I. TOWARD THE END

AMONTH ago I closed my article with

the discussion of the text of the Four Power Treaty and the examination of the political facts which led up to it. In the weeks which have followed, the attention of the Washington Conference has mainly been occupied with three things: First, with the Four Power Treaty, as it took on a new meaning under rather unusual circumstances; second, with the question of the limitation of naval armament, which had one incident verging on the sensational; and finally, with Far Eastern matters, of which China's situation is the most important.

In the present article I shall confine myself to a review of the discussion of the Four Power Treaty and of the naval limitation, leaving to another month any detailed survey of the Chinese questions which remain for the most part in the condition in which they stood when I last wrote, with no solution that warrants any extended remarks.

But before passing to the Washington Conference it is necessary to note that events outside of our own country have tended to give a new significance to this gathering. Mr. Hoover once described it as "a red carpet leading to a party," and from Cannes, where the Prime Ministers of many countries had gathered, there comes the announcement that-despite the amazing circumstances attending the resignation of M. Briand-there is soon to be a "party" which will take the form of an ecomonic conference to be held at Genoa on March 8. Thus the new watchword will be "back to Columbus."

In the larger sense, Washington, at best, will prove the preliminary to a new world conference, dealing with far greater issues, concerning many more countries, and if this in turn proves successful, it will mark the first concerted effort since the armistice to bring Allied nations and what were only recently enemy nations into coöperation for the common task of starting the world's economic watch to ticking again. And in looking backward over the recent events at

Washington, one must keep the European facts in mind.

We had a Washington Conference primarily because there were conditions in the Pacific Ocean, political conditions, which seemed to our own statesmen dangerous. To the questions of the Pacific were added those of armament. Logically it was perceived. that if political conditions could be satisfactorily dealt with, then there was every reason in the world why the race for naval supremacy should be called off and the costs of construction and the incidental dangers of competition abolished.

We disposed of the political questions in the Four Power Treaty, which at once provided for the elimination of the AngloJapanese Alliance and supplied the basis for peace in the regions of the Pacific Ocean by committing all four great powers to a declaration recognizing as inviolable the rights and possessions of one another. This done, we passed to the negotiation of a Five Power Treaty, which fixed naval strengths.

Unfortunately, while it was possible to arrive at a political settlement in the Pacific, preceding a naval arrangement, it was not possible, for obvious reasons, to reach any political settlement in the case of European conditions. Since it was not possible, European political conditions had properly been left off the agenda of the Washington Conference. This fact, however, imposed a necessary limitation upon the military and naval settlements which could be arranged and explained in totality the momentary disappointment over the submarine dispute.

Yet Americans should perceive, with respect to the submarine, that the attitude of France, which was in reality the attitude of Italy and is the attitude of most, if not all, of the weaker naval powers in Europe and in South America both, was, so far as France was concerned, based upon the fact that no political settlement had been made in advance or could be made in advance. And Americans must also remember that we should naturally and necessarily have refused a naval limitations program had we failed to get our political settlement first.

In all I have to say this month I desire to keep this point clear, for it is the key to what has happened and will happen in the European field. The Conference of Cannes, proceeding concomitantly with that of Washington, was in reality seeking to reach political solutions. If those agreements reached prior to M. Briand's departure can be confirmed in private discussions between Lloyd George and M. Poincaré, then the way will be cleared for economic discussions at Genoa. In any case, economic reconstruction, like limitation of naval armament, must follow, not precede, political settlements.

As it stands, the Washington Conference is plainly drawing to its close. In broad lines we know most of what it will accomplish. It has destroyed an old situation in the Pacific which was full of danger. It has opened a new phase. It has brought an association of four nations, which takes the place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and will, in due course, replace that other private pact, the Franco-Japanese Alliance. It has interrupted the conscious pitting of Japanese strength against American, and the consideration of the Pacific as the scene of a new war.

Quietly, but no less significantly, Britain has accepted the equal strength of another nation upon the seas. In less than ten years British supremacy on the blue water will have ceased, but even during that time all building against her by America, all AngloAmerican competition in battleships and bankruptcy, will have been prevented. nothing was possible until the political circumstances had been faced.

But

British statesmanship, which is very farseeing, perceived last summer that the AngloJapanese Alliance must go. It determined that it should be replaced by some sort of a three-power arrangement between Japan, Britain, and ourselves. The Four Power Treaty is the realization of British purpose. The presence of France as a signatory is the result of an American wish.

II. THE FOUR POWER PACT

When on December 10, in the Plenary Session, Senator Lodge presented the Four Power Treaty, there was general recognition in this country that this treaty represented the operation of clearing the way for the naval limitation. All the negotiations up to that moment had been developed toward this removal of the obstacles,

chief of which was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. What the country did not perceive and unfortunately Senator Lodge neglected to make clear was that the treaty covered, not merely the colonial possessions of the signatory nations, but the homeland of Japan.

