Railroad Companies-Massachusetts Rule 96 By what is known as the "Massachusetts rule," the liability of a railroad company as a common carrier terminates, and its responsibility as a warehouseman commences, when the goods have arrived at the point of destination, and have been deposited there to await the convenience of the consignee, without notice of the arrival of the goods being given to the consignee.95 In the leading case supporting this rule, the decision was put upon the ground that from the necessary conditions of the business of railroad corporations, and from their practice to have platforms on which to place goods from the cars in the first instance, and warehouse accommodations by which they may be securely stored, the placing of the goods of each consignment by themselves, in accessible places, ready to be delivered, completes the whole duty assumed by the railroad corporation as a carrier. The distinctive duty of the carrier is to carry the goods safely to the place of destination, and there discharge them upon the platform, and then and there deliver them to the consignee or party entitled to receive them, if he is there ready to take them forthwith, or, if he is not there, ready to take them, then to place them securely, and keep them a reasonable time, ready to be delivered when called for. Delivery from themselves as common carriers to themselves as keepers for hire discharges their responsibility as common carriers; so that they are responsible as common carriers only until the goods are removed from the cars and placed on the platform. In short, the railroad corporation ceases to be a common carrier, and becomes a warehouseman, as a matter (N. Y.) 305, 31 Am. Dec. 297; McMasters v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 Pa. 374, 8 Am. Rep. 264; Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Ill. 324; Crawford v. Clark, 15 Ill. 561; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transp. Co., 16 Vt. 52, 42 Am. Dec. 491; Id., 23 Vt. 186, 56 Am. Dec. 68; Sleade v. Payne, 14 La. Ann. 457; Stone v. Rice, 58 Ala. 95; Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. (Eng.) 314, 329; Garside v. Navigation Co., 4 Term R. (Eng.) 581. This usage need not be shown to have been known to the shipper, as he is presumed to contract with reference to all the usages of the particular trade. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 157, 167. 95 Thomas v. Boston & P. R. Corp., 10 Metc. (Mass.) 472, 43 Am. Dec. 444; Kight v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., 127 Ga. 204, 56 S. E. 363; Schumacher v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 207 Ill. 199, 69 N. E. 825; Bansemer v. Toledo & W. Ry. Co., 25 Ind. 434, 87 Am. Dec. 367; Stanard Milling Co. v. White Line Cent. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26 S. W. 704; Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co., 60 Pa. 109, 100 Am. Dec. 541; Spears v. Spartanburg, U. & C. R. Co., 11 S. C. 158; Francis v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 60, 95 Am. Dec. 769; Chalk v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 85 N. C. 423. 96 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R. R., 1 Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am Dec. 423. DOB.BAILM.-28 of law, when it has completed the duty of transportation, and assumed the position of warehouseman, as a matter of fact. This rule, in the opinion of Shaw, C. J., in the case in question," is held "to afford a plain, precise, and practical rule of duty, well adapted to the security of all persons interested." Of its simplicity there can be little question; but, as it is manifestly impossible for the consignee to anticipate the arrival of freight trains and be present then to receive the goods, it is believed that it unduly favors the carrier. Same-New Hampshire Rule 98 Under the New Hampshire rule, the strict liability of the common carrier continues until the expiration of a reasonable time after the arrival of the goods. It is held, though, that the "reasonable time" is not to be affected by the peculiar circumstances and conditions in the case of the individual consignee." Thus the time is not extended in favor of one living at a distance from the railroad warehouse as against one living in its immediate vicinity. The New Hampshire rule, owing to the hazardous uncertainty of the arrival of freight trains at unearthly and unusual hours, is fairer to the consignee and is more nearly in accord, than the Massachusetts rule, with what is believed to be a sounder public policy. Same-Michigan Rule The Michigan rule applies the same rule to railroads that obtains as to carriers by water. In order to relieve itself of its strict common-law liability, the railroad company must first give notice to the consignee of the arrival of the goods, and must then give the consignee a reasonable time for the removal of the goods. Until the lapse of a reasonable time after such notice, the liability of the carrier remains in all its strictness.1 97 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R. R., 1 Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am. Dec. 423. 