pretation, especially in view of the above quotation from appellant's brief. It is our opinion the combination of the two words "comprising essentially" should, under the circumstances, be held to mean as in claims 1 to 4 that the composition claimed is "free from other sulfate and sulfonic acid groups." In the case Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., 236 Fed. 756, the court held that the word "essentially" in a patent claim which contained the words "comprising essentially" is not a synonym for "substantially" and when used in a patent claim means indispensably necessary; important in the highest degree. With respect to claims 6 and 7, the words used are "composed of." These claims read as follows: 6. Wetting, cleaning and dispersing agents composed of unsaturated alkyl sulfates, the alkyl radical consisting of a normal unsaturated aliphatic radical having more than 8 carbon atoms. 7. Wetting, cleaning and dispersing agents composed of sulfuric acid esters of higher aliphatic primary unsaturated alcohols corresponding to the oleic acid series, the sulfuric acid radical being joined by reaction only at the carbon atoms to which the hydroxyl group was bound. Having in mind the statement in appellant's brief hereinbefore quoted, we hold that the words "composed of" should be regarded as synonymous with "consisting of." In the case of Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co., 212 Fed. 422, there was before the court the construction to be given the words "composed of," "formed of," and "comprising" in certain patent claims. The court said "Now 'formed of' and 'composed of' are the same; they both mean consisting of." While the words "composed of" may under certain circumstances be given, in patent law, a broader meaning than "consisting of," we believe that in the case at bar, they should be held to exclude in the sulfuric acids and in the unsaturated alkyl sulfates claimed the presence of other sulfate and sulfonic groups; in other words, the claims should not be given a broader interpretation than the Patent Office tribunals gave to claims 1 to 4. It follows from all the foregoing that we are unable to find error ess of * compounding * it * * * in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 温室 For the reasons stated, we find no reversible error in the holding of the board that none of the claims are sufficiently supported by the disclosure of appellant's application. In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary that we pass upon the second ground of rejection of the claims, viz, anticipation of the invention by the references. However, we think it proper to observe that we cannot find that appellant's prior applications disclose the involved invention in such manner as to entitle him to resort to them in order to antedate the references. While it is true that some of his applications and patents disclose the formula of the composition claimed, they are even more lacking than is appellant's instant application in disclosure of any process for compounding it. Consequently we are also in accord with the decision of the board with respect to the second ground of rejection of the claims before us. For the reasons stated the decision appealed from is affirmed. PATENTS 549 O. G. 199; 30 C. C. P. A. 821; 132 F. (2d) 942 RENSTROM v. SOLOMON (No. 4657) INTERFERENCE-RIGHT TO MAKE THE CLAIM As shown in the drawings of the appellee application, the two sides of each tooth slope to a narrow point at its outer end and the wheel, viewed either with or without its toothed part, is circular in shape. It is not proper to regard the "sides of the teeth" as sides of the wheel itself, and under the wording of the claim the limitation as to the shape of the roller considered as a whole is the important feature. United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, [Reversed.] December 1, 1942 APPEAL from Patent Office, Interference No. 76,856 Cushman, Darby & Cushman (William M. Cushman and Gorham F. Freer of counsel) for appellant. Charles M. Palmer for appellee. [Oral argument November 6, 1942, by Mr. Freer and Mr. Palmer] Before GARRETT, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, LENROOT, and JACKSON, Associate Judges GARRETT, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming that of the Examiner of Inter ferences awarding priority of invention to the party Solomon as to four counts involved in an interference declared between a patent issued to the party Renstrom, and an application of the party Solomon, the subject matter being broadly defined as hair curlers. The patent to Renstrom, No 2,118,737, bears date of May 24, 1938, the application, serial No. 184,459, therefor having been filed January 11, 1938. The application of Solomon, serial No. 177,666, was filed December 2, 1937. So, Renstrom is the junior party. At some time during the prosecution of Solomon's application, apparently March 3, 1939, he amended it by copying four of the six claims of the Renstrom patent and requested an interference declaration. The interference was declared March 20, 1939. Counts 1 and 2 (which are claims 1 and 3 of the patent) are typical. They read: 1. A roller for coacting with an end of a hair curler to secure clamp means thereof in hair clamping position, the roller being polygonal. 