Opinion of the court. Baltimore. The purchasers had no knowledge of the theft which has been spoken of, nor were there any circumstances attending their purchase of these bonds, tending to put them on inquiry as to the validity of the vendor's title to them, except the fact that the person offering them for sale was a stranger to them, that eight coupons were overdue, and that the bonds themselves were within two days of maturity. Action of covenant is now brought by J. W. Gilbough & Co. against the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad Company, for the amount of the bonds, principal and interest, and this company disclaiming property in the bonds, the Commonwealth of Virginia, by her Attorney-General, has been allowed to assert her claim to them, and make defence to the action under section 1st, chapter 149, of the Code of Virginia. HUGHES, J.-It is useless to pass upon any other question raised in the pleadings except the single one on which the case rests. That question is, assuming these bonds and their coupons to be commercial paper, payable to bearer, transferable by delivery, whether or not the admitted fact that they had been stolen invalidates the title of their bona fide holders by purchase at the market price of such bonds. It is no longer a question that the bonds of corporations payable to bearer are negotiable paper, at all times after they get upon the market, up to the date of their maturity. This is an elementary principle of commercial law. Nor is there any doubt, since the decision in Mercer & Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wallace, 83, that the interest coupons of such bonds not yet due are also negotiable paper. It may also be assumed, as the settled law of this country, as it is of England, that a bona fide holder, for value, of negotiable paper, in the form of the bonds and coupons in this case, by purchase before their maturity, is entitled to recover his demand from the maker or obligor, even though his vendor obtained them by fraud, or theft, or robbery. In general, the purchaser of personal property obtains no better title than that of his vendor, unless, in England, he purchase in certain markets overt. But, for the benefit of commerce, this rule is reversed in respect to negotiable paper, and the holder Syllabus. of such paper, though it has been stolen, has title to it if he himself came to it bona fide in the regular course of trade, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant to disprove the bona fides of his purchase. This principle is too thoroughly established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wallace, 110, National Bank of Washington v. Texas, 20 Wallace, 72, and Hotchkiss v. National Banks, 21 Wallace, 354, to be questioned here; however strong our inclination may be to protect the State of Virginia from such a theft as these bonds were in part the subject of. But clear as the principle of these decisions is, as to the principal of the bonds sued upon in this case, and as to the coupons which had not yet matured at the date of the plaintiffs' purchase, it is well-settled law that the eight coupons which were then past due were not such negotiable paper as falls within the scope of the principle. As to those overdue coupons, the plaintiffs took only the title of their vendor, who called himself Taylor, which was no title at all. See Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Grattan, at pages 777-780, and numerous cases there cited by Judge Joynes. Judgment may be entered accordingly. United States Circuit Court, District of North Carolina, at UNITED STATES v. MAUNIER.* An examination of a prisoner, made before his commitment, under impressions of fear, whether signed or not by him, cannot be read in evidence against him on his trial under indictment for murder on the high seas. An indictment for murder on the high seas need not state the length and depth of the wound which caused the death. * From Francois-Xavier Martin's Notes of North Carolina Decisions, 79. Statement of the cese. INDICTMENT for murder on the high seas. Mr. Attorney of the United States Hill offered to give in evidence the examination of the prisoner before his commitment. Martin, for the prisoner, objected to this: 1st. Because the prisoner at the time of his examination was under impressions of fear. 2d. Because the examination was not subscribed by the pris oner. 1. The prisoner was a French sailor, and the murder with which he stood charged had been committed upon the high seas. On his landing in North Carolina he was taken up and committed to jail. From thence he was taken on the next day, brought into court in irons, and examined, without being informed that he was then under an examination and not on his trial. He understood not the English language, and no one informed him of what was passing. There was room to believe that he thought, when he was remanded to jail, that he had been tried, convicted, and condemned, for he asked a person who understood the French language on what day he was to be executed. The counsel said although in the case of a person who had resided some time in this country, or in others in which the proceedings are carried on by jury, the objection would be frivolous, yet it must have weight in the case of a foreigner unacquainted with our laws and our language; that what the prisoner had seen in court, except perhaps the confrontation of witnesses, was all that in familiar circumstances he would have seen in his own country had he been tried there, where sentence of death is not pronounced in court in presence of the prisoner, but read to him afterwards by the clerk in the dungeon. 2. The examination and confession subscribed by an offender before a justice of the peace is good and sufficient evidence against such offender. Gilb. L. E., 140. The examination of Sterne and Boroski was, by the Chief Justice, refused to be read at their trial. (See St. Tr., vol. iii, p. 470.) And Serjeant Wilson, in his edition of Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. ii, p. 585, in notes, adds a query, whether the Statement of the case. Chief Justice was not right in such refusal. For, by the opinion of some judges now living, the statute does not extend to the examination of the party accused unless he signed his examination, but only to the witnesses or persons accusing. In Vaughan's case, Mr. Crauley having made oath that the examination was taken before Sir Charles Hedges, and signed by the prisoner, it was read. 5 St. Tr., 229. In Harrison's case, the Attorney-General desired that the defendant's examination, taken before the Lord Chief Justice Brumpton, might be read, and the defendant having acknowledged the hand to be his that was subscribed to it, it was read accordingly. 7 Stat. Tr., 118. In Layer's case, the prisoner's counsel said, and the Chief Justice granted, that this examination could not be read unless it was signed by him. 8 St. Tr., 474; 8 Mead, 89. PATTERSON, J., thought the examination ought to have been signed by the prisoner. SITGREAVES, J., said the first objection had much weight with him, and Mr. Attorney of the United States withdrew his motion. And it was moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the length and depth of the wound were not mentioned in the indictment. The prisoner's counsel cited 4 Co., 42; Haydon's case.* The court did not intimate that they had any doubt, but said if they had they would direct a copy of the indictment and reasons to be transmitted to the Supreme Court. Curia advisare vult. The court directed the prisoner to be arraigned on another indictment which had been found against him. Whereupon he pleaded not guilty, and the court ordered the trial to be proceeded on instantly. And with some difficulty was prevailed upon to adjourn it to the succeeding Monday, it being Saturday. An order was then made that the marshal send expresses to *This reference is at fault; but is taken literally from Judge Martin's book. Syllabus. the grand jury (who had been discharged), commanding their immediate return. On Monday following the prisoner was brought to the bar, as he and his counsel expected, to be tried on the second indictment. But the court informed the bar they would take up the motion in arrest of judgment. On the part of the United States several precedents of indictments were read out of West, in which the length and depth of the wound are not mentioned. Martin observed that, in all the indictments (but one) in which the length and depth of the wound were not mentioned, the instrument had gone through the body of the person killed, some limb had been cut off, or the wound had been given with a blunt In this case the mortal wound was stated to have been given with an axe, on the head. That the authority in Coke was not only unshaken, but frequently recognized. weapon. The court, however, overruled the motion, without making any observation, and passed sentence of death. At the same time sentence was passed on three other men who had been included in the same indictment, and they were soon after executed. This is the first time that judgment of death was given under the authority of the United States. United States Circuit Court, for the District of Virginia, at Richmond, November, 1795. UNITED STATES v. MUNDELL.* It is not necessary that the name of the prosecutor in the courts of the United States should be written at the foot of the indictment. In indictments for misdemeanors in the courts of the United States, the court, and not the jury, should assess the fine. When a statute of the United States makes any provision upon a subject within the scope of the powers of the General government, the State laws upon the same subject cease to operate. *This report is taken from 6 Call's Virginia Reports, p. 245. |