Pitts v. Whitman. claim the entire combination of the machinery as new. In the summing up of their invention they claim four distinct improvements in the machinery, as their invention. The words are: "We claim as our invention, (1). The construction and use of an endless apron divided into troughs or cells in a machine for cleaning grain, operating substantially in the way described (i. e., in the specification). (2). We claim also the revolving rake for shaking out the straw, and the roller for throwing it off the machine, in combination with such a revolving apron as set forth. (3). We claim the guard slats, E, in combination with a belt constructed substantially as above described; and, (4). The combination of the additional sieve and shoe, with the elevator for carrying up the light grain in the manner and for the purpose herein set forth." It is plain, therefore, that the patentees not only claim the entire machinery in combination, but also the four improvements above enumerated as their invention. And if they are their invention, there is no objection, in point of law, to their claim. And a violation of any one of the specified improvements, without any violation of the others, by the defendant, is sufficient to entitle the patentees, or their assignees, to an action for the infringe ment. So that in every way, in which I am able to contemplate the case, the motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment ought to be over-ruled. The District Judge concurs in this opinion, and, therefore, the motion is over-ruled. Upham v. Brooks et al. NATHANIEL G. UPHAM บ. HENRIETTA L. BROOKS AND OTHERS. WHERE, in a Bill in Equity, to redeem a mortgage given to secure the mortgagee against an incumbrance upon another estate purchased by hin, the plaintiff claimed as owner of the Equity of Redemption, against the defendant, who was assignee of the mortgage, and the bill did not set forth, that the condition of the mortgage had been fully performed and the incumbrance extinguished; It was held, on demurrer, that although, in law, the mortgagor could not recover the land mortgaged from the mortgagee, and those in possession under him without an actual extinguishment of the incumbrance, yet that, in Equity, he was entitled to maintain a bill to redeem upon an offer to redeem, and proving himself able and ready to discharge the incumbrance and procure releases thereof, and of claims on account thereof. Where A. was the legal owner of land, which he held in trust for B. as security for advances made by him on account of the purchase by B., It was held, that A was a necessary party to a bill brought by B. in respect of a claim arising upon such lands; and, as the bill did not make him a party, It was held, on demurrer, not to be maintainable. BILL in Equity. The bill was, in substance, as follows: "The bill alleges that the orator, Nathaniel G. Upham, a citizen of Concord, in the county of Merrimack, and State of New Hampshire, is the owner of a right in Equity of redemption of a certain tract of land, situate on Pleasant street, in Portland, in the State of Maine, known as the John Mussey homestead, and sets forth : "That said premises were the property of one Charles Mussey, now a citizen of Painsville, in the county of Geauga, and State of Ohio; and that on the 16th December, 1834, they were conveyed with full covenants of warranty by said Mussey to Robert Boyd, in part consideration of a conveyance by said Boyd to Mussey, his heirs and assigns, of one quarter part of 11000 acres of land in Stetson, in the county of Penobscot, and State of Maine. Upham v. Brooks et al. "The bill further alleges, that the Stetson land, at the time of said conveyance by Boyd, was under incumbrance, by mortgage, to Amasa Stetson, of Dorchester, Massachusetts; and, to secure the payment of said mortgage, the said Boyd, at the time of said conveyance, re-conveyed the Portland tract aforesaid to said Mussey in mortgage, with condition, that he would pay or cause to be paid to said Amasa the amount of his incumbrance on said Stetson land. "The bill further alleges, that afterwards, on the 16th May, 1835, said Mussey conveyed to Oliver B. Dorrance, and Marshall French and their assigns, with full covenants of warranty, said land in Stetson, and that subsequently said Dorrance and French entered into a contract with said Upham, the orator, to convey to him two thousand and twenty-four acres of said land, and received of him in consideration therefor large sums of money, amounting in all to more than seven thousand dollars; and in consideration of a further payment made in behalf of the orator by one Thomas C. Upham, for the remaining sum due on said land, the said Dorrance and French, on the 31st of October, 1837, conveyed said two thousand and twenty-four acres of land to said Thomas C. Upham by