2. A roller for pivotal mounting and coacting with an end of a hair curler to secure clamp means thereof in hair-clamping position, the roller being resilient and having a polygonal periphery. During the motion period (following the opening of the preliminary statements of the respective parties) Renstrom moved to dissolve the interference. The motion was denied by the Primary Examiner. Renstrom took no testimony and orders by the Examiner of Interferences followed, culminating in one of November 27, 1940, making the award of priority to Solomon, which, upon appeal by Renstrom, was affirmed by the board in the decision now before us for review. From the decision of the Primary Examiner we quote the following description, the italics being supplied, and numerals omitted: The common invention relates to a hair curler comprising a tubular mandrel, a semi-tubular clamping finger pivotally connected to the mandrel, and a loop whose intwined ends form the pivot for connecting the tubular, semi-tubular, and loop members, which loop is provided at its bight portion with an element to be partly received within the open end of the tube for holding the parts closed. In operation of the device, the outer end of a strand of hair is placed beneath the clamping finger and bound to the mandrel, the strand of hair is then wound about the mandrel and clamping finger, and, when the strand is completely wound the loop is moved into closed position and so retained in Renstrom by the polygonal figure mounted on the bight portion of the loop being partly received in the tubular mandrel and in Solomon by the toothed wheel being partly received within the tubular mandrel. The devices do not differ in the type of means mounted at the bight portion of the loop that of Renstrom, however being designated a polygonal preferably octagonal roller of rubber ** * *; while that of Solomon is designated a soft rubber disc stay having a peripheral rim or surface provided with a closed band of spaced teeth * * ** The particular feature about which the controversy revolves is the element described in counts 1 and 3 as a polygonal roller, and in counts 3 and 4 as a roller having a polygonal periphery-descriptions which, in the final analysis, have the same meaning. In his motion to dissolve, Renstrom stated two general grounds. The first is that Solomon has no right to make the counts because of lack of any disclosure of, or claim to, a polygonal roller or a roller having a polygonal periphery. The second is alternative, viz., that if the counts be construed to read upon the subject matter disclosed in the Solomon application they are unpatentable to Solomon over certain references which were made of record by the Primary Examiner in connection with Solomon's application during its prosecution and before the claims which constitute the counts had been copied into same. In connection with the first ground Renstrom made the contention that the counts should be regarded ambiguous and, therefore, interpreted in the light of his patent from which they were taken. Under the view which we take of the case only the first ground need be considered. We feel constrained to disagree with the holding of the tribunals of the Patent Office that the toothed wheel shown in the application of Solomon meets the requirement of the counts for a polygonal roller, or a roller having a polygonal periphery. Webster's New International Dictionary defines "polygon" as "A figure, generally plane and closed, having many angles, and hence many sides, esp. one of more than four angles." The Primary Examiner said, "The sides of the teeth [on the periphery of the wheel shown in Solomon's application] are obviously the sides of a polygon." The board, we suppose, entertained the same view. The teeth on the periphery are integral with the wheel and constitute a part of same. As shown in the drawings of the Solomon application the two sides of each tooth slope to a narrow point at its outer end and the wheel, viewed either with or without its toothed part, is circular in shape. It does not seem to us proper to regard the "sides of the teeth" as sides of the wheel itself, and under the wording of the claims the limitation as to the shape of the roller considered as a whole is the important feature. For the reasons stated, we are unable to agree that the roller shown by Solomon may properly be held to be polygonal, or to have a polygonal periphery. Consequently the decision of the board affirming that of the Examiner of Interferences is reversed. 550 O. G. 186; 30 C. C. P. A. 824; 132 F. (2d) 931 JONES . WINSOR (No. 4649) 1. PATENTS-APPEAL AND ERROR-GENERAL AFFIRMANCE The Board of Appeals did not discuss the holding of the Examiner that the question of estoppel against appellee may not be considered, because of appellant's failure to move to dissolve the interference under the provisions of Rule 122, but the general affirmance by the Board of the Examiner's decision operated to affirm this holding of the Examiner also. 2. PATENTS-INTERFERENCE-COMMON ASSIGNEE The United States is not in the position of an assignee of both applications. It is only a non-exclusive licensee and the parties to this appeal each have separate and adverse interests. The doctrine of election by a common assignee has no application here. 3. PATENTS INTERFERENCE ESTOPPEL Even though the patent to the appellant had issued, under the circumstances it would be most unconscionable to hold that appellee should not be permitted to prove that he was the first inventor, and if he could establish that fact, receive an award of priority in this proceeding. 4. PATENTS INTERFERENCE-REDUCTION TO PRACTICE The record establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that appellee was not only the first to conceive the invention, but reduced it to practice prior to February 27, 1932, as held by the Patent Office tribunals. 5. PATENTS-INTERFERENCE-DILIGENCE It is elementary in patent law that after a party has reduced an invention to practice, he is not chargeable with diligence, unless a subsequent conceiver has reduced the invention to practice prior to its reduction by the first conceiver. 6. PATENTS INTERFERENCE-SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE There is nothing in the record to indicate that any evidence was suppressed, nor does it appear that appellant ever made a demand upon the government or upon opposing counsel herein which was refused, for the production of the originals or photostatic copies of any papers relating to appellant's application for patent. United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, December 26, [Affirmed.] 1942 APPEAL from Patent Office, Interference No. 73,270 M. E. Jones for appellant. J. F. Mothershead and Carl D. McManamy for appellee. [Oral argument November 10, 1942, by Mr. M. E. Jones and Mr. McManamy] Before GARRETT, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, LENROOT, and JACKSON, Associate Judges LENROOT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal brings before us for a review a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office in an interference pro |