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paired senses would inform him of danger and enable him to avert it.80 Crossing railroad tracks would furnish an example of such an act.81 As to children, they are to be judged according to their age,82 and children of very tender years cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. Persons who must act quickly in positions fraught with imminent danger are not necessarily guilty of negligence. in adopting a perilous alternative merely because the alternative would be unreasonable to one thinking calmly and dispassionately on the subject.84 Again, this alternative might be reasonable for the purpose of escaping danger, while it would be negligence for the passenger to adopt it merely to prevent annoyance or escape inconvenience. The passenger might avoid the charge of negligence when the particular act was performed in pursuance of instructions from the carrier's servants, who are presumed to appreciate the danger. When, however, the peril is so imminent

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80 Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Nolan, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 347; Felton v. Horner, 97 Tenn. 579, 37 S. W. 696; Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. App. 267; Talbert v. Charleston & Western C. Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 137, 51 S. E. 564; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Derry, 47 Colo. 584, 108 Pac. 172, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 761; Wilson v. Detroit United Ry., 167 Mich. 107, 132 N. W. 762. 81 See Gonzales v. New York & H. R. Co., 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 57; Wilson v. Detroit United Ry., 167 Mich. 107, 132 N. W. 762.

82 Denison & S. R. Co. v. Carter, 98 Tex. 196, 82 S. W. 782, 107 Am. St. Rep. 626; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Nelson, 153 Ill. 89, 38 N. E. 560; Kirchner v. Oil City St. R. Co., 210 Pa. 45, 59 Atl. 270; Van Natta v. People's Street Ry. & Electric Light & Power Co., 133 Mo. 13, 34 S. W. 505; Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. Nelson, 66 Ark. 494, 52 S. W. 7; East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 92 Ga. 388, 17 S. E. 949; Kambour v. Boston & M. R. R., 77 N. H. 33, 86 Atl. 624, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188.

83 Erie City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 113 Pa. 412, 6 Atl. 269, 57 Am. Rep. 471; Buck v. People's Street Ry., Electric Light & Power Co., 46 Mo. App. 555.

84 Bischoff v. People's Ry. Co., 121 Mo. 216, 25 S. W. 908; Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie (Eng.) 493; Ladd v. Foster (D. C.) 31 Fed. 827; Buel v. New York Cent. R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314, 88 Am. Dec. 271; St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Hedge, 44 Neb. 448, 62 N. W. 887; Gannon v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 173 Mass. 40, 52 N. E. 1075, 43 L. R. A. 833; Steverman v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 205 Mass. 508, 91 N. E. 919; Fulghum v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 158 N. C. 555, 74 S. E. 584, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 558; Smith v. Chicago City R. Co., 169 Ill. App. 570.

85 Adams v. Railway Co., L. R. 4 C. P. (Eng.) 739; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470, 11 N. W. 276; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Bedell, 11 Colo. App. 139, 54 Pac. 280; PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. ASPELL, 23 Pa. 147, 62 Am. Dec. 323, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 336.

86 Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 23 L. Ed. 898; Clinton v. Root, 58 Mich. 182, 24 N. W. 667, 55 Am. Rep. 671; Irish v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 4 Wash. 48, 29 Pac. 845, 31 Am. St. Rep. 899; Montgomery & E. R. Co. v. Stewart, 91 Ala. 421, 8 South. 708; Killmeyer v. Wheeling Traction Co. (W. Va.) 77 S. E. 908.

and obvious that no prudent man would do the particular act, even with such instructions, then the act is negligence; for such instructions can never justify an obviously foolhardy act.87 Passenger's Negligence Must Proximately Contribute to the Injury

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The defense of contributory negligence involves two separate elements, as indicated by the two words of the expression: First, the negligence of the passenger; secondly, such negligence must have contributed to the injury. Of these, the latter is just as essential as the former, in order that the defense may be a valid one. When the carrier's negligence and the injury flowing therefrom are admitted, however materially the passenger's conduct may have contributed to the injury, this is no excuse to the carrier, unless such conduct constitutes legal negligence on the part of the passenger. The converse is equally true: However negligent the passenger may have been, this again does not relieve the carrier from liability unless the particular negligence of the passenger materially contributed to producing the injury." The causal connection, then, between the passenger's negligence and the injury, must be shown in order that the defense of contributory negligence may be made out. The law does not bar a recovery against a negligent carrier for the consequences thereof, simply because the passenger's conduct was somewhat instrumental in bringing on such injury, nor merely because of the passenger's negligence disassociated from the injury. Both must concur. Thus, when a passenger was injured by a car backing over him after he had left the

87 Hunter v. Cooperstown & S. V. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 18, 26 N. E. 958, 12 L. R. A. 429; Aufdenberg v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 132 Mo. 565, 34 S. W. 485; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Gore, 202 III. 188, 66 N. E. 1063, 95 Am. St. Rep. 224; Southern R. Co. v. Bandy, 120 Ga. 463, 47 S. E. 923, 102 Am. St. Rep. 112.

