guide books; (7) directories; (8) maps and charts; (9) calendars; (10) catalogues; (11) mathematical tables; (12) a list of hounds; (13) abstracts of titles to lands; and collections of (14) statistics, (15) statutory forms, (16) recipes and (17) designs.

The copyright in such cases may be in the combination and arrangement only, or it may be also in any original material included with other material. Quantity is not an essential element in copyright so much as " substantial importance;" an English court protected a passage of only sixty words, and a Scotch justice contended that Walter Scott's change of a single word in "Glenallan's Earl" authorized a copyright for the new edition, though another law lord differed, and the case was decided on other grounds. In the case of new editions, a few colorable alterations or unimportant notes will not justify a new copyright, but, as in the case of Lockhart's notes to Scott, the courts will protect notes of substantial worth, though the copyright on the text or on other notes printed with them has expired. In any case, the copyright on a new edition, whether made by re-writing, extending, condensing, annotating, or otherwise altering, runs independently of the term of the original or any other edition, covers only the new parts, and cannot prevent the issue by others of the original or any other edition on which copyright has expired.

"A book must include every part of the book; it must include every print, design or engraving which forms part of the book, as well as the letter-press therein, which is another part of it," according to the ruling decision of ViceChancellor Parker, in the English case of Bogue vs. Houlston. This precedent would doubtless be accepted by American courts, following Drone, who says: "The copyright protects the whole and all the parts and contents of a book: when the book comprises a number of independent compositions, each of the latter is as fully protected as the whole." The practice of some publishers in copyrighting a magazine and also specific articles or engravings, seems, therefore, a work of supererogation. On the other hand, copyright cannot extend to any part of a book not subject in itself to copyright, as a part written by a foreigner. The general copyright is not, however, vitiated as to copyrightable portions by its seeming to cover non-copyrightable portions, as was held by Lord Kenyon in Cary vs. Longman. But when copyright is

claimed on a work partly composed of uncopyrightable matter the courts may require the claimant on interrogatories to designate which parts are and which are not original. "If the parts cannot be separated," says Drone, "it would seem that copyright will not vest in any of it."

A copyright owner cannot prevent another person from publishing the matter contained in his book, if invented or collected independently, or from making "fair use" of its contents. Two map-makers or cataloguers, collecting accurately and completely at first hand the same data, would naturally make the same map or catalogue, and each would equally be entitled to copyright. It has even been held that the collected material might be used by a second compiler as a guide in a second compilation, if subjected to original verification, as in the case of a street directory. In this respect, copyright law differs from patent law, where a first use bars others from the same field. But under the general rule as to "fair use," the great proportion of copyright perplexities are to be foundrelating to compilation, abridgment, translation, quotation, and dramatization. Such cases are usually decided on the individual matters of fact in each case.

In respect to abridgments and translations, the courts have held to precedents which the best writers, such as Curtis, Drone and Copinger, declare to be contradictory to the true principles of copyright law. In 1740 Lord Hardwicke, deciding against a mere reprint, " colorably shortened only," of Sir Matthew Hale's

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Pleas of the Crown," declared that he would not restrain "a real and fair abridgment,'' and in 1774 Lord-Chancellor Apsley, after consultation with Blackstone, held that an abridgment of Hawkesworth's "Voyages," involving understanding and skill, was not plagiarism or a copyright wrong, but "an allowable and meritorious work." In the leading American case of Story's "Commentaries," Justice McLean, while expressing his own opinion that "an abridgment, if fairly made, contains the principle of the original work, and this constitutes its value," added, "But a contrary doctrine has long been established in England . . . and in this country the same doctrine has prevailed. I am, therefore, bound by precedent, and I yield to it, in this instance, more as a principle of law than a rule of reason or justice." Similarly, in Lawrence vs. Dana, in 1869, Justice

Clifford declared that "an abridgment ought to be regarded as an infringement . . but the opposite doctrine has been too long established to be considered open to controversy."

In regard to translations, the only direct precedent is the American case of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," in 1853, in which Mrs. Stowe had copyrighted not only the original work, but a German translation which she had caused to be made; Justice Grier held that she could not recover against another person who was issuing another German translation, since it was not "copies of her book." This case was previous to the stat ute permitting authors to reserve the right of translation.

