advantages and disadvantages when the action is for injury to a passenger as when it is for an injury to goods.22 In general, the tort action is preferable, so that the majority of suits against the passenger carrier are brought in that form.23 Where it is doubtful whether the action in any particular case is to be regarded as one of assumpsit or trespass on the case, the leaning of the courts is to consider the action one of trespass on the case founded on the breach of duty inhering in the relation of carrier and passenger.” Where exemplary damages are sought, the declaration must be on the tort, and not in assumpsit, on the contract.25

THE PLEADINGS

205. As in the case of actions against carriers of goods, the pleadings in an action against the passenger carrier should show clearly whether the action is one of contract or of tort. The pleadings should state facts stating a complete cause of action, consistent with the evidence to be adduced at the trial.

more City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619, 48 Am. Rep. 134; NEVIN ▾. PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO., 106 Ill. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 297; Willson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 5 Wash. 621, 32 Pac. 468, 34 Pac. 146; Serwe v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 48 Minn. 78, 50 N. W. 1021; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Peoples, 31 Ohio St. 537; Knights v. Quarles, 2 Brod. & B. (Eng.) 102; Boster v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 36 W. Va. 318. 15 S. E. 158; Hansley v. Jamesville & W. R. Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. 528, 32 L. R. A. 543, 44 Am. St. Rep. 474.

22 See ante, § 155. The differences are chiefly concerned with statutes of limitation, the parties who may sue and be sued, strictness of allegation and proof, and damages.

23 See ante, p. 503. See, also, Heirn v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17, 66 Am. Dec. 588; Denver Tramway Co. v. Cloud, 6 Colo. App. 445, 40 Pac. 779; Willson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 5 Wash. 621, 32 Pac. 468, 34 Pac. 146; Kelly v. Ry. Co., [1895] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 944; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Laird, 164 U. S. 393, 17 Sup. Ct. 120, 41 L. Ed. 485.

24 See Chitty on Pleading, 135; Burnett v. Lynch, 5 Barn. & C. (Eng.) 589; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 74 Am. Dec. 785; Gorman v. Southern Pac. Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31 Pac. 1112, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157; Boling v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 189 Mo. 219, 88 S. W. 35; McKeon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 477, 69 N. W. 175, 35 L. R. A. 252, 59 Am. St. Rep. 910.

25 See ante, p. 504. See, also, Purcell v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 108 N. C. 414, 12 S. E. 954, 956, 12 L. R. A. 113; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Moore, 40 Miss. 39; Craker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Wysor, 82 Va. 250; Pullman Co. v. Lutz, 154 Ala. 517, 45 South. 675, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 904, 129 Am. St. Rep. 67; Richardson v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. E. 235; Sedgwick on Damages (9th Ed.) §§ 603, 670.

Particularly striking is the analogy between the carrier of goods and the passenger carrier as to the pleadings in actions against the carrier.26 It is the peculiar function of the plaintiff's pleading to indicate whether the case is one ex contractu or ex delicto."" Then the plaintiff's pleading should contain, consistent with his theory of the case, a statement of every essential fact in the cause of action against the passenger carrier. These facts should indicate: (a) The establishment of the relation of passenger and carrier.28 (b) The duty owed by the carrier.29 (c) The breach of that duty.30 (d) The damage to the passenger resulting proximately from this breach, and when special damages are sought these should be duly pleaded. Finally, the pleader should remember that he must prove his case as alleged, and therefore he must so shape his pleadings as to prevent any variance between the facts alleged and the facts proved. The allegata and probata must correspond.

31.

26 See ante, § 156.

27 As just indicated, the courts lean toward considering the action as one ex delicto. See cases cited in note 24.

28 North Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Liddicoat, 99 Ala. 545, 13 South. 18; Breese v. Trenton Horse R. Co., 52 N. J. Law, 250, 19 Atl. 204; Smith v. Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co., 124 Ind. 394, 24 N. E. 753; Powell v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. (Miss.) 8 South. 738.

29 This is the least important, since, if the proper facts be alleged from which the duty springs, the duty duly follows, largely as a matter of course, so that the court will take judicial notice of the nature and extent of the duty. See Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441, 92 Am. Dec. 322; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Laird, 58 Fed. 760, 7 C. C. A. 489; Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340, 30 Am. Rep. 799.