deed of warranty, which he, the said Upham, holds in trust for the orator, subject to the payment of the advance so made by said Thomas. "And the orator further alleges, that said Mussey, contriving and intending to prevent the due application of the Portland tract, which was mortgaged as aforesaid, to secure to said Mussey and his assigns the covenants of warranty of said Stetson land, caused an assignment of said mortgage to be made to one Joshua Richardson, on the 16th November, 1838, which was long after said Mussey's sale of said Stetson land, with full covenants of warranty, to said Dorrance and French, and their assigns; and subsequently, with a similar fraudulent design, caused said mortgage to be further assigned by said Richardson to one Henrietta L. Brooks, a resident and citizen Upham v. Brooks et al. of Portland, in the county of Cumberland and State of Maine, on the 19th June, 1839, both which assignments are duly executed, acknowledged and recorded in the registry of deeds in said Cumberland, and the said Henrietta now holds said mortgaged property as a pretended security for some debt or claim, which she has against said Mussey, and which the orator alleges is wholly disconnected with any terms or con ditions of said mortgage, and is fraudulent and groundless, a a claim under the same. Yet notwithstanding this, the said Richardson entered on said premises for condition broken, and to foreclose said mortgage; and said Henrietta has received the rents and profits of said estate from November, 1838, to the time of the filing of this bill, to be applied in payment of said pretended debt, and claims that said mortgage would have been fully foreclosed by her, had she not executed a writing extending the equity of redemption of the same to, and including the date hereof, and that from and after this date all right in equity of redeeming said estate will fully cease. "The orator further alleges, that on account of the neglect and refusal of said Mussey to relieve the Stetson land of the mortgage to said Amasa Stetson, agreeably to his covenants with said Dorrance and French and his assigns, and from other causes, they, the said Dorrance and French, have been unable to take up said mortgage in order that the orator might derive any benefit by his title aforesaid from them; and the said Dorrance and French, and the said Mussey and Boyd, have severally, since said time, become insolvent, and said Amasa Stetson and his assigns have entered upon said Stetson land, and have foreclosed his mortgage thereon, so that all title derived to the orator from said Mussey, and said Dorrance and French, has utterly failed; and your orator is left remediless for any part of his large advance as aforesaid, unless the said Mussey, or his assigns, shall cause the mortgage of said Upham v. Brooks et al. Portland tract to be applied in discharge of the covenants of warranty of said Stetson land, according to the design of said conveyance. "And the orator further alleges, as heretofore named in said bill, that he is the holder and owner of the right in equity of redemption of said mortgage from said Boyd to said Mussey, conveyed to the orator by quitclaim deed of said Boyd, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, and that said Mussey hath not been damnified or injured by any claim or demand by his grantees, or their assigns, of said land in Stetson, on account of his said covenants of warranty of the same, and that the orator, as holder and owner of said equity, on the 20th January inst. made a demand in writing on said Henrietta L. Brooks, and on this 21st of January inst. on the attorney of said Mussey, for a true account of the sum due, if any, on the mortgage aforesaid, and of the rents and profits of said mortgaged estate, and tendered to each of them the sum of twenty dollars for any nominal breach of said mortgage, and full discharges and releases from the said Mussey's grantees, and their assigns, of all claims against him, the said Mussey, and any other person or persons for his or their liability, as warrantor of said Stetson land, as a full discharge and release, so far as concerned said Mussey, of said Stetson mortgage, and of all claim to hold said Portland land therefor; and requested of said Henrietta, and also of the attorney of said Mussey, a full discharge and release of the mortgage on said Portland tract, which tender and releases as aforesaid are still proffered here in Court; but the said Henrietta and said Mussey severally refused to discharge said mortgage, and said Henrietta claimed and still claims to hold said mortgaged premises for debts and sums in no 'manner secured by said mortgage, alleging that said Mussey, on the 19th June, 1839, by his promissory note owed her $800; which, since said time, up to April 16th, 1840, had been reduced by the rents |