Delay, however, even when in no way due to the negligence of the carrier, does not release the carrier from his duty of completing the carriage of the goods.15 The contract of carriage is in no sense discharged by such delay. Accordingly, when the cause of delay is removed, the carrier must again use ordinary care to complete the transportation and promptly carry the goods to their destination.18

In the cases that follow, the common carrier, who was in no way negligent, was held not liable for delay. In all of these cases, it might be noted, the carrier would have been liable for loss of, or damage to, the goods if similarly caused. When delay was caused by a collision on land," mobs or strikers,18 destruction of part of

110; Swift River Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 169 Mass. 326, 47 N. E. 1015, 61 Am. St. Rep. 288; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 32 N. E. 476, 21 L. R. A. 117, 34 Am. St. Rep. 579. Special damages for a carrier's delay in transportation cannot be recovered where the carrier had no notice at the time of contract of the special facts; not even those accruing from delay occurring after it is given such notice. Hassler v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 142 S. W. 629. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co., 104 Tenn. 568, 58 S. W. 303, 50 L. R. A. 729, 78 Am. St. Rep. 933; Deming v. Grand Trunk Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am. Rep. 267; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Mudford, 48 Ark. 502, 3 S. W. 814. Special damages for delay in shipment of goods are recoverable when the carrier has notice that delay in delivery will result in such damages. v. Southern Ry. Co., 90 S. C. 366, 73 S. E. 772.

Mills

15 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. W. 695. 16 Hadley v. Clarke, 8 Term R. (Eng.) 259. Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 348; Spann v. Erie Boatman's Transp. Co., 11 Misc. Rep. 680, 33 N. Y. Supp. 566; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 458.

17 CONGER v. HUDSON RIVER R. CO., 6 Duer (N. Y.) 375, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 204.

18 See 1 Hutch. Carr. § 657; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hollowell, 65 Ind. 188, 32 Am. Rep. 63. But see Blackstock v. New York & E. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48, 75 Am. Dec. 372. Where the employés of a railroad company suddenly refuse to work, and are discharged, and delay results from the failure of the company to promptly supply their places, the company is liable for any damage caused by such delay; but, where the places of the striking employés are promptly supplied by other competent men, and the strikers then prevent the new employés from doing duty by lawless and irresistible violence, the company is not liable for delay caused solely by such lawless violence. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Hazen, 84 Ill. 36, 25 Am. Rep. 422; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hollowell, supra; GREISMER v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. R. CO., 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. 828, 55 Am. Rep. 837, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 206; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Levi, 76 Tex. 337, 13 S. W. 191, 8 L. R. A. 323, 18 Am. St. Rep. 45; Haas v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 81 Ga. 792, 7 S. E. 629; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Tex. 8, 11 S. W. 900, 4 L. R. A. 545; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 89 Ind. 457; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Levi (Tex. App.) 14 S. W. 1062; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. App.) 15 S. W. 121;

the carrier's track by fire,19 or a scow running into the carrier's boat,20 the carrier exercising ordinary diligence was excused.21 What is a Reasonable Time

We have just seen that the carrier must use ordinary care to deliver the goods within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time, in this connection, is a question of fact for the jury, to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case.2 These, of course, may present an almost infinite variety. Thus, the nature of the goods, the distance they are to be carried,

22

Bartlett v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 94 Ind. 281. But cf. Read v. St. Louis, K. & C. & N. R. Co., 60 Mo. 199.

19 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6.

20 Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 215, 28 Am. Dec. 521.

21 For other cases in which the carrier's delay was excused, see Bowman v. Teall, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 306, 35 Am. Dec. 562; Beckwith v. Frisby, 32 Vt. 559 (freezing of navigable waters); Bennett v. Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. Dec. 90; Silver v. Hale, 2 Mo. App. 557 (low stage of river); Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Ballentine v. North Missouri R. Co., 40 Mo. 491, 93 Am. Dec. 315; Briddon v. Railroad Co., 28 L. J. Exch. (Eng.) 51 (heavy snow). But where a carrier accepted an automobile for shipment, it is liable for an unreasonable delay in the shipment, and its temporary inability to secure a car large enough to hold the automobile will not exonerate it. Grigsby v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 709. See, generally, Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 458; Livingston v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 5 Hun (N. Y.) 562; Taylor v. Railroad Co., L. R. 1 C. P. (Eng.) 385. A carrier need not incur heavy expense, or use extraordinary exertions, to hasten the transportation of goods. Reasonable diligence is all that is required. Empire Transportation Co. v. Wallace, 68 Pa. 302, 8 Am. Rep. 178.