30 The modern decisions are quite liberal to the plaintiff, in not requiring great particularity here, and in upholding allegations of negligence in general and sometimes quite indefinite forms. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S. W. 280, 11 L. R. A. 486, 23 Am. St. Rep. 345; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542, 21 N. E. 31, 12 Am. St. Rep. 443; McCaslin v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 93 Mich. 553, 53 N. W. 724; Lavis v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 54 Ill. App. 636; Searle v. Kanawha & O. Ry. Co., 32 W. Va. 370, 9 S. E. 248.

81 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Savage, 110 Ind. 156, 9 N. E. 85; Southern Pac. Co. v. Hall, 100 Fed. 760, 41 C. C. A. 50; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Cook, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 376, 27 S. W. 769; Wabash Western Ry. Co. v. Friedman, 146 Ill. 583, 30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E. 1111.

32 Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v. Winn, 93 Ala. 306, 9 South. 509; Buck v. People's Street Railway & Electric Light & Power Co., 108 Mo. 179, 18 S. W. 1090; Lombard & S. S. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Christian, 124 Pa. St. 114, 16 Atl. 628; Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Stark, 38 Mich. 714; Indiana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46; Richmond Ry. & Electric Co. v. West, 100 Va. 184, 40 S. E. 643.

THE EVIDENCE

206. The plaintiff's evidence, that is consistent with his pleadings, as well as relevant and admissible, must, in the light of legal presumptions, establish the facts necessary to make out a cause of action against the passenger carrier.

Here, as elsewhere, the duty of proving his case rests upon the passenger plaintiff. The evidence adduced for this purpose must of course be relevant and such as is admissible according to the doctrines of evidence as applied by the courts.33 By a preponderance of such evidence, the passenger must prove the essential facts in his case on which the recovery is based.31

The burden of proof upon the various questions that may arise. in actions against passenger carriers has already been discussed in connection with the specific treatment of each of these questions. Particularly important are the presumptions as to the carrier's negligence 35 and the passenger's contributory negligence.36 It therefore may not be amiss to state again that proof of the mere happening of an accident causing injury does not necessarily raise a presumption of the carrier's negligence. But such presumption does arise when the proof shows that the accident was due to instrumentalities peculiarly in the carrier's control and that ordinary experience demonstrates that such accidents can be avoided by the use of the highest degree of practicable care. As to contributory negligence, the better doctrine, supported by the weight of authority, is that this is a defense to be affirmatively proved by the carrier. A number of courts, however, require the passenger to negative his contributory negligence, by proving the exercise of ordinary care on his part, as an element of his case against the carrier.

33 See 2 Fetter on Passenger Carriers, §§ 447-472, for discussion of this subject, with practical reference to actions against carriers of passengers.

34 Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836, 54 Am. Rep. 312; Yarnell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 1, 18 L. R. A. 599; Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021, 16 L. R. A. 808, 28 Am. St. Rep. 72; Dennis v. Pittsburg & C. S. R. R., 165 Pa. 624, 31 Atl. 52; Murphy v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 89 Ga. 832, 15 S. E. 774; Donovan v. Hartford St. Ry. Co., 65 Conn. 201, 32 Atl. 350, 29 L. R. A. 297.

35 See ante, § 188, and cases cited in notes.

36 See ante, § 188, and cases cited in notes.

THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES-ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

207. In actions brought by the passenger for personal injuries, the damages are such as will reasonably compensate the passenger for the damage suffered as a proximate and natural consequence of such injury. Among the important elements of the damage are mental and physical pain, inconvenience, loss of time, medical expenses, and diminution of earning power.

87

The measure of damages for personal injuries which the passenger may recover against the carrier is in general the same as in personal injury cases in other fields of the law. A very striking difference is necessarily found here, however, between carriers of goods and passenger carriers. As to the former, the most important element is the more or less definite market value of the goods; 38 as to the latter, other and subtler considerations must apply in compensating the injured passenger, with a wide field for the personal equation as to the passenger and the varying judgment of juries. Damages are, of course, allowed only for the proximate and natural consequences of the injury, though these may be quite varied.39 When the consequences, however, are proximate and natural, it is no defense to the carrier that these injuries were aggravated by, or even would not have been suffered had it not been for, the previous sickness of the passenger, as in the case of a pregnant woman."

