V. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Legislative History and Early Application. The Subcommittee has asked for an examination of the application of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to address problems arising from use of the above-described technologies for alteration of motion pictures without the consent of the principal director and principal screenwriter. Section 43(a) provides: Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). The Trademark Act of 1946, popularly known as the Lanham Act, was enacted to correct several problems that had arisen under the prior Acts of 1905 and 1920. These included a lack of comprehensive trademark protection, conflicting case law, textual ambiguities, and the lack of conformity of U.S. trademark law with international commitments. Section 43(a) did not attract much attention during debates, and its legislative history is sparse. However, the history of the development of the language that became section 43(a) and its historical setting reveal two clear Congressional objectives to create a uniform Federal law - of unfair competition and to protect consumers against confusion. In 1938, the Supreme Court had ruled in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that there is no Federal common law in the United States. This meant that protection from unfair competition, and safeguards against confusion of the buying public, were available only under State law or judicial decisions. The result was "a checkerboard of rights and a checkerboard of protection." Robert, "Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, pp. 265, 285 (1948). ... The drafters of the Lanham Act intended to remedy this lack of uniformity. The Act itself contains a clear statement of Congressional purpose in section 45, which states in relevant part that "[t]he intent of this chapter is to protect persons engaged in ... commerce against unfair competition; [and] to prevent fraud and deception ... by the use of reproductions, copies [and] counterfeits ..... 15 U.S.C. 1127. The Senate Report on the Lanham Act also provides guidance: The purpose... is twofold. One is to protect and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274. Despite its potentially broad application, few cases were brought under section 43(a) in the early years following passage of the Lanham Act. In those few cases, moreover, courts declined to apply the provision to forms of unfair competition other than traditional cases of "passing off," 1.0., the unauthorized use of the trademark of a competitor. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951). The watershed decision came in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). The plaintiff manufactured a dress that it advertised for sale at $17.95; the defendant sold inferior copies of plaintiff's product for $6.95, featuring a photograph of the plaintiff's dress in its advertisements. rejecting defendant's claim that section 43(a) only codified the preexisting common law of unfair competition, the court concluded that Congress had created a new statutory claim for many forms of unfair competition. 214 F.2d at 651. In The real boom in section 43(a) cases began in the 1960s; since then, case law has expanded significantly both the types of conduct falling within the provision and the range of persons with standing to sue. Section 43(a) now provides relief against infringement of unregistered trademarks, unfair competition arising from the copying of trade dress and certain configurations of goods, and false advertising claims related to the goods of another. See "USTA Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations on the United States Trademark System and the Lanham Act" (USTA Review Commission Report) at 96 (1987); see also Bauer, "A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?", 31 UCLA L. Rev. 671, 685-703 (1984). The next section discusses cases where creative artists have sought remedies for false attribution or unconsented alteration of their works under both common-law unfair competition and section 43(a). VI. Protection of Creative Artists Under Common-Law Unfair Competition and Section 43(a). Creative artists are not strangers to the law of unfair competition. For many years, courts have used both common law and section 43(a) unfair competition theories to protect creative artists from violations of their moral rights arising from false attribution or unconsented alteration of their works. It has been said that the law of unfair competition developed judicially to restrain people from "playing dirty tricks on each other." Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcommittee on Trademarks of the House Committee on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1939). In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the Supreme Court granted protection against unfair competition for misappropriation of products involving literary activity. Defendant International News Service (INS) obtained news reports from early news stories written by Associated Press (AP) members; INS sent the stories to its own members in other time zones to compete with AP members there. The Court noted that news stories are not copyrightable per se, but found that AP had a "quasi-property" right in its stories. 248 U.S. at 236. The Court enjoined INS from publishing the stories on the theory that it had "misappropriated" AP's uncopyrighted news product. In Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939), relief was granted against misappropriation of a |