the standpoints of peace, order, efficiency, and economy that the same power shall exercise a mandate over them all, leaving for the present their interior boundaries unsettled. The ultimate disposition or form of government of these States, other than that they may look forward to autonomy, but not necessarily independence, should, in our opinion, not now be announced. Their capacity for self-government and their ability to sustain amicable and workable relations among themselves remain to be tested under control by such power as may be induced to undertake its supervision, facing a long period of tutelage for possibly unappreciative and ungrateful pupils, much expense, probably diplomatic embarrassment from a reconstitution of Russia, and little reward except the consciousness of having contributed to the peace of the world and the rehabilitation of oppressed humanity. The covenant of the League of Nations contemplates that "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" shall be subject to a mandatory power for an unstated period, thus appearing to recognize in advance the dismemberment to some degree of that Empire. [The italic is ours.] This, in connection with the arraignment of the Turkish Government in the reply of the peace conference, partly quoted on page 15 ante (see p. 29), may not unreasonably be construed to apply to any or all parts of the Turkish Empire as fast as they reach a certain stage of development. As between actual dismemberment and a receivership for his entire country, the Turk would beyond doubt prefer a mandatory for the whole Empire as it may stand after adjudication by the peace conference. Bad as he is, without the pale of consideration from many standpoints, there would seem to be no objection to action taken in his interest and in line with his preference if the interest and inclination of the world lie in the same direction.

A power which should undertake a mandatory for Armenia and Transcaucasia without control of the contiguous territory of Asia Minor-Anatolia—and of Constantinople, with its hinterland of Roumelia, would undertake it under most unfavorable and trying conditions, so difficult as to make the cost almost prohibitive, the maintenance of law and order and the security of life and property uncertain, and ultimate success extremely doubtful. With the Turkish Empire still freely controlling Constantinople, such a power would be practically emasculated as far as real power is concerned. For generations

these peoples have looked to Constantinople as the seat of authority. The most intelligent and ambitious Armenians have sought the capital as a career. The patriarch of the Armenian Church in Constantinople, although subordinate in matters of doctrine to the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin, is in reality the political head of the Armenian people by his location in Constantinople. Every people in the Empire is numerously represented at the capital, the Armenians reaching before the war the number of 150,000, with business connections ramifying to distant corners of the entire country. To no small degree the future business and industrial development of their native land will depend upon these men. Transportation lines and commerce center at Constantinople. Before the war Constantinople was the most important port in continental Europe, reckoned upon the basis of shipping clearances. There are well-informed business men who believe it is destined to become the third most important commercial city in the world. But, through generations of habit, unless put under a mandatory, Constantinople will continue to be a whirlpool of financial and political currents. Concession hunting, financial intrigue, political exploitation, and international rivalries will center there in the future as in the past. Concerted international action for administration of Constantinople is impracticable. All concerts for governmental action are cumbersome; all concerts must have a leader to secure effectiveness, and were it possible to agree upon one power which should really lead, the reality of a mandate would exist with the handicap of a camouflage concert. In any concert for the future government of Constantinople there would still exist the temptation for single powers to play politics and befriend Turkey for value received. There must be actual control, for responsibility without authority is worse than useless in a land of oriental viewpoints.

As Americans, supposed to be disinterested, this mission was the recipient of confidences from the various sources. Turks when not deriding foreign efforts were deploring their effect on their unfortunate Empire. Without dependable centralized control of Constantinople, a power exercising mandate in Armenia would be crippled in administration, restricted in trade development, ridden by concessionaires, dependent on Turkish discredited diplomacy for redress of local and boundary grievances, and in extreme case practically cut off from communication with the western world. It is believed that allied sentiment is so crys

tallized in the opinion that Constantinople must be placed under a mandatory, that it may safely be assumed for the purposes of this report that this will be done.

Conceded that there shall be a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia and one for Constantinople and Anatolia, there are many considerations that indicate the desirability of having such mandates exercised by the same power. If separate powers exercised such mandate the inevitable jealousies, hatreds, exaggerated separatist tendencies, and economic difficulties would compel failure. With all its faults the Turkish Empire is an existing institution and it has some rusty blood-stained political machinery which under control of a strong mandatory can be made to function. The peoples in question live in adjacent territory and whether they wish it or not are neighbors. A single mandatory for the Turkish Empire and the Transcaucasus would be the most economical solution. No intelligent scheme for development of railroads for Transcaucasia and Armenia can be worked out without extension into Anatolia. Natural highways through the high mountains of Armenia are few, and transportation development will, with proper feeders, at best be costly and difficult; without access into Anatolia it will be impossible. For many years the expenses of exploitation will not be met by equivalent receipts. This situation would be alleviated by control of both regions. With Constantinople, Anatolia, and Armenia in different hands, the manufacturers and exporters of Armenia could not hope for an equal share in the commerce and trade of the Near East.

