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As to contributory negligence, the better rule is that this is an affirmative defense to be proved by the carrier; but many courts hold that the passenger must himself show that he was exercising due care when injured.

Presumption of Carrier's Negligence

Though there are statements in the books to the contrary, 28 it is now well-settled that the mere proof of an accident, resulting in injury to the passenger, does not necessarily create a presumption of negligence against the carrier. The rule is different, as we have seen, 30 in the case of the carrier of goods; but the carrier there is an insurer, and other striking differences exist between the two kinds of carriers. Thus proof of injury to a passenger by a brick thrown through the car window by an outsider would not of itself make out a case of prima facie liability against the carrier. "But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident be such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." " Perhaps the clearest example of this is a railroad collision, which, ordinarily, the use of the highest de

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28 Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479, 49 Am. Dec. 533; Cooper v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co., 61 S. C. 345, 39 S. E. 543; Southern Pac. Co. v. Cavin, 144 Fed. 348, 75 C. C. A. 350; Galena & C. U. R. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 471; Id., 17 Ill. 509, 65 Am. Dec. 682.

29 Dennis v. Pittsburg & C. S. R. R., 165 Pa. 624, 31 Atl. 52; Saunders v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 6 S. D. 40, 60 N. W. 148; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Rood, 163 Ill. 477, 45 N. E. 238, 54 Am. St. Rep. 478; Faulkner v. Boston & M. R. R., 187 Mass. 254, 72 N. E. 976; Spencer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 311, 81 N. W. 407; Reynolds v. Richmond & M. Ry. Co., 92 Va. 400, 23 S. E. 770; Paynter v. Bridgeton & M. Traction Co., 67 N. J. Law, 619, 52 Atl. 367; WILLIAMS v. SPOKANE FALLS & N. R. CO., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 341; Rist v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 236 Pa. 218, 84 Atl. 687; Allen v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 35 Wash. 221, 77 Pac. 204, 66 L. R. A. 804; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cornelius, 6 Ala. App. 386, 60 South. 740.

30 Ante, § 118.

81 Erle, C. J., in Scott v. Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & C. (Eng.) 601. See, also, LOUISIANA & N. W. R. CO. v. CRUMPLER, 122 Fed. 425, 59 C. C. A. 51, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 326; WILLIAMS v. SPOKANE FALLS & N. R. CO., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 341; Wayne v. St. Louis & N. E. Ry. Co., 165 Ill. App. 353; Moore v. Greene. ville Traction Co., 94 S. C. 249, 77 S. E. 928.

82 Skinner v. Ry. Co., 5 Exch. (Eng.) 786; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126, 25 N. E. 869; Copson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 233, 50 N. E. 613; Larkin v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa, 652, 92 N. W. 891; Graham v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 81,

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gree of practicable care can unquestionably prevent. The same is true when the carrier's conveyance breaks down 33 or turns over, when the locomotive boiler explodes,35 when a rail breaks,3 a switch is wrongly thrown over,37 a bridge goes down with a train, or the brakes fail to work." Since these and similar cases probably embrace a majority of accidents, it is true that in more than half of the cases proof of the injury makes out a prima facie case against the carrier. This, however, is not the same as saying that in all cases the prima facie presumption thus arises.

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This presumption against the carrier, even when it does arise, is at best a mere prima facie one, which the carrier can rebut.“0 This he does by affirmatively showing that the accident was in no way due to his negligence in the premises. No liability then attaches to the carrier. By proving the exercise of the highest degree of practicable care as to the apparent causes of the acci

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38 N. W. 812; Wedenkind v. Southern Pac. Co., 20 Nev. 292, 21 Pac. 682; WILLIAMS v. SPOKANE FALLS & N. R. CO., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 341; Kirkendall v. Union Pac. R. Co., 200 Fed. 197, 118 C. C. A. 383; Nagel v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 169 Mo. App. 284, 152 S. W. 621.

33 Lawrence v. Green, 70 Cal. 417, 11 Pac. 750, 59 Am. Rep. 428; Feldschneider v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 122 Wis. 423, 99 N. W. 1034.

34 Boyce v. California Stage Co., 25 Cal. 460; Farish v. Reigle, 11 Grat. (Va.) 697, 62 Am. Dec. 666.

35 Kelly v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 113 Mo. App. 468, 87 S. W. 583; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips, 49 Ill. 234; Id., 55 Ill. 194.

