to the carrier in good condition, and a redelivery of them by the latter in a damaged condition, is sufficient proof of injury." If the evidence in the case ceases here, the plaintiff recovers against the carrier.

After the proof indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the carrier, unless he can disprove the facts thus established by the plaintiff, can escape liability only by showing that such loss or injury was due to one of the five excepted perils. When the liability of the common carrier of goods remains as at common law, no other evidence is relevant or in any way affects the issue between the parties. The burden, then, of proximately connecting the loss or injury with one of the excepted causes is clearly upon the carrier.

The cases are in direct conflict, however, as to the duty of proving or disproving the carrier's negligence in connection with the excepted peril. As we have just seen, after the plaintiff's prima facie case, the carrier must show that one of the excepted perils was responsible for the loss or injury. The mooted point is: Must he also go further and show that there was no negligence on his part, in connection with the excepted peril, to which the loss or injury may be attributed? Is the carrier required to absolve himself by proving his own lack of negligence, or is such negligence a positive fact to be proved by the plaintiff ? "

The preponderance of authority seems to favor the rule, which seems to be sound, that the burden of proving the carrier's negli

414; Grier v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 108 Mo. App. 565, 84 S. W. 158; Saleeby v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 99 App. Div. 163, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1042; Mouton v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 128 Ala. 537, 29 South. 602; J. H. Cownie Glove Co. v. Merchants' Dispatch Transp. Co., 130 Iowa, 327, 106 N. W. 749, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1060, 114 Am. St. Rep. 419.

57 Marquette, H. & O. R. Co. v. Langton, 32 Mich. 251; The Vincenzo, 10 Ben. 228, Fed. Cas. No. 16,948; Bonfiglio v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 476, 84 N. W. 722; The La Kroma (D. C.) 138 Fed. 936; Morris v. Wier, 20 Misc. Rep. 586, 46 N. Y. Supp. 413; Heck v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 51 Mo. App. 532; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Naive, 112 Tenn. 239, 79 S. W. 124, 64 L. R. A. 443; Uber v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 151 Wis. 431, 138 N. W. 57.

58 Read v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 60 Mo. 206; Wallingford v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 26 S. C. 258, 2 S. E. 19; J. H. Cownie Glove Co. v. Merchants' Dispatch Transp. Co., 130 Iowa, 327, 106 N. W. 749, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1060, 114 Am. St. Rep. 419; Slater v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 29 S. C. 96, 6 S. E. 936. Sometimes the plaintiff's own showing may show clearly the carrier's exemption from responsibility. Davis v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 1 S. W. 327.

59 See 3 Hutch. Carr. 1354-1357, with very elaborate citation of cases.

60

gence rests upon the plaintiff. Under this rule, which obtains in England, New York, and the United States Supreme Court, the carrier prevails, in the absence of further proof by the plaintiff, when he shows that the loss or injury was the result of one of the excepted causes, under circumstances which do not of themselves import negligence on his part. These cases proceed on the ground that loss or injury from an excepted peril raises no presumption that the carrier has been negligent, but rather a presumption that he has performed his duty in the premises. It is therefore held that the carrier's negligence is a positive fault, which the plaintiff must prove.

Very many courts, however, are not so kind to the carrier and hold that, to offset the plaintiff's prima facie case, the carrier must prove, not only that the loss or injury was due to an excepted peril, but also that he exercised reasonable diligence or ordinary care in the premises to avoid such peril and to escape its consequences. In other words, the carrier must prove an excepted

61

60 This rule obtains in England, and is supported by the United States courts and those of New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Missouri, Rhode Island, Maine, Louisiana, Kansas, and other states. Muddle v. Stride, 9 Car. & P. (Eng.) 380; The Glendamoch, L. R. (1894) P. (Eng.) 226, 63 L. J. P. 89; Lamar Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453, 93 S. W. 851; Witting v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 631, 14 S. W. 743, 10 L. R. A. 602, 20 Am. St. Rep. 636; Davis v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 1 S. W. 327; Read v. St. Louis, K, C. & N. R. Co., 60 Mo. 199 (cf. Hill v. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 323); Steers v. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co., 57 N. Y. 1, 15 Am. Rep. 453; Lamb v. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co., 46 N. Y. 271, 7 Am. Rep. 327; Cochran v. Dinsmore, 49 N. Y. 249; Patterson v. Clyde, 67 Pa. 500; Colton v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 67 Pa. 211, 5 Am. Rep. 424; Farnham v. Camden & A. R. Co., 55 Pa. 53; Goldey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 Pa. 242, 72 Am. Dec. 703; cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 87 Pa. 395; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. 378, 80 Am. Dec. 627; Whitesides v. Russell, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 44; Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. v. Corcoran, 40 Ark. 375; Little Rock, M. R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 208; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623; Kallman v. United States Exp. Co., 3 Kan. 205; Kelham v. The Kensington, 24 La. Ann. 100; Smith v. North Carolina R. Co., 64 N. C. 235; Hubbard v. Harnden Exp. Co., 10 R. I. 244; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Manchester Mills, 88 Tenn. 653, 14 S. W. 314; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176, 19 L. Ed. 909; Western Transp. Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129, 20 L. Ed. 160; Christie v. The Craigton (D. C.) 41 Fed. 62; Mitchell v. U. S. Exp. Co., 46 Iowa, 214; Sager v. Portsmouth, S. P. & E. R. Co., 31 Me. 228, 50 Am. Dec. 659; National Rice Mill Co. v. New Orleans & N. E R. Co., 132 La. 615, 61 South. 708.

