could have been no possible denial of so reasonable a proposal. We should have seen not merely the sinking of the surrendered German battleships, but a subsequent scrapping of all navies, with the retention of a sufficient number of destroyers to constitute an international maritime police. We did not, however, propose the "freedom of the seas" doctrine until it was too late to insist upon it; and, although from some points of view it was the most practical and important of all the Fourteen Points, we were obliged to withdraw it in order to secure an armistice otherwise based upon American principles.

Conflicting

What could have been done for

Naval Policies naval disarmament quite easily After the War in the early part of 1918, could not be done in November of that year; and much less could it be done in the peacemaking Conference at Paris. President Wilson came home with a fixed determination that if the United States was not to promote the cause of disarmament and peace through the mutual guarantees of a League of Nations, we would have to proceed to support our principles, as well as to defend our interests, by creating as rapidly as possible a navy that should be not merely one of the strongest, but decidedly the most powerful in the world. This demand of the Wilson Administration upon Congress and the country was made at a time when the British Government was proclaiming, with equal earnestness and determination, the continued and permanent policy of supremacy for the British fleet. Up to that time, the British Government had not wavered in its purpose to build ships in maintenance of its two-power policy. That is to say, the British navy must either be twice as powerful as the navy next in rank, or else at least as powerful as the second and third navies combined.

capacity of the Panama Canal, so that the United States would not have been able in case of trouble to bring super-dreadnoughts from the Atlantic Fleet to the aid our ships in the Pacific. British interests in Asia were so complicated that the Japanese felt secure in the belief that Great Britain would be obliged to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. While this alliance would probably not have brought the British fleet into direct action against the United States if we had been engaged in war with Japan, it was evident enough that, with the alliance maintained and renewed, the danger of strife in the Pacific would be increased rather than diminished unless, indeed, the United States should practically abandon what had hitherto been regarded as American interests and American responsibilities in the Pacific and Far East.

Competition

as

Proposed

Such were the situations that

our Government was facing last year; and Secretary Daniels, with President Wilson's approval, did not hesitate to ask Congress to support a shipbuilding program that would in due time have made the American navy stronger than the British, while leaving Japan far in the rear. It was admitted everywhere that, in a competition for naval prestige and power, the United States was foremost in command of money, materials, shipyards, and labor, and could soon take first rank. All other interested governments were anxiously studying the signs at Washington to see if the proposed naval policy would have Republican as well as Democratic support. It soon became apparent that foreign policy as directed by President Harding and Secretary Hughes was of a most friendly and pacific quality, but that it was even more firm and more definite than had been the foreign policies of the Wilson Administration during its last year. The Republican Administration was very anxious to reduce public expenditures. It had no desire to participate in a competitive armament race. It was willing, however, to spend as much money as might be found necessary to defend the peace of the United States and to protect American interests.

in dispute; and the other was to make such abundant preparation in advance that no nation under any pretext would involve itself in war with us without having been willing to try all possible methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. It is necessary to have in mind these considerations in order to understand the difficulties and dangers that confronted governments when President Harding invited Great Britain and Japan to study the international problems of the Far East and the Pacific. It was a happy decision at Washington to give the Conference a broader character by inviting France and Italy to participate, with China as vitally concerned, and with Holland and Belgium not merely as having colonial interests, but also as representing highly civilized members of the family of nations not engaged in naval competition and deeply interested in peace by agreement.

and Japan stop their current building of battleships and reduce their navies in such a way that fixed ratios might be established. It is evident that such a plan must involve an immense number of technical considerations, and these will form topics for future discussion. The great point of the Hughes proposal was that competition should cease, and that, as regards the larger classes of ships, navies should not expand during the coming ten years beyond the maximum tonnage agreed upon. Concerning ratios, the thing proposed was that England and the United States should aim at an equality with one another in sea power, with the Japanese navy equal to 60 per cent. of the American or the British. It was proposed to reduce the American tonnage of so-called "capital" ships to 500,000 tons, the British ultimately to the same maximum, and the Japanese to 300,000. So much discussion was raised by the Japanese, who until very recently had possessed a quite inferior navy, that there was comparatively little comment upon what in the long run will be seen as the most important of all the decisions made at this conference, namely, that of the British

Britain's

How

fortunate for us if we had felt ourselves compelled to assume that burden. ever, for the American and British governments to accept the principle of naval equality is equivalent to declaring before the whole world that Great Britain and the United States, in further development of the principles of 1814, are not going to make war upon one another, either in the present century, nor in those to follow. Gradually this Anglo-American accord will be made the basis of an association for the regulation of maritime affairs, with a still further limitation of naval armaments. The United States abandoned a prospective position of naval leadership, and the British in turn abandoned an actual leadership, having behind it the tradition and the experience of

