III. WHO MAY APPLY. CRAMPTON V. ZABRISKIE. Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1879. Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. On the 14th of December, 1876, the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Hudson, in New Jersey, passed a resolution to purchase of the defendant, Crampton, certain real property in Jersey City, upon which to erect a court-house and other buildings for the county, at the price of $2,000 for every 2,500 square feet, the price at which he had previously offered to sell the same, and to issue to him in payment thereof bonds of the county, payable out of the amount appropriated and limited for the expenses of the next fiscal year, the bonds to run for one year and to draw interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum. The bonds were to be signed by the director at large and the collector of the county, and to be issued under its seal. On the 18th of December, Crampton executed and delivered to the board a conveyance of the property, which was accepted and recorded in the office of the register of deeds; and thereupon three bonds were executed and delivered to him, two of which were for the sum of $75,000 and one was for $75,720. No provision was made by the board for the payment of the bonds beyond the general declaration that they should be paid out of the amount appropriated and limited for the next fiscal year. By the law then in force the fiscal year commenced on the first day of December of each year, and the expenditures of the board were restricted to the amount raised by tax for that year, unless by the spread of an epidemic or a contagious disease a greater expenditure should be required; and the amount to be raised was to be determined at a meeting of the board to be held prior to July 15 of each year. Some of the resident tax-payers were dissatisfied with this issue of bonds without making definite provision for their payment by taxation and accordingly obtained from the Supreme Court of the State a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the board. The court adjudged the proceedings invalid, and set the same aside. It does not appear that any attention was paid either by the board or Crampton to this judgment. The board did not reconvey or offer to reconvey the land to Crampton; nor did the latter return or offer to return to the board the bonds received by him. But, on the contrary, Crampton commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States to enforce their payment. The present suit, therefore, is brought by other tax-payers of the county to compel the board to reconvey the land and Crampton to return the bonds, and to enjoin the prosecution of the action to enforce their payment. The facts here stated are not contradicted; they are substantially admitted; and upon them the court below very properly rendered a decree for the complainants. Indeed, upon the simple statement of the case, it would seem that there ought to be no question as to the invalidity of the proceedings of the board. The object of the statute of New Jersey defining and limiting its powers would be defeated if a debt could be contracted without present provision for its payment in advance of a tax levy, upon a simple declaration that out of the amount to be raised in a future fiscal years it should be paid. The law, in terms, limits the expenditures of the board, with a single exception, to the amount to be raised by taxation actually levied, not by promised taxation in the future. And, as if this limitation was not sufficient, it makes it a misdemeanor in any member of the board to incur obligations in excess of the amount thus provided. It would be difficult to express in a more emphatic way the will of the legislature that the board should not incur for the county any obligations beyond its income previously provided by taxation; in other words, that the expenses of the county should be based upon and never exceed moneys in its treasury, or taxes already levied and payable there. Of the right of resident tax-payers to invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys of the county or the illegal creation of a debt which they in common with other property-holders of the county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question. The right has been recognized by the state courts in numerous cases; and from the nature of the powers exercised by municipal corporations, the great danger of their abuse and the necessity of prompt action to prevent irremediable injuries, it would seem eminently proper for courts of equity to interfere upon the application of the tax-payers of a county to prevent the consummation of a wrong, when the officers of those corporations assume, in excess of their powers, to create burdens upon property-holders. Certainly, in the absence of legislation restricting the right to interfere in such cases to public officers of the State or county, there would seem to be no substantial reason why a bill by or on behalf of individual tax-payers should not be entertained to prevent the misuse of corporate powers. The courts may be safely trusted to prevent the abuse of their process in such cases. Decree affirmed. The injunction will not be issued to the President. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475. Other cases in this collection illustrating the use of the injunction against officers are Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Claypool, 149 Ind. 193, to prevent officers acting under an unconstitutional law; Rogers v. Jacobs, 88 Ky. 502; Rogers v. Common Council, 123 N. Y. 173; Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, cases of taxpayers' actions to restrain unlawful expenditure of money; Evansville v. Miller, 146 Ind. 613, and Stewart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, to restrain collection of an assessment; and Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661 to restrain enforcement of ordinance declaring a nuisance. All supra. See also, Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 107; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Jacksonville Electric Light Co. v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 229; Sun, &c., Association v. The Mayor, 152 N. Y. 257. CHAPTER XIII. THE CERTIORARI. I. CHARACTER OF ACT REVIEWABLE. DAVIS V. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. February, 1891. 153 Mass. 218. Petition, by Richard B. Davis and Theodore Rust, for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the county commissioners of Hampshire in abolishing the crossing at grade of South street in the city of Northampton by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad. C. ALLEN, J. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, having been allowed to take part in the argument in support of the order of the county commissioners, contends that the petitioners have no such standing or interest in the matter in controversy as to entitle them to be heard in court. The general doctrine is familiar, that, ordinarily, one cannot maintain a private action for a loss or damage which he suffers in common with the rest of the community, even though his loss may be greater in degree. Without dwelling upon other decided cases in Massachusetts, or elsewhere, we are of opinion that the petitioners would not be entitled to recover damages for the diminished value of their lands, that being a loss not peculiar to themselves, but the same in kind as that which is suffered by others who owned lands situated upon the same street, or other streets contiguous thereto. Although the doctrine may sometimes be rather harsh in its application to special cases, there are sound reasons on which it rests. The chief of these reasons are, that to hold otherwise would be to encourage many trivial suits, that it would discourage public improvements if a whole neighborhood were to be allowed to recover damages for such injuries to their estates and that the loss is of a kind which pur chasers of land must be held to have contemplated as liable to occur, and to have made allowance for in the price which they paid. If, then, the petitioners could not maintain a private action for damages to their lands, it remains to be determined whether they are entitled to have a private remedy for setting aside the proceedings of the county commissioners in making the contemplated change in the crossing. In the present case, inasmuch as the petitioners are not entitled to a private remedy for damages, we think they are not entitled to maintain a petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the county commissioners. The result arrived at by a majority of the court, upon both grounds is that the entry must be, Petition dismissed. See also Oliver v. Mayor, 63 N. J. L. 634, and State v. Paterson, 34 N. J. L. 163, supra, where the writ was used to review a legislative act. PEOPLE EX REL. JOHN COPCUTT V. BOARD OF HEALTH OF YONKERS. Court of Appeals of New York. November, 1893. This was a proceeding to review by certiorari the proceedings of the board of health of the city of Yonkers, by which certain dams upon the Nepperham river were determined to be nuisances and ordered to be removed. EARL, J. The disposition of this case turns largely upon the effect and the construction of the statutes constituting the board of health, and defining its powers and duties, and we will, therefore, first give attention to the statutes. By chaper 184 of the Laws of 1881, an act to revise the charter of the city of Yonkers, it is provided in title nine that the mayor, the supervisor, the president of the common council, the president of the board of water commissioners, and president of the board of police and the health officer shall constitute the board of health of the city, and the board is given power, among other things, "to |