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adoption of the system of cumulative voting in order to secure minority representation; and, mainly through his efforts, in 1874 a provision was inserted in the constitution of Pennsylvania (article 16, section 4) permitting stockholders in corporations to vote cumulatively upon the shares of stock. It was held in Hays v. Com., 82 Penn. St. 518, that, as to corporations existing at the time the constitutional provision was adopted, the constitutional provision could not apply, because it interfered with and affected existing vested rights.

and in Califor

In Nebraska (article 11, section 5), nia (article 12, section 12), by constitutional enactment, cumulative voting is permitted upon stock in corporations. So far as I am aware, Illinois is the only state which has tried the experiment of cumulative voting for members of the legislature. It is significant that all the states which have authorized such voting have submitted it to the people for their adoption as a part of the fundamental law. In Ohio the legislature endeavored to authorize it without a constitutional amendment, and it was declared unconstitutional.

Such has been the action of other states. Is the law contrary to the constitution of this state? The provisions of the constitution bearing upon this question are those relating to elections, and those to the election of representatives.

It was conceded upon the argument by counsel who appeared to defend the constitutionality of this law that, when the constitution was adopted, no such thing was thought of as cumulative voting; that it is a recent invention; and that our people, when they adopted the constitution, had no thought of investing the legislature with the right of enacting a cumulative voting law; but they contend that, no matter what has been the uniform custom, the legislature has the power to enact a cumulative voting law, or any other law that is not expressly or by plain implication forbidden them to do by the constitution.

there is in my mind no doubt that the act under consideration is unconstitutional. The constitution is the outgrowth of a desire of the people for a representative form of government. The foundation of such a system of government is, and always has been, unless the people have otherwise signified by

their constitution, that every elector entitled to cast his ballot stands upon a complete political equality with every other elector, and that the majority or plurality of votes cast for any person or measure must prevail. All free representative governments rest on this, and there is no other way in which a free government may be carried on and maintained. That the majority must rule, lies at the root of the system of a republican form of government no less than it does in a democratic. When there are more than two candidates for the same office placed in nomination, it may often happen that one candidate, although he may receive more votes than any other, may not receive a majority of the votes cast. Still the principle of majority rule is preserved, for in such case more of the electors prefer such candidate than they do any other particular candidate to represent them. It is the constitutional right of every elector, in voting for any person to represent him in the legislature, to express his will by his ballot; and such vote shall be of as much influence or weight in the result, as to any candidate voted for, as the ballot and vote of any other elector. The constitution does not contemplate, but by implication forbids, any elector to cast more than one vote for any candidate for any office. This prohibition is implied from the system of representative government provided for in that instrument.

The political history of the state from 1836 to the present time shows that every elector has an equal voice in the choice of those who shall represent the people in the legislature. It is implied in those provisions of the constitution which require that representatives in the legislature shall be chosen by ballot, and by single districts. By these provisions every elector expresses his wish by ballot, and a single vote is implied. It is implied in those provisions of the constitution that declare that every male citizen of twenty-one years of age, and possessing the qualifications prescribed, shall be entitled to vote at all elections; and that all votes shall be given by ballot, except for such township officers as may be authorized by law to be otherwise chosen.

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Giving to the language of the constitution its ordinary signification, it declares the principle that each elector is entitled to express his choice for representative, as well as all other officers, which is by his vote, and the manner of expressing such choice is by ballot. When he has expressed his preference in this manner, he has exhausted his privilege; and it is not in the power of the legislature to give to his preference or choice, without conflicting

with these provisions of the constitution, more than a single expression of opinion or choice. As to members of the legislature, county or township officers, the constitution nowhere in express terms prohibits the legislature from enacting a law that the certificates of election shall be issued to the person having the least number of votes. This is practically what is asked for in this case, for relator admits that he has received a minority of the votes cast, if each relator [elector] can cast but one vote for a candidate. No one would contend that a law declaring the person who received the least number of votes elected to an office would be a constitutional and valid law; and yet we cannot lay our finger on the clause prohibiting in terms such legislation.