We had then a moment of bewilderment when, after Mr. Hughes had on three successive days announced that the mainland of Japan was included within the meaning of the language of the treaty, President Harding flatly asserted on the fourth day that the opposite was the case. A few hours later the President issued a formal statement acknowledging that his commissioners had signed the treaty believing it applied to the mainland.

Now we have here to consider, not the reasons for the accidental lack of complete liaison between President and Secretary of State, but the bearing of the two translations of the document upon the situation. In the first place: How did the American commissioners come to consent to the inclusion of the mainland of Japan? The reason is simple: They did it, as they have now explained privately, because they did not regard the point as important.

What happened was that when the language of the treaty had been agreed upon Mr. Balfour raised the question as to whether islands and dominions in the region of the Pacific included the main islands of Japan. There was discussion and Mr. Balfour insisted that he and his associates held this view because Australia and New Zealand were included and, being sovereignties like Japan, would feel their dignity affronted if they should be protected like the Philippines while Japan was not. Mr. Shidehara, representing Japan, demurred, insisting that Japanese pride would be hurt if the mainland of Japan received even the color of a guarantee which was not extended to the mainland of the United States, and that Japanese prestige would suffer.

In the end, as so often happened, Mr. Balfour had his way. Japan was included. Our delegates, Mr. Hughes in particular, expressed no opinion, for they regarded the question as outside of their field of interest. For them the Four Power Treaty was a mere self-denying ordinance. For them it meant no more than an agreement to respect the rights and integrity of other nations, and they were quite as ready to respect the integrity of the main islands of Japan as of

the outer fringe of her mandated territories.

No one quite knows why Mr. Lodge made no reference to this fact in his address, yet it would seem-and his friends say thisthat he held to the American view that the point was unimportant. It would seem, too, that there was a suggestion, perhaps made by Mr. Balfour, that the point be not stressed, since, if it were, the Japanese might take umbrage and feel that there had been just such a reflection upon their honor as their Ambassador, Mr. Shidehara, had suggested. And that seems to be the whole story of the incident.

But when the President's comment provoked nation-wide discussion, then there were two odd repercussions. In Japan the In Japan the opposition took just the line Mr. Shidehara had foreseen, while in the United States there was much protest against a unilateral provision, no matter how tenuous were the commitments it carried with it. Happily a solution was not difficult to find. Japan and the United States both had strong rea sons in domestic politics for a restatement of the meaning of the treaty, and France had not the smallest interest in objecting. Therefore it was clear that Mr. Balfour could not long hold out in defense of that provision which he had put in in order to salve the pride of Australia.

Already

The way out has been taken. agreement has been reached upon the form of a protocol, a note which will be exchanged between the signatories to the Four Power Treaty, asserting that each accept the meaning of the language therein contained as having no reference to the main islands of Japan. With this agreement dies all the agitation in the Senate in favor of a reservation to this effect, and similarly the opposition in Japan loses its argument against the treaty.

Undeniably the whole episode was unfortunate. It gave the impression, which I do not think was in the least warranted, that an attempt had been made to deceive. Simple explanations are seldom acceptable, but are more than once accurate, and I am inclined to think the real explanation lay in the failure of the American delegation to perceive that the question had any real importance, and therefore their omission to stress it was natural. They saw it simply as a question between Japan and Great Britain and accepted the decision of these countries. What they were concerned with was the extinction of the Anglo-Japanese

Treaty and the avoidance of any commitment by us which should even take the form of an alliance.

More serious, but by no means of incurable character, was the failure to extinguish the Franco-Japanese Treaty, as well as the Anglo-Japanese. The two documents are equally undesirable from the American point of view, and American ratification of the Four Power Treaty would hardly precede the extinction of this agreement between two of the signatories, which binds them to a variety of coöperations on the mainland of Asia. But doubtless this omission will be rectified in the Nine Power Treaty which will deal with questions on the mainland of Asia.

As to the Four Power Treaty, in return for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which we regarded as dangerous, we have agreed to respect Japanese and British rights and sovereignty in the Pacific and to confer and consult in case of differences of opinion between the signatories or between a signatory and an outside power.

III. THE SUBMARINE

Turning now to the debate over the submarine, we have a far more complicated matter to deal with. At the outset of the Conference the United States declared for the submarine and placed at 90,000 the tonnage desired by us. This stand represented the opinion of our naval advisers and was supported by a unanimous report of the Advisory Committee appointed by President Harding to supplement the labors of the delegates themselves.

When Mr. Hughes presented this view on November 12, Mr. Balfour instantly took exception to it and opened the debate over the advisability of banning the submarine altogether. From the outset it became clear that Britain stood alone in her position against the submarine, and for obvious reasons, since for her and for her alone, the submarine was a deadly weapon in the hands of any enemy. But France, Japan, Italy and most other countries, including many not represented at the Conference, argued that it was the weapon of the future and the main arm of countries whose finances did not permit them to build capital ships.