98 Moses v. Boston & M. R. R., 32 N. H. 523, 64 Am. Dec. 381; Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 128 Ala. 167, 29 South. 203; Leavenworth, L. & G. R. Co. v. Maris, 16 Kan. 333; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Cleve land, 2 Bush (Ky.) 468; Winslow v. Vermont & M. R. Co., 42 Vt. 700, 1 Am. Rep. 365; Backhaus v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 92 Wis. 393, 66 N. W. 400; Berry v. West Virginia & P. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 538, 30 S. E. 143, 67 Am. St. Rep. 781. 99 Moses v. Boston & M. R. R., 32 N. H. 523, 64 Am. Dec. 381. See, also, other cases cited in preceding note. 1 Hutchison (section 708) calls this the New York rule. The doctrine is supported by the following cases: McMillan v. Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. Dec. 208; Pinney v. First Division of St. Paul & P. R. Co., 19 Minn. 251 (Gil. 211); Gulf & C. R. Co. v. Fuqua & Horton, 84 Miss. 490, 36 South. 449; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Hatch, 52 Ohio St. 408, 39 N. This is believed to be the best of the three rules. The same conditions that obtain in the case of water carriers are applicable here to justify the same test in the case of railroads. Any difference is one of degree, not of kind, and hardly warrants a different rule. This is particularly true as to transcontinental traffic, or even that traversing the lines of several railroads. Then the consignee can never know with even approximate certainty of the expected arrival of the goods. It might also be pointed out that by requiring the railroad company, in possession of immediate and exact knowledge, to give notice of the arrival of the goods, the carrier is relieved of the burden of answering any number of inquiries. The requirement of notice, therefore, usually by postal, though a great advantage to the consignee, imposes little, if any, hardship on the railroad company. Duty of Common Carrier When Consignee Refuses to Receive the Goods The duty of the consignee to receive the goods, upon the tender of a proper delivery, is as clear as the carrier's duty to deliver. The strict liability of the common carrier cannot be prolonged at the option of the consignee merely to suit his convenience. The consignee must act with reasonable promptness in taking the goods. If he fails to do so, whatever other duty may rest on the carrier as to the goods, the carrier's insuring liability is thereby terminated.s Even though a consignee may neglect to accept or receive the goods, the carrier is not thereby justified in abandoning them, or in negligently exposing them to injury. The law enables the car E. 1042; Fenner v. Buffalo & S. L. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709. The English cases also favor this rule. Chapman v. Great, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Q. B. Div. 278; Mitchell v. Railway Co., 10 L. R. Q. B. 256. 2 The essential fairness of this rule has so commended itself to many state Legislatures that it has been expressly enacted by statutes. Cavallaro v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94; Collins v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 104 Ala. 390, 16 South. 140; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Naive, 112 Tenn. 239, 79 S. W. 124, 64 L. R. A. 443; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 72 Tex. 175, 10 S. W. 398. 3 Redmond v. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. Steamboat Co., 46 N. Y. 578, 7 Am. Rep. 390; Hedges v. Hudson River R. Co., 49 N. Y. 223; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Suitter (D. C.) 17 Fed. 695; De Grau v. Wilson (D. C.) 17 Fed. 698. See, also, Manhattan Rubber Shoe Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 9 App. Div. 172, 41 N. Y. Supp. 83; Arkansas S. R. Co. v. German Nat. Bank, 77 Ark. 482, 92 S. W. 522, 113 Am. St. Rep. 160. As to notice to the consignor, see cases cited in notes 56-59. 4 Hermann v. Goodrich, 21 Wis. 536, 94 Am. Dec. 562; 17 Conn. 138; Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 371; Merwin v. Butler, 2 Head (Tenn.) 488, 75 Am. Dec. 744; Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller rier to exempt himself wholly from responsibility in such a contingency, by giving him the right to warehouse the goods. When this is done, he is no longer liable in any capacity, and if they are subsequently lost by the negligence of the warehouseman the carrier is not liable. But so long as the carrier has the custody of the goods, although exempted from liability as carrier, there supervenes upon the original contract of carriage, by implication of law, a duty, as bailee or warehouseman, to take ordinary care of the property. SAME DELIVERY TO A CONNECTING CARRIER 145. Where goods are received by a carrier to be transported over connecting lines, the initial carrier is not liable for loss or injury occurring beyond its own line, unless, by special contract, he undertakes to convey the goods to their destination. In England and a few of the American states, such a contract (rendering the initial carrier responsible for loss or dam Co., 60 Pa. 109, 100 Am. Dec. 541; Northern v. Williams, 6 La. Ann. 578; Segura v. Reed, 3 La. Ann. 695; Tarbell v. Royal Exch. Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170, 17 N. E. 721, 6 Am. St. Rep. 350; Redmond v. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. Steamboat Co., 46 N. Y. 578, 7 Am. Rep. 390; McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. Rep. 657; The City of Lincoln (D. C.) 25 Fed. 835, 839; Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28, 39, 16 L. Ed. 412; The Grafton, 1 Blatchf. 173, Fed. Cas. No. 5,655. Where consignee is unable, or refuses, to accept goods, carrier must secure them in place of safety, and will not be justified in leaving them exposed on wharf. Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 39, 8 Am. Dec. 211. See, also, The Keystone v. Moies, 28 Mo. 243, 75 Am. Dec. 123; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46 N. E. 374, 36 L. R. A. 527. The carrier (when the consignee refuses or fails to receive the goods) may sell perishable freight, when that is necessary to prevent a total loss to the shipper, though, if practicable, notice should be given to the consignor before the sale. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. C. H. Cox & Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 1196; Dudley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 58 W. Va. 604, 52 S. E. 718, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135, 112 Am. St. Rep. 1027. In some states, this right is expressly given by statute. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dreyfus, 37 Okl. 492, 132 Pac. 491. 5 Redmond v. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. Steamboat Co., 46 N. Y. 578, 7 Am. Rep 390; Manhattan Rubber Shoe Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 9 App. Div. 172, 41 N. Y. Supp. 83. In such case, whatever remedy the owner has is against the warehouseman. 6 Tarbell v. Royal Exch. Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170, 17 N. E. 721, 6 Am. St. Rep. 350; Hasse v. American Exp. Co., 94 Mich. 133, 53 N. W. 918, 34 Am. St. Rep. 328; Welch v. Concord R. R., 68 N. H. 206, 44 Atl. 304; Byrne v. Fargo, 36 Misc. Rep. 543, 73 N. Y. Supp. 943; Bryan v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 169 Ill. App. 181; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. A. R. Harper Piano Co., 63 Fla. 264, 58 South. 491. age occurring on the lines of connecting carriers) is presumed from the acceptance of the goods by the initial carrier, when the goods are consigned to a point beyond the terminus of the initial carrier's line. In the great majority of the American states, however, this mere acceptance of goods consigned beyond its own line does not render the initial carrier responsible beyond its own line. Such acceptance is held not to constitute, of itself, a contract to transport the goods to their destination. The question is further complicated by statutes, both state and federal, most of which, like the federal Interstate Commerce Act (Carmack Amendment), render the initial carrier liable for loss or damage occurring on the lines of the connecting carrier. Who are Connecting Carriers 7 According to the judicial definition most frequently approved, "a connecting carrier is one whose route, not being the first one, lies somewhere between the point of shipment and the point of destination." The carrier to whom the goods are originally delivered for transportation by the consignor is called the initial carrier. All other carriers engaged in transporting the goods between the place of shipment and their destination are connecting carriers. The initial carrier receives the goods from the consignor and starts the transportation; the connecting carrier receives the goods either from the initial carrier or from another connecting carrier, and a particular connecting carrier either may or may not complete the transportation. There is but one initial carrier; there may be any number of connecting carriers. A transfer company from the depot at the station of destination to the consignee's business house was held not to be a connecting carrier, on the ground that the goods had already reached their destination and were not being carried by the transfer company under the original transportation contract.R When Initial Carrier is Liable for Through Transportation The duty of a common carrier at common law is limited to receiving and transporting goods over its own line-a duty which it must perform, or respond in damages. But it is not its duty to Nanson v. Jacob, 12 Mo. App. 125. 8 Nanson v. Jacob, 12 Mo. App. 125. For interesting contrast as to whether a railroad company, hauling cars from the depot to consignee's store or mill, is a connecting carrier, see Western & A. R. Co. v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 81 Ga. 522, 7 S. E. 916, 2 L. R. A. 102; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wichita Wholesale Grocery Co., 55 Kan. 525, 40 Pac. 899. |