In regard to dramatization, the leading cases are English it has been held that the mere copyrighting of a book cannot prevent dramatization, but that copyright of a work in dramatic form before its literary publication does prevent other dramatization of the literary work.

It is not improbable that the prevailing sentiment of the best authorities will ultimately overthrow the above precedents, but the law as to abridgments should be definitely amended, as proposed by the English commission, so that no abridgment of a copyright work can be published without the owner's consent. The precedents cited apply, of course, only to books copyrighted without reservation of rights; in England the right of translation may be reserved under the international copyright provisions, notice being given on title page, and in America the Revised Statutes (Sec. 4952) enact that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works," which is done, under the Official Regulations, by notifying the Librarian of Congress of such reservation, for record, and by printing the words " Right of translation reserved" or All rights reserved" below the copyright notice. There is no provision against any translation, abridgment, etc., of a book not copyrighted; nor can any person do more, in any case, than copyright his own translation, abridgment, etc. He cannot prevent any other person making independent use of the original which he has used unless he is himself the owner of the original.

The question of how much quotation is within the limits of "fair use" is almost entirely a question of fact to be decided by the court in the individual case: the leading case hereafter will probably be that of the publishers of "Gordon's memoirs" against the Pall Mall Gazette

for undue quotation, now pending in England.

The state of the law regarding titles is also somewhat confusing. There seems to be no copyright protection for the title of a book per se, but it may be considered an essential part of the book. Judge Shepley held (1872) that "the right secured is the property in the literary composition-the product of the mind and genius of the author-and not in the name or title given to it. The title does not necessarily involve any literary composition; it may not be, and certainly the statute does not require that it should be, the product of the author's mind . . . It is a mere appendage, which only identifies, and frequently does not in any way describe, the literary composition itself. . . If there were no piracy of the copyrighted book there would be no remedy

for the use of a title which could not be copyrighted independently of the book." The English rulings are to the effect that a title has no copyright protection except as part of a book, but that the use of a title to attract purchasers on the supposition that they are getting another book previously known by that title is a fraud punishable at common law. General titles cannot in any way be protected: the publishers of the " Post-Office Directory," England, and of "Irving's Works," America, were both defeated in attempts to prevent the use of those titles. Judge Curtis, in the N. Y. Superior Court, decided in 1874, in the case of a play, that "the use of the word Charity' as a designation for any work of art or literature cannot ordinarily be monopolized by any one person." The specific title "The Two Orphans' was, however, protected at common law in another case. In the case, also, of the specific title Trial and Triumph," 1876, ViceChancellor Malins enjoined quite another book under the same title, though the title was chosen in ignorance of the first book and in entire good faith. So, also, in the title "Splendid Misery,'' used by Miss Braddon in 1879, the English judge was inclined to support the copyright claim of Mr. Hazlewood, who had used it in 1874, until it was shown that a third novelist had used it in 1801, so that it had become, in a measure, common property.

Titles are rather to be considered as trademarks, which may be registered in the United States under Secs. 4937-4947 of the Revised Statutes and protected by the statutory penalties, or may be protected on general principles of equity. In the Chatterbox" cases, 1884-85,

Judge Wheeler's injunction restraining the use of this name or word, or any name or word substantially identical therewith," in or upon any juveniles of the general character of the English book of that name, rests on principles of trademark and not of copyright, but thus a measure of international copyright is indirectly secured. In the English case of "Belgravia' Lord Cairns also seemed to think that there could not be copyright in a single word, but this question is avoided by considering a title as a trademark.

It was laid down, in the case of " Belgravia," that there can be no claim to protection for the title of an unpublished book, no matter what expenditure has been made or advertising done, and this holds in trade-mark as well as in copyright law. "There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark as an abstract name," ruled Judge Shepley, 1872, for a trade mark simply shows that certain goods "were manufactured by a certain person."

Nor can an abandoned

title, in the case of a periodical, be held against a person starting a new periodical of that name, providing it does not purport to be a continuation of the old, according to a French case quoted by English authorities.

