Key-point condition: If, after approving the key-point condition, the commission later determines that the balance of public convenience and necessity shifts through competition or otherwise, so that injury to the public from impairment of the inherent advantages of motor transportation exceeds the advantage to the public of efficient rail transportation, it may correct the tendency by restoration of rail movement requirement or otherwise.-Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60(72)*; Illinois Central R. Co. Extension, 44 M.C.C. 651 (655)*.

The key-point was designed to permit motor-vehicle services in lieu of local freight train service between way-station points and to prohibit motor-vehicle service in lieu of through freight train service, between break-bulk or key points. Id., Illinois Central, p. 655.

Since if the city remains designated as a key point applicant can no longer transport l.c.l. freight between the two cities, and would have to restore rail service on such traffic, which in turn would necessitate restoration of waycar service at all points on the branch, condition establishing the city as а key point will be eliminated.-Willett Co. of Ind., Inc., Extension, 44 M.C.C. 283 (284)*.

When elimination of the city as a key point would not be consistent with the purpose of denial of authority for motor transportation as to points between which through merchandise-car service adequate to meet the public need is available, the city will be retained as a limited key point.—Id. p. 287.

A key point named in connection with irregular-route operations can be bypassed.-Pacific Motor Trucking Co. Extension, 44 M.C.C. 643(645).

The commission's modification of the key-point condition in 28 M.C.C. 5 did not accomplish any change in the previously accepted principles and was in no way inconsistent with the implied legislative approval of the commission's earlier administrative interpretation.

Rock Island Transit Co.-PurchaseWhite Line, 40 M.C.C. 457(469)*.

That the railroad on occasions may have only a limited amount of traffic moving to a particular key point is no ground for authorizing a change from all-rail to all-motor service between large and strategic rail points.—Columbia Motor Transport Co., 46 M.C.C. 69 (91).

Monopoly: It is the duty of the commission to guard against the danger of the development of a transportation monopoly, and to preserve the inherent advantages of each mode of transportation. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60(73).*

See also §207(a), n. 7.

Office of Defense Transportation: The commission has no power to compel continuance of coordination of rail and motor services established in conformity with General Order No. 1 of the ODT as a necessary emergency measure, and which has not been satisfactory to applicant or its patrons.— Illinois Central R. Co. Extension, 43 M.C.C. 767(774).

Pick-up and delivery: Where service is authorized from or to points which are stations on a railroad, the authority permits service from or to the railroad stations and also all points within the established pick-up and delivery limits of the stations.-Rock Island Motor Transit Co. Extension, 44 M.C.C. 430 (434).

Restrictions, auxiliary, supplemental service: As there is need for north and south service for movement of all-motor carrier traffic, condition that service shall be auxiliary or supplemental of rail service, eliminated.-Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. Extension, 44 M.C.C. 474 (480).*

Public need exists for improved service at local points, as intermediate or off-route points, which are stations on the railway's line; auxiliary or supplemental-to-rail service condition imposed.-Rock Island Motor Transit Co. Extension, 44 M.C.C. 430(434).

It is not the commission's policy to grant joint authority to two applicants to continue coordinated motor service for rail lines. Separate authority granted, restricted to auxiliary or supplemental service. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 44 M. C. C. 401(409).

Such restriction does not permit applicant to engage in operations unconnected with rail service, and it may not be a party to tariffs containing allmotor or joint rates, nor participate in a directory providing for substitution of train for motor-vehicle service.Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.-Purchase -Lebeck, 39 M. C. C. 771(788-9).

As vendor is authorized to serve only points on the considered route which are stations on the railroad, a restriction limiting service by vendee to such stations is unnecessary.-Southern Pac. Transport Co.-Purchase-Trinity, 40 M. C. C. 215 (219); Willingham-Purchase Adams, 40 M. C. C. 411(424).

Preservation of inherent advantages of motor-carrier service and accomplishment of purposes of the national transportation policy require that, except in unusual circumstances, every grant to a railroad or its affiliate of authority to operate as a motor common carrier, or to acquire such authority, should be so conditioned as to limit the future motor service to that which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service.— Rock Island Motor Transit Co.-Purchase-White Line, 40 M. C. C. 457 (473).*

There is no justification for rigidly restricting railroad-controlled motorcarrier operations under authority acquired under §207, and at the same time allowing operation under purchased authority wholly free from all restrictions except territorial or geographical limits. -Id., p. 471.

repugnant to the act.-Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 263 I. C. C. 139(140–1).

