rass the creative forces of the country as the thought that the results of industry and enterprise will be exposed to future expropriation.

THE RELATION OF REFORM TO PUBLIC OPINION

It is of supreme importance for the citizen as a law-maker to form a just conception of the true relation between constitutional guarantees and public opinion. There is no constitutional provision that could long remain effective if opposed by public opinion in any real sense; for the process of constitutional amendment, although impossible to a mere majority, presents an open path for the forward movement of a serious public determination when it has been deliberately taken on defensible grounds.

It is, however, necessary to distinguish between public opinion and a mere majority decision when the latter is evidenced only

sense.

by the counting of affirmative and negative votes.

A plébiscite—including under this term the initiative and the referendum—is usually not an expression of opinion in any real

It is usually merely an opportunity for a choice between alternatives so ingeniously presented as to facilitate decision, without analysis and without reflection. Most popular votes are of this character.

Let us take, for example, the plébiscite by which Louis Napoleon was authorized personally to prepare a constitution for France. In this there was expressed no “opinion,” public or private, as to what the constitution should be; for it was not known what it was designed to be. The vote was, therefore, not an expression of "opinion” in any proper sense, but only an expression of confidence in a particular person, to whom all the authority of the people in this matter was bodily transferred. If we take as another example the plébiscite by which the President of the French Republic was accorded the title and functions of emperor, the same may be said; only, in this case, since the President had evidently resolved to absorb most of the public powers, the question presented was merely one of choice between the acceptance of an emperor or a revolution. There was, therefore, in real

, ity-leaving aside all doubt regarding the regularity and actual numerical result of the vote-no expression of public opinion in a proper sense; that is, of definite conclusions deliberately arrived at by a balance of considerations.

The truth is, that, without specific discussion and reference to general principles, public opinion does not exist. Popular demonstrations of mere feeling, whether of sympathy or antipathy, do not constitute public opinion, no matter how extensive they may be, even though they include the participation of the entire population. Without a definite proposal, comprising not only some precise end to be attained but a definite means of attaining it and some consideration of its effect if successful, public opinion does not exist. Mere popular unrest and vague social aspirations do not of themselves constitute public opinion. The pressure resulting from these may lead to the formation of opinions; and these, if they become general through discussion, may ultimately take on a public character, but not unless they assume the form of definite propositions.

It is evident, therefore, that reforms, to become effectual, must await the growth of intelligent appreciation. The only way to promote them is to fix attention upon them by debate and by appealing to the reasoning powers. Until this is done, even though legislation be enacted, it will not be respected. It is useless, therefore, to force it

prematurely upon society. Merely to experiment is worse than useless; it is danger

It incurs the risk of inducing the general belief that all legislation and all the social arrangements resulting from it are merely empirical; that everything is purely arbitrary; and that nothing is to be depended upon. Such a régime would substitute imagination for reason and emotion for experience. In short, government by impulse is only another name for anarchy.

THE CONFLICT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH

IMPERIALISM

Are these conclusions in any respect a condemnation of democracy? By no means. The error of many political speculations lies in representing that human progress, especially in legislation, consists merely in the triumph of democracy over monarchy, of the will of many over the will of one. A little reflection is sufficient to show that this