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or nothing to protect property owners or to ensure a fairer and more effective regulatory system. Rather, we are convinced that these proposals to require compensation in contexts very different from the balance struck under the Constitution itself are a direct threat to the vast majority of American citizens.

The truth is that this bill and similar proposals are based on a radical premise that has never been a part of our law or tradition: that a private property owner has the absolute right to the greatest possible profit from that property, regardless of the consequences of the proposed use on other individuals or the public generally. As a result, passage of these arbitrary and radically new compensation schemes into law will force all of us to decide between two equally unacceptable alternatives. The first option would be to cut back on the protection of human health, public safety, the environment, civil rights, worker safety, and other values that give us the high quality of life Americans have come to expect. The cost of these protections and programs after passage of the proposed compensation legislation would be vastly increased. Ironically, if we chose this path, the value of the very property this legislation seeks to protect would erode as vital protections are diminished. The other option would be to do what these proposals require: pay employers not to discriminate, pay corporations to ensure the safety of their workers, pay manufacturers not to dump their waste into the streams that run through their property and our neighborhoods, pay restaurants and other public facilities to comply with the civil rights laws. That is, each American would be forced to pay property owners to follow the law. In the process, we would end any hope of ever balancing the budget.

No matter which of these two avenues we pursue, hardworking American taxpayers will be the losers. Either they will no longer be able to enjoy the clean skies, fresh water, and safe workplaces they have come to expect, or they will be forced to watch as their tax dollars are paid out to corporations and other large property owners as compensation.

The Administration will not and cannot support legislation that will hurt homeowners or cost American taxpayers billions of dollars. The Administration, therefore, strongly opposes S. 605 and similar bills. The Attorney General would recommend that the President veto S. 605 or similar legislation.

II. THE COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TITLES II AND V WOULD HARM THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PROPERTY OWNERS, COST AMERICAN TAXPAYERS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, CREATE HUGE NEW BUREAUCRACIES AND A LITIGATION EXPLOSION AND UNDERMINE VITAL PROTECTIONS

A. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution

As you know, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." That short phrase has provided the compensation standards for takings cases since the founding of our country. Within its contours lies a balance between the authority of the government to act in the public interest and its obligation to provide compensation when those actions place an unfair burden on an individual's property. Before we consider proposals to alter and expand those standards, it is worth discussing what the Constitution provides and why we believe it has served the American people so well over the last 200 years.

The genius of the Constitution's Just Compensation Clause is its flexibility. In deciding whether a regulation is a compensable taking, the Constitution requires the government, and if necessary the courts, to consider the nature of the property interest at issue; the regulation's economic impact; its nature and purpose, including the public interest protected by the regulation; the property owner's legitimate expectations; and any other relevant factors. The ultimate standards for compensation under the Constitution are fairness and justice. Thus, we have never recognized an absolute property right to maximize profits at the expense of the property or other rights of others. For example, reasonable zoning by local governments has long been accepted as a legitimate means to promote safe and decent communities without requiring the payment of compensation to those whose property values might be adversely affected. Indeed, we recognize that the value of property in the community as a whole is thereby enhanced. On the other hand, when government regulation "goes too far" (in the words of Justice Holmes) and imposes a burden so unfair on an individual property owner that it constitutes a taking, compensation must be paid.

This constitutional tradition has been carefully developed by the courts through hundreds of cases over the course of our nation's history. As I mentioned, its genius is its flexibility, for it allows the courts to address the many different situations in which regulations might affect property. It allows for the fair and just balancing of

the property owner's reasonable expectations and property rights with the public benefits of protective laws, including the benefit to the property owner.

It goes without saying that the economic impact of a regulation is an important consideration in deciding whether it would be fair and just to compensate a property owner. But in the very case that established the concept of a regulatory takingPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922)-the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." From the earliest days of our Republic, we have recognized that the government has a legitimate, and indeed a critical, role to play in protecting all of us from the improper exploitation of property. In America, we have an opportunity to use our property freely-within the bounds we set through our communities and elected representatives. We have also recognized that our rights as citizens entail a corresponding responsibility to refrain from exercising those rights in ways that harm others.

As we consider our constitutional tradition and the potential effects of S. 605, it is important to keep the takings issue in perspective. Certain advocates of compensation bills suggest that the government routinely disregards its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation when it takes private property. This is simply incorrect. The Justice Department's regulatory takings docket is actually relatively small. To cite but one example, of the 48,000 landowners who applied for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act in 1994, only 358, or 0.7 percent, were denied a permit. Another 50,000 land-use activities are authorized annually through general permits under the 404 program. And we now have only about 30 takings claims involving the 404 permit program. These figures result from our commitment to ensuring that government programs are implemented in a way that respects property rights.