36 Arkansas Midland Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 S. W. 550.

87 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Worthington, 21 Md. 275, 83 Am. Dec. 578. 38 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 435, 20 N. E. 284, 3 L. R. A. 434, 10 Am. St. Rep. 60.

39 Sharp, v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 94, 20 S. W. 93.

40 McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 193 Pa. 339, 44 Atl. 435, 74 Am. St. Rep. 690; Eureka Springs Ry. Co. v. Timmons, 51 Ark. 459, 11 S., W. 690; Pershing v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 561, 32 N. W. 488; Major v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 21 Utah, 141, 59 Pac. 522; Louisville & C. Packet Co. v. Smith, 60 S. W. 524, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1323; Eldridge v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 253, 20 N. W. 151; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Porter, 117 Tenn. 13, 94 S. W. 666, 10 Ann. Cas. 789; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Sheeks, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434.

41 Fleming V Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry., 158 Pa. 130, 27 Atl. 858, 22 L. R. A. 351, 38 Am. St. Rep 835; Fordyce v. Jackson, 56 Ark. 594, 20 S. W. 528, 597; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Marshall's Adm'r, 90 Va. 836, 20 S. E. 823; WILLIAMS v. SPOKANE FALLS & N. R. CO., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 341; McCurrie v. Southern Pac. Co., 122 Cal. 558, 55 Pac. 324; O'Clair v. Rhode Island Co., 27 R. I. 448, 63 Atl. 238; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v Kuhn, 107 Tenn. 106, 64 S. W. 202; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Posten, 31 Okl. 821, 124 Pac. 2.

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dent, the presumption is overcome and the carrier is relieved of responsibility.

Burden of Proof as to Contributory Negligence

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By the better rule, supported by the weight of authority, the passenger need go no further than proving the carrier's negligence and the resulting injury; it then devolves upon the carrier to prove the passenger's contributory negligence. The passenger need not, in order to recover, show the absence of negligence in his part. This rule seems sound, for the law does not as a rule presume one to be negligent, and particularly as every prompting of human nature is in favor of the passenger's exercising due care in the interest of self-preservation. If, however, in proving the carrier's negligence, the passenger establishes by his own evidence a prima. facie case of contributory negligence on his part, he must by his evidence further overcome this presumption (which he has himself raised), in order that he may recover against the carrier.43

Some of the courts, however, require the passenger to prove affirmatively that he was, when injured, exercising due care-in other words, that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.** According to this holding not only must the passenger convict the carrier, but he must also exonerate himself by showing that his own conduct was legally blameless. He must negatively relieve himself of negligence, as well as positively fix it upon the carrier.

42 Washington & G. R. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571, 13 Sup. Ct. 557, 37 L. Ed. 284; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Bromberg, 141 Ala. 258, 37 South. 395; Mares v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 3 Dak. 336, 21 N. W. 5; Carrico v. West Virginia Cent. & P. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 389, 14 S. E. 12; Bradwell v. Pittsburgh & W. E. P. Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 404, 20 Atl. 1046; Jones v. United Rys. & Electric Co., 99 Md. 64, 57 Atl. 620; Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Hardy, 88 Miss. 732, 41 South. 505; Durrell v. Johnson, 31 Neb. 796, 48 N. W. 890; Berry v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 N. J. Law, 141, 4 Atl. 303; Hughes v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 127 Mo. 447, 30 S. W. 127; Harmon v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 163 Mo. App. 442, 143 S. W. 1114.

48 Patterson v. Central Railroad & Banking Co., 85 Ga. 653, 11 S. E. 872; North Birmingham St. Ry. Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 247, 7 South. 360, 18 Am. St. Rep. 105.

44 Tumalty v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 170 Mass. 164, 49 N. E. 85; Sosnofski v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 134 Mich. 72, 95 N. W. 1077; Waldron v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 N. H. 362, 52 Atl. 443; Brockett v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 763; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N. E. 343; Owens v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 88 N. C. 502; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nowicki, 148 Ill. 29, 35 N. E. 358; Tolman v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 198, 50 Am. Rep. 649; Maercker v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 137 App. Div. 49, 122 N. Y. Supp. 87.

SAME-CARRIERS BY WATER

189. In general, the rules governing the liability of land carriers for injury to a passenger are also applicable to carriers by water, though, of necessity, difference in the two methods of transportation must result in some differences in liability.

