ing that he considered force, uncontrolled by ethics, an essential attribute of the State.

JEAN BODIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

It is not, however, quite just to Machiavelli to load his name and memory with a burden of infamy for expounding as a theory what history shows to have been the general practice of most of his contemporaries, and long continued to be considered essential to statesmanship by those who came after him. Moreover, that which made his exposition most repugnant has been substantially embodied in most subsequent theories of the true nature of the State, namely, the idea that it is essentially a creation of "blood and iron," and not subject to any law other than that of its own omnipotence.

Jean Bodin's conception of sovereignty (1530-1596)—a conception

-a conception designed to

veil the omnipotence of the State under a guise of juristic philosophy—is, in reality, not widely separated from it, and yet it is substantially the basis of the theory of the State which still prevails.

Bodin's aim was to establish a reasonable natural foundation for royal omnipotence. The principle from which he deduces it is the idea of “supreme power” as essential to the State, which he then tranquilly identifies with supreme authority. This, he holds, exists in every independent community, and is both absolute and perpetual. It is from this source that all laws proceed. It is the very substance of the State.

To such “supreme power” he gives the name "sovereignty,” equivalent to the imperium of the Roman Law, which in his Latin edition of 1591 he calls "majestas.” Although in deducing this principle he refrains from advocating any particular form of government, it is evident that “supreme

power" must be exercised by a person; and, in fact, his exposition proves to be only a philosophic disguise for the idea of absolute royal authority. Still, it is not strictly necessary that “supreme power” be exercised by a royal person; for the idea of sovereignty, as "supreme power,” is equally applicable to every form of government. The future development of Bodin's principle, which he contends is “absolute, indivisible, and inalienable,” shows that it can be equally applied to a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy.

The defect in Bodin's conception of sovereignty is not that it is essentially baseless, but that it is a purely mechanical conception. It belongs to the category of might, but not to the category of right. . The State, he contends, commands simply because it has the power to command. But, if that be true, what authority does it possess if one has the power to disobey? If

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authority is based merely on the power to compel, there is equal authority in the power to resist; and government thus becomes merely a problem in the balance of mechanical forces. The State, upon this theory, has no authority whatever, except that derived from its superior force. But there is not in mere force, even though it be supreme, any right to command. Can human nature be required to bow before “supreme power,” merely because, as power, it is supreme? Is it possible that all that is dear to the affections, all that is true to the intelligence, all that is obligatory to the moral sense, reason and conscience, must be tacitly surrendered and openly sacrificed merely because the possessor of irresistible force speaks in the name of the State? Can it be a duty on the part of a human being to obey the arbitrary decrees of power, simply because it is power? It may be that, as a question of fact, submission can be enforced; but can that mere fact create an obligation? How is it possible for men to respect, much less to sustain by their free volitions, an institution that demands obedience upon such terms? And, further, can it be that, in their relations to one another, States—the highest forms of social development—are merely so many embodiments of arbitrary force contending with one another for the mastery of the world, restrained by no law, subject to no control, and bound by no obligation?

THE APPEAL TO RELIGION FOR AUTHORITY

It is clear that the idea of “supreme power,” even though it be a primary and essential attribute of the State, is a wholly inadequate basis for the conception of rightful authority. It furnishes neither the elements necessary for a logical definition of authority, nor the foundation of an accept