B. The compensation schemes in S. 605

A Radical Departure from Constitutional Tradition. The compensation schemes in S. 605 disregard our civic responsibilities and our constitutional tradition. They replace the constitutional standards of fairness and justice with a rigid, "one-size-fitsall" approach that focuses on the extent to which regulations affect property value, without regard to fairness, to the harm that a proposed land use would cause others, to the landowner's legitimate expectations, or to the public interest. They ignore the wisdom of the Supreme Court, and they would wipe out many vital protections and generate unjust windfalls.

S. 605 would require the federal government to pay a property owner when federal agency action reduces the value of the affected portion of the property by 33 percent or more. The compensation requirement also applies to a wide range of state and local actions under federally funded, delegated, or required programs. The single exception to the compensation requirement is in the relatively rare instance in which the agency action does nothing more than restrict property use that is already prohibited by applicable state nuisance law.

It is important to recognize just how radical S. 605 and similar bills are. In 1993, every Member of the U.S. Supreme Court-including all eight Justices appointed by Republican Presidents-joined an opinion stating that diminution in value by itself is insufficient to demonstrate a taking. See Concrete Pike & Products of California Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993). They not only acknowledged the correctness of this principle, but they characterized it as "long established" in the case law, a principle developed and accepted by jurists and scholars throughout our Nation's history. This constitutional principle does not result from insensitivity to property rights by the Founders or the courts, but instead from a recognition that other factors such as the landowner's legitimate expectations, the landowner's benefit from government action, and the effect of the proposed land use on neighboring landowners and the public-must be considered in deciding whether compensation would be fair and just. Because S. 605 precludes consideration of these factors, its single-factor test would necessarily result in myriad unjustified windfalls at the taxpayers' expense.

The compensation standard in S. 605 is also flawed because the loss-in-value trigger focuses solely on the affected portion of the property. The courts have made clear that fairness and justice require an examination of the regulation's impact on the parcel as a whole. E.g., Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). By establishing the affected portion of the property as the touchstone, the bill ignores several crucial factors essential to determining the overall fairness of the regulation, such as whether the regulation returns an overriding benefit to other portions of the same parcel. Moreover, under S. 605 a landowner could segment the parcel or otherwise manipulate the

loss-in-value calculation in a manner that demonstrates a very high (if not total) loss in value in almost every case. For example, if a developer is allowed to develop 99 acres of a 100 acre parcel, but required to leave one acre undeveloped to protect a bald eagle's nest, the developer could seek compensation for that restriction on a single acre. Or suppose the civil rights laws require a restaurant to make its restrooms accessible to wheelchair users. Under S. 605, the restaurant owner would not need to show a 33 percent loss in value of the entire restaurant, but only of the affected portion of the restaurant. In other words, it could argue that the space needed for this accommodation is no longer available for tables, and that because this small affected portion has been reduced in value, automatic compensation is required under the bill.

Sections 204(a)(2) (A) through (C) would freeze into law several additional compensation standards that appear to be loosely based on various Supreme Court cases. In our view, these standards in the bill reflect unjustifiably broad readings of the applicable case law.

The overall breadth of the bill's compensation requirement is staggering. It includes extremely broad definitions of "property," "just compensation," "agency action," and other key terms, some of which conflict with their accepted meaning as used in the Constitution. It applies without regard to the nature of the activity the agency seeks to prohibit. In many cases, large corporations would be free to use their property in whatever manner they desire, however reckless, without regard to the impact their activities have on their neighbors and the community at large.

Think of the consequences of this requirement for just the federal permit programs. A landowner would be able to claim compensation whenever an application for a federal permit is denied. For example, a landowner could apply for a federal permit to build a waste incinerator. If that permit is denied for whatever reason and the denial decreases the value of the property, the government could be obligated to pay the permit applicant. It is not much of a stretch to conclude that applying for federal permits may become a favored form of low-risk land speculation. The more likely a permit is to be denied, the more attractive it may be under these

schemes.