Substituted truck-for-rail service is authorized only in the interest of improved rail service at railroad waystations at which it is impracticable to stop and unload peddler cars or to set out cars containing 1.c.l. freight.—Alto Trucking Co., Inc., Extension, 44 M. C. C. 755(762).

Through route: That contemplated through service may not lawfully be rendered under §5(2) unified rights does not warrant denial for coordinated railtruck authorization, for movement of the railroad's 1.c.l. traffic is such that the motor carrier would still be in position to render efficient, economical service in conjunction with train service, in auxiliary or supplemental service to the railway.-Willingham-Purchase— Adams, 40 M. C. C. 411(424).

15. State regulation; police powers; cooperation generally.—

Joint hearing, cooperation, §13(3), n. 10, 11, infra.

Burdens upon commerce are those actions of a State which directly impair the usefulness of its facilities, which may arise from other causes than costs or long delays. A burden may arise from a State statute which required interstate passengers to order their movements on the vehicle in accordance with local rather than national requirements.-Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia-U. S.-*.

See also §3(1), n. 103.

When Congress exercises its exclusive power over interstate commerce, the States cannot legislate on the subject, and the situation is covered as much by what is not done by Congress or the Interstate Commerce Commission, as by the regulations made; the State has no power to fill what it may regard as a hiatus left by Congress and the commission. First Natl. Benefit Society v. Garrison, 58 Fed. Supp. 972(985). [Insurance involved.]

Even when an act of Congress does not go into effect until a certain time

following its passage, State legislation is immediaely superseded upon the enactment of the Federal statute.—Id., p. 985.

Laws made under the police power of the States must yield whenever Congress, in the exercise of the powers

granted to it, legislates upon the precise subject matter, for that power, like all other reserved powers of the States, is subordinate to those in terms conferred by the Constitution upon the Nation.-Id., p. 987.

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1. Interstate commerce defined.Neither through billing, uninterrupted movement, continuous possession by the carrier, nor unbroken bulk, is an essential of a through interstate shipment.-Quaker Oats Co v. Canadian Natl. Rys., 263 I. C. C. 350(351).

3. Coastwise movement.-See also §302(i), n. 20.

The term "coastwise" is defined as including movements over navigable inland waterways.-American Republics Corp. v. Wichita Falls & S. R. Co., 259 I. C. C. 605(608).

16. Intention of shipper.-When it was the original and continuing intent of complainant that the shipments were to be exported to foreign countries, and all of them were so transported, that intent is controlling. The commission is without jurisdiction.-Quaker Oats Co. v. Canadian Natl. Rys., 263 I. C. C. 350(352).

Whatever intention complainant may have had when shipments were forwarded from Texas origins was negatived by the fact that it was aware that its export and ocean-going coastwise outlets at Houston had already been eliminated. And, it failed to use due diligence in moving the out-bound commodity in coastwise commerce over available inland waterways. The shipments were intrastate, not subject to

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the act.-American Republics Corp. v. Wichita Falls & S. R. Co., 259 I. C. C. 605(608).

See also §6(7), n. 160.

18. Transit services or incidents affecting continuity.-The transit tariff in effect on dates shipments left the various origin points gave to intrastate movements to Houston a temporary interstate character, in that they were to become part of interstate movements if and when reshipments from Houston were for export or coastwise movement. As its terms were not complied with, the interstate character of movement to Houston was lost.-American Republics Corp. v. Wichita Falls & S. R. Co., 259 I. C. C. 605 (608).

52. Transportation to or from a foreign country.-The commission does not have authority to prescribe through international rates for the future or to require United States carriers to participate in such rates, but may determine lawfulness of joint rates applied. -Carstens Packing Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 264 I. C. C. 164(170).

53. "Only insofar as such transportation takes place within the United States."-Congress has, in §15(3) of the 1940 act, granted to the commission power to establish through joint railwater routes, and §302(i) (2) makes this power applicable to such routes "from

a place in the United States to another place in the United States."-United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U. S. 612(621).*

56. Canadian traffic.-The commission is not empowered to prescribe specific through rates over differential lake-rail routes, part of which are in Canada.Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C. 447(515).*

60. Foreign commerce passing through the United States.-See also n. 53.

Transportation from a foreign country through the United States to a foreign country is not embraced within §1.-Quaker Oats Co. v. Canadian Natl. Rys., 263 I. C. C. 350 (351).

