Opinion of the Court. In the Empire of Germany, as formerly in the States which now form part of that Empire, the judgments of those States are mutually executed; and the principle of reciprocity prevails as to the judgments of other countries. Foelix, nos. 328, 331, 333-341; Moreau, nos. 178, 179; Vierhaus, in Piggott, 460-474; Westlake, ub. sup. By the German Code of 1877, "compulsory execution of the judgment of a foreign court cannot take place, unless its admissibility has been declared by a judgment of exequatur;" "the judgment of exequatur is to be rendered without examining whether the decision is conformable to law;" but it is not to be granted "if reciprocity is not guaranteed." Constant, 79-81; Piggott, 466. The Reichsgericht, or Imperial Court, in a case reported in full in Piggott, has held that an English judgment cannot be executed in Germany, because, the court said, the German courts, by the Code, when they execute foreign judgments at all, are "bound to the unqualified recognition of the legal validity of the judgments of foreign courts," and "it is, therefore, an essential requirement of reciprocity, that the law of the foreign State should recognize in an equal degree the legal validity of the judgments of German courts, which are to be enforced by its courts; and that an examination of their legality, both as regards the material justice of the decision as to matters of fact or law, and with respect to matters of procedure, should neither be required as a condition of their execution, by the court ex officio, nor be allowed by the admission of pleas which might lead to it." Piggott, 470, 471. See also Clunet, 1882, p. 35; 1883, p. 246; 1884, p. 600. In Switzerland, by the Federal Constitution, civil judgments. in one canton are executory throughout the Republic. As to foreign judgments, there is no federal law, each canton having its own law upon the subject. But in the German cantons, and in some of the other cantons, foreign judgments are executed according to the rule of reciprocity only. Constant, 193-204; Piggott, 505-516; Clunet, 1887, p. 762; Westlake, ub. sup. The law upon this subject has been clearly stated by Brocher, President of the Court of Cassation of Geneva, and professor of law in the university there. In his Nouveau Opinion of the Court. Traité de Droit International Privé, (1876) § 174, treating of the question whether "it might not be convenient that States should execute, without reviewing their merits, judgments rendered on the territory of each of them respectively," he says: "It would, certainly, be advantageous for the parties interested to avoid the delays, the conflicts, the differences of opinion, and the expenses resulting from the necessity of obtaining a new judgment in each locality where they should seek execution. There might thence arise, for each sovereignty, a juridical or moral obligation to lend a strong hand to foreign judgments. But would not such an advantage be counterbalanced, and often surpassed, by the dangers that might arise from that mode of proceeding? There is here, we believe, a question of reciprocal appreciation and confidence. One must, at the outset, inquire whether the administration of the foreign judiciary, whose judgments it is sought to execute without verifying their merits, presents sufficient guaranties. If the propriety of such an execution be admitted, there is ground for making it the object of diplomatic treaties. That form alone can guarantee the realization of a proper reciprocity; it furnishes, moreover, to each State the means of acting upon the judicial organization and procedure of other States." In an article in the Journal, after a review of the Swiss decisions, he recognizes and asserts that "it comes within the competency of each canton to do what seems to it proper in such matters." Clunet, 1879, pp. 88, 94. And in a later treatise, he says: "We cannot admit that the recognition of a State as sovereign ought necessarily to have as a consequence the obligation of respecting and executing the judicial decisions rendered by its tribunals; in strict right, the authority of such acts does not extend beyond the frontier. Each sovereignty possesses in particular, and more or less in private, the territory subject to its power. No other can exercise there an act of its authority. This territorial independence finds itself, in principle, directly included in the very act by which one nation recognizes a foreign State as sovereign; but there cannot result therefrom a promise to adopt, and to cause to be executed upon the national territory, judgments rendered by Opinion of the Court. the officials of the foreign State, whoever they may be. That would be an abdication of its own sovereignty; and would bind it in such sort as to make it an accomplice in acts often injurious, and in some cases even criminal. Such obligations suppose a reciprocal confidence; they are not undertaken, moreover, except upon certain conditions, and by means of a system of regulations intended to prevent or to lessen the dangers which might result from them." 3 Cours de Droit International Privé, (1885) 126, 127. In Russia, by the Code of 1864, "the judgments of foreign tribunals shall be rendered executory according to the rules established by reciprocal treaties and conventions," and, where no rules have been established by such treaties, are to be "put in execution in the Empire, only after authorization granted by the courts of the Empire;" and, " in deciding upon demands of this kind, the courts do not examine into the foundation of the dispute adjudged by the foreign tribunals, but decide only whether the judgment does not contain dispositions