61 Among the states upholding this rule are Connecticut, California, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Kentucky, Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. Mears v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 75 Conn. 171, 52 Atl. 610, 56 L. R. A. 884, 96 Am. St. Rep. 192; Wilson v. California Cent. R. Co., 94 Cal. 166, 29 Pac. 861, 17 L. R. A. 685; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.

cause plus the absence of negligence on his part in connection therewith. Loss or injury by an excepted cause, according to these cases, involves a prima facie presumption of negligence, which, if not overcome by a showing on the part of the carrier, is sufficient to hold him liable. Mere proof, then, that the loss or injury was due to an excepted peril, stopping there, would avail the carrier nothing. This rule has the merit of convenience, as the carrier is in the better position to know all the facts; but it seems to be unduly severe upon the carrier.

It should be noted that, according to the generally accepted modern terminology, the burden of proof does not shift. But the duty of going forward with the evidence may, and frequently does, shift from one party to another, as we have seen above, during the trial. A failure in the duty thus imposed may therefore result in the loss of the suit by the delinquent party.

62

CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK

119. Carriers of live stock are none the less common carriers whenever carriers of other goods would be. The exception relieving the common carrier, in the absence of his negligence, from liability for loss or damage due to the inherent nature of the goods, here becomes of striking importance, owing to the vitality of the freight.

Brown, 90 S. W. 567, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 772; Bosley v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 54 W. Va. 563, 46 S. E. 613, 66 L. R. A. 871; Hinkle v. Southern Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 932, 36 S. E. 348, 78 Am. St. Rep. 685; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S. E. 679, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898, 110 Am. St. Rep. 170, 4 Ann. Cas. 128; South & N. A. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606, 23 Am. Rep. 578; Steele v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247, 79 Am. Dec. 49; Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003, 45 Am. Rep. 428; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017; Gains v. Union Transp. & Ins. Co., 28 Ohio St. 418; United States Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144; Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362, 62 Am. Dec. 285; Union Express Co. v. Graham, 26 Ohio St. 595; Slater v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 29 S. C. 96, 6 S. E. 936; Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 286, 45 Am. Dec. 732; Baker v. Brinson, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 201, 67 Am. Dec. 548; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. China Manuf'g Co., 79 Tex. 26, 14 S. W. 785; Ryan v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 13, 57 Am. Rep. 589; Brown v. Adams Exp. Co., 15 W. Va. 812; Shriver v. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co., 24 Minn. 506, 31 Am. Rep. 353; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Manning, 23 Neb. 552, 37 N. W. 462; Ferguson v. Southern Ry., 91 S. C. 61, 74 S. E. 129.

62 See, as to this, 4 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2483-2498. See, also, Insurance Co. of North America v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 152 Ind. 333, 53 N. E. 382, Cau v. Texas & P. R. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 24 Sup. Ct. 663, 48 L. Ed. 1053; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Manchester Mills, 88 Tenn. 653, 14 S. W. 314; Schal

Though there are a few decisions to the contrary," the overwhelming weight of authority holds that the carrier of live stock is none the less a common carrier of goods." He is therefore sub

ler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 1042; Long v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 147 Pa. 343, 23 Atl. 459, 14 L. R. A. 741, 30 Am. St. Rep. 732. These last cases are concerned with the carrier's exemption by contract; but the burden of proof is usually the same as to negligence and an excepted peril, whether such peril be one excepted by law or one excepted by contract.

63 Michigan, S. & N. I. R. Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. Rep. 466, the leading case in support of this view, has been followed by other Michigan cases. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Perkins, 25 Mich. 329, 12 Am. Rep. 275; McKenzie v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 137 Mich. 112, 100 N. W. 260. This doctrine was upheld in the Kentucky cases of Louisville, C. & L. R. Co. v. Hedger, 9 Bush, 645, 15 Am. Rep. 740, and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wathen, 66 S. W. 714, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2128. But the doctrine of these cases seems to be repudiated in the later cases of Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Sanders & Russell, 118 Ky. 115, 80 S. W. 488, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2333, and Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Magowan, 147 Ky. 422, 144 S. W. 80.

