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IV

LAW AS MUTUAL

OBLIGATION

VI

THE CITIZEN AS SUBJECT TO LAW

Thus far our thoughts have been occupied with the nature of the State, the basis of the law; and the function of the citizen as a law-maker. It has been pointed out that the people, duly organized, are sovereign, in the only sense in which sovereignty has a rightful existence; and that every citizen shares in the exercise of this ultimate political authority. Within the limits of a rightful rule of the majority, he is a legitimate ruler. It is, perhaps, less flattering to human pride to be obliged to recall the fact that the citizen is also subject to the law, and, if he chance to belong to the minority, subject to forms of law which he has not favored and may not desire to obey. Is he,

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as a citizen, prepared to stand this test? Will he yield a voluntary obedience to the law, simply because it is the law, when it does not suit his convenience to obey it, and even when in principle it does not receive his approval?

Upon the answer to this question turns the effective authority, and even the very existence, of the State. If the answer be negative, we are confronted with the spirit of revolution; and out of revolution, if that spirit continues, must come either a new and more acceptable State, or anarchy.

It is important to recall the fact that revolution is not an infrequent phenomenon, and that the greater number of modern States are the offspring of revolutionary action. These movements, however, are of quite different types and have produced quite different results. It is, perhaps, worth while to distinguish between them as regards their aims, the permanence of their

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