22 Cartwell v. Pacific Express Co., 58 Ark. 487, 25 S. W. 503; Bosley v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 54 W. Va. 563, 46 S. E. 613, 66 L. R. A. 871; Coffin v. New York Cent. R. Co., 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 379; Wibert v. New York & E. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 245; Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407; Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 215, 28 Am. Dec. 521; Michigan Southern & N. I. R. Co. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375, 71 Am. Dec. 278; Bennett v. Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. Dec. 90; East Tennessee & G. R. Co. v. Nelson, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 272; Gerhard's Adm'r v. Neese, 36 Tex. 635; McGraw v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 41 Am. Rep. 696; Petersen v. Case (C. C.) 21 Fed. 885; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Heath, 41 Ark. 476; Ormsby v. Union Pac. R. Co. (C. C.) 2 McCrary, 48, 4 Fed. 706; St. Clair v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 80 Iowa, 304, 45 N. W. 570. Where an unusual contingency has arisen, which, unexpectedly, largely increases the business, and thereby prevents the handling of freight with the usual promptness and dispatch, the criterion of reasonable diligence is not the usual average speed in ordinary times, but the average running time under the extraordinary and unusual circumstances existing at the time. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6. For cases where delay has been held unreasonable, see Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 14 C. C. A. 153, 66 Fed. 868; Cartwright v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 85 Hun, 517, 33 N. Y. Supp. 147; Davis v. Jacksonville Southeastern Line, 126 Mo. 69, 28 S. W. 965.

the mode of transportation, the weather, the season of the year, the amount of traffic handled by the carrier, are all important considerations, to which due weight should be given.

Delivery Within Time Stipulated

The carrier may here, as elsewhere, enlarge his liability by contract. Accordingly, when the carrier agrees to transport goods within a specified time, he is absolutely liable if he fails to do so.23 He here assumes a strict responsibility by his own affirmative contract, and he must therefore live up to it. In such a case, when the tenor of his contract is for delivery at or before a definite time, without any exceptions, he would then be liable for delay beyond that time, though due to an inevitable accident, or even to the act of God. The contract is the measure of his responsibility, so that it is simply a question of construing the contract. Of course, there could be no recovery for delay that is due to the shipper's own wrong.25

23 Fox v. Boston & M. R. Co., 148 Mass. 220, 19 N. E. 222, 1 L. R. A. 702, Pereira v. Central Pac. R. Co., 66 Cal. 92, 4 Pac. 988; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Thrapp, 5 Ill. App. 502; Deming v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am. Rep. 267; Place v. Union Express Co., 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 19; Harrison v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 364, 41 Am. Rep. 318; Parmelee v. Wilks, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 539; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 62 Am. Dec. 142; Cantwell v. Pacific Express Co., 58 Ark. 487, 25 S. W. 503. Cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bryan (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 98; International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Wentworth, 87 Tex. 311, 28 S. W. 277. So, where a vendor of goods agrees absolutely to deliver them by a certain time, impossibility of obtaining them will not excuse him. Gilpins v. Consequa, Pet. C. C. 85, Fed. Cas. No. 5,452; Youqua v. Nixon, Pet. C. C. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 18,189. Nor impossibility of delivering them. Bryan v. Spurgin, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 681. The contract may be implied from acceptance of the goods with knowledge that they are intended to be at their destination on a given day. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Thrapp, 5 Ill. App. 502; Grindle v. Eastern Express Co., 67 Me. 317, 24 Am. Rep. 31; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209, 40 Am. Rep. 415. But see United States Exp. Co. v. Root, 47 Mich. 231, 10 N. W. 351. 24 Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 62 Am. Dec. 142; 25 Fowler v. Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co., 87 N. Y. 190; G. W. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa, 551, 80 N. W. 569.

Id., 1 Duer, 209. Stoner v. Chicago

CHAPTER XI

LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT

122. Historical and Introductory.

123.

124.

125.

126.

127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

134.

Method of Limiting Liability.

Notice of the Carrier's Regulations.

Form of the Contract.

Consideration of the Contract.

Construction of the Contract.

Burden of Proof.

Validity of Specific Stipulations-Stipulations Relieving Carrier of Lia

bility Save for Negligence.

