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The question of what goods must be deposited with the innkeeper is one of no little difficulty. By some statutes, goods needed for the personal use of the guest need not be deposited, but may be retained in the guest's room, or on his person, without diminishing the innkeeper's responsibility. Other statutes enumerate the classes of goods to be deposited, which are usually of small bulk and relatively large value. When this enumeration does not include articles of personal use, of course no deposit of such articles is necessary to fix the common-law liability of the innkeeper. When the enumeration does include such articles, however, the decisions are in conflict. Some cases hold that money for current expenses and personal articles are still impliedly exempted, and the innkeeper remains responsible as at common law. Other cases, probably the greater number, insist that there is no such implied exception, and that the guest has his choice of depositing the goods and insisting on the technical innkeeping liability, or of not depositing them, in which case the innkeeper is, like an ordinary bailee, liable only for negligence.10 Perhaps the wording of the individual statutes may account in a measure for much of this conflict.

SAME THE RIGHT OF COMPENSATION AND LIENTHE COMPENSATION OF THE INNKEEPER

99. The innkeeper is entitled to his compensation and may require payment in advance. His charges, however, must be reasonable.

The innkeeper is, of course, entitled to his proper compensation, as this is the sole advantage that he derives from the innkeeping relation. Owing to his intimate association with, and his im

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See, for example, Rev. Code Del. 1852, amended 1893, p. 409 (14 Del. Laws, c. 417, p. 390, § 1); Code Iowa 1897, § 3138; Laws Neb. 1905, c. 81, § 2. 7 See, for example, Comp. St. Ky. 1894, § 2176; Voorhies' Rev. Civ. Code La. 1889, art. 2969; Rev. Laws Minn. 1905, § 2810. For cases construing such provisions, see Rains v. Maxwell House Co., 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114, 64 L. R. A. 470, 2 Ann. Cas. 488; Briggs v. Todd, 28 Misc. Rep. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23.

8 Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130.

Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310; Murchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. Rep. 754.

10 Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258; Rains v. Maxwell House Co., 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114, 64 L. R. A. 470, 2 Ann. Cas. 488; Lang v. Arcade Hotel Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 372.

11 Newton v. Trigg, 1 Shower (Eng.) 268; Baldwin v. Webb, 121 Ga. 416, 49 S. E. 265. See, also, Roche v. Road Driver's Ass'n of New York (Sup.) 96 N. Y. Supp. 205.

portance to, the public, the law requires of the innkeeper, as it does of the common carrier, that his charges be reasonable.12 Were it not for this qualification, the innkeeper might also evade his duty to receive as guests all proper persons who apply by fixing his compensation so high that the intending guest could not possibly pay it. In the absence of statutes, 13 which are rare in this country, regulating his compensation, the innkeeper may fix his charges as he sees fit, provided that they are reasonable. In determining whether the charges are reasonable in a particular case, the character of the accommodations furnished, the locality of the inn, and various other considerations apply," while evidence as to the charges made for similar accommodations at neighboring inns is relevant and important.15

Compelled by law to serve indifferently all proper persons who apply, the innkeeper, like the common carrier, is permitted by law to require payment of his charges in advance. 10 He can therefore demand his compensation as soon as the relation of innkeeper and guest is established." This right, however, is not as a rule exercised by the innkeeper, though many make a practice of enforcing it as to guests who come to the inn without baggage.

Criminal Statutes Protecting Innkeeper's Compensation

The innkeeper is further protected as to his compensation by criminal statutes in most of the states, designed to deter unscrupulous persons from securing entertainment at an inn without payment therefor.18 Even under these statutes, however, the mere failure to pay the charges of the innkeeper is not made criminal unless it is in some way connected with fraud.1 Under most of the statutes, it is made a crime to obtain the entertainment with. intent to defraud the innkeeper of his charges, in connection with

12 Roche v. Road Driver's Ass'n of New York (Sup.) 96 N. Y. Supp. 205; Newton v. Trigg, 1 Shower (Eng.) 268; Baldwin v. Webb, 121 Ga. 416, 49 S. E. 265.

13 See Banks v. Oden, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 546; Com. v. Shortridge, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 638.

14 Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. (Eng.) 67.