88 See summary, 3 Hutch. Carr. § 1239; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, 24 L. Ed. 506.

89 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 32 Ill. App. 237; Western Maryland R. Co. v. Herold, 74 Md. 510, 22 Atl. 323, 14 L. R. A. 75; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Clowes, 93 Va. 189, 24 S. E. 833; Bronson v. Oakes, 76 Fed. 734, 22 C. C. A. 520; Wylde v. Northern R. Co. of New Jersey, 53 N. Y. 156; Gee v. Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. (Eng.) 161; Hesse v. Meriden, S. & C. Tramway Co., 75 Conn. 571, 54 Atl. 299.

90 Dewire v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 148 Mass. 343, 19 N. E. 523, 2 L. R. A. 166; Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. Greiner, 113 Pa. 600, 6 Atl. 246; Kansas & A. V. R. Co. v. White, 67 Fed. 481, 14 C. C. A. 483; Jones v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 279, 45 N. W. 444; Distler v. Long Island R. Co., 151 N. Y. 424, 45 N. E. 937, 35 L. R. A. 762; Hickey v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,

148 Ill. App. 197; Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Root, 49 Neb. 900, 69 N. W. 397; Kearney v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 158 N. C. 521, 74 S. E. 593.

train, it was held that his riding on the platform (even if it be conceded to be negligent) was no defense, for this in no wise contributed to the injury later received."1

SAME-SAME-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE A QUESTION OF LAW OR OF FACT

186. The question of contributory negligence is ordinarily one of fact for the jury, under general instructions from the When, however, (1) the facts are not disputed, and (2) the deduction to be drawn from those facts is so clear that but one conclusion could fairly be made by reasonable men, the question becomes one of law for the

court.

Question of Law or of Fact

In the great majority of cases, the question of contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury; it is only in the rarer and somewhat exceptional case that the question is one of law for the court. When the testimony is conflicting, so that there is dispute as to the facts, then there is cordial agreement among the courts that it is peculiarly the province of the jury to sift and weigh the testimony, and the question is one for the jury to decide." 92 It is sometimes said that when the facts are clear the question is then solely one of law; but this is quite inaccurate. It is the jury's task to pass, not only on what are the facts, but also on this question: Do these facts constitute a failure on the passenger's part to exercise for his safety the ordinary care of a reasonably prudent man? If this question is an open one-that is, if reasonable men might be expected to differ on it-then the decision of that question is one for the particular jury in the instant case.98 If, therefore, either the facts or the deduction to

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91 Gadsden & A. U. Ry. Co. v. Causler, 97 Ala. 235, 12 South. 439.

92 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Byrum, 153 Ill. 131, 38 N. E. 578; Morgan v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Cal. 501, 30 Pac. 601; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 329, 17 Am. Rep. 368; Cleveland v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 53 Hun, 638, 7 N. Y. Supp. 28; Krock v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 214 Mass. 398, 101 N. E. 968.

93 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Powers, 149 U. S. 43, 13 Sup. Ct. 748, 37 L. Ed. 642; Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 57 W. Va. 132, 49 S. E. 1030, 68 L. R. A. 901; Comerford v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 181 Mass. 528, 63 N. E. 936; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer, 27 Colo. 313, 61 Pac. 606, 51 L. R. A. 121; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Proctor, 89 S. W. 714, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 598; Edgerly v. Union St. R. Co., 67 N. H. 312, 36 Atl. 558; Coburn v. Philadel

** See cases cited in note 92.

be drawn from those facts be not clear, then the question is for the jury.

When, though, the facts are clear (being admitted or proved by uncontradicted evidence), and in addition the question of whether those facts do or do not constitute contributory negligence is also clear, then the question of contributory negligence becomes one of law for the court.96 If a single conclusion alone can reasonably be drawn, there is then nothing to be submitted to the jury, for it is the function of the court to declare this conclusion as the only one that is under the circumstances permissible. Whether this deduction, however, is so clear as to make the question one of law has in a veritable horde of cases given the courts no end of trouble.""

Specific Instances

So vast is the passenger traffic of the modern carrier (particularly the railroad), so prolific has this been of personal injury litigation, and so frequent is the defense of contributory negligence, that a vast body of case law has arisen denying or affirming that certain acts or classes of acts are contributory negligence as a matter of law. This is of great practical importance, and very frequently is of controlling importance, in settling the question of contributory negligence. The cases, though, as might be expected, in the various jurisdictions are frequently far from harmonious. Some brief mention is therefore in order of a few of the most frequent and important of these cases.

The courts have split on the question of whether boarding a

phia, W. & B. R. Co., 198 Pa. 436, 48 Atl. 265; JACKSON v. CRILLY, 16 Colo. 103, 26 Pac. 331, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 338; Burnside v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 110 Minn. 401, 125 N. W. 895; Thorne v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 237 Pa. 20, 85 Atl. 25; Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 355.