Stipulations Seeking to Relieve the Carrier from Liability for Neg.
ligence.

Stipulations Limiting Liability as to Amount Recoverable-In the
Absence of the Carrier's Negligence.

Carrier Negligent-Amount Fixed Without Regard to the Val-
ue of the Goods.

Agreed Valuation of the Goods.

Limitations as to Time and Manner of Presenting Claims. 135. Statutory Regulation of Contracts Limiting Carrier's Liability.

HISTORICAL AND INTRODUCTORY

122. Though the common-law liability of the common carrier of goods was that of an insurer (with certain exceptions), this rigorous responsibility may be modified by special contract between the shipper and the carrier.

Contracts Enlarging the Liability of the Carrier

The courts are unanimous in holding that the common carrier of goods may by special contract indefinitely enlarge and extend his common-law liability. The carrier cannot be compelled by law to enter into such contracts, but if he voluntarily enters into them the law will not hesitate to give them effect. Such contracts, increasing the liability imposed by the common law, are in no sense

1 Southern Express Co. v. Glenn, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 472, 1 S. W. 102; Gaither v. Barnett, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 488; McCauley v. Davidson, 10 Minn. 418 (Gil. 335); Id., 13 Minn. 162 (Gil. 150); Strohn v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 23 Wis. 126, 99 Am. Dec. 114; Redpath v. Vaughan, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 489. As the common carrier's liability at common law is so rigorous, the courts require clear language to indicate an intention to increase this responsibility. They are therefore slow to infer such an intention from mere general expressions. Gage v. Tirrell, 9 Allen (Mass.) 299; Price v. Hartshorn, 44 Barb. 655; Id., 44 N. Y. 94, 4 Am. Rep. 645.

opposed to public policy. Hence, if they possess the usual requisites of contractual validity, they are valid and binding.'

Thus the carrier may by contract constitute himself an insurer, even against the risks ordinarily excepted by the common law, such as the act of God or the public enemy. More usual stipulations are that the carrier will carry by a certain route, that the goods will be carried by land or by water, that only specified cars or other instrumentalities will be used in transporting the goods, or the manner of carrying the goods may be specified in detail.' Again, the carrier may by contract absolutely insure the delivery of the goods at the destination by a specified time. In all these cases, the carrier, having fully and freely entered into the contract, is bound to perform it fully or respond in damages for his breach of it.

Contracts Limiting the Liability of the Carrier-In England

Though the insuring liability of the common carrier of goods was fixed as inhering in the relation, and seems not to have been regarded originally as a matter of contract, yet in comparatively early times we find a recognition of the carrier's right to diminish this unusual responsibility by contract.

The earliest judicial reference to this right seems to have been a declaration of Lord Coke in Southcote's Case. Lord Hale, in Morse v. Slue,10 apparently conceded the right. The tremendous importance of the right, however, was not immediately recognized by the carrier, for it was not until after the middle of the eighteenth century that any further cases of importance on the subject were decided. The cases of Gibbon v. Paynton 11 (1769), Forward v. Pittard 12 (1785), and the judgment of Lord Ellenborough in Nicholson v. Willan 18 (1804), place the right upon a fairly sound ju

2 See cases cited in preceding note.

& Price v. Hartshorn, 44 Barb. 655; Id., 44 N. Y. 94, 4 Am. Rep. 645; Gage v. Tirrell, 9 Allen (Mass.) 299; Miller v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 62 Mo. App. 252.

4 Maghee v. Camden & A. R. Transp. Co., 45 N. Y. 522, 6 Am. Rep. 124; Steel v. Flagg, 5 Barn. & Ald. (Eng.) 342; Goodrich v. Thompson, 44 N. Y. 324.

Merrick v. Webster, 3 Mich. 268.

Mathis v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 S. C. 271, 43 S. E. 684, 61 L. R. A. 824. 7 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 20 Hun (N. Y.) 39;

Penn v. Buffalo & E. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 204, 10 Am. Rep. 355.

8 Shelby v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 77 Mo. App. 205; Rudell v. Ogdensburgh Transit Co., 117 Mich. 568, 76 N. W. 381, 44 L. R. A. 415.

94 Coke (Eng.) 43 b (1601).

10 1 Vent. (Eng.) 190 (1671).

11 4 Burr. (Eng.) 2298.

12 1 T. R. (Eng.) 27.

18 5 East (Eng.) 507.