15 Cross v. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332.

16 Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. (Eng.) 276; Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 484, 47 L. J. Q. B. 700.

17 Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209. 18 See Beale, Innkeepers, c. 32. The constitutionality of such statutes is now well established. State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N. W. 471; State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656. As penal statutes, they are to be strictly construed. Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 Ill. App. 358.

19 People v. Nicholson, 25 Misc. Rep. 266, 55 N. Y. Supp. 447; People v. Klas, 79 Misc. Rep. 452, 141 N. Y. Supp. 212.

some false pretence.20 Many statutes also make it a crime for the guest, who has not paid the innkeeper, to remove his baggage surreptitiously from the inn, either apart from, or in connection with, obtaining the entertainment with fraudulent intent.21 The individual statutes should in all cases be carefully consulted. Usually the statutes include keepers of boarding houses and lodging houses, 22

SAME-SAME-THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN-ITS NATURE AND EXTENT

100. The innkeeper has a lien, to secure his proper compensation, on all the property within the inn belonging to the guest.

In General

As a further incident of his duty to entertain the public, the common law gives to the innkeeper a lien on the goods of the guest within the inn to secure the payment of his proper charges.23 The innkeeper can thus retain (until his compensation is paid) the goods brought by the guest to the inn; but he cannot detain the person of the guest, nor could he "strip the guest of his clothes." 24 Since the innkeeper is compelled to receive even persons incompetent to contract, such as married women and infants, his lien is valid in such cases. The lien is similar in its various legal incidents to other common-law liens; but the lien arises on goods brought to the inn by the guest, even though they are never actually delivered to the innkeeper, but are retained by the guest in his own possession. Even property which is exempt from execution and attachment, if brought to the inn, is subject. to the innkeeper's lien.20 As a general rule, then, if the goods

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20 State v. Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994; Chauncey v. State, 130 Ala. 71, 30 South. 403, 89 Am. St. Rep. 17; Ex parte Williams, 121 Cal. 328, 53 Pac. 706; State v. Black, 75 Wis. 490, 44 N. W. 635.

21 State v. Engle, 156 Ind. 339, 58 N. E. 698; Commonwealth v. Morton, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 207; Commonwealth v. Billig, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 477. 22 Commonwealth v. Gough, 3 Kulp. (Pa.) 148.

28 Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 958, 121 Am. St. Rep. 886, 12 Ann. Cas. 397; R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867; Nance v. O. K. Houck Piano Co. (Tenn.) 155 S. W. 1172; Murray v. Marshall, 9 Colo. 482, 13 Pac. 589, 59 Am. Rep. 152; Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202; COOK v. KANE, 13 Or. 482, 11 Pac. 226, 57 Am. Rep. 28, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 166. 24 Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. & W. (Eng.) 248, 7 L. J. Ex. 60.

25 Watson v. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147.

26 Swan v. Bournes, 47 Iowa, 501, 29 Am. Rep. 492.

are brought to the inn and are owned by the guest, the innkeeper can detain them as security for his unpaid charges. In most of the states, provision is made by statute for the lien of the innkeeper.2

Goods Not Owned by the Guest

There is grave conflict among the courts as to whether the innkeeper has a lien on goods brought to the inn by a guest who is not the owner.28 When the guest has no actual or apparent right to deposit the goods at the inn, and the innkeeper knows that the guest's possession is wrongful, then clearly it would seem that there is no lien.29 On the other hand, it seems only fair that the lien should exist, when the guest in charge of the goods is the servant, agent, or bailee of the owner, using the goods about the owner's business, so that authority from the owner to subject the goods to the lien might reasonably be presumed. The lien should also exist, even when no such actual authority on the part of the guest exists, if the owner has so clothed the guest in possession of the goods with the indicia of ownership, that the doctrine of estoppel can be invoked against the owner.3

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The English courts,82 however, and in general the American

27 For specimens of such statutes, see Pub. Acts Mich. 1897, No. 145; Comp. Laws Mich. 1897, §§ 5317-5323; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. Wash. § 5975; Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3318; Laws S. D. 1893, c. 102, amending Civ. Code 1887, § 3686.

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28 The question is discussed at some length, with analyses of the cases, in Beale, Innkeepers, §§ 261-265; Van Zile, Bailm. & Carr. §§ 379–383. See, also, the notes in 3 Ann. Cas. 626, and 12 Ann. Cas. 404.

