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conveyance. Thus the passenger should not be compelled to alight at an unsafe place, and trains should be stopped for a period of time that is long enough to permit a passenger to enter the train or leave it in safety." The carrier's duty not to invite the passenger expressly or impliedly to alight, at an unsafe place is particularly important at night, when the passenger is less able to see the danger or to protect himself from it." Though the cases are not entirely clear, it seems that the carrier ordinarily owes no duty to assist an able-bodied passenger to enter or leave the carrier's vehicle, unless this is fraught with some unusual difficulty or danger.** But a different rule applies when the passenger is so sick or infirm as manifestly to need such assistance. As a general rule, too,

Rep. 811; Robostelli v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (C. C.) 33 Fed. 796; McDonald v. Kansas City & Independence Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 127 Mo. 38, 29 S. W. 848; New York C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Doane, 115 Ind. 435, 17 N. E. 913, 1 L. R. A. 157, 7 Am. St. Rep. 451; CHICAGO & A. R. CO. v. ARNOL, 144 Ill. 261, 33 N. E. 204, 19 L. R. A. 313, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 332; Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Ford, 34 Okl. 575, 126 Pac. 745, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 745; Vine v. Berkshire St. R. Co., 212 Mass, 580, 99 N. E. 473; Donovan v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 132 La. 239, 61 South. 216, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 109.

42 Richmond City Ry. Co. v. Scott, 86 Va. 902, 11 S. E. 404; Hartzig v. Lehigh Val. R. R. Co., 154 Pa. 364, 26 Atl. 310; Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. Law, 169, 19 Atl. 178, 7 L. R. A. 435, 19 Am. St. Rep. 442; Ellis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 120 Wis. 645, 98 N. W. 942; Nicholson v. Railway Co., 3 Hurl. & C. (Eng.) 534; Mensing v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 117 Mich. 606, 76 N. W. 98; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. of Texas v. Missildine (Tex. Civ. App.) 157 S. W. 245.

48 Kefauver v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (C. C.) 122 Fed. 966; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 Pa. 113, 18 Atl. 759, 15 Am. St. Rep. 701; Smalley v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 131 Mich. 560, 91 N. W. 1027; CHICAGO & A. R. CO. V. ARNOL, 144 Ill. 261, 33 N. E. 204, 19 L. R. A. 313, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 332; Emery v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 67 N. H. 434, 36 Atl. 367; Washington & G. R. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571, 13 Sup. Ct. 557, 37 L. Ed. 284; Franklin v. Visalia Electric R. Co., 21 Cal. App. 270, 131 Pac. 776. 44 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274, 8 S. W. 679; Miller v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 93 Ga. 630, 21 S. E. 153; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Pa. 427, 16 Atl. 848; Leedom v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 598.

45 Yarnell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 1, 18 L. R. A. 599; Jarmy v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 55 Minn. 271, 56 N. W. 813; Southern R. Co. v. Reeves, 116 Ga. 743, 42 S. E. 1015; Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Pressell, 39 Ind. App. 472, 77 N. E. 357; Western & A. R. Co. v. Earwood, 104 Ga. 127, 29 S. E. 913.

46 Madden v. Port Royal & W. C. Ry. Co., 41 S. C. 440, 19 S. E. 951, 20 S. E. 65; Alexandria & F. R. Co. v. Herndon, 87 Va. 193, 12 S. E. 289; Werner v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 105 Wis. 300, 81 N. W. 416; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wortham, 73 Tex. 25, 10 S. W. 741, 3 L. R. A. 368; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Rives, 137 Ga. 376, 73 S. E. 645, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564; Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. App. 267.

when a carrier accepts a passenger under physical disability rendering him unable to care for himself properly, as when he is sick. or infirm, or even drunk, these facts must be considered in determining whether the carrier has exercised the requisite care in looking after such passenger." There are various other duties resting on the carrier, such as announcing the stations, and, when there is no dining car in the train, and the journey is long, to stop the train at reasonable intervals long enough to permit the passengers to obtain food or other refreshment."" The carrier should also warn passengers of impending danger.50