which are contrary to the public order, or which are not permitted by the laws of the Empire." Constant, 183-185. Yet a chamber of the Senate of St. Petersburg, sitting as a Court of Cassation, and the highest judicial tribunal of the Empire in civil matters, has declined to execute a French judgment, upon the grounds that, by the settled law of Russia, "it is a principle in the Russian Empire that only the decisions of the authorities to whom jurisdiction has been delegated by the sovereign power have legal value by themselves and of full right;" and that "in all questions of international law, reciprocity must be observed and maintained as a fundamental principle." Adam v. Schipoff, Clunet, 1884, pp. 45, 46, 134. And Professor Englemann, of the Russian University of Dorpat, in an able essay, explaining that and other Russian decisions, takes the following view of them: "The execution of a treaty is not the only proof of reciprocity." "It is necessary to commit the ascertainment of the existence of reciprocity to the judicial tribunals, for the same reasons for which there is conferred upon them the right to settle all questions incident to the cause to be adjudged. The existence of reciprocity be Opinion of the Court. tween two States ought to be proved in the same manner as all the positive facts of the case." "It is true that the principle of reciprocity is a principle, not of right, but of policy; yet the basis of the principle of all regular and real policy is also the fundamental principle of right, and the point of departure of all legal order― the suum cuique. This last principle comprehends right, reciprocity, utility; and reciprocity is the application of right to policy." "Let this principle be applied wherever there is the least guaranty, or even a probability of reciprocity, and the cognizance of this question be committed to the judicial tribunals, and one will arrive at important results, which, on their side, will touch the desired end, international accord. But, for this, it is indispensable that the application of this principle should be entrusted to judicial tribunals, accustomed to decide affairs according to right, and not to administrative authorities, which look above all to utility, and are accustomed to be moved by political. reasons, intentions, and even passions." Clunet, 1884, pp. 120122. But it would seem that no foreign judgment will be executed in Russia, unless reciprocity is. secured by treaty. Clunet, 1884, pp. 46, 113, 139, 140, 602. In Poland, the provisions of the Russian Code are in force; and the Court of Appeal of Warsaw has decided that, where there is no treaty, the judgments of a foreign country cannot be executed, because, “in admitting a contrary conclusion, there would be impugned one of the cardinal principles of international relations, namely, the principle of reciprocity, according to which each State recognizes juridical rights and relations, originating or established in another country, only in the measure in which the latter, in its turn, does not disregard the rights and relations existing in the former." Clunet, 1884, pp. 494, 495. In Roumania, it is provided by code that "judicial decisions rendered in foreign countries cannot be executed in Roumania, except in the same manner in which Roumanian judgments are executed in the country in question, and provided they are declared executory by competent Roumanian judges;" and this article seems to be held to require legislative reciprocity. Opinion of the Court. Moreau, no. 219; Clunet, 1879, p. 351; 1885, p. 537; 1891, p. 452; Piggott, 495. In Bulgaria, by a resolution of the Supreme Court, in 1881, "the Bulgarian judges should, as a general rule, abstain from entering upon the merits of the foreign judgment; they ought only to inquire whether the judgment submitted to them does not contain dispositions contrary to the public order, and to the Bulgarian laws." Constant, 129, 130; Clunet, 1886, p. 570. This resolution closely follows the terms of the Russian Code, which, as has been seen, has not precluded applying the principle of reciprocity. In Austria, the rule of reciprocity does not rest upon any treaty or legislative enactment, but has been long established, by imperial decrees and judicial decisions, upon general principles of jurisprudence. Foelix, no. 331; Constant, 100-108; Moreau, no. 185; Weiss, Traité de Droit International, (1886) 980; Clunet, 1891, p. 1003; 1894, p. 908; Piggott, 434. In Hungary, the same principles were always followed as in Austria; and reciprocity has been made a condition by a law of 1880. Constant, 109; Moreau, no. 186 & note; Piggott, 436; Weiss, ub. sup. In Italy before it was united into one kingdom, each State had its own rules. In Tuscany, and in Modena, in the absence of treaty, the whole merits were reviewed. In Parma, as by the French Ordinance of 1629, the foreign judgment was subject to fundamental revision, if against a subject of Parma. In Naples, the code and the decisions followed those of France. In Sardinia, the written laws required above all the condition of reciprocity, and, if that condition was not fulfilled, the foreign judgment was reëxaminable in all respects. Fiore, Effetti Internazionali delle Sentenze, (1875) 40-44; Moreau, no. 204. In the Papal States, by a decree of the Pope in 1820, "the exequatur shall not be granted, except so far as the judgments rendered in the States of his Holiness shall enjoy the same favor in the foreign countries; this reciprocity is presumed, if there is no particular reason to doubt it." Touillier, Droit Civil, lib. 3, tit. 3, c. 6, sec. 3, no. 93. And see Foelix, no. 343; Westlake, ub. sup. In the Kingdom of Italy, |