pose provided by the statute, after the expiration of the time. therein fixed, and was it his duty to exercise this power? While it is true that the statute in controversy does not in express terms provide for a meeting of the trustees on a day subsequent to the one named, neither does it expressly limit the power or right to meet on the day prescribed, and not thereafter. The duty of the trustees, under the statute, to elect a superintendent biennially, is imperative, and each of them is obliged to convene with the others on the first Monday in June of the proper year for that purpose. But there are no negative words in the statute, nor any feature or provisions therein to indicate that the legislature, under all circumstances, intended to limit their power to meet for the discharge of the duty assigned, to the day appointed, and thereby restrain or prohibit them from effectually executing it after the time appointed. Appellant's presence, under the circumstances, was essentially necessary, and, having the legal ability to be present, he refused to yield his obedience to the law and meet with relators, and thereby assist to carry out its object and purpose; and now, when confronted with the strong arm of the court compelling the performance of a willfully omitted duty, he seeks to shield himself from its performance under the claim, and upon the ground asserted, that he no longer possesses the power to do so. This claim, as we have seen, the law does not support. The authorities constrain us to hold that, under the facts, the obligation to perform this important public duty continued to rest on appellant after the expiration of the legally appointed day, and the law did not deprive him of the power to perform it thereafter, and mandamus is the proper action to remedy the wrong perpetrated by him. In addition to other authorities on this point, see Smith's Addison on Torts, p. 648. Where the question involved in a mandamus proceeding is of a public concern, as is the one herein, and the object of the action is to enforce the performance of a public duty or right in which the people in general are interested, the applicant for the writ is not required to show any legal or special interest in the result sought to be obtained. It is only necessary that he be a citizen, and, as such, interested in common with other citizens in the execution of the law. High on Extraordinary Remedies, section 431; Board, etc., v. State, 86 Ind. 8, and cases there cited. It follows, therefore, that the relators are shown to have the requisite degree of interest to enable them to maintain this action. It is to be re gretted that appellant, as a public official, entrusted, under the law, with a public duty, should disregard its plain provisions and commands. Such neglect or refusal to perform a duty which he had sworn to discharge, merits severe condemnation. When public officers, charged with the execution of the law, refuse to obey its mandates, or willfully ignore them, the evil results which must necessarily follow from such acts, tend to undermine the very foundation of civil government. When such officers fail or refuse to discharge their plain duties under the law, not only do they violate their official oaths, but also subject themselves to the penalty imposed by section 2105, Burn's R. S. 1894 (2018 R. S. 1881). Judgment affirmed. Any taxpayer has sufficient interest to apply for mandamus to force the performance of duties affecting the public. People v. Hulsey, 37 N. Y. 346; State v. Common Council, 33 N. J. L. 110; Ottawa v. People, 48 Ill. 233; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343. But this is not the rule in Massachusetts, Wellington et al., Petitioners, 16 Pickering 87, and in some other states. In cases of merely private interest, private interest peculiar to the applicant must be shown. People v. Walker, 9 Mich 328. Officers of the government are also proper parties to mandamus proceedings to compel the performance of public duties by officers or public corporations. See Attorney Gen. v. Com. Council, 78 Mich., 545; Same v. Same, 53 Mich. 213; Same v. Same, 112 Mich. 145; State v. Crawford, 28 Fla. 441; Chicago &c R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; People v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58. IV. DEMAND AND REFUSAL. STATE EX REL. GRINSFELDER V. RAILWAY CO. Supreme Court of Washington. June, 1898. REAVIS, J. Application by relator for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant, a street railway company, to operate a line of street railway to Bell Park addition to the city of Spokane. 1. It is urged by the defendant, appellant here, that, no demand having been made upon it to resume the operation of its line, the action cannot be maintained. It is true that, upon the necessity of a previous demand and refusal to perform the act which it is sought to coerce by mandamus the authorities are not altogether reconcilable. Mr. High says: "The better doctrine, however, seems to be that which recognizes a distinction between duties of a public nature, or those which affect the public at large, and duties of a merely private nature, affecting only the rights of individuals. And while in the latter class of cases, where the person aggrieved claims the immediate and personal benefit of the act or duty whose performance is sought, demand and refusal are held to be necessary as a condition precedent to relief by mandamus, in the former class, the duty being strictly of a public nature, not affecting individual interests, and there being no one specifically empowered to demand its performance, there is no necessity for a literal demand and refusal. In such cases the law itself stands in lieu of a demand, and the omission to perform the required duty in place of a refusal." High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d