that general, public dissemination of materials otherwise actionable under local law is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, will seriously undermine the "informing function" of Congress. To the extent that the Committee report is printed and internally distributed to Members of Congress under the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, the work of Congress is in no way inhibited. Moreover, the internal distribution is "public" in the sense that materials internally circulated, unless sheltered by specific congressional order, are available for inspection by the press and by the public. We only deal, in the present case, with general, public distribution beyond the halls of Congress and the establishments of its functionaries, and beyond the apparent needs of the "due functioning of the [legislative] process." United States v. Brewster, supra, at 516.

That the Speech or Debate Clause has finite limits is important for present purposes. The complaint before us alleges that the respondents caused the committee report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribution of the report continues to the present," and that "unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute and publish" damaging information about petitioners and their children. It does not expressly appear from the complaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either the Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did anything more than conduct the hearings, prepare the Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated, such acts by those respondents are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause and may not serve as a predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other respondents, however, are alleged to have carried out a public distribution and to be ready to continue such dissemination.

In response to these latter allegations, the Court of Appeals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the respondents that they had no intention of seeking a republication or carrying out further distribution of the report, concluded that there was no basis for injunctive relief. But this left the question whether any part of the previous publication and public distribution by respondents other than the Members of Congress and Committee personnel went beyond the limits of the legislative immunity provided by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Comstitution. Until that question was resolved, the complaint should not have been dismissed on threshold immunity grounds, unless the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the action against the other respondents was foreclosed by the doctrine of official immunity, a question to which we now turn.12

II

The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large part been of judicial making," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959), confers immunity on government officials of suitable rank for the reason that "officials of government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effec

12 While an inquiry such as is involved in the present case, because it involves two coordinate branches of Government, must necessarily have separation of powers implications, the separation of powers doctrine has not previously prevented this Court from reviewing the acts of Congress, see, e. g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra; Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, even when the Executive Branch is also involved, see, e. g., United States v. Brewster, supra; Gravel v. United States, supra.

tive administration of policies of government." Id., at 571.13 The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile two important considerations—

,

"[O]n the one hand, the protection of the individual citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities." Id., at 565. In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immunity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred might not be the same for all officials for all purposes. Id., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967). Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553–555 (1967). But policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more limited privilege. Id., at 555-558. Also, the Court determined in Barr that the scope of immunity from defamation suits should be determined by the relation of the publication complained of to the duties entrusted to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also the companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 597-598 (1959). The scope of immunity has always been tied to the "scope of authority." Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative

ap

13 Both before and after Barr, official immunity has been held plicable to officials of the Legislative Branch. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967).

context, for instance, "[t]his Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recognized "the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 (1967), but have carefully confined that immunity to protect only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376; cf. Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 486.

Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no readymade answer as to whether the remaining federal respondents-the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents should be accorded absolute immunity in this case. Of course, to the extent that they serve legislative functions, the performance of which would be immune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials enjoy the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. Our inquiry here, however, is whether, if they participate in publication and distribution beyond the legislative sphere, and thus beyond the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, they are nevertheless protected by the doctrine of official immunity. Our starting point is at least a minimum familiarity with their functions and duties.

The statutes of the United States create the office of Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the authorized printer for the various branches of the Federal Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and binding may be done at the Government Printing Office only when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer

is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741, 901-910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial Branches of Government, §§ 1101-1123. The Public Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of Documents with duties concerning the distribution and sale of documents. §§ 1701-1722.

Under the applicable statutes, when either House of Congress orders a document printed, the Printer is to print the "usual number" unless a greater number is ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be divided between bound and unbound copies and distributed to named officers or offices of the House and Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superintendent of Documents for further distribution "to the State libraries and designated depositories." Ibid." There are also statutory provisions for the printing of extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706-708, public and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, §§ 709– 712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721722, memorial addresses, § 723-724, and the Statutes at Large, § 728-729. Section 733 provides that "[t]he Public Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepayment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of committees together with the evidence papers submitted, or any part ordered printed by the Congress."

With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial Branches, it is provided that "[a] head of an executive department . . . may not cause to be printed, and the Public Printer may not print, a document or matter unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public business." § 1102 (a). The executive departments and

14 For the authorization to supply sufficient copies for such distribution see § 738. The Public Printer is also required to furnish the Department of State with 20 copies of all congressional documents and reports. 44 U. S. C. § 715.