There are times when to yield Historic is to conquer. Judged by the Renunciation highest tests of statesmanship and diplomacy, Great Britain won enduring praise for herself, and made an almost measureless contribution to the future harmonizing of the world, when she abandoned the position she has held since the days of Queen Elizabeth, and cordially adopted the proposal that the American navy should be as strong as the British. The people of the British Islands, and those of the British Dominions, have made no mistake in accepting this profound change in their naval policy. Mr. Balfour, as head of the British delegation, in endorsing the Hughes program at the second open session of the Conference, painted an eloquent picture of the British Empire, with its dependence upon ocean transportation and its defensive needs. It is a high order of statesmanship that is able to look all the facts in the face and to make a decision that might seem to involve a sacrifice, whether of power or of prestige. As a matter of fact, this decision will bring to the British people and their associated countries a succession of substantial benefits.

centuries.

British Senti

Unanimous

The British Government, fully ment Almost supporting its delegates at Washington, acted in accordance with the clear sentiment of the British people, as expressed in many ways, notably through the brilliant work of the Conference correspondents of British newspapers, and through the strong endorsement of British editors at home, regardless of political partisanship. At no other point had British national opinion been so sensitive as at this one point of naval policy. To accept whole-heartedly the doctrine that Uncle Sam's navy is to be as strong as John Bull's navy is for the British people to say that the fundamental dogma in their new creed is that of harmony and coöperation with the people of the United States. They believe that the American people will be just, generous and

gallant in all real emergencies. There is no intention whatever on the part of either of these two governments to try to get the better of the other in the development of new forms of naval equipment. It may be true. that battleships are becoming obsolete, and that vessels equipped to carry bombing airplanes are to be regarded by the technical authorities as henceforth more important. But neither of the two governments has any notion of taking advantage of the other through the development of new kinds of machinery for wielding sea power. Their intentions are pacific and coöperative. They will unite to make nával holidays permanent.

challenge) to rule the Pacific by naval power and to dominate Siberia, Manchuria, and China by combined land and sea forces. Certain British imperialists on their part had been saying that they must renew the alliance, if Japan so desired, as a matter of politeness. This of course was a diplomatic way of saying that they believed that there were more advantages for Britain in a combination with Japan for world control than in an agreement with the United States for fair play and coöperation all around. Obviously, the United States could not explicitly demand that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be terminated. Neither could the United States undertake to build a navy that should be greater than the combined fleets of Great Britain and Japan. The time had come for understandings all around; and fortunately the best sentiment of Australia and Canada took the American view, and discovered that public opinion in Great Britain was moving in that direction.

Japan Enters a Larger

In order that the British Gov

ernment should withdraw from Combination the Japanese Alliance without exasperating Japan, it was necessary to create good feeling in that country. This has been to a large extent accomplished at Washington. And so it came to pass that the Alliance was expressly terminated by one of the clauses in a new agreement, known as the Four-Power Treaty and signed at Washington December 13. The parties to this agreement are the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France. In his important article in the present number of this REVIEW, explaining the work of the Conference, Mr. Simonds deals thoroughly with this agreement for maintaining peace in the Pacific. If any question arises that is likely to disturb harmony among these powers, in relation to their insular possessions or other interests of any kind in the Pacific, they agree to come together in fresh conference, to consider the controversy and to adjust it. In a similar way, if disputes arise through the aggression of any other power not a party to the treaty, the four governments agree to hold a conference and determine upon the best way to meet the exigencies of the particular situation. The agreement is to remain in force for ten years, and beyond that period it will continue unless a year's notice is given by any member that it wishes to withdraw. France was glad to be included in any compact that recognizes guarantees for security.

A Treaty of Great Promise

This treaty might appear to the

superficial reader or the casual student of international affairs to be rather vague and indefinite. It is, however, pronounced by the Japanese Premier, Baron Takahashi, as the "grandest contribution to the cause of peace ever recorded in history." It rests upon a basis of confidence and good will, and its implications are altogether those of mutual respect, of good faith all around, and of friendly coöperation. It is obvious that the powers most immediately concerned are three rather than four. Yet there was much felicity in adding France to the list; and the treaty from every standpoint is stronger for this inclusion. France represents the general interest of Europe in the Pacific; moreover, in case of a difference to be adjusted by conference, the presence of France would be especially helpful. This treaty moves in the right direction, by safe and practical methods.