I shall not trace here the course of the debate, but merely note that as it progressed Mr. Hughes became more and more

imprcard with British arguments and his hampion-hup of the submarine grew weaker and weaker On the other hand, the French und bedom povations did not change and they were substantially supported by many gher mature not at the Conference.

But the French position had a double wwwer It was haval, as expressed by Tom's wwval expert; it was also political. by Fox se'l xand quite frankly: "You had on in the Pacific which troubled 4 political situation, and before you way lam tation you got rid of distication by a political treaty.

w Power Pact Now we 4 x textion, a pol real situawe can get id of it we can

**tation o

time as they could make their terms Europe, just as the British had refraine from scrapping the Anglo-Japanese Allie until they had obtained our promise to joż in a Four Power Pact. The difference w that the French were bargaining with British, while the British were bargaining with us.

As a consequence the proposed limitati of the tonnage of submarines and the st gested banning of them went by the bur Since France would not consent to accep tonnage less than that of Britain or 2 United States. Beth countries refused limitation and Britain declined smir to accept any limitation on all aur shan which are in fact the anti-submi

lways a political, not a naval, question, and herefore it had to be settled by political, hot naval, adjustments.

Turning now for a moment to the quesion of the regulation of submarines under Root resolutions, I warn my readers against 00 broad assumptions. What has hapened is no more than that the powers repesented in Washington have agreed to reffirm that state of law which existed before he World War and to promise among emselves not to imitate German violations f international law. Before the war treatent of merchant vessels was strictly reguted. But the Germans refused to observe my of the laws.

At Washington it is agreed that subarines must be operated as were warships fore 1914. Merchantmen must be vised and searched, not sunk on sight, and ssengers and crews must be taken off. But is was the law before the German foray. to the prime point, "What is a merchantin?" it has not been settled. The British n all their merchantmen in war. The ench law authorizes the sinking of all ned ships. Therefore the way is still en for a vast amount of trouble, and in ling to define merchantmen the Washing■ Conference has really begged the quesn, although reports of its decisions give impression that it has done something great importance.

As a result of the Franco-British situathe submarine and auxiliary ships, isers and the like, remain unregulated as numbers or size, so far as the submarine oncerned, although the cruiser is limited

as to size and calibre of cannon. This · mean that in the future we shall have nsive competition in these fields, as in raft, which also escape without restrics, or it may mean that new conferences, wing new political agreements, will to an application to the more modern pons of those limitations now applied to obsolescent battleship by the Conference. V. THE FIVE POWER TREATY

have discussed the submarine in advance e question of naval ratio because, at least e contemporary press, it had a place of er importance. It remains now to disthe question of the limitation of capital , which, in the minds of most Amerisubstituted the main business of the hington Conference. Everyone recalls

that on November 12, in his opening speech, Mr. Hughes proposed that the United States, Japan, and Great Britain should undertake to reduce their naval strength, which was to be represented by the ratio 5-5-3, the smallest figure representing the Japanese strength. He proposed also that there should be a tenyear holiday in naval construction and that at the end of that period the United States, Great Britain, and Japan should possess approximately 500,000 tons of capital ships for the first two and 300,000 tons for Japan.

Substantially this result has been arrived at and will be embodied in the Five Power Treaty which, as I write, is being drafted. In the course of the negotiations the Japanese insisted that they should be permitted to keep their great new ship, the Mutsu, which was to them an object of patriotic pride. This Japanese claim, quite reasonable in the premises, led to a modification of the program as proposed by Mr. Hughes, and as a consequence of the modification the United States will scrap two old ships and complete two post-Jutlands now nearly finished-the Colorado and the Washington, giving us three post-Jutlands-the Colorado, the Maryland, and the Washington. Great Britain will be free to construct two superHoods, but the ratio of strength as between the three Great Powers will remain unchanged, as will all the other conditions proposed by Mr. Hughes.

Having completed the negotiations as between the three principal naval powers, Mr. Hughes turned to the case of France. and Italy. Here he encountered momentary objections on the part of the French, who presented a program calling for ten new capital ships, It turned out, however, that the French claim was based on the statement made by Mr. Hughes in his opening speech that the ratio established for capital ships would be maintained in the case of submarine and auxiliary cruisers.

An exchange of notes between Mr. Hughes and M. Briand led to the French acceptance of a ratio of 1.75, representing substantially their present strength in capital ships, and Italy accepted the same figure. As I have said, France advanced her claim to ten battleships, not with the idea of building these battleships, but merely for obtaining the ten-battleship ratio with respect to submarine and auxiliary ships, and this was the first maneuver for the submarines which I have already explained.

As yet undisclosed and still requiring that