It is true, the constitution does not prohibit the legislature by express language from concocting some scheme by which the equality of the electors in the choice of representatives may be impaired or defeated. There is nothing in the constitution which by express language prohibits the legislature from enacting a law providing that such electors as appear by the assessment roll of the preceding year to have been assessed $1,000 and upward shall have an additional vote for each $1,000 for which they are assessed and pay taxes on. This would permit every elector qualified under the constitution to vote at least once, and others to vote as many times as they were assessed $1,000 upon the assessment roll. It requires no argument to show that such legislation would defeat the object of the elective franchise, which is that every elector's franchise is of equal value to that of every other elector, and it would subvert the will of the people as expressed through the ballot. And such is the case before us. No reason can be given why, under our constitution, one elector should be permitted to vote twice or seven times for any particular person to represent him in the legislature, when any other elector, who desires to exercise the right which the constitution gives him to vote for every person allowed by law to represent him in the legislature, is permitted to vote but once. The choice of the elector, as expressed by the ballot, who "plumps" his vote under this law is equal to the choice of two electors in Grand Rapids, or to seven in Detroit, who exercise the right which the constitution gives him to vote for every candidate to be chosen. It is no answer to say that he, too, may forego the right of an elector to vote for the number of representatives which the law permits in cities entitled to more than one representative; for to do so he is compelled to relinquish a constitutional right, and his right as an elector is in this respect

abridged. What different in principle or in result is this law, which permits one elector to cast more than one vote for a candidate, from the act of a person who stuffs a ballot-box with more votes for a particular candidate than there were electors voting for him? The only difference is that in one case the will of the majority is overcome and defeated under the forms of law, and in the other without law. Both are frauds upon the rights of the majority of the electors; both alike strike down the constitutional safeguards of the people; both are subversive of a free representative government.

Any construction of the constitution which will permit an elector to vote more than once for the same person to be a representative, would destroy that uniformity of the right of every elector, wherever he may reside in this state, to cast one vote, and but one vote, for each representative for which he is entitled to vote; and as was said by Mr. Justice Campbell in the case of Attorney General v. Detroit Common Council, 58 Mich. 216:

"It cannot be lawful to create substantial or serious differences in the fundamental rights of citizens in different localities in the exercise of their voting franchise."

The law under consideration does create substantial and serious differences between the rights of the electors in Grand Rapids and in Detroit and those of other parts of the state, in the exercise of their voting franchises. In Grand Rapids it defeats the will of a majority of the electors, and, instead of securing a minority representation, it gives an equal representation with the majority. In Detroit, as stated upon the argument of the learned counsel, instead of that municipality being represented in the legislature by those electors who constituted a majority who voted for representative, and, if no elector had voted more than once for any candidate, such majority would have elected seven representatives, the minority of the electors voting have elected four out of the seven by "plumping" their votes in different parts of the city. Here the will of the majority has been defeated and overridden by votes which do not represent the will of an individual elector in each case, but which do represent, if the law is constitutional, a legal stuffing of the ballot-boxes with false votes. In this state, no matter by what means accomplished, whether because a candidate who receives a majority of the votes is ineligible, or whether an elector votes more than once for a candidate, no person is elected who receives only the vote of a minority of the electors voting. People v. Molitor, 23 Mich. 341. Although the constitution re

quires representatives to be elected upon a general ticket in the cases specified, yet every elector is not obliged to vote for every office to be filled, or for every person on the ticket. He may vote for one or more. But he cannot vote more than once for any person, for the reason before stated.

Upon consideration of the whole record, the application must be denied.

MORSE and LONG, JJ., concurred with CHAMPLIN, C. J.
CAHILL, J., dissenting.

Where limited or cumulative voting is permitted by the constitution for certain officers it may be provided by the legislature for others. Commonwealth v. Reeder, 171 Pa. St. 505; People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565.

HANNA V. YOUNG.

Court of Appeals of Maryland. June, 1896.

84 Md. 179.

ROBERTS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The sole object of this appeal is to test the validity of the 30th section of the Act of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at January session, 1896, ch. 359.

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The facts proper to be stated are that an election for five town commissioners was held in the town of Bel-Air, on the first Monday of May, 1896, and conducted in accordance with the provisions of its charter as amended by the act of 1896, except that judges of election, as required by section 30 of said act, did not, as a condition precedent, require of each person offering to vote at such election, to show that he was assessed with one hundred dollars' worth of real or personal property on the tax book of said town before he was entitled to vote. The said judges of election ignored this provision of the Act of 1896 and allowed all male citizens residing within the corporate limits of Bel-Air above the age of twenty-one years to vote, notwithstanding the right of a number of said citizens to vote was challenged, upon the ground that they were not assessed with the requisite amount of property. The election was accordingly conducted as if the Act of 1896 had not been passed or was void of legal effect. The result of the

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