quarterly, in equal installments, out of said annuity fund, the following annuities respectively, to-wit: (1) Teachers who shall have so taught for a period aggregating twenty years, and not exceeding twenty-five years, shall each receive an annuity not exceeding $200 each, per year. (2) Teachers who shall have so taught for a period aggregating twenty-five and not exceeding thirty years, shall each receive an annuity of not exceeding $225 each, per year. (3) Teachers who shall have taught for a period aggregating thirty years or more, shall each receive an annuity of $250 each, per Then follow certain provisos, and section 131, which reads: "If any teacher shall be retired by the board of educatior after fifteen and before twenty years' service in the public schools of Minneapolis for any of the causes aforesaid, such teacher upon retirement shall receive back the sums so deducted from his or her salary." Upon the part of appellant it has been argued that the clause in the contract with the board of education permitting a deduction of one per cent. of the salaries affects merely the mode of payment of that percentage of the salaries, and is equivalent to an assignment by the teachers of that portion of their salaries to the trustee fund, and that the payment of such percentage of the salaries into the trustee fund is incident to and within the power of the board of education. Upon the other hand, it is contended by respondent that the board of education possessed no authority to make the contracts referred to, and that its act in passing the resolutions and regulations, as well as in exacting the contract from the teachers, was ultra vires and void; also that the one per cent. of the salaries thus diverted and paid into the trustee fund was a part of the public moneys of the district, and the act of the board in diverting it from its legitimate channel was ultra vires. We must first consider the authority with which the board of education is vested. The powers of the board are found embraced within the following laws: Sp. Laws 1878, c. 157, as amended by the following acts, to-wit: Sp. Laws 1879, c. 62; Sp. Laws 1881, c, 114; Sp. Laws 1881 (Ex. Sess.), cc. 49, 52; Sp. Laws 1883, c. 233; Sp. Laws 1885, cc. 86, 97; Sp. Laws 1887, c. 22. The pertinent part of the law reads as follows: "It shall have the entire control and management of all common schools within the city of Minneapolis. It shall be entitled to demand, have and receive all moneys which have accrued or shall accrue to either of said districts, or to said united district, for school purposes, under any law of this state, or otherwise, and may appropriate and use such moneys for the support and maintenance of the schools within such district as such board may deem best. It may also hire or erect and maintain, as it shall deem best, schoolhouses and school-rooms, but it shall never erect any building upon land to which it has not the title in fee simple. It may employ superintendents and teachers, and make rules and regulations for the government of schools, and for the employment and examination of teachers, and prescribing their powers and duties; and prescribing the description, grading and classification of scholars and their management, and the course of instruction and books to be used, and all other matters pertaining to the government and welfare of schools. It may also make by-laws, rules and regulations for its government. Said board of education is hereby authorized and empowered to levy upon the taxable property in said city such taxes as will raise sufficient sums of money for all school purposes of every character, including the purchase of sites and building and repairs of school houses, and expenses incident to the maintenance thereof, and as will also provide for the prompt payment of all indebtedness of said district: Provided, that the aggregate annual levy of such taxes shall never exceed in any one year four mills on the dollar upon the assessed valuation of such district." From a consideration of these statutes, we do not think the legislature intended to confer upon the board of education authority to exact from the teachers one per cent. of their salaries for the purposes outlined in the rules and regulations above referred to. The question before us must be disposed of upon the facts appear. ing in the petition, and we are not prepared to concede that the relator voluntarily relinquished that proportion for such purposes. The conviction cannot be avoided that the effect of such requirement, when applied to all teachers employed, must be to compel some of them, at least, to enter into the contract upon compulsion and without any expectation of receiving any personal benefit therefrom. It is difficult, therefore, to sustain the validity of the act on the part of the board of education in thus withholding the one per cent. of the salaries upon the ground that such a plan was voluntarily entered into by the teachers in signing the contract. We do not wish to intimate that the care of those who have given their life-work to a cause of such benefit to the public may not to some extent be provided for when the limit of activity is reached, and the fund for that purpose be raised by taxation. It certainly conduces to the welfare of the school system to make it profitable and attractive for persons to devote themselves to the work, and, if it would attract to the service a better class of teachers, is not such an object for the benefit and welfare of the school system? Conceding, therefore, that the legislature might grant the power, within proper limits, to provide a fund for such a purpose, it is very clear that it has not been done by the enactments above referred to. At the time of the passage of these laws we are