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train and invites the passengers to alight at a place at which it would be extremely inconvenient or unsafe to alight, the passenger relation still continues.26

Even after he has alighted, the passenger continues as such until he has had the time and opportunity to leave the premises of the carrier.27 Thus one who, after leaving the carrier's train, is immediately crossing the station platform on his way to the street, is still a passenger.28 But when one remains at the station for purely social purposes (as to loiter and chat with friends), then he is no longer a passenger, and cannot claim the duties owed only to passengers." In the case of street cars, which ply the public streets and have no premises thereon, the passenger ceases to be such immediately after he has alighted.30

SAME SAME CONNECTING CARRIERS

170. A person received for transportation over the lines of connecting carriers is ordinarily a passenger of the initial carrier only to the end of its own line; but he may continue a passenger of the initial carrier throughout the entire journey, either by contract to that effect or by virtue of a partnership arrangement between the connecting carriers.

R. A. 193; Richmond City Ry. Co. v. Scott, 86 Va. 902, 11 S. E. 404; Weller v. Railway Co., L. R. 9 C. P. (Eng.) 126; Bridges v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 H. L. (Eng.) 213.

26 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Pa. 427, 16 Atl. 848; Griffith v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 168, 11 S. W. 559; Lewis v. Ry. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. (Eng.) 66; Cockle v. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. (Eng.) 457. As to carrying the passenger past the usual depot, see International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Terry, 62 Tex. 380, 50 Am. Rep. 529; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Chambers, 71 Ill. 519; Reed v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry. Co., 100 Mich. 507, 59 N. W. 144; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Lockhart, 79 Ala. 315; White Water R. Co. v. Butler, 112 Ind. 598, 14 N. E. 599; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, 9 South. 375, 30 Am. St. Rep. 17; Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. McCurdy, 45 Ga. 288, 12 Am. Rep. 577; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. 180; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 74 Am. Dec. 785; Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374, 90 Am. Dec. 332. As to compelling passenger to alight before reaching the depot, see Brulard v. The Alvin (C. C.) 45 Fed. 766; Miller v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 93 Ga. 630, 21 S. E. 153.

27 Keefe v. Boston & A. R. R., 142 Mass. 251, 7 N. E. 874; Glenn v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 165 Ind. 659, 75 N. E. 282, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872, 112 Am. St. Rep. 255, 6 Ann. Cas. 1032.

28 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Glenk, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 30 S. W. 278; Keefe v. Boston & A. R. R., 142 Mass. 251, 7 N. E. 874.

29 Glenn v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 165 Ind. 659, 75 N. E. 282, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872, 112 Am. St. Rep. 255, 6 Ann. Cas. 1032.

30 Smith v. City Ry. Co., 29 Or. 539, 46 Pac. 136, 780; Nelson v. Metropol

In considering the termination of a passenger carrier's liability where connecting carriers are concerned, much the same principles are applicable as in the case of the carrier of goods.1 The duties imposed by law upon the carrier are limited to the carrier's own line. Any liability, therefore, resting on the passenger carrier beyond his own line is self-imposed.32 In the absence, then, of any liability thus imposed, the carrier is bound to transport only to the end of his own line, and when that is reached, and a reasonable time and opportunity are given to the passenger for alighting and leaving the carrier's premises, the traveler is no longer a passenger of the initial carrier. When, however, the initial carrier operates its own trains and transports its own passengers over the line of a connecting carrier, according to its contract with these passengers, then the initial carrier for the time being makes the connecting line its own.84 The initial carrier is therefore liable for any negligence of the connecting line in the operation of the road or in the maintenance or repair of the track and roadbed. It cannot escape liability by saying that these matters are entirely in the management and control of the connecting carrier, over whose line the cars of the initial carrier are being carried.

33

85

The initial carrier may, and frequently does, contract to carry the passenger through to his destination, though that be beyond the end of its own line. When this is true, the passenger remains a passenger of the initial carrier, even though passing over the lines

itan St. R. Co., 113 Mo. App. 702, 88 S. W. 1119; Chattanooga Electric Ry. Co. v. Boddy, 105 Tenn. 666, 58 S. W. 646, 51 L. R. A. 885; Poland v. United Traction Co., 107 App. Div. 561, 95 N. Y. Supp. 498; Lee v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 454, 65 N. E. 822.

81 See ante, § 145.

32 Kerrigan v. South Pac. R. Co., 81 Cal. 248, 22 Pac. 677; Hartan v. Eastern R. Co., 114 Mass. 44. See, also, cases cited in the succeeding notes.