47 Winfrey v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 194 Fed. 808, 114 C. C. A. 218; Memphis St. R. Co. v. Shaw, 110 Tenn. 467, 75 S. W. 713; Weightman v. Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 70 Miss. 563, 12 South. 586, 19 L. R. A. 671, 35 Am. St. Rep. 660, distinguishing Sevier v. Vicksburg & M. R. Co., 61 Miss. 8, 48 Am. Rep. 74; Meyer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 4 C. C. A. 221, 54 Fed. 116; Sawyer v. Dulany, 30 Tex. 479; Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 490; Philadelphia City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Hassard, 75 Pa. 367; Allison v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 274; Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568-584; Indianapolis, P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, 10 N. E. 70, 58 Am. Rep. 387; Croom v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 296, 53 N. W. 1128, 18 L. R. A. 602, 38 Am. St. Rep. 557. When a child of such tender and imbecile age is brought to a railway station or to any conveyance, for the purpose of being conveyed, and is wholly unable to take care of itself, the contract of conveyance is on the implied condition that the child is to be conveyed subject to due and proper care on the part of the person having it in charge. Such care not being used, where the child has no natural capacity to judge of the surrounding circumstances, a child might get into serious danger from a state of things which would produce no disastrous consequences to an adult capable of taking care of himself. Waite v. Railway Co., El., Bl. & El. (Eng.) 719, per Cockburn, C. J., in exchequer chamber. See, also, Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 161 N. C. 462, 77 S. E. 402; Indianapolis Southern R. Co. v. Wall (Ind. App.) 101 N. E. 680; Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v. Sears (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 1003.

48 Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203; Goodyear, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 206, 66 S. W. 862; 118 Ga. 227, 45 S. E. 23, 63 L. R. A. 68.

Houston & T. C. R. Co. v.
Southern R. Co. v. Hobbs,

49 Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568; Peniston v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co., 34 La. Ann. 777, 44 Am. Rep. 444.

50 Romine v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co., 24 Ind. App. 230, 56 N. E. 245; Tilden v. Rhode Island Co., 27 R. I. 482, 63 Atl. 675; Whalen v. Consolidated Traction Co., 61 N. J. Law, 606, 40 Atl. 645, 41 L. R. A. 836, 68 Am. St. Rep. 723; Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Utah, 244, 55 Pac. 364; Prerisich v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 47 Mont. 170, 131 Pac. 25.

SAME SERVANTS OF THE CARRIER

183. The highest practicable care must be exercised by the carrier in securing servants proper in skill and character and sufficient in number. The carrier is responsible for the acts of his servants within the scope of their authority

Employment of Proper Servants

51

It would be a queer rule of law that would permit the carrier to exercise a slighter degree of care in selecting its human instrumentalities than it must employ as to inanimate agencies. So the carrier must exercise the same degree of care in selecting servants as it is required to use in providing machinery. The carrier must use this care in ascertaining the fitness of his servants for the duties assigned to them, or answer for such negligence. This applies, not only to the servant's mechanical fitness, but also to his character and habits.52 It would clearly be negligence, for example, for a carrier to employ one as a passenger engineer, with knowledge of his utter lack of sobriety, just as it would be to employ one so color-blind that he cannot distinguish the color of signals. It would, of course, be negligence to retain a servant, after knowledge of his unfitness, though he was a proper servant when hired by the carrier. The carrier's servants, too, must be sufficient in number for the traffic to be handled, however competent may be each individual employé."

53

Liability of Carrier for Acts of Servant

By the well-known rules of agency and master and servant, the carrier is liable for the acts of his agents and servants within

51 Anderson v. Scholey, 114 Ind. 553, 17 N. E. 125; Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 41 Minn. 360, 43 N. W. 54, 5 L. R. A. 442, 16 Am. St. Rep. 703; Long v. Chicago, K. & W. R. Co., 48 Kan. 28, 28 Pac. 977, 15 L. R. A. 319 30 Am. St. Rep. 271; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, 98 Am. Dec. 229; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 181, 10 L. Ed. 115; Schafer v. Gilmer, 13 Nev. 330; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. (Eng.) 319; Olsen v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 426, 54 S. W. 470; Blumenthal v. Union Electric Ry. Co., 129 Iowa, 322, 105 N. W. 588; Spooner v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 190 Mass. 132, 76 S. E. 660.

52 See cases cited in preceding note.

53 Bass v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 24 Am. Rep. 437; Cleghorn v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 15 Am. Rep. 375; Gasway v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 58 Ga. 216.

54 See Hamline v. Houston, W. S. & P. F. R. Co., 14 Daly (N. Y.) 144; Means v. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 124 N. C. 574, 32 S. E. 960, 45 L. R. A. 164. In some of the states statutes have been passed regulating the size of train crews.

56

the scope of their authority.55 And this is true, however careful the carrier may have been in selecting, training, and instructing such employé. Pro hac vice, the act of the servant becomes the act of the master, who, receiving the benefits of such act, must also bear its burdens. This is true of corporate masters as well as of natural persons.$7

The expression "scope of employment" is used in a broad sense here, and if the act in question falls within it, the master is liable for its proximate consequences, even though he may have expressly forbidden such acts.58 Thus a passenger engineer may have been specially warned not to exceed a certain speed over a trestle, and yet if he dangerously exceed this instructed speed and the train is wrecked, the carrier is responsible to an injured passenger. The negligent act, though forbidden by the carrier master, was yet within the scope of the employment of the engineer servant. The negligence of the servant under similar circumstances is the negligence of the master. When, however, the servant's act is one entirely outside of the scope of his employment, he is, as to such act, merely an individual, and not a servant of the master, and the master thereby incurs no liability.59