The Armenian Patriarch, the head of the Armenian Protestants, and others at Constantinople, on our return from Armenia, called and volunteered the belief that the Armenian question could not be settled within the boundaries of that country, and that they were prepared to pass under a single mandate which should include the other parts of the Turkish Empire. In a later written statement, however, they modified this, stating that while “Different nations of this Empire may enjoy the help of the same mandatory power" they felt that to bring Armenia under the same system of administration as that of the Turks would defeat the object of the development of Armenian ideals, "because by assuring the individual rights of a people the national rights and ideals of the same people can not necessarily be assured;" that "Giving a good government to the

whole Turkish Empire will not induce the Armenians to gather to their native land. They will still be a scattered people, etc."

A party of distinguished Turks, including a former cabinet minister of high standing and a diplomat who for eight years represented his country at one of the European courts, stated that as between the independence of Turkey as it existed in 1914, and a mandate for the Empire given to the United States they greatly preferred the latter, and believed that they spoke for the educated classes of all Turkey.

It has been very evident to this mission that Turkey would not object to a single disinterested power taking a mandate for her territory as outlined in the armistice with the Allies, and that it could be accomplished with a minimum of foreign soldiery, where an attempt to carve out territory for any particular region would mean a strong foreign force in constant occupation for many years. The aim of the Nationalist, or National Defense Party, as its adherents style it, as stated by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, its head, is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire under a mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America.

The mission, while at Sivas, had a conference with the chiefs of this party, which held a congress at Erzerum in July and one at Sivas in September. This movement has been the cause of much apprehension on the part of those interested in the fate of the Armenians, to whose safety it has been supposed to portend danger. The leader, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, is a former general officer in the Turkish Army, who commanded with distinction an army corps at the Dardanelles, and appears to be a young man of force and keen intelligence. He is supposed to have resigned from the army to lead this movement. It sought, as a means to its end, the overthrow of the Ferid Pasha cabinet, which has since fallen, claiming that it was entirely under the influence of one of the great powers which itself desires a mandate for the Empire. While professing entire loyalty to the Sultan the Nationalist leader had gone to the extremity of cutting all official telegraph communications between the capital and the interior, pending the removal of the cabinet. The fall of the Damad Ferid Pasha ministry in October would seem to put the Empire behind the movement, for the Turkish officials in the interior were already identified with it. statement given out on October 15, Mustapha Kemal said:

In a

The Nationalist Party recognized the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is our aim to secure the development of Turkey as she stood at the armistice. We have no expansionist plans, but it is our conviction that Turkey can be made a rich and prosperous country if she can get a good government. Our government has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all our experience we are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place.

The events of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the uneasiness produced by the activities and propaganda of certain European powers have so stirred the Turkish people in the long interval since the armistice that the mission fears that an announcement from Paris at this time of an intention to carve from Turkey a State of Armenia, unless preceded by a strong military occupation of the whole Empire, might be the signal for massacres of Christians in every part of the country. There is no wisdom in now incorporating Turkish territory in a separate Armenia, no matter what the aspirations of the Armenians. Certainly it is unwise to invite trouble which may be avoided by the consolidation of the mandate region under a single power. Under one mandatory they will be neighbors. Under two or more they will be rivals, their small differences subjected to the interminable processes of diplomatic representation, with the maintenance of duplicate and parallel establishments in many lines of governmental activity. Only under a single mandatory can the matter of ultimate boundaries be deferred, which is believed by this mission to be important.

In the proposition to carve an independent Armenia from the Ottoman Empire there is something to be said on the part of the Turk; namely, that his people, even when all the refugees shall have returned to their homes, will be in the majority in the region contemplated for a reconstituted Armenia-and they were in the majority before the deportations took place-even though due, as it may be, to the gerrymandering of provincial boundaries and the partial extermination of a people. Notwithstanding his many estimable qualities, his culture, and his tenacity of race and religion, the Armenian generally does not endear himself to those of other races with whom he comes in contact. The Armenian stands among his neighbors very much as the Jew stands in Russia and Poland, having, as he does,