Because S. 605 goes beyond mere land-use restrictions and applies to all manner of agency actions, it is likely to have many unintended consequences that we cannot even begin to anticipate. The bill's various and confusing terms and conditions make it difficult to predict how the courts would apply it, but we can rest assured that plaintiffs' lawyers will seek the broadest possible application: compensation for businesses that must comply with access requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act; compensation for a bank where federal regulators determine that the bank is no longer solvent and appoints a receiver; compensation for corporations across the country where the Congress adjusts federal legislation designed to stabilize and protect pension plans; compensation for virtually any federal action that might affect the complex water rights controversies in the West; compensation for agricultural interests that must comply with changing phytosanitary restrictions; compensation where food safety rules or product labeling requirements diminish the value of factories producing unsafe products; and so forth. The examples are virtually endless.

A Threat to Property Rights. Although these bills purport to protect property rights, they would undermine the protection of the vast majority of property owners: middle-class American homeowners. For most Americans, property ownership means home ownership. "Property rights" means the peaceful enjoyment of their own backyards, knowing that their land, air, and drinking water are safe and clean. The value of a home depends in large measure on the health of the surrounding community, which in turn depends directly on laws that protect our land, air, drinking water, and other benefits essential to our quality of life.

In fact, in a recent survey by a financial magazine, clean water and air ranked second and third in importance out of 43 factors people rely on in choosing a place to live-ahead of schools, low taxes, and health care. By undercutting environmental and other protections, these automatic compensation bills would threaten this basic right and the desires of middle- class homeowners. In the process, the value of the most important property held by the majority of middle-income Americans-their homes-would inevitably erode.

An Untenable Fiscal Impact. Because these bills are so broad and inflexible, and because they mandate compensation where none is warranted, the potential budgetary impacts are almost unlimited. Even if new regulatory protections were scaled back, these bills would still have a huge fiscal impact by requiring compensation for statutorily compelled regulation and other essential government action. The Administration agrees with the assessment made earlier this year by Senator Richard L. Russman, a Republican State Senator from New Hampshire, who testified before

the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures. He stated:

As a fiscal conservative and believer in limited government, compensation-type "takings" bills represent expensive "budget- busters." Their purpose is to give taxpayer subsidies to those who have to comply with requirements designed to protect all property values, and the health and safety of average Americans.

Because the compensation scheme in S. 605 is so broad in scope, it is extremely difficult to provide even a rough estimate of its overall potential fiscal impact. I am told that one proponent of these bills testified, with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act alone, that potential liability would make administration of the Act prohibitively expensive. A 1992 study by the Congressional Budget Office estimated that application of one takings proposal to just "high value" wetlands a proposal that also would have radically revised existing compensation obligations-would cost taxpayers $10-15 billion. S. 605 would, of course, apply to far more programs and agency actions than just these two examples. Because S. 605 goes beyond mere land-use restrictions and applies to all kinds of agency actions, it is likely to have many unintended consequences and untoward fiscal impacts that we cannot even begin to anticipate.

Proponents of these bills sometimes argue that these costs are already being absorbed by the individual landowners. However, the potential costs of the bill are so high not because landowners are unreasonably shouldering these costs now, but because the bill would require compensation in many cases where compensation would be unfair and unjust-for example, where the landowner had no reasonable expectation to use the land in the manner proposed, or where other uses would yield a reasonable return on investment without harming neighboring landowners or the pub

lic.

S. 605 also requires the federal government to pay compensation for many State and local actions even where State and local officials would have the discretion to pursue another course of conduct. Imposing federal liability for actions by State and local officials would remove the financial incentive to ensure that State and local action minimizes impacts on private property, and would thereby further expand potential federal expenditures under the bill.

In addition to the compensation costs, S. 605 would exact a tremendous economic toll by preventing the implementation of needed protections. For example, fish and shellfish populations that depend on wetlands support commercial fish harvests worth billions of dollars annually. If compensation schemes render the protection of wetlands prohibitively expensive, the commercial fishing industry would suffer devastating financial losses. Ironically, this bill might require the federal government to compensate the fishery and related economic interests whose profits are reduced by the government's failure to protect wetland habitats. There is seemingly no end to the chain of compensation claims created by the bill.

At the end of the day, no one can really say how much S. 605 would cost American taxpayers, except to say that those costs would be in the billions of dollars. The answer given by some proponents of these bills is that the costs will depend on how regulators respond. But suppose that every regulator responds by doing everything possible to reduce impact on private property. The compensation costs for carrying out existing statutory mandates and providing needed protections would still be overwhelming. I urge every fiscally responsible Member of this Committee to insist on a realistic cost analysis of this bill before the Committee votes on its merits.