93 See cases cited in note 93.

96 Smith v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 33, 17 N. W. 398; Goodlett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 122 U. S. 391, 7 Sup. Ct. 1254, 30 L. Ed. 1230; Shelton's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 39 S. W. 842; Chaffee v. Old Colony R. Co., 17 R. I. 658, 24 Atl. 141; Ricketts v. Birmingham St. Ry. Co., 85 Ala. 600, 5 South. 353; Jacob v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 105 Mich. 450, 63 N. W. 502; Baltimore Traction Co. of Baltimore City v. State, 78 Md. 409, 28 Atl. 397; JACKSON v. CRILLY, 16 Colo. 103, 26 Pac. 331, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 338; Sigl v. Green Bay Traction Co., 149 Wis. 112, 135 N. W. 506, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 65; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Gilbert, 6 Ala. App. 372, 60 South. 542; Chapman v. Capital Traction Co. 37 App. D. C. 479.

97 See cases cited in notes 98, 99, 1-9.

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moving train or alighting therefrom" is contributory negligence as a matter of law. As the circumstances in this connection vary so widely, depending largely on the person, place, and speed of the train, the better view seems not to regard it as contributory negligence as a matter of law. The same seems to be true of passing from car to car while the train is in motion,' of standing in the car under similar circumstances, and of a passenger

98 Among the representative cases holding that this is contributory negligence as a matter of law are Tobin v. Pennsylvania R. R., 211 Pa. 457, 60 Atl. 999; Denver Ry. Co. v. Pickard, 8 Colo. 163, 6 Pac. 149; Knight v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 26 La. Ann. 402; Pence v. Wabash R. Co., 116 Iowa, 279, 90 N. W. 59; Chaffee v. Old Colony St. R. Co., 17 R. I. 658, 24 Atl. 141. That this is not contributory negligence as a matter of law, see South Chicago City R. Co. v. Dufresne, 200 Ill. 456, 65 N. E. 1075; McKee v. St. Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 470, 83 S. W. 1013; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Holloway, 71 Kan. 1, 80 Pac. 31, 114 Am. St. Rep. 462; Creech v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 66 S. C. 528, 45 S. E. 86.

99 That this is contributory negligence as a matter of law is held in Brown v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 181 Mass. 365, 63 N. E. 941; Schiffler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 96 Wis. 141, 71 N. W. 97, 65 Am. St. Rep. 35; Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Athon, 6 Ind. App. 295, 33 N. E. 469, 51 Am. St. Rep. 303; Mearns v. Central R. R., of New Jersey, 139 Fed. 543, 71 C. C. A. 331; Boulfrois v. United Traction Co., 210 Pa. 263, 59 Atl. 1007, 105 Am. St. Rep. 809, 2 Ann. Cas. 938. Alighting from a moving car or train is not necessarily contributory negligence as a matter of law: Carr v. Eel River & E. R. Co., 98 Cal. 366, 33 Pac. 213, 21 L. R. A. 354; Hecker v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 110 Mo. App. 162, 84 S. W. 126; New Jersey Traction Co. v. Gardner, 60 N. J. Law, 571, 38 Atl. 669; Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 123 Ind. 415, 23 N. E. 973, 7 L. R. A. 687, 18 Am. St. Rep. 330; Simmons v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 120 Ga. 255, 47 S. E. 570, 1 Ann. Cas. 777; Wallace v. Third Ave. R. Co., 36 App. Div. 57, 55 N. Y. Supp. 132; Mills v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 94 Tex. 242, 59 S. W. 874, 55 L. R. A. 497; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Ky. 258, 147 S. W. 886; Harris v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 32 Ind. App. 600, 70 N. E. 407; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dilburn (Ala.) 59 South. 438.

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1 This is usually held not to be contributory negligence per se. peake & O. Ry. Co. v. Clowes, 93 Va. 189, 24 S. E. 833; Bronson v. Oakes, 76 Fed. 734, 22 C. C. A. 520; McIntyre v. New York Cent. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Berg's Adm'r, 32 S. W. 616, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1105. Particularly is this true on modern vestibuled trains. Bronson v. Oakes, 76 Fed. 734, 22 C. C. A. 520; Costikyan v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 58 Hun, 590, 12 N. Y. Supp. 683, affirmed 128 N. Y. 633, 29 N. E. 147. In the following cases it is either suggested that passing from car to car while a train is in motion is contributory negligence per se, or held such under the circumstances of the instant case: Bemiss v. New Orleans City & Lake R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1671, 18 So. 711; Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 90 Tex. 82, 36 S. W. 247, 37 S. W. 319; Sawtelle v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 15 Blatchf. 216, Fed. Cas. No. 12,392; Hill v. Birmingham Union Ry. Co., 100 Ala. 447, 12 South. 201; Hunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 72 S. C. 336, 51 S. E. 860, 110 Am. St. Rep. 605.

2 Not contributory negligence. Gee v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. (Eng.)

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