29 Beale, Innkeepers, § 262, "where the possession of the guest is wrongful, and is known to the innkeeper to be so; and to this extent the doctrine [that the innkeeper has no lien on knowledge that the guest has no title to the goods] is undoubtedly correct." In Gump v. Showalter, 43 Pa. 507, the court denied the right of the innkeeper as to a statutory lien and right of sale on a horse stolen by the guest, but it did not appear that the innkeeper had notice of the theft. In Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark (Eng.) 172, 3 E. C. L. Rep. 641, the innkeeper's lien was made to depend on "whether the defendant [innkeeper] knew, at the time when the horse was delivered into his custody, that P. [the guest] was not the owner of the property, but a mere wrongdoer." In Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) 311, the innkeeper was given a lien on a stolen horse, when he had no knowledge of this fact.

30 ROBINS & CO. v. GRAY, [1895] 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 501, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 164, a leading case on the whole subject; Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202; R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867. 31 This seems to follow from the application of the general principle of estoppel. See, also, R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867.

32 ROBINS & CO. v. GRAY, [1895] 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 501, Doble Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 164; Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269; Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. N. S. 267; Gordon v. Selber, 25 Q. B. D. 491.

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courts, hold that the innkeeper can claim his lien on whatever goods are brought to the inn by the guest, regardless of the question of actual ownership, if the goods are honestly received by the innkeeper on the strength of the innkeeping relation; and this, even though the guest may have stolen the goods, provided, of course, that the innkeeper is ignorant of this fact. This unusual rule is put on the ground that, since the innkeeper is obliged to receive all persons, with their goods, without inquiries as to the guest's title to the goods, incurring also an exceptional liability as to such goods, he should, as a compensation for the burden thus imposed on him, have a lien on all the goods that come into his control in his character of innkeeper, as belonging to the guest, regardless of the question of the real ownership of the goods.

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The American cases, as indicated, have, in general, accepted the English rule, in the absence of statute, though individual judges have protested that the innkeeper should have no such lien on the goods of a third person merely because brought by the guest to

33 Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.) 310; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 488, 38 Am. Dec. 663.

84 The English rule established by ROBINS & CO. v. GRAY, [1895] 2 Q. B. 501, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 164 (when guest is not known by the innkeeper to be unlawfully in possession of the goods) gives the innkeeper his lien, even though he knows that the guest is not the owner of the goods. A number of the American cases giving the innkeeper a lien on the goods of another brought by the guest to the inn qualify the rule by requiring that the innkeeper (to have his lien) must have no notice of the ownership of such other person. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 518, 55 N. W. 56, 21 L. R. A. 229, 38 Am. St. Rep. 568; COOK v. KANE, 13 Or. 482, 11 Pac. 226, 57 Am. Rep. 28, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 166; Covington v. Newberger, 99 N. C. 523, 6 S. E. 205.

85 See Beale, Innkeepers, § 265. Under statutes the American courts have shown a decided tendency to limit the statutory lien, and to hold that it does not extend to the goods of third persons in the possession of the guest, even when the language of the statute seemed merely to be declaratory of the common law. WERTHEIMER-SWARTS SHOE CO. v. HOTEL STEVENS CO., 38 Wash. 409, 80 Pac. 563, 107 Am. St. Rep. 864, 3 Ann. Cas. 625, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 169; Torrey v. McClellan, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 371, 43 S. W. 64; McClain v. Williams, 11 S. D. 227, 76 N. W. 930, 49 L. R. A. 610, 74 Am. St. Rep. 791; WYCKOFF v. SOUTHERN HOTEL CO., 24 Mo. App. 382, Dobie Cas. Bailments and Carriers, 168. The language of the statute was so broad, "belonging to or under the control of their guests," that the statutory lien was held, in Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa, 586, 72 N. W. 765, 39 L. R. A. 291, 64 Am. St. Rep. 198, to cover goods of a third person in the control and possession of the guest. See, also, Lurch v. Wilson, 62 Misc. Rep. 259, 114 N. Y. Supp. 789, awarding the statutory lien to the innkeeper, when the innkeeper had no notice that the property was that of a third person until after the property had been put within the inn.

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