Huge New Bureaucracies and Countless Lawsuits. S. 605 would also require the creation of huge and costly bureaucracies to address compensation requests. Title II would greatly expand the grounds for filing judicial claims for compensation where regulation affects private property. Title V would establish an administrative compensation scheme with binding arbitration at the option of the property owner. Agencies would need to hire more employees to process compensation claims, more lawyers to handle claims, more investigators and expert witnesses to determine the validity of claims, more appraisers to assess the extent to which agency action has affected property value, and more arbiters to resolve claims. The sheer volume of entitlement requests under these schemes would be overwhelming. The result would be far more government, not less.

A Threat to Vital Protections. As I mentioned earlier, the passage of any of these compensation bills would pose a serious threat to human health, public safety, civil rights, worker safety, the environment, and other protections that allow Americans to enjoy the high standard of living we have come to expect and demand. If S. 605 were to become law, these vital protections-which Congress itself has established— would simply become too costly to pursue.

S. 605 evidently attempts to address this concern in a small way by providing an exception to the compensation requirement in Title II where the property use at issue would constitute a nuisance under applicable state law.

This narrow nuisance-law exception would not adequately allow for effective protection of human health, public safety, and other vital interests that benefit every American citizen. For example, the nuisance exception would not cover many protections designed to address lone-term health and safety risks. The discharge of pollution into our Nation's air, land, and waterways often poses long-term health risks that would not be covered by the exception. Nor does the nuisance exception address cumulative threats. Very often, the action of a single person by itself does not significantly harm the neighborhood, but if several people take similar actions, the combined effect can devastate a community. Pesticide use, wetlands destruction, discharges of toxic pollutants to air and water, improper mining, or other property use by an individual property owner might not constitute a nuisance by itself. However, in conjunction with similar use by other property owners, they can seriously affect the health or safety of a neighborhood or an entire region. In some states, special interest groups have lobbied state legislatures for exceptions to the nuisance laws that allow huge commercial enterprises to operate noxious facilities in family-farm communities and residential neighborhoods.

Furthermore, there are certain critical public-safety issues that are governed exclusively by federal law, such as nuclear power plant regulation. As a result, public safety in these matters could be held hostage to the government's ability to pay huge compensation claims. Nor does the nuisance exception address uniquely federal concerns, such as national defense and foreign relations. Had S. 605 been in effect during the Iranian hostage crisis, federal seizure or freezing of Iranian assets could have resulted in numerous statutory compensation claims.

The nuisance exception also fails to recognize that there are many important public interests that are not related to health and safety and not addressed by state nuisance law. As I have already discussed, these bills threaten civil rights protection, worker safety rules, and many other vital protections.

"Horror Stories". Much of the debate about these issues has been fueled by what appear to be horror stories of good, hardworking Americans finding themselves in some sort of regulatory nightmare where the government is forbidding them from using their property in the way that they want. It is important to look closely at these stories, for they often are not as they first appear. They sometimes contain a kernel of truth, but you should realize that you're not always getting all of the facts.

I am not suggesting that there are no genuine instances of overregulation. We all know of cases of regulatory insensitivity and abuse that are quite simply indefensible. As I will discuss later, this Administration has made great strides in reducing unreasonable and unfair burdens on middle-class landowners, and we are committed to continuing the effort to reinvent government until the job is done.

Before I address those efforts, however, I want to draw the attention of the distinguished Members to another set of horror stories: those that may result if these compensation bills become law. I am confident that these are not the consequences any of us want:

Suppose a coal company in West Virginia removed so much coal from an underground mine that huge cracks opened on the surface of the land, rupturing gas fines, collapsing a stretch of highway, and destroying homes. If the State refused to take action, and the Interior Department required the mining company to reduce the amount of coal it was mining to protect property and public safety, the mining company might well be entitled to compensation for business losses under this bill.

Suppose a restaurant franchisee challenges the Americans with Disabilities Act provisions governing access for disabled individuals in public accommodations. If the franchisee could show that the requirements of the ADA somehow reduced his profits (perhaps by requiring a ramp that reduces the number of tables allowed in the restaurant) and thus diminished the value of the affected property, he could be entitled to compensation.

Suppose the federal government restricts the importation of assault rifles. If an import permittee could show that the ban reduced the value of his overseas inventory, he could seek compensation under the bill.

• Suppose a group of landowners challenge the federal government's implementation of the National Flood Insurance Program, which imposes certain land use restrictions designed to decrease the risk of flooding. They could argue that such restrictions diminish the value of their land and obtain compensation.

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