which permits reasonable and uniform regulations to be made as to the time and mode of exercising the right of suffrage, and as to the ascertainment of the qualifications of voters. We must therefore pronounce section 7 of the St. of 1885, c. 345, to be unconstitutional. Where the constitution prescribes who are voters the legislature may not require the payment of taxes where that is not required by the constitution or residence in the district for a longer period than that provided in the constitution as a qualification for voting. People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; St. Joseph etc., R. R. Co. v. The Buchanan County Court, 39 Mo. 485. Nor may the legislature take away any of the constitutional qualifications as by permitting women to vote where the constitution requires the male sex. Coffin v. Election Commissioners, 97 Mich. 188; In re Gage, 141 N. Y. 112. ROGERS V. JACOBS. Supreme Court of Kentucky. January, 1889. Chief Justice LEWIS delivered the opinion of the court. Appellant, a citizen and owner of real and personal property in the city of Louisville, instituted this action for an injunction to prevent appellees, mayor and auditor, issuing certain municipal bonds which the general council, by an ordinance passed October 20, 1888, authorized and sold for purposes therein specified, in case of approval by a majority of qualified voters of the city voting at an election that was held November 14, 1888. As the only cause stated in the petition, or now relied on in argument, for the relief prayed for, is that the election is void for the reason it was held in the manner prescribed by an act of the General Assembly, entitled "An act to regulate municipal elections in the city of Louisville," approved February 24, 1888, the only question necessary or proper to be decided on this appeal is whether that statute is valid. It is contended that the act conflicts with three distinct provisions of the Constitution. 3. Section 5, article 10, which provides that all elections shall be "free and equal." A statute requiring votes to be given by ballot need not, any more than the mode of voting viva voce, operate unequally, or so as to deprive any person entitled of the privilege of suffrage, and if the one we are considering conflicts with that clause of the constitution, or denies the privilege of free suffrage, which really exists independent of that section, it is simply on account of defect or vice of some particular provision, not indispensable to the general or successful operation of the law. And the only question about which we have any difficulty is in regard to section 9, that, by requiring each voter to retire to a compartment, and there being alone and unaided, indicate by a mark on his ballot the various candidates, for numerous offices, he wishes to vote for, practically operates to deprive those unable to read or write of a free and intelligible choice, and, in fact, makes free suffrage as to them a matter of chance or accident. And thus, while the rights and interests of many may be involved, and should not be denied or jeopardized by nullifying the entire statute already in operation, if it is in other respects valid, we have no right to sanction any law, or part of a law, that takes from a single human being his constitutional rights. It is, however, permissible and often important, to limit the operation of, disregard or strike from a statute one or more provisions that conflict with the constitution, rather than allow them to vitiate the whole. And in accordance with, or at least in analogy to, that rule, section 9, must be held inoperative to the extent it, in the manner mentioned, deprives illiterate persons of the opportunity and means of freely and intelligently voting, for they have the right to avail themselves of whatever reasonable aid and information may be necessary to enable them to cast their ballots understandingly, and cannot be legally deprived of it. But as the statute is valid in other respects, the general demurrer to the petition was properly sustained, and judgment dismissing the action is affirmed. ATTORNEY GENERAL EX REL. CONELY V. COMMON COUNCIL. Supreme Court of Michigan. December, 1889. 78 Mich. 545. MORSE, J. At the last session of the legislature an act was passed, entitled: "An act to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise, in the city of Detroit." This act was approved by the governor July 1, 1889, upon which day it took effect, and became operative. Local Acts of 1889, p. 994. The relator, in his petition, sets forth that the common council of the city of Detroit has neglected and failed to comply with the law, and still fails and neglects to do so, although well aware that the necessity of such compliance is reasonable and urgent; and he believes that said common council intend to ignore the act entirely, and that such body intend to hold the city election to take place in November, 1889, under the registration and election laws in force before the passage of this act, the same in every respect as if no such act had been passed. The Attorney General therefore asks that this court issue a peremptory mandamus to compel said common council to provide suitable and proper means for the registration of electors. The common council of the city of Detroit, in answer to the order to show cause why the writ of mandamus should not issue to compel them to obey this law, says: 3. That this law will also disfranchise a large number of electors, residents of Detroit, who do business outside of and away from said city, as such persons will necessarily be absent from the city during the days fixed by this act for registration. 