ed.), § 13. See also, Id. § 41. In Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Territory, 3 Wash. T. 303 13 Pac. 604, it was said by the court: "No demand for the facilities required was ever made upon the company. That a demand would be necessary as a foundation of proceedings of this nature to establish a mere private right, is conceded; but it is claimed by appellee that this was a question of public right and that the company was neglecting to perform a duty which it owed to the public, and that in such a case a demand was not necessary. We think this claim is established by the facts and law of this case." It may be noted that appellant did not deny that it had discontinued the operation of its street railway line indefinitely. The rule which requires a demand to be made before application to the court for a writ of mandate is founded upon reason; that is, it is unjust that defendant should be subjected to the payment of costs for a failure of some duty which it was willing to perform, had it been requested to do so. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. V. EFFECT OF CHANGE IN OFFICE. MURPHY V. UTTER. Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1901. 186 U. S. 95. This was an appeal by the Loan Commissioners of Arizona from a judgment of the Supreme Court of that Territory rendered March 22, 1901, granting a peremptory writ of mandamus and commanding such Loan Commissioners, upon the tender by plaintiffs of $150,000 bonds of the county of Pima with coupons attached, described in the petition, to issue and deliver to the petitioners refunding bonds of the Territory pursuant to certain acts of Congress. Mr. Justice BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. Of the numerous defenses on the merits set up in the amended return, but two are pressed upon our attention, namely, whether the petition abated by a change of the personnel of the Loan Commission, or by a repeal of the act abolishing the commission altogether. 1. The court was correct in holding that the change in the personnel of the commission did not abate the proceeding, which was not taken against the individuals as such, but in their official capacity as Loan Commissioners. The original petition was entitled and brought by Utter and Voorhies, plaintiffs, against "Benjamin J. Franklin, C. P. Leitch and C. M. Bruce, Loan Commissioners of the Territory of Arizona," and the prayer was for a writ of mandamus requiring the defendants, "acting as the Loan Commissioners of the Territory," to issue the refunding bonds. The question when a suit against an individual in his official capacity abates by his retirement from office has been discussed in a number of cases in this court, and a distinction taken between applications for mandamus against the head of a department or a bureau for a personal delinquency, and those against a continuing municipal board in its corporate capacity. The earliest case is that of The Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298, which was a writ of mandamus against Mr. Browning, then Secretary of the Interior, in which it appeared that Mr. Browning had resigned some months before the decision of the court was announced. It was held that the suit abated by his resignation, because he no longer possessed the power to execute the commands of the writ, and that his successor could not be adjudged in default, as the judgment was rendered against him without notice or opportunity to be heard. The same question was more fully considered in United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604, in which it was held that a mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury abated on his death or retirement from office, and that his successor could not be brought in by way of amendment or order of substitution. It was doubtless to meet the difficulties occasioned by these decisions that Congress on February 8, 1899, passed an act, 30 Stat. 822, to prevent the abatement of such actions. We have held, however, in a number of cases, that if the action be brought against a continuing municipal board it does not abate by a change of personnel. Thus, in Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624, which was an application for a mandamus against a board of county commissioners and its individual members to compel them to levy a tax to pay a judgment, it was held that the action would lie, though the terms of the members had expired, and the case of Boutwell was distinguished upon the ground that the county commissioners were "a corporation created and organized for the express purpose of performing the duty, among others, which the relator seeks to have enforced. The alternative writ was directed both to the board in its corporate capacity and to the individual members by name, but the peremptory writ was ordered against the corporation alone." Said the Chief Justice: "One of the objects in creating such corporations, capable of suing and being sued, and having perpetual succession, is that the very inconvenience which manifests itself in Boutwell's case may be avoided. In this way the office can be reached and the officer compelled to perform its duties, no matter what changes are made in the agents by whom the officer acts. The board is in effect the officer, and the members of the board are but the agents to perform such duties. While the board is proceeded against in its corporate capacity, the individual members are punished in their natural capacities for failing to do what the law requires of them as representatives of the corporation." This was followed by Thompson v. United States, 103 U. S. 480, which was a petition for a mandamus to compel the clerk of a township to certify a judgment obtained by the relator against the township, to the supervisor, in order that the amount thereof might |