41

40

87 RICKETTS v. CHESAPEAKE & O. R. CO., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S. E. 801, 7 L. R. A. 354, 25 Am. St. Rep. 901, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 378; Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. Ed. 374; Cone v. Central R. Co., 62 N. J. Law, 99, 40 Atl. 780; Smedley v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. Ry. Co., 184 Pa. 620, 39 Atl. 544; Florida Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394, 5 South. 714; Kral v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 422, 74 N. W. 166; Southern Pac. Co. v. Maloney, 136 Fed. 171, 69 C. C. A. 83; VAN DE VENTER v. CHICAGO CITY R. CO. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 32, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 377.

38 See ante, §§ 160-161.

89 Hobbs v. Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. (Eng.) 111; Bell v. Gulf & C. R. Co., 76 Miss. 71, 23 South. 268; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277; Boothby v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 66 N. H. 342, 34 Atl. 157; Rosted v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 123, 78 N. W. 971.

40 Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Kral v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 422, 74 N. W. 166; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co.,

41 St Louis S. W. R. Co. of Texas v. Ferguson, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 61 S. W. 797.

Physical Pain and Medical Expenses

42

Physical pain suffered by the injured passenger is always an important element in fixing the damages. Though it is always difficult to reckon this in dollars and cents, the anguish of bodily suffering is one of the most terrible and real consequences of a personal injury, for which compensation should unquestionably be given. The duration and severity of such pain are always prominent, when the amount of such damages is to be determined, in the minds of the jury. Not only past, but future, pain may be considered, when such future pain is reasonably certain to follow the injury, but not when this is speculative, or merely probable. This rule is essential, since the injury is a single cause of action, for which only one suit can be brought.

48

Money spent for medical expenses, such as medicines, nurses, doctors, and treatment at a hospital, is a clear element of damages.** The causal connection between these and the injury is too obvious for comment. And especially should these expenses be recoverable, since the law imposes upon the injured passenger the duty of reasonable care in minimizing the damages.45

172 Mass. 488, 52 N. E. 747, 43 L. R. A. 832, 70 Am. St. Rep. 298; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286, 30 L. Ed. 1146; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, 17 N. E. 297.

42 Morse v. Auburn & S. R. Co., 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 621; O'Donnel v. St. Louis Transit Co., 107 Mo. App. 34, 80 S. W. 315; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514, 9 South. 722, 30 Am. St. Rep. 65; Cone v. Central R. Co., 62 N. J. Law, 99, 40 Atl. 780; Hickenbottom v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 122 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 279; Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 76 Minn. 90, 78 N. W. 965; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. 191, 55 Am. St. Rep. 705; Pence v. Wabash R. Co., 116 Iowa, 279, 90 N. W. 59; VAN DE VENTER v. CHICAGO CITY R. CO. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 32, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 377.

43 Curtis v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 Am. Dec. 258; Hamilton v. Great Falls Street Ry. Co., 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860, 43 Pac. 713; Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836, 54 Am. Rep. 312; White v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 536, 21 N. W. 524, 50 Am. Rep. 154. Damages have also been allowed for disfigurement. The Oriflamme, 3 Sawy. 397, Fed. Cas. No. 10,572; Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N. E. 694, 63 Am. St. Rep. 343; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481, 30 S. W. 887, 31 S. W. 147.

44 Parker v. South Carolina & G. R. R., 48 S. C. 364, 26 S. E. 669; Smith v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 108 Mo. 244, 18 S. W. 971; Sherwood v. Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 82 Mich. 374, 46 N. W. 773; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, 98 Am. Dec. 229; North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 486, 29 N. E. 899; Eckerd v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 353, 30 N. W. 615; Montgomery St. Ry. Co. v. Mason, 133 Ala. 508, 32 South. 261; VAN DE VENTER v. CHICAGO CITY R. CO. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 32, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 377.

45 Texas & P. R. Co. v. White, 101 Fed. 928, 42 C. C. A. 86, 62 L. R. A. 90;