Argument for Defendant in Error.

meaning of the state constitution. It is conceded to be a corporation, but is it a constitutional township? That question can be determined only by a construction of the constitution and statutes of South Carolina, and is therefore peculiar to that State. It exclusively relates "to the internal constitution of the body politic of the State of South Carolina."

It is submitted that these cases, giving a construction by the highest court of the State to its constitution, should be followed by this court. Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338; Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293.

Insisting that there has been a recognition of township bonds as valid securities by the legislature, through the several acts permitting the issuing of such bonds in aid of railroads, and by the courts through the cases above cited, appellant claims to have brought his case within the exception stated in the case of Pine Grove Township v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, to the rule that the Federal courts upon a question of this character will follow the decisions of the state tribunals.

But the paramount controlling reason which induced the court to disregard the state decisions has already been assigned. It lay, not in the fact that the bonds had been recognized by the different departments of government, but that "the question before us belongs to the domain of general jurisprudence. In this class of cases this court is not bound by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise. It must hear and determine for itself."

If, therefore, appellee is right in the postulate that the question at bar is one involving the constitution of South Carolina and relating to the internal policy of that State, this case, as stated in the complaint, is still within the rule established in Claiborne County v. Brooks, unaffected by the decision of Pine Grove Township v. Talcott.

It is also averred in the complaint that the plaintiff, for full value and without notice of any defect or irregularity therein, purchased his bonds in reliance upon their recitals, etc.

The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable here. The inva

Argument for Defendant in Error.

lidity of the bonds does not arise from any failure in the performance of conditions precedent, and it is not disputed that all such conditions were performed. The malady lies deeper than that, and is to be found in the organic existence of the township itself. That is to say, the unconstitutionality of the bonds has not been adjudged upon any question of fact, about which the plaintiff may have been ignorant, but it rests upon a matter of law which is presumed to have been known to the plaintiff and all others, namely, upon the legal question whether or not a subscription to aid in building a railroad was a corporate purpose so far as the township of Ninety Six was concerned.

This distinction has been clearly defined by this court. Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83; Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674.

II. It has been earnestly contended by the appellant in the argument before the lower court that his bonds were purchased before the decision in Floyd v. Perrin, and that that decision will not control this court. In no case has this fact alone determined Federal courts in following or disregarding the decisions of state courts. Whenever the decisions of this court have been so affected, it has been because of other considerations which are absent in the case at bar, viz.: (1) That before the decision of the state court was announced the question had been submitted to the Federal tribunal, and was being considered on its merits; (2) That before the state court had spoken, this court had announced its own judgment; or (3) That prior to the purchase of the bonds, earlier decisions of the state court had upheld their validity. Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U. S. 91, citing Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360; Daviess County v. Huidekoper, 98 U. S. 98; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677; Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556.

III. It is submitted that the corporation known as the "Township of Ninety Six" is not a township within the meaning of the constitution of South Carolina, nor is it otherwise such a municipal or political division of the State as that under the constitution it may be vested with the power to tax.

Opinion of the Court.

IV. The act of December 19, 1887, does not cure the invalidity of appellant's bonds nor otherwise render them obligations of the township.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the constitution of South Carolina of 1868, art. 9, sec. S, "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes." 2 Charters and Constitutions, 1659.

The situation arising out of the subsequent acts of the legislature and decisions of the courts of the State, with regard to bonds like those now in question, will be best understood by stating these acts and decisions in chronological order.

By the act of September 26, 1868, entitled "An act to organize townships, and to define their powers and privileges," the inhabitants of every township were declared to be a body politic and corporate, with power to sue and be sued, to hold and convey real and personal estate, to make contracts, to hold meetings, to elect town officers, to vote money for schools, burial grounds, highways and bridges, and to lay taxes for the purpose of keeping highways and bridges in repair; the lines of the townships were to be perambulated, and the marks and bounds renewed, once in every seven years forever; and the act was to take effect, as to each township, on the completion of the duties assigned to county commissioners under §§ 11, 12, of another act of the same date, by which the county commissioners were directed to divide the counties into townships, to establish their boundaries, and to designate the name of each, and the time and place of holding its first meeting. 14 Statutes of South Carolina, pp. 128, 143–151.

