upon its freight trains." When a railroad company makes other suitable provision for passenger travel, no one has the right to demand that he shall be allowed to ride in its trains devoted exclusively to the carrying of freight. Not infrequently, however, persons do travel on such trains or vehicles, and the question when such persons are passengers has been frequently before the courts, particularly as to persons riding on freight trains.

When the railroad company makes a clear and well-defined separation between its freight and passenger traffic and the conveyances devoted thereto, and its regulations (up to which it lives) forbid the transportation of passengers on freight trains, then the conductors and other officials have no authority to permit persons to ride on such trains. Under such circumstances, these persons, even though they ride with the conductor's consent, are not to be considered as passengers of the carrier." Particularly is this true when these trains, by their appearance and lack of facilities for passengers, clearly indicate that they are intended by the company solely for the transportation of freight and the company's servants engaged in handling this."

If, however, in spite of the apparent separation of freight and passenger transportation, the company habitually permits persons to travel on its freight trains, or even if the company sits silent with knowledge that its regulations forbidding such practices are habitually broken, then a person may reasonably infer that the company permits the practice. If, under these circumstances, a person boards the freight train with the conductor's consent, believing that

77 Jenkins v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 41 Wis. 112; Gardner v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 51 Conn. 143, 50 Am. Rep. 12; POWERS v. BOSTON & M. R. CO., 153 Mass. 188, 26 N. E. 446, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 303.

78 POWERS v. BOSTON & M. R. CO., 153 Mass. 188, 26 N. E. 446, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 303; Stalcup v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 16 Ind. App. 584, 45 N. E. 802; Baltimore & O. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 66 Ohio St. 276, 64 N. E. 119, 90 Am. St. Rep. 583; Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382, 15 Am. Rep. 513; Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Rep. 98; Arnold v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 83 Ill. 273, 25 Am. Rep. 386; Thomas v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co., 72 Mich. 355, 40 N. W. 463; Murch v. Concord R. Corp., 29 N. H. 9, 61 Am. Dec. 631; Hobbs v Texas & P. Ry. Co., 49 Ark. 357, 5 S. W. 586; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hailey, 94 Tenn. 383, 29 S. W. 367, 27 L. R. A. 549; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 513, 28 S. W. 252. And see Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, 59 Ill. 110.

70 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Rep. 98; Dysart v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 122 Fed. 228, 58 C. C. A. 592.

the conductor has the power thus to accept him for transportation, then he is a passenger."

When the separation of passenger and freight traffic is not distinctly made, and the carrier customarily carries persons on its freight trains, then somewhat different considerations apply. Here one boarding the freight train, with the conductor's consent, honestly believing in the authority of the conductor, when the train itself does not give him notice to the contrary, is to be considered a passenger. By making its freight trains lawful passenger trains, a railroad company, so far as the public is concerned, apparently gives the conductors of its freight trains authority to carry passengers, and, if a particular freight conductor has orders not to carry passengers upon his train, they are in the nature of secret instructions limiting his apparent authority, and third persons are not bound by such instructions without notice.88

82

In general, it may be said that one riding on a train or conveyance, which by its appearance indicates that it is not used for carrying passengers, is presumed prima facie not to be a passenger, even though he is permitted to ride by the agent in charge of such train or conveyance. The burden of proving the authority of such

80 Greenfield v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 133 Mich. 557, 95 N. W. 546; Berry v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 124 Mo. 223, 25 S. W. 229; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. 180; Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Rep. 98; Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 41, 14 Am. Rep. 735; Dunn v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada, 58 Me. 187, 4 Am. Rep. 267; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Yarbrough, 83 Ala. 238, 3 South. 447, 3 Am. St. Rep. 715; St. Joseph & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185, 10 Pac. 461; Burke v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 51 Mo. App. 491.

81 Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 41, 14 Am. Rep. 735; Whitehead v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. 263, 11 S. W. 751, 6 L. R. A. 409; Fitzgibbon v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 108 Iowa, 614, 79 N. W. 477; Everett v. Oregon S. L. & U. N. Ry. Co., 9 Utah, 340, 34 Pac. 289; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sutton, 53 Ill. 397; Simmons v. Oregon R. Co., 41 Or. 151, 69 Pac. 440, 1022; Boggess v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 37 W. Va. 297, 16 S. E. 525, 23 L. R. A. 777.

