town of Milton and nothing else? We think not. But for the words, "Selectmen of Milton," the promise would be in the usual and proper form for a personal undertaking. Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. 352; Besse v. Dyer, 9 Allen, 151; Lancaster v. Walsh, 4 M. & W. 16; Lockhart v. Barnard 14 M. & W. 674; Thatcher v. England, 3 C. B. 254; Tarner v. Walker, L. R. 1 Q. B. 641; L. R. 2 Q. B. 301. If it contained express words of personal promise, and the corporation was a private corporation, or the agents were not public officers, the mere addition of their office would not exonerate them. Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. 120, 125; Fullam v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen 1, 4; Tucker Manuf. Co. v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 101, 104. The only argument which can be relied on for a different conclusion here is that the defendants were public officers, and that a more liberal rule prevails with regard to them. It has been doubted how far there is such a difference with regard to agents or officers of a town; Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. 120, 124; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507; Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272; and these cases show very plainly, if authority for the proposition is needed, that such officers will bind themselves personally if they purport to do so. As a test of what the defendants have purported to do by the literal meaning of their words, suppose that their offer had been under seal, we think it would have been impossible to say that the only meaning of the signature was the town of Milton. See Codding v. Mansfield, 7 Gray, 272, 273. Perhaps our conclusion is a little strengthened by the consideration that, so far as appears, the defendants had not authority to bind the town for more than $500. Pub. Sts. c. 212, § 12. For, although, of course, an agent does not make a promise his own by exceeding his authority, if it purports to bind his principal only (Jefts v. York, 4 Cush. 371) still, when the construction is doubtful, the fact that he has no authority to bind the supposed principal is a reason for reading his words as directed toward himself. Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507, 512. See also McCartle v. Bates, 29 Ohio St. 419, supra. The intention of an officer to make himself liable must be clear. Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345; for the general rule is that the officer signing a public contract does not bind himself. MCCURDY V. ROGERS. Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June, 1886. 21 Wisconsin 199. DOWNER, J. The first question is: Did the county court err in instructing the jury "that if they found from the evidence that the defendant, as chairman of the board of supervisors of the town of Oshkosh, agreed to pay for said town to said Lent $300 for his credit, the contract was not binding on the town, and the defendant was liable therefor personally?" The town was authorized by law to pay only $200 bounty to each volunteer; and if the defendant, as agent of the town, promised to pay more than that sum, the promise was not binding on the town. The principle of the instruction is, therefore, that an agent who does not give a cause of action against his principal, is of necessity personally liable. This is generally so. Is it so in all cases? Is it so in this? Was there sufficient testimony to base the instruction upon? It was held in Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & Wels., 1, that where the wife, acting as agent for her husband, had an original authority, which had been revoked by the death of the husband, unknown to her, she was not liable by reason of making a void contract in his name after his death. The well reasoned opinion of the court in that case leads to the conclusion, that to make any agent personally liable, where he does not intend to be, and the credit was not given to him, there must be some wrong or omission of right on his part, such as asserting he had authority when he knew or ought to have known he had not, or a failure to disclose fully all the facts within his knowledge. To the same effect is Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 384. See also Story on Agency, §§ 265, 287. It is not claimed that the appellant made any false representations to Lent, or practiced any deception upon him, unless it was done by making a promise in the name of the town which he had no authority to make. His assuming to make a contract which he had no authority to make would ordinarily in the case of private agents, be equivalent to a representation that he had authority to make it. But not so in this case; or if so, its falsity was known at the time to Lent. For the authority which the town had was by virtue of a general statute law, which both parties alike are presumed to know. A representation made by the defendant to Lent, and at the time known by him to be false, of course could not be relied on by him, and could not be a wrong to the injury of Lent. The complaint is in assumpsit, and the instruction taken in connection with the complaint, assumes or is to the effect that if the defendant promised as agent for and in the name of the town, and promise is void as to the town for want of authority in the agent to make it, it became the individual promise of the agent, on which he was liable in this action. We do not see on principle how an agent can be liable on any contract, unless there are apt words to charge him; or how a promise on his part can be implied, unless the credit was given to him. The authorities are somewhat conflicting as to the liability of an agent in actions ex contractu; but the weight of authority we think is, that to charge an agent in such an action the credit must have been given to him, or there must be an express contract, and if there is a written contract there must be apt words in it to charge him. See Story on Agency, § 264a, and note; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn., 384, and authorities