By the act of January 19, 1870, the township act of 1868 was repealed, "except that portion of the same fixing the number, names and boundaries of the respective townships of the respective counties." 14 Statutes of South Carolina, p. 313.

Opinion of the Court.

The act of December 23, 1882, chartering the Greenville and Port Royal Railroad Company, as amended by the act of December 24, 1885, (both of which were declared to be public acts,) contained the following provisions:

"SECT. 6. That, in addition to the provisions contained in the preceding section for private subscription, it shall and may be lawful for any city, town, county or township, interested in the construction of said road, to subscribe to its capital stock such sum as a majority of their voters, voting at an election held for that purpose, may authorize the county commissioners or proper authorities of such city, town, county or township, to subscribe, which subscription shall be made in seven per cent coupon bonds, payable in such instalments as the county commissioners or proper authorities of such city, town, county or township may determine, and to be received by said company at par; said bonds to be made payable in sixteen, twenty, twenty-four and twenty-eight years after the date thereof, and to be of the denomination of one hundred dollars, five hundred dollars and one thousand dollars: Provided that a sufficient sum realized from such bonds shall be retained to complete the grading through the county or township in which it is subscribed Provided that no election shall be held in any of the towns, cities or townships in said counties unless one half of the owners of real estate situate and living in such town, city or township shall first petition for an election on the subject of subscribing to the capital stock, as hereinbefore provided; and no subscription shall be made by any of the towns, cities or townships until the conditions of this proviso shall have been complied with."

"SECT. 9. That, for the payment of the interest on such bonds as may be issued by said counties, cities, towns or townships, the county auditor, or other officer discharging such duties, or the city or town treasurer, as the case may be, shall be authorized and required to assess annually upon the property of said city, town, county or township such per centum

as may be necessary to pay said interest of said sum of money

subscribed, which shall be known and described in the tax book as said railroad tax, which shall be collected by the treas

Opinion of the Court.

urer under the same regulations as are provided by law for the collection of taxes in any of the counties, cities, towns, or townships so subscribing, and which shall be paid over by the said treasurer to the holders of said bonds, as the interest shall come due, on presentation of the coupons, which said coupons. shall be reported to the county commissioners by said treasurer, or the council of any city or town where there are coupons from the bonds of such city or town, and all such coupons shall be cancelled by the county treasurer as soon as they are paid by them.

"That, for the purposes of this act, all the counties and townships in said counties, along the line of said railroad, or which are interested in the construction as herein provided for, shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, bodies politic and corporate, and vested with the necessary powers to carry out the provisions of this act; and shall have all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, in respect to any rights or causes of action growing out of the provisions of this act.

"The county commissioners of the respective counties are declared to be the corporate agents of the counties or townships so incorporated and situate within the limits of said counties." 19 Statutes of South Carolina, pp. 239–241.

The power of the legislature, under the constitution of the State, to authorize townships to subscribe for stock, and to direct the issue of the bonds, in aid of the construction of railroads, appears to have been assumed, as undoubted, by the Supreme Court of the State, April 15, 1885, in Chamblee v. Tribble, 23 So. Car. 70; and July 14, 1886, in Carolina Railway v. Tribble, 25 So. Car. 260, 266.

By the act of December 19, 1887, the amending act of 1885 was further amended by adding a section providing "that, within ten years of the time when the bonds which may be subscribed to the capital stock of said corporation shall fall due, the money to pay the same shall be raised by taxation in the same manner, and paid out by the county treasurer, as provided for the payment of the annual interest on such bonds." 19 Statutes of South Carolina, p. 921. The principal, if not the only, object of this act would seem to have