when the taking serves a public purpose. The Constitution nowhere sanctions the use of the legislature's power to take 10/ property for merely private purposes. Indeed, one of the reasons the takings clause requires the public to pay for what it takes is to help ensure that what is paid for benefits the public, 11/ The since the public will soon tire of paying for purely private acquisitions that do not benefit the commonweal. copyright-repealing bills before the Congress, as applied to copyrights already in existence at the time such bills take effect, appear to satisfy neither of these two indispensible prerequisites. The retroactive repeal of existing copyright protection cannot be sustained as an exercise of the independent power of Congress to create copyrights, because it does the very opposite. And, as will be shown below, the First Amendment does not require or empower Congress to revoke these copyrights, and in fact may forbid it to do so. The proposed bills are also open to the serious charge that they take the property of copyrightholders for purely private reasons, precisely the sort of "robbery" that the 12/ 10/ See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1096) (compensation cannot cure the unconstitutionality of a taking for a private purpose); accord, Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Brandeis, J.). 11/ L; Tribe, American Constitutional Law, $58-5, 9-2 (1978). United States Constitution, Article I, $8. 13/ This much is indeed 14/ takings clause is designed to prevent. explicit in their very language, which allows VTR owners freely to copy ance-protected materials for "private use. Once the copies are sold or traded for value they benefit someone other than the primary copyright infringer 15/ the law no longer exempts them. Furthermore, it can hardly - that is, when be contended that the persons who will be aided by the proposed bills are the public at large. Only relatively well-to-do 16/ television owners can now afford Betamax, and the claim that Congress intends to aid all those who will eventually own such costly equipment is suspect because Congress will be passing the measure when only the wealthier strata of the population possess these machines machines whose very use - will likely reduce the amount of quality television programming available, to the detriment of all television viewers. 17/ The special benefits that these bills would bestow on such foreign corporations as Sony also make suspect the claim they they are designed to aid the American public. While 13/ " See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 101 S.Ct. 446; 452 (1980) ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation. This is the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent.") (unanimous decision). 15/ Id. The bills cited in note 1, supra, protect only noncommercial recording. : 16/ The average unit costs between $650 and $1300. is permitted - special aid to distressed domestic firms and their employees as in the case of Chrysler or Lockheed, where the entire American public might suffer if the imperilled giant fell - Sony is in no financial distress and is, of course, not even a domestically-based corporation. Takings for purely private purposes, it must be stressed, are constitutionally... forbidden even where compensation is provided. And, although "not the courts characteristically defer to the judgment of the legislature as to the existence of public purposes for its 18/ regulatory actions in economic matters, such deference is total19/ and readily turns to distrust where, as here, the public has not been willing to pay for what some few private 20/ parties have been given. for their property, in short, Congress would better ensure that the proposed exception to the copyright laws will not be found unconstitutional as a private taking. Indeed, the fact that Congress provides compensation to those from whom it takes property may be its only proof in such a case as this that the exception serves a public purpose within the ken 'of Congress' power. By compensating copyrightholders 18/ 19/ Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 438 U.S. 234 (1978); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 C.S. 528, 529, 533 (1973). 20/ Cf. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1520 (1977) (judicial oversight must be tightened when "self-interest is at stake"). It should be added that, if Congress adopts a royalty - scheme where copyright owners are paid some appropriate - Whether or not these two high hurdles could be overcome, those unfamiliar with the legal use of the term "property" may argue that a copyright, whatever sort of animal it may be, is not "property" at all, and that Congress thus cannot be required to pay for having taken one for that matter, compelled to adduce a public purpose for such a taking. After all, you can't plant corn or put up a house on a copyright; copyrights make unusual Christmas presents. But these doubts begin to fade with a moment's reflection, and they evaporate altogether with a minute's research. There can be no mistaking 21/ that a copyright is property in the strictest legal sense. 21/ See J. Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 4 (1962); T. Fields Jr., Intellectual and Industrial Property in a Nutshell, 77 W.Va.L.Rev. 525 (1977); 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 49, 52 (1981); 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 45, 47 (1978-79). With a copyright comes "the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. 22/ Property rights in intangibles have been recognized at common law since the the Betamax itself -0 are likewise manufactured. The case of copyrights and patents reminds us that "property" refers to a legal relationship, not an object.25/ And copyrights are 24/ counterparts. 22/ Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Fox Film Corp. v. Doval, 286 U.S. 123 (1932). See 23/ Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 1-12 (11th ed., 1971). 24/ H.R. Rep. No. 756, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p.1 25/ Restatement of Property ch. I, Introductory Note (1936). |