there cited. If there are not apt words to charge the agent, and the credit is not given to him, then he is liabel only in an action ex delicto. It is said that this leads or may lead in this action to the conclusion that no one is liable; for the town is not. This may be so. But we do not think, if it be so, that it affords us a sufficient ground for holding the defendant liable, unless his acts bring him within the principles we herein lay down. If the defendant had stipulated with Lent that he should not be personally liable, it is clear that, in the absence of fraud on his part, no personal liability would rest on him. According to the authorities cited by the appellant's counsel, if he was chairman of the board of supervisors, the defendant was a public agent. The law raises a very strong presumption against any credit being given to a public agent acting within the scope of his authority. Why should a public agent in such a case be presumed to make himself personally liable, and trust to the government for remuneration, rather than a presumption be raised that the party with whom he is dealing was to trust the government? Both know the government is not bound; and if the party contracting with the agent desires him personally to be bound, it appears to us not unreasonable that he should so expressly stipulate. The instruction was erroneous; because the defendant, if he acted as a public agent, was not ex necessitate liable by reason of transcending his authority under the circumstances of this case, either in an action ex contractu or ex delicto. By the Court.-Judgment of the county court reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. 2. Contracts Relative to Offices. ROBERTSON V. ROBINSON. Supreme Court of Alabama. December, 1880. BRICKELL, C. J. All agreements or contracts having for their object that which is repugnant to public justice, or violative of public policy, or offensive to good morals, or contrary to statutory provisions, or in derogation of the principles of the common law relating to the public peace or security, and injurious to the community, are void: "and the reason why the common law says such contracts are void, is for the public good." The agreement between Sewell and appellant, it is insisted, falls within this general principle, because, in fact, it was a sale of the office or employment of deputy assessor of the county of Montgomery. Whether this is the real character of the agreement, and, if it be, whether it is offensive to law, and violative of public policy, requires that the whole transaction should be inquired into and considered. The form of the agreement, and the expressions embodied in the writing to which it was reduced are only matters of evidence, not operating an estoppel upon the parties, and not embarrassing or hindering the court. If it were otherwise-if the manner of the transaction could gild over and conceal the truth, this great conservative principle of the law, essential to the purity of the administration of justice, of public morals, and of the general welfare, would be evaded at the pleasure of the designing, the wicked and the corrupt. The county assessor of taxes is a public officer, elected by the qualified voters of the county, commissioned by the governor, required to take the oath of office prescribed by the constitution to be taken by all public officers, the highest or lowest, and charged with duties of great importance to the public and to the citizen-duties not only ministerial, but in their nature in some respects, judicial. He has authority to appoint deputies, whose acts have the force and effect of his official acts, and for whose good conduct he is responsible.-Code of 1876, § 397. The deputy appointed by him, not for a mere particular case, or for a mere casual, special service, is required to take the constitutional oath of office. The statute authorizing his appointment, requiring him to take the oath of office, distinguishing between him and one whom the assessor may appoint to a special service, places him, in many respects as a public officer. The transaction between Sewell and the appellant had its origin on the day of, and pending the election of tax-assessor for the county of Montgomery, in November, 1874. It commenced by a proposition made by Sewell to the appellant, in substance, that if Sewell, who was a candidate for tax-assessor, was successful, he would appoint the appellant his chief deputy, and pay him from the fees and perquisites of the office twenty-five hundred dollars annually, if the appellant would make for him his official bond, and perform all the duties of the office, except such as related to the assessment of the poll-tax. The proposition was accepted, and it is this agreement the subsequent writing was intended to embody, and which the parties treated as embodying. Of such an agreement in the strong language of Chief Justice WILMOT, in Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 241 (1 Smith's L. C. Pt. 2, 673), it may be said, that it "is void ab initio, by the common law, by the civil law, moral law, and all laws whatever." It concerns a place of public trust, in which the public have high interests, involving the performance of public duties, and which cannot be made the subject of traffic, and can not become the matter of trade and bargaining. It was corrupting the appellant as a voter, bound by his duty to cast his vote from public, not private considerations, on the eve of the election to make such a proposition; tempting him to merge his duty as a citizen in the promptings of mere selfishness, in the gratification of his avarice. It was bargaining away the discretion in the appointment of a deputy which Sewell was bound to exercise for the public good, and not for the promotion of his private interest or convenience. It was an irrevocable appointment, continuing during the term of office, which was contemplated, fettering the power of appointment with which Sewell was clothed by law. In fact, it was a sale of the office of deputy, and the consideration was not only the service the appel |