82 Dunn v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada, 58 Me. 187, 4 Am. Rep. 267; St. Joseph & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185, 10 Pac. 461; Brown v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 38 Kan. 634, 16 Pac. 942; Wagner v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 512, 10 S. W. 486, 3 L. R. A. 156; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Black, 87 Tex. 160, 27 S. W. 118. See, also, as to construction trains, St. Joseph & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185, 10 Pac. 461.

88 Lawson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 64 Wis. 447, 456, 24 N. W. 618, 54 Am. Rep. 634; St. Joseph & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 185, 10 Pac. 461; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Axley, 47 Ill. App. 307. See, also, Simmons v. Oregon R. Co., 41 Or. 151, 69 Pac. 440, 1022.

84 Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382, 15 Am. Rep. 513; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Headland, 18 Colo. 477, 33 Pac. 185, 20 L. R. A. 822; Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Rep. 98.

85

agent to create one a passenger rests upon the person thus riding. If such person knows that the agent has no such actual authority, and that in riding he violates the company's regulations, then he is not a passenger as to the company; and this is true even though he is received by the agent's express assent and pays for his transportation.s

Employés of the Carrier

Employés of the passenger carrier, if engaged in the performance of their duties as such employés while riding, are not passengers. They are servants of the carrier, and the duties and liabilities of the carrier towards them are those which the master owes or incurs towards the servant. The relation, then, is that of master and servant, not that of passenger and carrier. The distinction is important, in that, while the carrier owes to a passenger the highest degree of practicable care,88 to a servant the carrier owes the duty of exercising merely ordinary care. There are defenses, too, such as the fellow servant doctrine, which a carrier can set up against a servant, but which are not available against a passenger."

89

Not only are those persons not passengers who are actually engaged in operating the train on which they are riding, such as the conductor, brakeman, or engineer, but the rule is of much broader application. Those are servants, and not passengers, when the transportation grows out of, and is immediately connected with, the service of the carrier by whom they are employed." Thus

85 Waterbury v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (C. C.) 17 Fed. 671.

86 Whitehead v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 22 Mo. App. 60; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hailey, 94 Tenn. 383, 29 S. W. 367, 27 L. R. A. 549; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 76 Tex. 174, 13 S. W. 19; Sands v. Southern R. Co., 108 Tenn. 1, 64 S. W. 478.

87 Vick v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am. Rep. 36; Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Corp., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 228; O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 59 Pa. 239, 98 Am. Dec. 336; Howland v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 226, 11 N. W. 529; Kumler v. Junction R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 150. See cases cited in note 89.

88 Post, 179.

89 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Jackson's Adm'r, 85 Va. 489, 8 S. E. 370; Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed. 235; Allen v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah, 239, 26 Pac. 297; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Johnson, 81 Fed. 679, 27 C. C. A. 367.

90 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 Ill. 458, 39 N. E. 324, 43 Am. St. Rep. 259; Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772.

91 Vick v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am. Rep. 36; Wright v. Northampton & H. R. Co., 122 N. C. 852, 29 S. E. 100; Chattanooga Rapid Transit Co. v. Venable, 105 Tenn. 460, 58 S. W. 861, 51 L. R. A. 886;

93

95

painters and switch cleaners, riding, after completing one job, to another, and a foreman, carpenter," or civil engineer " employed by the carrier and traveling in connection with their duties are all servants.

96

Where one is carried to and from his work by the carrier in whose service he is, and no charge is made for this service, he is while being thus carried merely a servant of the company." When, however, the carrier is paid for this service, as when the wages of the person are reduced for such transportation, then he is a passenger. If, however, though transported free on an employé's pass, such employé is riding in connection with his own business or pleasure, and his traveling is not in connection with his duties as an employé of the carrier, then he is a passenger, and not a servant of the carrier."

97

98

TRAVELERS' INS. CO. v. AUSTIN, 116 Ga. 266, 42 S. E. 522, 59 L. R. A. 107, 94 Am. St. Rep. 125, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 305.

92 McQueen v. Central Branch U. P. Ry. Co., 39 Kan. 689, 1 Pac. 139; Shannon v. Union R. Co., 27 R. I. 475, 63 Atl. 488.

93 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stuber, 108 Fed. 934, 48 C. C. A. 149, 54 L. R. A. 696.