The federal Congress in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction over navigable waters, has general control of the water carrier, and has enacted innumerable statutes affecting his liability.

In General

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The measure of care, as the test of negligence, is the same as to carriers by water as to carriers by land. The same is true of the broad general principles of the common law affecting the carrier's liability for injuries to the passenger. There are, however, not a few unique rules applicable to the water carrier alone. Thus in a marine tort, when the passenger is guilty of contributory negligence, this need not bar a recovery against the carrier; but the damages are worked out by comparing the respective negligence of the passenger with that of the carrier." Again, the passenger injured by the negligence of the water carrier may proceed directly against the ship (instead of against the owner) to fix an in rem liability against the ship. From the very nature of the case, the master of a vessel is vested with an authority far more arbitrary and far-reaching than that possessed by any single person connected with the transportation on land." Intrusted with

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45 American S. S. Co. v. Landreth, 108 Pa. 264; Yerkes v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co., 7 Mo. App. 265; Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Buckner, 57 S. W. 482, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 401; Hughes v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 11 Misc. Rep. 65, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1012; Miller v. Ocean Steam-Ship Co., 118 N. Y. 199, 23 N. E. 462; The Pilot Boy (D. C.) 23 Fed. 103; White v. Seattle, E. & T. Nav. Co., 36 Wash. 281, 78 Pac. 909, 104 Am. St. Rep. 948.

46 Croft v. Northwestern S. S. Co., 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac. 42; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y. 661; Hoboken Ferry Co. v. Feiszt, 58 N. J. Law, 198, 38 Atl. 299; The Oriflamme, 3 Sawy. 397, Fed. Cas. No. 10,572; Rosen v. City of Boston, 187 Mass. 245, 72 N. E. 992, 68 L. R. A. 153; Trabing v. California Nav. & Imp. Co., 121 Cal. 137, 53 Pac. 644.

47 The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 29, 34 L. Ed. 586.

48 The Wasco (D. C.) 53 Fed. 546; The Pacific, 1 Blatchf. 569, Fed. Cas. No. 10,643; McGuire v. The Golden Gate, 1 McAll. 104, Fed. Cas. No. 8,815; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, 17 Sup. Ct. 930, 42 L. Ed. 296.

49 See particularly the language of Mr. Justice Story in Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, Fed. Cas. No. 2,575. See, also, Block v. Bannerman,

a terrible responsibility for the lives and safety of those on board, he must, owing to his necessarily isolated position, be vested with commensurate powers.

Regulation by Congress under Admiralty Jurisdiction

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The exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States Congress has resulted in the regulation of the passenger traffic by a number of statutes affecting many minute details of water transportation. The discussion of these belongs to a work on admiralty. Reference has already been made to the Harter Act (Act Feb. 13, 1893, c 105, 27 Stat. 445 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2946])1 and the Limited Liability Act (Act March 3, 1851, c. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2943]),52 passed to encourage the upbuilding of a merchant marine by limiting the shipowner's liability to the value of the vessel and freight.

A large number of statutes regulate precautions for the safety of passengers, by requiring inspection of the hull and boilers of passenger steamers, by requiring that the masters, mates, pilots, and engineers be licensed, by limiting the number of passengers a vessel may carry, by requiring a proper supply of life preservers and lifeboats, by providing as to the carrying of explosives, the precautions necessary against fire, and hundreds of other details covering the many aspects of passenger traffic by water.

CONTRACTS LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF THE PASSENGER CARRIER

190. By the weight of authority, the common carrier cannot, even by express contract, limit or restrict his liability for injuries received by a pay passenger. This rule, however, is absolutely denied by some courts and variously qualified by others.

As to gratuitous passengers, and as to express messengers, Pullman porters, etc., whom the carrier is under no legal duty to transport, the weight of authority sanctions contracts limiting the carrier's liability.

10 La. Ann. 1; The Hammonia, 10 Ben. 512, Fed. Cas. No. 6,006; Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Camp. (Eng.) 58.

50 For brief enumeration of, and comment on, some of the more important of these statutes, see 2 Fetter, Passenger Carriers, §§ 413-416.

51 Ante, § 120.

52 Ante, § 120.

53 For brief summary as to these, see 2 Hutch. Carr. § 1148.

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