not aware that any such power had been exercised by boards of education within this state. The legislature had never attempted to deal with the subject, and no board of education had ever endeavored to put it in use. There is no reason for assuming that the legislature contemplated any such object, and there is certainly nothing within the language employed to intimate that such unusual and extraordinary power was intended to be implied. The authority of the board is also questioned upon the ground that the money retained is in fact public money, and not the private funds of the teachers. It does not seem very material whether the money so assigned be considered public or private funds,-the result must be the same. But it is interesting to notice what the practical effect is of carrying out the plan outlined in the petition. If the entire salary had been paid to relator, and he had then voluntarily relinquished or paid back one per cent. thereof for the purposes expressed, it would clearly be private money; but one per cent. never had been paid in fact, and it never was contemplated that it would be. When the relator entered into the contract he surrendered absolute control over that portion of his salary, and, in effect, entered into a contract with the board that his salary would be ninety-nine per cent. of the amount nominally stated. So from this view of the case it appears to us that the money retained never left the treasury, but remained public money, and the board of education had no authority to divert it from the uses mentioned in the statute. Judgment affirmed. See also Hubbard v. State (Ohio), 58 L. R. A. 654, which holds that under a constitutional provision requiring all taxation to be equal and uniform the legislature may not require deductions from the pay of officers to be paid into a pension fund. CHAPTER VII. THE EXERCISE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORITY. I. GENERAL PREREQUISITES OF VALID ACTION. Territorial Jurisdiction. PAGE V. STAPLES. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. May, 1881. Exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas. This action was trespass for assault and false imprisonment brought in the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant, Staples, a deputy sheriff of the county of Providence, arrested the plaintiff Page on a writ issued by the justice court of the town of Gloucester, May 31, 1879, and made returnable June 14, 1879, in an action of trover brought by one Jedidiah Sprague against said Page. The arrest was made June 5, 1879, in the town of Scituate. At the trial in the Court of Common Pleas, Page adduced testimony to show that Staples, in conducting him to the county jail in the county of Providence, carried him through a part of Kent county. The plaintiff was non-suited by the presiding justice, and brought the case into this court by exceptions to the non-suit. MATTESON, J. We do not think that the defendant can justify the taking of the plaintiff through a part of Kent county for the purpose of committing him to the jail in Providence county. In the absence of statutory provisions, the power of a sheriff is limited to his own county. He is to be adjudged as sheriff in his own county and not elsewhere. He cannot, therefore, execute a writ out of his own county, and if he attempts to do so becomes a trespasser. The only exceptions to this principle are, that having a prisoner in his custody upon a writ of habeas corpus, he has power, by virtue of the writ, to travel through other counties, if necessary in order to take his prisoner to the place where the writ is returnable; and he may, also, upon fresh pursuit, retake a prisoner who has escaped from his custody into another county. Platt v. The Sheriff of London, Plowd. 35, 37; Hammond v. Taylor, 3 B. & A. 408; Watson's Sheriff, 60, 61; Avery v. Seeley, 3 Watts & Serg. 494, 497. In the case at bar the plaintiff did not escape from the defendant's custody into Kent county, but was voluntarily taken by the defendant into that county. The moment they crossed the line between the counties, into Kent county, the defendant ceased to have any authority over the plaintiff. He had no more right to detain him in that county than he would have had to arrest him there. The exception is sustained and the case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for a new trial. 2. Disqualification on Account of Personal Interest. GOODYEAR V. BROWN. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May, 1893. Opinion by Mr. Justice WILLIAMS, May 22, 1893: It is true, as the appellants contend, that there is no enactment to be found in the statute book of this State which in words forbids the secretary of internal affairs to receive his own individual application for a land warrant, grant it, cause a survey to be made and returned upon it, accept the return of survey, pass upon the validity of the survey, as a member of the board of property, and finally cause a patent to issue to himself, the individual, for the land included within it. But it does not follow that everything may be done by a public officer that is not forbidden in advance by some act of assembly. Remedies are provided for evils when they are discovered, and rules of law are applied when a necessity arises for their application. What was alleged in this case, and was held by the learned judge of the court below, is that dealings between a public officer and himself as a private citizen that bring him in collision with other citizens, equally interested with himself in the integrity and impartiality of the officer, are against public policy. In a general way it may be said that public policy means the public good. Anything that tends clearly to injure the public health, the public |