broad, fair use provision, section 107, really protects this?

Both the lower courts were simply guessing at rather broad language in two separate sections. The court of appeals relied on section 106, which gave the copyright owner very broad control of his material. The district court judge relied on section 107, which has a very broad definition of "fair use."

The materials on which to determine what Congress intended are not there. The Supreme Court would just look into the crystal ball, like both other courts have done, and try and guess at what Congress intended. If Congress intends one thing or another, it can tell the Supreme Court, it can tell the Federal court, “Here's what we really had in mind."

Senator D'AMATO. So you reject that contention that we should wait for the Supreme Court to act?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, because the Supreme Court is not going to determine a remedy. Congress has to determine a remedy.

Senator D'AMATO. In any event, even if we determine that there is a violation of some copyright law, then comes the matter of enforcement and the rest, as you have spelled out.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The equipment is simply not there. The statutory materials are simply not there. Congress has to do something, one way or another.

Senator D'AMATO. In your analysis of S. 1758, Professor, did you indicate, or does it appear to you, that the enforcement of S. 1758 would in any way work a hardship on, for example, the authors or the producers?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, it is going to work a hardship on the producers, because they are not going to get a huge windfall.

Senator D'AMATO. But would it work a hardship on them?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I do not see how it would work any hardship on them. They have already made their deals with the television networks, with everyone else, with syndicators, or whatever. This is a total windfall for them, one way or another.

Senator D'AMATO. Does it work a hardship on the writers, the authors, et cetera?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As I said, there was a strike this summer in which the writers ended up with a very small amount of the total coming in, and mostly I believe from the actual sale of video cassettes over the counter.

Senator D'AMATO. But S. 1758 in itself would not work a hardship on them?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, it would not work a hardship on them at all.
Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Professor.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DECONCINI. Congressman, do you wish to make a statement?

Mr. PARRIS. I have just one very quick question, Senator.

Would you agree with the statement that the adoption of this legislation would render the question of individual use by the Supreme Court, the ninth circuit, or whoever-would render that moot and that the adoption of this legislation would be, in effect, even an appropriate delinkage of the mechanism of the profoundly more complex issues of payments of royalties, the entertainment fees, and all those questions, as opposed to individual use of this equipment? Would that be an effective way to approach it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It would be effective. Let me just, if I can, act professorial for a moment. There is some technical gap in the legislation. The one thing it does not cover is if there is a performance under State law which is not being simultaneously recorded, so that there is no Federal statutory copyright protection. There still may be enforcement under State misappropriation laws.

I think there should be an additional technical amendment to make sure that any home video recording of any kind is neither a violation of copyright nor of any State statutory or common law. That would simply eliminate that issue. The home video recording would simply not be actionable under the laws of either the Federal Government or of any State. Then Congress can come in and make a more appropriate examination of the technologies and determine what it thinks would be desirable over the long run.

Mr. PARRIS. But do you think we should limit it just to the home? How about the priest who wants to watch the Notre Dame replays on Sunday morning during mass? He wants to do that on the next Saturday night in his office, for example.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is a definition for public performance in the statute which talks about,

To publicly perform the work is to perform or to display it at a place open to the public or in any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.

I think you can simply plug in that definition. If there is a normal circle of social acquaintances, that is what we are talking about, but that already exists within the statute, and that might be plugged into this situation.

Mr. PARRIS. Thank you. Senator DECONCINI. Thank you very much, Professor Friedman. We appreciate your enthusiastic analysis of this legislation and Congress' involvement in it. It has been very helpful to us.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Thank you very much. (Material follows:)




My name is Leon Friedman and I welcome the opportunity
to testify this afternoon on s.1758, a bill that would over-

rule the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.2d 963 (1981.

I am a professor of law at Hofstra Law School in

Hempstead, New York.

I teach copyright law and have practiced

in the field for over 20 years.

I have also lectured on copy-

right law to federal judges through the auspices of the Federal

Judicial Center.

I believe that s. 1758 is both an appropriate

remedy for Congress to enact and it is a desirable response

to the court decision.

The Decision

The Universal City Studios decision held that off-the-air

copying of copyrighted television programs by videotape
recorders constituted copyright infringement even if the copy-

ing was done by private persons for their own non-commercial


The Court of Appeals reversed an earlier decision by
Judge Ferguson reported at 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Calif. 1979)

which held that videotape recording by private consumers con-

stituted fair use and/any event the manufacturers of such
equipment were not contributory infringers The Court of Ap-
peals, relying on the absence of any language in the copy-
right law or legislative history relating to private home
video recording, concluded that such copying could not be

fair use.

It held that the broad grant of monopoly rights

to copyright owners under Section 106 of the law, in particular,

par. 1 which gave such owners the right to "reproduce the copy-

righted work in copies or phonorecords," dictated a finding of



It viewed the problem differently than the

district court:

the question was not whether Congress showed

any intent "to protect copyright holders from certain re-
production of his works," Rather the question was whether

"Congress... exhibited the intent to limit the rights of

copyright owners in ways not specified in $$107-118." 659

F.2d at 966. Finding no intent to limit the broad grant of

rights under $106 or any indication that the fair use doctrine

was meant to apply, it found for the plaintiff. It rejected
any analogy in the photocopying area, particularly the Court

of Claims decision in Williams & Wilkens Co. v. United States,

487 F.2d 1345 ( 1973) aff'd by an equally divided court,

420 U.S. 376 (1975) which held that single-copy photocopying

of a copyrighted article for personal use constituted fair


The court remanded the case for fashioning of an ap-

propriate remedy which it recognized would be very difficult.

Congressional Action

It is entirely appropriate for Congress to step into

the matter now and legislate a solution to the problems raised

[blocks in formation]

situation because of the broad grant of protection in Section


The Supreme Court can try to interpret or guess what

Congress intended just as the lower courts did, based on the

almost complete lack of statutory materials focusing on the


Or Congress can now tell the courts exactly what it

wants to do about the question now since it apparently never

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