33 Hartan v. Eastern R. Co., 114 Mass. 44; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, 112 III. 295, 54 Am. Rep. 238; Kerrigan v. South Pac. R. Co., 81 Cal. 248, 22 Pac. 677; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740, 12 Pac. 93, 57 Am. Rep. 199.

N. W. 1106, 4 L. R.
Great Western Ry.

84 Chollette v. Omaha & R. V. R. Co., 26 Neb. 159, 41 A. 135; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Gates, 61 Ill. App. 211; Co. v. Blake, 7 Hurl. & N. (Eng.) 987; Buxton v. Railway Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. (Eng.) 549; Thomas v. Railway Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. (Eng) 226. And see, as to a bridge, Birmingham v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 59 Hun, 583, 14 N. Y. Supp. 13.

85 Washington v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., 101 N. C. 239, 7 S. E. 789, 1 L. R. A. 830; McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277 (Gil. 189); Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Dumser, 161 Ill. 190, 43 N. E. 698; Eaton v. Boston & L. R. Co., 11 Allen (Mass.) 500, 87 Am. Dec. 730; Seymour v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 3 Biss. 43, Fed. Cas. No. 12,685.

of connecting carriers, until he arrives at the specified destination." The question naturally arises as to what constitutes such a contract. This question, we have already seen, plays a large part in the law of connecting carriers of goods, when courts have shown themselves eager to affix liability to the initial carrier for acts occurring on the lines of connecting carriers.37 Statutes, too, have been active in this endeavor.38 The reason given, an eminently practical one, is the exceedingly great difficulty that the shipper has in determining on which line the loss or injury occurred; the goods having passed beyond his control and means of information. No such considerations obtain as to the carrier of passengers. The passenger, who is injured, is necessarily present when the accident happens by which he is injured, and there is ordinarily no difficulty whatsoever in determining on which line the accident happened.

Accordingly the courts seem to require more or stronger evidence in the case of the passenger carrier than in the case of the carrier of goods, from which a contract for through transportation is to be inferred. Thus, while a through bill of lading will ordinarily make the carrier of goods responsible for the entire transportation over its own and connecting lines, yet a through ticket sold by the first carrier to a passenger is held ordinarily not to have this effect. But such a ticket usually makes the initial carrier re

41

40

36 Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Crow, 54 Neb. 747, 74 N. W. 1066, 69 Am. St. Rep. 741; Talcott v. Wabash R. Co., 159 N. Y. 461, 54 N. E. 1; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am. Dec. 469; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y. 661; Bussman v. Western Transit Co., 9 Misc. Rep. 410, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1066; Cary v. Cleveland & T. R. Co., 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 35; Candee v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 21 Wis. 582, 94 Am. Dec. 566; Cherry v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 1 Mo. App. Rep. 253, 61 Mo. App. 303; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 852; Watkins v. Railroad Co., 21 D. C. 1. That such a contract is not ultra vires, see Buffett v. Troy & B. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168; Bissell v. Michigan Southern & N. I. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258.

37 Ante, § 145.

38 Ante, p. 451.

39 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647, 38 Am. Rep. 617; Moore v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 561, 45 S. W. 609; Auerbach v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290.

40 Ante, p. 443.

41 Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 15 Sup. Ct. 136, 39 L. Ed. 176; Nicholls v. Southern Pac. Co., 23 Or. 123, 31 Pac. 296, 18 L. R. A. 55, 37 Am. St. Rep. 664; Hartan v. Eastern R. Co., 114 Mass. 44; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295, 54 Am. Rep. 238; Young v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 115 Pa. 112, 7 Atl. 741; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 852; Knight v. Portland S. & P. R. Co., 56 Me. 234, 96 Am. Dec. 449; Hood v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 22 Conn. 1. And see Brooke v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 15 Mich. 332; Kessler v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 538.

DOB.BAILM.-35

sponsible only to the end of its own line, and it is held to be merely the agent of the connecting carriers in issuing tickets good for transportation over their lines. 2 Other evidence, however, taken in connection with the through ticket, might well show that the contract was one for through carriage, by which the initial carrier does remain responsible to one who is considered its passenger throughout the entire journey. Even under such contracts, however, the passenger, for injury or delay occurring on the line of a connecting carrier, is not limited to his remedy against the first carrier. The passenger, in such cases, may, if he so prefers, sue the particular carrier on whose line the delay or injury actually occurred."