64 This is the rule in England. Blower v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 655; Kendall v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 373. With the exceptions mentioned in the preceding note, the American courts are practically unanimous. Fordyce v. McFlynn, 56 Ark. 424, 19 S. W. 961; Cooper v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., 110 Ga. 659, 36 S. E. 240; Waldron v. Fargo, 170 N. Y. 130, 62 N. E. 1077; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717; Ficklir v. Wabash R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 221, 93 S. W. 847; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hinely-Stephens Co., 64 Fla. 175, 60 South. 749; MAYNARD v. SYRACUSE, B. & N. Y. R. CO., 71 N. Y. 180, 27 Am. Rep. 28, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 213; Cragin v. New York Cent. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 61, 10 Am. Rep. 559; Penn v. Buffalo & E. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 204, 10 Am. Rep. 355; CONGER v. HUDSON RIVER R. CO., 6 Duer (N. Y.) 375, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 204; Clarke v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. Dec. 205; Harris v. Northern Indiana R. Co., 20 N. Y. 232; St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Dorman, 72 Ill. 504; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 20 Ill. 624, 71 Am. Dec. 291; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Harmon, 12 Ill. App. 54; Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W. 432, 5 Am. St. Rep. 226; EVANS v. FITCHBURG R. CO., 111 Mass. 142, 15 Am. Rep. 19, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 201; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 13 Am. Rep. 42; Kinnick v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 69 Iowa, 665, 29 N. W. 772; McCoy v. Keokuk & D. M. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 424; German v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 127; Powell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 32 Pa. 414, 75 Am. Dec. 564; Atchison & N. R. Co. v. Washburn, 5 Neb. 117; Porterfield v. Humphreys, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 497; Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio St. 722; Welsh v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 65, 75 Am. Dec. 490; South & N. A. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606, 23 Am. Rep. 578; Kimball v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247, 62 Am. Dec. 567; Moulton v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W. 497, 47 Am. Rep. 781; Agnew v. The Contra Costa, 27 Cal. 425, 87 Am. Dec. 87; Lindsley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 36 Minn. 539, 33 N. W. 7, 1 Am. St. Rep. 692; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex. 314, 5 S. W. 567, 2 Am. St. Rep. 494; Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 18 Mo. App. 569; McFadden v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92 Mo. 343, 4 S. W. 689, 1 Am. St. Rep. 721. "It is claimed there is

ject to the liabilities and entitled to the rights which the law attaches to that relation. The question is naturally an important one, particularly in determining his liability for loss or injury. Is this to be measured, as in the case of common carriers, as that of an insurer, with the specified exceptions, or is it to be measured, like that of the ordinary bailee for hire, in terms of negligence, in which case he would be responsible only for his failure to exercise ordinary care.

In Michigan" it was held that the carrier of live stock was not a common carrier, and not liable as such, on the ground that "the transportation of cattle and live stock by common carriers by land was unknown to the common law when the duties and responsibilities of common carriers were fixed, making them insurers." But as was said in a leading case in Kansas: ** "The transportation of thousands of other kinds of property, either by land or water, was unknown to the common law, and yet such kinds of property are now carried by common carriers every day." The Michigan doctrine, based on so slender a thread of reasoning, has been generally repudiated, and one who would be held a common carrier under the accepted tests is none the less so merely because the nature of the goods which he is carrying happens to be live stock.67

We have already seen that, to impose the unusual responsibility on the common carrier, the goods must be put in his possession and control; in other words, there must be a delivery to him, so as to constitute a bailment." When this is done, the carrier is

a difference between live stock and other property as to the responsibility assumed by a carrier in its transportation; that the voluntary motion of the stock introduces an element of danger into the transportation against which neither reason nor authority require that the carrier insure; that, inasmuch as it is customary that the shipper, or some one for him, accompany the stock, there is only a qualified or partial delivery to the carrier; and also that proof that a railroad company has suitable cars, and is engaged in the business of carrying cattle, is not proof that it is a common carrier as to such cattle, because, to insure their safe transportation, requires yards and stables, with conveniences for feeding, both at the termini and along the route, as well as a corps of experienced stockmen to take care of them in the transit. These last, as it seems to us, are duties incident to the employment, and not elements to determine its character. Engaging in the business of transporting cattle, it becomes a duty to provide every suitable facility therefor. Not the manner of doing the work, but the fact of engaging in the business, is the test laid down in the books for determining the character of the carrier." Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623. 65 Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. Rep. 466. 66 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 235, 12 Am. Rep. 494. 67 See cases cited in note 64.

68 See ante, p. 327; post, § 136.