ing to the executive or administrative department of the government it by no means follows that it may not perform functions which are, in their nature, judicial. Hearing and determining appeals from the county board of review, hearing witnesses and equalizing the appraisement of real estate, and assessing the railroad property named in the act, is the performance of a duty judicial in its nature.

It is often a matter of much difficulty to determine whether the functions exercised by a tribunal of this character are such as pertain exclusively to the courts, or whether they are such as it may lawfully exercise.

That it was in the power of the general assembly to confer on the State Board of Tax Commissioners the power to hear and determine appeals from the county boards of review, to equalize the assessments of real estate and to assess the railroad property named in the act is not doubted, and the question as to whether the legis lature could confer upon it the power to fine and imprison the citizens of the State for contempt of its authority depends upon whether such action is purely judicial or only quasi judicial.

The power to punish for contempt belongs exclusively to the courts, except in cases where the Constitution of a State expressly confers such power upon some other body or tribunal. Our State Constitution confers such power upon the general assembly, but upon no other body. The doctrine that such power rests with the courts alone is based upon the fact that a party can not be deprived of his liberty without a trial. To adjudge a person guilty of contempt for a refusal to answer questions, the tribunal must determine whether such questions are material, and whether it is a question which the witness is bound to answer, otherwise it can not be determined that the witness is in contempt of its authority in refusing to answer.

So far as we are informed, the trial of a citizen involving the question of his liberty, by any civil tribunal other than a court, has never been sustained, unless the power to do so was conferred by some constitutional provision. For the reasons above given, our conclusion is that so much of the act under consideration as attempts to confer on the State Board of Tax Commissioners power to fine and imprison for contempt is in violation of section 1, article 3, of the State Constitution, and is void. It follows that such board had no authority to fine the appellee and commit him to the

jail of Marion county, and that the Marion Superior Court did not err in ordering his release.

It is claimed, however, by the learned Attorney-General that the conclusion here reached is in conflict with the conclusion in the cases of ex parte Mallinkrodt, 20 Mo. 493; Swafford v. Berrong, 84 Ga. 95, and Noyes v. Byxbee, 45 Conn. 382.

We have given each of those cases a careful consideration.

In the case of Swafford v. Berrong, supra, it was held that the act of the general assembly incorporating the town of Clayton conferred upon the governing board or council judicial powers, with authority to try offenders alleged to have violated the town ordinances; and inasmuch as it was a court, when sitting for that purpose, it had the power to punish for contempt. No question of the authority of the general assembly to confer such power, under the Constitution of Georgia, was involved in the case or decided by the court.

In our opinion these authorities do not conflict with the conclusion we have reached in this case.

Judgment affirmed.

See also People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, holding that the power to decide, even subject to appeal to the courts, the title to real estate is a judicial power which may not be granted by the legislature to an administrative officer. But the power to order arrest for non-payment of taxes may constitutionally be vested in an administrative officer. Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grattan 165, infra.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. BRIMSON. Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1893. 154 United States 447.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This appeal brings up for review a judgment rendered December 7, 1892, dismissing a petition filed in the Circuit Court of the United States on the 15th day of July, 1892, by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the act of Congress entitled "An act to regulate commerce."

The petition was based on the twelfth section of the act authorizing the commission to invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of documents, books and papers.

The Circuit Court held that section to be unconstitutional and void, as imposing on the judicial tribunals of the United States duties that were not judicial in their nature. In the judgment of that court, this proceeding was not a case to which the judicial power of the United States extended. 53 Fed. Rep. 476, 480.

The twelfth section, 26 Stat. 743, c. 126, the validity of certain parts of which is involved in this proceeding, provides as follows: "For the purpose of this act the commission shall have power to require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation. And in case of disobedience to a subpœna the commission, or any party to a proceeding before the commission, may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents under the provisions of this section.

"And any of the Circuit Courts of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpœna issued to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or other person, issue an order requiring such common carrier or other person to appear before said commission (and produce books and papers if so ordered) and give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as contempt thereof."