43

As is true of carriers of goods," the initial carrier of passengers may incur liability beyond the end of his own line, not only by contract with the passenger, but also by partnership agreements. made with the connecting carriers. Where there is such a partnership agreement between the carriers engaged in carrying the passenger, each carrier becomes liable for the defaults of any of the members of the partnership. In such case, the initial carrier would be liable to the passenger, even though he was injured on the line of the connecting carrier, due entirely to the negligence of the servants of the latter.""

42 Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. 425, 27 L. Ed. 325; Pool v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 29; St. Clair v. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co., 77 Miss. 789, 28 South. 957; Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Foster, 134 Ala. 244, 32 South. 773, 92 Am. St. Rep. 25; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill. 522, 44 N. E. 861, 35 L. R. A. 599. The contrary is held, however, by the English cases and some of the American courts. Najac v. Boston & L. R. Co., 7 Allen (Mass.) 329, 83 Am. Dec. 686; Wilson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 21 Grat. (Va.) 654; Candee v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 21 Wis. 582, 94 Am. Dec. 566; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Blake, 7 Hurl. & N. (Eng.) 987; Mytton v. Railroad Co., 4 Hurl. & N. (Eng.) 614.

48 Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am. Dec. 469; Wheeler v. San Francisco & A. R. Co., 31 Cal. 46, 89 Am. Dec. 147; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Gates, 162 Ill. 98, 44 N. E. 1118; Talcott v. Wabash R. Co., 159 N. Y. 461, 54 N. E. 1; Cherry v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 61 Mo. App. 303; Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Crow, 54 Neb. 747, 74 N. W. 1066, 69 Am. St. Rep. 741. 44 Austin v. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 442; Schopman v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 24, 55 Am. Dec. 41; Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Fahey, 52 III. 81, 4 Am. Rep. 587; Johnson v. West Chester & P. R. Co., 70 Pa. 357. 45 See ante, p. 445.

46 Bostwick v. Champion, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 571; Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 35 Am. Dec. 376; Wylde v. Northern R. Co. of New Jersey, 53 N. Y. 156; Croft v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 8 D. C. 492; Waland v. Elkins, 1 Starkie (Eng.) 272; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740, 12 Pac. 93, 57 Am. Rep. 199.

47 Howe v. Gibson, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 22 S. W. 826; Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wolff, 13 Ill. App. 437. See, also, cases cited in preceding note.

In determining what constitutes such a partnership arrangement, the same principles are applicable as in the case of the carrier of goods. These dealings, by which it is sought to establish such a partnership, are between the carriers themselves, and not between the carrier and the shipper or the carrier and the passenger. Quite striking is this similarity in the two different kinds of common carriers, those carrying goods and those transporting passengers, in the cases when the evidence tending to prove the partnership is concerned with the sharing of profits, or the employment of common agents by the initial and connecting carriers.50

49

SAME-EJECTION OF PASSENGER BY CARRIERCAUSES OF EJECTION

171. The carrier may eject the passenger from its vehicle, thereby terminating the relation of carrier and passenger, when

the passenger:

(1) Refuses to pay the proper fare, or to show or to surrender his ticket.

(2) Violates the reasonable regulations of the carrier. (3) Is guilty of improper or disorderly conduct.

Fare and Tickets

51

The common carrier of passengers is, of course, entitled to his compensation before the completion of the journey. As the whole conduct of his business is built up on this right, it is only fair that it should be properly safeguarded. Accordingly, if the passenger wrongfully refuses to pay the proper fare, the carrier may eject such passenger from its train or vehicle, thereby terminating the relation of carrier and passenger. If this were not the

48 See ante, pp. 445-447, and cases cited.

52

49 See, also, Collins v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 169, 39 S. W. 643.

50 See, also, Texas & P. R. Co. v. Dye (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 551. 51 See chapter XIX.

52 BROWN v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO., 51 Iowa, 235, 1 N. W. 487, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 318; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9, 81 Am. Dec. 336; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dewin, 86 Ill. 296; Great Western Ry. Co. of Canada v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Gibson v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. (C. C.) 30 Fed. 904; O'Brien v. Boston & W. R. Co., 15 Gray (Mass.) 20, 77 Am. Dec. 347; State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. Law, 309; Wyman v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 34 Minn. 210, 25 N. W. 349; Lillis v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co., 64 Mo. 464, 27 Am. Rep. 255; Braymer v. Seattle, R. & S. R. Co., 35 Wash. 346, 77 Pac. 495; Shular v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 339, 2 S. W. 310; Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. James, 82

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