55 Hoffman v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 25, 41 Am. Rep. 337; Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461, 43 Am. Rep. 433; Thorpe v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 402, 32 Am. Rep. 325; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 26 L. Ed. 141; article, 25 Am. Law Rev. 569. See Edwards v. Railway Co., L. R. 5 C. P. (Eng.) 445; Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234, 20 N. E. 135; Philadelphia & D. R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 468, 14 L. Ed. 502; Baltimore & O. Ry. Co. v. Leapley, 65 Md. 571, 4 Atl. 891; Taillon v. Mears, 29 Mont. 161, 74 Pac. 421, 1 Ann. Cas. 613; Texas Midland R. R. v. Monroe (Tex. Civ. App.) 155

S. W. 973.

56 See cases cited in preceding note.

57 See cases cited in note 55, in practically all of which the carrier was a corporation. See, also, Bass v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 450, 17 Am. Rep. 495; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ballard, 85 Ky. 307, 3 S. W. 530, 7 Am. St. Rep. 600.

58 Philadelphia & D. R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 468, 14 L. Ed. 502Fitzsimmons v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. Co., 98 Mich. 257, 57 N. W. 127; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Leapley, 65 Md. 571, 4 Atl. 891; Heenrich v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (D. C.) 20 Fed. 100; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 56 Ark. 245, 19 S. W. 839.

59 McGilvray v. West End St. Ry. Co., 164 Mass. 122, 41 N. E. 116; Owens v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 126 N. C. 139, 35 S. E. 259, 78 Am. St. Rep. 642; Walker v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 121 Mo. 575, 26 S. W. 360, 24 L. R. A. 363, 42 Am. St. Rep. 547; Goodloe v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 107 Ala. 233, 18 South. 166, 29 L. R. A. 729, 54 Am. St. Rep. 67; Candiff v. Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 42 La. Ann. 477, 7 South. 601; Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v Carper, 112 Ind. 26, 13 N. E. 122, 14 N. E. 352, 2 Am. St. Rep. 144.

SAME PROTECTION OF THE PASSENGER

184. The carrier must exercise the highest degree of practicable care to protect the passenger against the violence and assaults of his fellow passengers or outsiders.

The carrier is liable for assaults on passengers by the carrier's servants while engaged in performing their duties, even though such assaults may be, strictly speaking, outside of the scope of the servants' employment.

Assaults by Fellow Passengers or Outsiders

The carrier's high degree of care is not limited to preventing injuries due to the carrier's own operations, but this duty extends further to protecting passengers from injury and insult at the hands of others." The passenger, by becoming such, places himself in the control of the carrier, and to the carrier he can and must look to safeguard him from the acts of others, whether these be his fellow passengers or strangers. For such injury, then, due to the carrier's failure to exercise the highest degree of care in protecting the passenger, the carrier becomes liable."1

In such cases, the fellow passenger or stranger in no sense acts for the carrier, and his acts impose no liability on the carrier; but the actionable negligence of the carrier consists in failing to prevent such person from doing violence or offering an insult to the passenger.62 It therefore follows that if, by the use of the

60 Evansville & I. R. Co. v. Darting, 6 Ind. App. 375, 33 N. E. 636; King v. Ohio & M. R. Co. (C. C.) 22 Fed. 413; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McEwan, 51 S. W. 619, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 487; PITTSBURGH, FT. W. & C. RY. CO. v. HINDS, 53 Pa. 512, 91 Am. Dec. 224, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 334; New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200, 24 Am. Rep. 689; Felton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 69 Iowa, 577, 29 N. W. 618; Britton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 88 N. C. 536, 43 Am. Rep. 749; Putnam v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 108, 14 Am. Rep. 190; Batton v. South & N. A. R. Co., 77 Ala. 591, 54 Am. Rep. 80; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pillsbury, 123 Ill. 9, 14 N. E. 22, 5 Am. St. Rep. 483; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510, 18 Am. Rep. 424; Koch v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 75 App. Div. 282, 78 N. Y. Supp. 99; Cobb v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 179 Mass. 212, 60 N. E. 476; Southern R. Co. v. Lee, 167 Ala. 268, 52 South. 648; Seale v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 214 Mass. 59, 100 N. E. 1020.

61 See cases cited in preceding note. See, also, Lucy v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 64 Minn. 7, 65 N. W. 944, 31 L. R. A. 551; West Memphis Packet Co. v. White, 99 Tenn. 256, 41 S. W. 583, 38 L. R. A. 427; Holly v. Atlanta St. R. R., 61 Ga. 215, 34 Am. Rep. 97; United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. State, to Use of Deane, 93 Md. 619, 49 Atl. 923, 54 L. R. A. 942, 86 Am. St. Rep. 453.

62 Wood v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 42 S. W. 349, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 921;

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