Application of the domestic rates is not a factor rendering subject to the commission's jurisdiction the transportation to New York, if such transportation is actually a part of through transportation not subject to the commission's jurisdiction.—Id., p. 352.

Exportation was at all times intended, the traffic therefore was at all times export traffic from a foreign country through the United States to a foreign country, to which provisions of the act do not apply.—Id., p. 352.

66. Common carriers defined.-Part II, §203(a)(14), n. 1**; Part III, §302(d), n. 1, volumes 11, 12, 13.

67. Incorporation and charter powers, as affecting common-carrier status.Holding of the Supreme Court [297 U. S. 175] that whether a transportation agency is a common carrier depends not upon its corporate character or declared purposes, but upon what it does, does not support the contention that a bona fide common carrier which temporarily suspends its service thereby ceases to be a common carrier.-Tex-OKan Flour Mills Co. v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 263 I. C. C. 91(93).*

76. Switching service only. That the transfer company's stock is owned ex

clusively by other common carriers in line-haul service does not alter the fact that it is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce.-Terminal Allowance at Minnesota Transfer, 263 I. C. C. 325(330).

83. Adequacy of facilities.-When the commission has found that a corporation not equipped for water carriage, which proposed under certain contingencies to acquire equipment, was not a common carrier within the meaning of 86(11), such corporation had published no tariff, had no equipment, had never carried anything. Corporation empowered by charter to acquire equipment and operate, distinguished. Tex-OKan Flour Mills Co. v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 263 I. C. C. 91(93).*

96. Cessation from status.—See n. 67, supra; §1(3)(a), n. 1.

105. Interurban electric lines. A street, interurban, or suburban electric railway not operated as a part of a general railroad system of transportation, but which transports interstate traffic, filing schedules with the commission, is subject to the act.-McGinn v. Philadelphia & W. Ry. Co., 259 I. C. C. 798 (800).

109. Pipe lines.-Provisions of the act with respect to pipe lines apply to all engaged in interstate transportation of oil or other commodities, except water and gas, by pipe line.-Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 59 Fed. Supp. 978 (981-2).*

An oil refining company, authorized by its charter to transport petroleum, producing and purchasing oil and, through its wholly owned subsidiary, transporting it by pipe line from points within a State to the refinery, and after refining, transporting the products through its own line to other States, for the purpose of sale, is subject to the act. Id., p. 982.

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Volume 6-p. 4559

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1. Agencies; lessors and lessees.While the stockyards company began operation prior to enactment of §1(18)(20), by performance of the service for years it incurred the relationship and duty to the public of a common carrier. This relationship is not terminated by lease to another for performance of the service; if the lease is terminated, the lessor must resume operation and continue it until legally relieved.-Livestock Terminal Service Co. Abandonment, 257 I. C. C. 1(7).

A lessor company by operation of law immediately, and without respect of its own desires, becomes responsible for the operation of railroad properties owned by it upon termination of a lease thereof.-Hoboken Rail Road, Ware House & S. S. Connecting Co. Operation, 257 I. C. C. 739(744)*.

16. Terminal carriers: Stockyards.While the stockyards company began operation long prior to the enactment of §1(18)-(20), in performance of the service for years it incurred the relationship and duty to the public of a common carrier subject to the act.-Livestock Terminal Service Co. Abandonment, 257 I. C. C. 1(7).

Provisions of Part I apply to common carriers engaged in transportation of passengers and property; but under the broad provisions and purposes of $5, "engaged in transportation" must be construed in the light of carrier duty

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31. Railroad construed; terminals.— Tulsa Union Depot is a terminal or terminal facility used or necessary in transportation of persons, and is within the term "railroad,” despite the fact that it neither owns nor operates any track.-Status of the Tulsa Union Depot Co., 262 I. C. C. 78(80).

Railroads may limit their terminal services to particular piers if there is no unjust discrimination or undue prejudice. They may not be required to operate on private property. United States v. Aberdeen & R. R. Co., 264 I. C. C. 683 (689).*