4. That it will also disfranchise those persons who from sickness are unable to appear before the boards of registration on such days. 5. That it will disfranchise those moving from one ward to another after the last day of registration, who are electors under the constitution and general laws of the state as to qualifications of voters. That for these reasons, and for other good and substantial reasons appearing upon the face of the law, the act is inoperative, burdensome, unreasonable, unconstitutional and void. Upon hearing and argument of this matter upon petition and answer, we, on October 11, 1889, denied the application for the writ. The reasons for so doing will now be stated. In my view the law is unreasonable and void in that it undertakes to disfranchise a large number of voters, through no fault of their own, and to make an unjust and unlawful distinction between the rights of native-born and naturalized citizens and electors. The constitution authorizes the legislature to enact laws "to preserve the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise;" but this does not authorize by direction or indirection, the disfranchisement, without his own fault or neglegence, of any elector under the constitution. Article 7, sec. 6. The constitution provides that "In all elections, every male citizen, every male inhabitant residing in the state on the 24th day of June, 1835, every male inhabitant residing in the state on the first day of January, 1850, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, pursuant to the laws thereof, six months preceding an election, or who has resided in the state two years and six months, and declared his intention as aforesaid, and every civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States, and not a member of any tribe, shall be an elector, and entitled to vote; but no citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector, or entitled to vote at any election, unless he shall be above the age of twentyone years, and has resided in this state three months, and in the township or ward in which he offers to vote ten days next preceding such election." By this section of the constitution it will be noticed that there are five distinct classes of persons who are made electors, and the only qualification to any of these classes is that the elector shall be of age, and have resided in the state three months, and in the township or ward where he offers to vote ten days, next preceding the election. It cannot be for a moment contended that by section 6 of article 7 the framers of the constitution intended to give the legislature power to arbitrarily disfranchise any elector who is such under section 1 of the same article, or to make any difference between the rights of any of the classes of electors therein specified, or to put obstacles in the way to the ballot box for one class, while the road is left open to another. The laws to regulate elections, and to preserve their purity, and to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, must be reasonable, uniform, and impartial, and must be calculated to facilitate and secure, rather than to subvert and impede, the exercise of the right to vote. Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 488. Let us examine the act before us. See Local Laws of 1889, p. 994. The plan of registration under this law is extensive and minute in its details. In this discussion we shall only concern ourselves with its general features and results. It provides that in the year 1889, and again in 1892, and every fourth year thereafter, striking by design or accident, a presidential election year, there shall be a new complete and general registration of voters in the city of Detroit. And it is made the duty of every elector to see that his name is registered in compliance with the requirements of the law, and he shall not be deemed to have acquired a legal residence in the precinct unless he has so caused himself to be registered, "nor shall any ballot be received by the inspectors at any election, under any pretense whatever, unless the name of the person offering such ballot shall have been entered in the register of the precinct in which he claims to vote as herein provided." Sections 3 and 4. The elector must personally apply to the board for registration, and such board "shall examine each applicant." Persons who will be of age on election days, having the other qualifications of electors, may be entered on the register. "Every applicant, in the years when a general new registration is required, who has commenced to reside in such precinct, and who has resided therein at least two days," if he be otherwise qualified, shall be entered on the register, and can vote on election day, if he has resided therein ten full days next preceding. Section 7. The meeting of these boards of registration for 1889, and for 1892, and every four years thereafter, is first to be held on the first Monday of October, at which time the board sits for four days, and also again one day, on the fourth Monday of October. The law makes no provision for any other registration in the years of this new or general registration. In this year, the fourth Monday of October came on the 28th and the city election on the 5th of November, there being seven days between the last day of registration and election day, but whenever the month of October begins on Sunday, Monday or Saturday more than ten days will ensue between the last day of registration and |