94 Seaver v. Boston & M. R., 14 Gray (Mass.) 466.

95 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Smith, 67 Fed. 524, 14 C. C. A. 509, 31 L. R. A. 321. 96 Ionnone v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 21 R. I. 452, 44 Atl. 592, 46 L. R. A. 730, 79 Am. St. Rep. 812; Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Corp., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 228; St. Louis, C. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Waggoner, 90 Ill. App. 556; McNulty v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 182 Pa. 479, 38 Atl. 524, 38 L. R. A. 376, 61 Am. St. Rep. 721; Higgins v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 36 Mo. 418; McDonough v. Lanpher, 55 Minn. 501, 57 N. W. 152, 43 Am. St. Rep. 541; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Harmon, 85 Ark. 503, 109 S. W. 295; Walsh v. Cullen, 235 Ill. 91, 85 N. E. 223, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 911.

97 O'Donnell v. Allegheny R. Co., 50 Pa. 490; Id., 59 Pa. 239, 98 Am. Dec. 336; Downey v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 28 W. Va. 732; Harris v. Puget Sound Electric Ry., 52 Wash. 289, 100 Pac. 838; Hebert v. Portland R. Co., 103 Me. 315, 69 Atl. 266, 125 Am. St. Rep. 297, 13 Ann. Cas. 886.

98 Ohio & M. R. Co. V. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9, 81 Am. Dec. 336; Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Co., 162 Mass. 66, 37 N. E. 770, 25 L. R. A. 157, 44 Am. St. Rep. 335; Rosenbaum v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 38 Minn. 173, 36 N. W. 447, 8 Am. St. Rep. 653; Carswell v. Macon, D. & S. R. Co., 118 Ga. 826, 45 S. E. 695; Williams v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 18 Utah, 210, 54 Pac. 991, 72 Am. St. Rep. 777; Whitney v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 102 Fed. 850, 43 C. C. A. 19, 50 L. R. A. 615; State, to Use of Abell, v. Western Maryland R. Co., 63 Md. 433.

CHAPTER XVII

COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF THE RELATION

167.

Commencement of the Relation.

168. Termination of the Relation-In General.

169.

170.

171.

172.
173.

Full Performance by Carrier-Alighting at Station.
Connecting Carriers.

Ejection of Passenger by Carrier-Causes of Ejection.
Circumstances Surrounding the Ejection.

Abandonment of Incompleted Journey by Passenger.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE RELATION

167. A person becomes a passenger, entitled to the exercise of the care due to passengers, when, after he has offered himself for immediate transportation, he is accepted expressly or impliedly by the carrier.

The degree of care which the passenger carrier owes to any person is determined by the relation existing between the carrier and such person. The highest degree of practicable care is the measure of the common carrier's duty to a passenger,' but this duty, coincident with the relation of passenger, arises only at the moment that one becomes a passenger. It is, therefore, a matter of no little importance to determine just when the relation of passenger and carrier commences. When it has once begun, it continues until it is terminated in one of the ways mentioned in the next section.

One becomes a passenger when he puts himself into the care of the carrier to be transported, and is received and accepted as a passenger by the carrier. There is hardly ever any formal act of delivery of one's person into the care of the carrier, or of acceptance

1 Post, § 179.

2 Dodge v. Boston & B. S. S. Co., 148 Mass. 207, 19 N. E. 373, 2 L. R. A. 83, 12 Am. St. Rep. 541.

Berry v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 124 Mo. 223, 25 S. W. 229; Brien v. Bennett. 8 Car. & P. (Eng.) 724; Smith v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 1, 18 N. W. 827, 50 Am. Rep. 550; North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 140 Ill. 275, 29 N. E. 672; Bricker v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 1, 18 Atl. 983, 19 Am. St. Rep. 585; Schaefer v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 331; Exton v. Central R. Co., 63 N. J. Law, 356, 46 Atl. 1099, 56 L. R. A. 508; WEBSTER v. FITCHBURG R. CO., 161 Mass. 298, 37 N. E. 165, 24 L. R. A. 521, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 309; Strong v. North Chicago St. R. Co., 116 Ill. App. 246.