Opinion of the court. manufacture, and that complainant would therefore be put in the same position as if he had originally sold all the machines. That this being the case, he ought not to be allowed to interfere with the vendees of defendants while the suit against them was pending. In support of their position they cited the decrees of Judge Drummond in the case of Isaac W. Barnum v. Herman B. Goodrich, entered in United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, July 2d, 1873, wherein the complainant having brought suit against the defendant, and obtained an order for defendant to keep an account of the sale of the devices alleged to be an infringement, was enjoined from prosecuting suits already begun by him in other circuits against the defendant's vendees, and from bringing any further suits against defendant's vendees; also the decree entered by the Hon. H. H. Emmons, United States Circuit Judge, and Hon. P. B. Swing, United States District Judge, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, in the case of Hezekiah B. Smith v. J. A. Fay & Co., restraining the complainant from bringing suit against the defendant's vendees in other circuits, the complainant in this case having obtained an interlocutory decree, and a reference to the master, and the suit being at that time pending before master on the question of the account. The defendants relied upon the fact that the complainant was a resident of Indiana, and not before the court, and had sought the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of bringing the suit, and for no other purpose. He was not therefore subject to any order upon him, that the court could not enforce an order if it made one, and it would not do an idle thing. Respondents insisted that the order could be enforced by dismissing the suit, by a fine, or, if complainant should afterwards come within the district, by imprisonment. The respondents asking the order were represented by A. Sterling, Esq., and Hatch & Parkinson, of Cincinnati; the complainant by M. D. Leggett & Co., of Cleveland. The following was the decree entered by the court: This cause coming on, etc., on petition of defendant for injunction against complainant, to restrain him from prosecuting or Syllabus. threatening to do so, suits against any vendee of defendant for use or sale of clover hullers made by defendant, and sold by them, and it appearing to court that complainant has threatened to bring such suits, while suit is pending by him in this court against defendants, the manufacturers, the court doth order that complainant be restrained from commencing prosecution, or threatening so to do, any suit against any vendee of defendants, for an alleged infringement of the letters patent involved in this case, and on which this case is brought, based on any user or sale by said vendee of any clover machine purchased of defendants. Provided, defendants within thirty days file a bond in the sum of $5000, with security to be approved by the court, for payment of any damages that may be adjudged against defendants in this suit, and shall also file a sworn monthly statement of the number of clover machines hereafter made and sold by them. Both judges concurred in this. United States Circuit Court, District of South Carolina, at Charleston, December, 1874. CHARLES KERRISON, ASSIGNEE, v. A. T. STEWART & Co. et al. Though a plea to the jurisdiction of a United States district court for irregularity in the process, if taken, might have been sustained, yet if it was not taken, and the defendant appeared, pleaded, and went to trial, and there was judgment after verdict, another United States court will treat the judgment as valid and binding. When, by act of Congress, a district court of the United States is invested with circuit court powers (see Section 571, Rev. Stat. United States), it is not thereby constituted a cireuit court, it possesses those powers only in the territory of the district named by the act of Congress, and neither the justice for the circuit, nor the judge for the circuit of which the district is a part, can sit in such district court. There is no authority of law for removing civil causes, irregularly brought in the circuit court of the United States proper for such district, into such district court. Opinion of the court. IN equity. BOND, J.-In the year, A. T. Stewart & Co. recovered a judgment in the District Court for the Western District of South Carolina, which court by law is clothed with circuit court powers within that district, against Kerrison & Leiding, now in bankruptcy. Kerrison & Leiding, before the rendition of said judgment, had made a deed of assignment for the benefit of certain creditors, which deed Stewart & Co. successfully assailed in the courts of the State as fraudulent; and the judgment in that case, in which the trustees were parties defendant, bound the cestuis que trust also. Kerrison & Leiding then applied for the benefit of the Bankrupt Act, and were adjudicated bankrupts subsequently to the date of the judgment recovered in the District Court of the United States. Stewart & Co. claim to have a lien, by virtue of their judgment, upon the lands of said bankrupt which came into the hands of the assignee. This claim is contested because it is alleged that the record of the said judgment is irregular and imperfect, first because the writ was tested in the name of the Chief Justice of the United States, though the writ was in a district court, and was made returnable before the clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States at Charleston, which is not within said district, who was likewise the clerk of said district court, instead of being returned to rules in the District Court. There are other irregularities set forth in the statement of facts, which it is not necessary to notice, because notwithstanding them all the defendants in this action appeared, pleaded, and went to trial before a jury of the District Court of the Western District, without plea to the jurisdiction, and without any complaint or notice of the irregularities in question, or any of them. Under these circumstances, it must be considered that all errors in pleadings and all irregularities in the filings of the pleas or declarations, and of returns to the process, were waived, and if this were not so, there is no remedy for the defendants except by appeal or writ of error to set the judgment aside, or to reverse it. It cannot be inquired into in this collateral way. I am of opinion that the judgment of A. T. Stewart & Co. v. Kerrison & Leiding is a valid and subsisting one, and that they are Statement of the case. entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of such of the real estate of the bankrupts as it was a lien upon, according to its priority. While the court refuses to set aside this judgment on account of the irregularities complained of, it cannot refrain from saying, for the benefit of the profession, that in its judgment a plea to the jurisdiction of the District Court at Greenville would have been well taken. That court is not a circuit court. Neither the Chief Justice of the United States nor the circuit judge, who are required by law to hold circuit courts, can hold or assist in holding the District Court for the Western District of Sonth Carolina. That court, held by the district judge, has circuit court powers within the territory prescribed by law for its jurisdiction, which any person legally entitled may invoke at pleasure; but there is no authority at all for removing causes originally brought in the Circuit Court of the United States to that court, against the consent of parties, except in certain criminal cases at the instance of the district attorney. I am aware that the practice to do so prevailed for some time, but it has produced great confusion, and has no warrant in law. United States Circuit Court, District of South Carolina, Dec. 1877. GREGORY A. PERDICARIES v. THE CHARLESTON GASLIGHT COMPANY. Stock in a corporation in South Carolina owned, during the civil war, by citizens of the United States, sequestrated during the period of war by a confederate court, and sold to citizens of South Carolina at first and second-hand, did not pass by such proceedings to the purchasers, but belongs still to the loyal citizens against whom it was sequestrated. IN equity. On the 30th August, 1861, the confederate States passed an act in retaliation for the act of the 6th August of the United States, sequestrating, with few exceptions, the property of loyal citizens found within their territory. The proceeds of sale of such sequestrated property were paid into the confederate treasury, to Statement of the case. be held as an indemnity to those suffering loss under said act in the United States. Shortly thereafter a vigilance committee in Charleston reported to the officers charged with the execution of this act, that certain shares in the Charleston Gaslight Company were held by such loyal citizens. Pursuant to the act a writ of garnishment was served on the company, requiring it to make return of its shares so held. On the 27th September, 1861, the company made its return, setting forth that fifteen (15) of its stockholders were, as far as your deponent is informed, living in the several cities of the United States hereinafter set forth, but it cannot pretend to determine whether or not they are alien enemies; and that these held four thousand two hundred and sixty-six (4266) shares, and were entitled to four thousand and two hundred and sixty-six (4266) dollars as dividends. Of these, thirteen citizens of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, were adjudged such alien enemies, and their shares (3766) and their dividends ($3766) were sequestrated, the shares being transferred to the confederate States court on the books of the company, and the dividends being paid to the officers of the confederate States. The names of the loyal stockholders were erased from the list of the company's stockholders. After advertisement, giving the fullest notice of the sale, these shares were sold at public outery, and purchased in various parcels by eighteen persons to whom, on the orders of confederate State officers, scrip bearing the same number as those of the loyal stockholders were issued. Subsequently, 1000 of these 3766 shares were sold to other persons, viz., E. M. Black, William Carrington, Dewing, Thayer & Co., G. F. Jackson, Peoples' Bank of South Carolina, and H. H. Williams. Black was a director, and attended all the meetings of the board, which considered the orders of the confederate States court. The company followed the advice of eminent counsel in obeying the mandates of this court, and, in fact, the penalties for disobedience were very heavy, and no appeal possible, except on giving heavy security. The holders of the sequestrated stock alleged that the company colluded with the officers of the confederate States, in the sequestration of the shares of the loyal stockholders, but failed, absolutely, to prove this. Shortly after |