The nature of the present proceeding, instituted pursuant to the authority conferred by that section, will appear from the following summary of the pleadings and orders in the cause:

Prior to the 14th of June, 1892, informal complaint was made to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, that the Illinois Steel Company, a corporation of Illinois, had caused to be incorporated under the laws of that State the Calumet and Blue Island Railroad Company, the Chicago and Southeastern Railway Company of Illinois, the Joliet and Blue Island Railway Company, and the Chicago and Kenosha Railway Company, for the purpose of operating its

switches and side tracks at South Chicago, Chicago, and Joliet, respectively, and engaging in traffic by a continuous shipment from cities and places without to cities and places within Illinois.

The commission, of its own motion, decided to investigate the matters set forth in said informal complaint by inquiring into the business of all said railroad companies and the management thereof with reference as well to the alleged making of illegal, unjust and unreasonable rates, as to the alleged unjust and illegal discrimination in favor of the Illinois Steel Company, and the failure to file with the commission the above contracts, agreements, and tariffs.

An order was thereupon made by the commission, which recited the facts of the informal complaint made to it, and required each of the above-mentioned companies to make and file in its office in Washington, a full, complete, perfect, and specific verified answer, setting forth all the facts in regard to the matters complained of.

Each of the companies which, according to the allegations of the petition, the Illinois Steel Company had caused to be incorporated, filed its answer with the commission, and averred that it had in all respects complied with the obligations imposed upon it by the laws of the State and of the United States; that it was not engaged in interstate commerce within six months preceding the filing of the complaint against them; and it answered "No" to each of the above specific questions.

The commission, notwithstanding these denials, conceived it to be their duty to proceed with the investigation by the examination of witnesses and the books and papers of the corporations involved, and especially to ascertain whether the Illinois Steel Company was the owner in fact of the railroads, which it was alleged to have caused to be incorporated, and whether such incorporations were for the purpose of giving to that company an undue and illegal preference in the transportation of its property and freight.

Among the witnesses subpoenaed to testify before the commission was William G. Brimson, the president and manager of the five roads so incorporated in Illinois. . Having stated that his companies did not engage in the transportation business for everybody and anybody having occasion to employ them, and that their business was limited to the above companies with which they had traffic arrangements, he was asked whether the companies of which he was president and manager were owned by the Illinois

Steel Company. The witness, under the advice of counsel, refused to answer this question.

J. S. Keefe, secretary and auditor of the five roads mentioned, was examined by the commission as a witness. He admitted that he had in his possession a book showing the names of the stockholders of the Calumet and Blue Island Railway Company, but refused, upon the demand of the commission, to produce it. He also refused to answer the question, "Do you know, as a matter of fact, whether the Illinois Steel Company owns the greater part of the stock of these several railroads?"

William R. Stirling, first vice-president of the Illinois Steel Company, was also examined as a witness, and after stating that that company had a contract with the five railroads in question to handle the railroad business at the five "plants" of the steel company, refused to answer the question, "Is that the only relation which your company sustains to these railroad companies?"

On the succeeding day the commission issued a subpæna duces tecum, directed to J. S. Keefe, secretary and auditor of the five railroads in question, commanding him to appear before that body, and bring with him the stock books of those companies. A like subpoena was issued to William R. Stirling, as first vice-president of the steel company, commanding him to appear before the commission and produce the stock books of that company. Keefe and Stirling appeared in answer to the subpoenas, but refused to produce the books or either of them so ordered to be produced.

The commission thereupon, on the 15th day of July, 1892, presented to and filed in the court below its petition embodying the above facts, and prayed that an order be made requiring and commanding Brimson, Keefe, and Stirling to appear before that body and answer the several questions propounded by them and which they had respectively refused to answer, and requiring Keefe and Stirling to appear and produce before the commission the stock books above referred to as in their possession.

The answers of Brimson, Keefe, and Stirling in the present proceedings, besides insisting that the questions propounded to them, respectively, were immaterial and irrelevant, were based mainly upon the ground that so much of the Interstate Commerce Act as empowered the commission to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents, and authorized the Circuit Court of the United States to order common carriers or persons to appear before the commission and produce books and papers and give evidence, and to punish by pro