There can be no copyright in an immoral book, and Lord Eldon, in Southey vs. Sherwood, carried this doctrine so far as to deny the common law right of an author in a non-innocent manuscript, because there could be no right to hold what there was no right to sell. His opinion, resulting in the wide sale of a book which the author desired to suppress, has been severely criticised by later authorities. There can be no copyright in blasphemous, seditious, or libellous books; but though this rule was very strictly enforced by English judges a century ago, the later courts hesitate to rule strictly on this point, lest the rule be perverted to sectarianism or despotism. There can be no copyright in books involving fraud, as those which spuriously obtain salable value by being represented to be the work of writers who did not write them, or to contain matter which they do not contain; but this rule does not extend to books under assumed names or innocently pretending to be what they are not, as when Horace Walpole's" Castle of Otranto" was put forward as a translation from the Italian. There can be no statutory copyright in books not yet published, but simply projected, just as there can be no copyright in a title not representing any book.

There is nothing in copyright law corresponding to the caveat in patent law.

In regard to periodicals and books published in parts, as also in regard to encyclopædias and other composite books, there are no specific statutory provisions in the United States, but they come under the general designation of books. Each issue of a magazine or other periodical must therefore be separately entered as though a separate book, although the title may be registered as a trade-mark once for all. All copyrightable matter contained in the issue would then be copyrighted, as before noted. It seems probable that even a daily newspaper could thus be copyrighted day by day at a cost of $365 per year, so as to protect all its original material of substantial literary value. A daily Price-List of the New York Cotton Exchange was so entered day by day for some time, but the question of maintaining such a copyright seems never to have been tested in court. The New York Sun copyrights its Sunday cable letter separately. A specific act to protect news for twenty-four hours has been proposed in Congress, but never passed. A book, published in more than one volume or part, the portions not complete in themselves, is probably protected by copyright entry of the first part; but, of course, all parts must be deposited in the Library of Congress. The statutes of Great Britain provide specifically that a work published in parts or a periodical may be fully protected by copyright entry of the first part, but the word "newspaper " does not occur in the definitions of the Act. When the London Times's memoir of Beaconsfield was reprinted as a penny pamphlet, the Times brought suit as a matter of common-law right, but the judge held that a newspaper was copyrightable under the statute, and therefore that a common-law suit could not hold. It was held by Mr. Justice Molesworth, in Melbourne, Australia, that a newspaper proprietor had copyright in special news telegrams, and another paper was enjoined from using them.

Lectures are protected in England by statutory provision, provided the lecturer gives notice to two justices at the place of reading that he reserves his rights. There is no statutory provision in this country, but the courts seem disposed to protect a lecturer on the common law ground that the lecture read is not published by reading, and can be controlled as a manuscript. Newspapers have, however, in practice freely republished lectures.

Probably, when this is done

with consent of the author, he loses copyright, on the ground that non-copyrighted articles in a non copyrighted periodical cannot have protection; but if done without his consent, the publication by another party cannot deprive him of his rights. It is suggested that the law should permit free report without vitiating book copyright, unless the lecturer forbids such report preceding his lecture.

The general rules as to books govern the other articles of publication mentioned in the Revised Statutes, but it should be noted that in the case of dramatic and musical compositions, in addition to copyright covering publication in print, there is "playright," covering performance. This rests partly upon principles of common law and partly upon the statute; it opens a wide field, into which this summary will not enter.

THE English law secures copyright to an author cr his assigns; the United States Constitution mentions "authors and inventors," and the Revised Statutes name "any citizen of the United States or resident therein, who shall be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any kind, and the executors, administrators, or assigns of any such person" as the persons in whom copyright may lodge. The Librarian of Congress accordingly issues copyright certificates for books as to an author" or "proprietor" only, assuming usually that an editor is the "author" and a publisher the "proprietor," and never going behind the claim set forth in the application.

The author of a book is the person primarily entitled to copyright. He may sell or otherwise transfer his production before it is copyrighted, in which case the new proprietor obtains all the common-law rights of property, both in the manuscript and its publication, including the right to copyright. This common-law right, including the right to copyright, may extend, Mr. Drone argues, to the finder of an unpublished manuscript, provided no one successfully disputes his ownership of his find, if the manuscript be copyrightable; but there are no decisions on this point. Or a copyright may be taken out by another person (as the publisher of the book), impliedly in trust for the author, as is a usual custom among American publishers. The proprietor is defined to mean "the representative of an artist or author who might himself obtain copyright."

The copyright officer makes no inquiry into the right of the claimant, and that question, in any of its bearings, must be settled by the courts. When one person is employed by another to prepare a book, or an article which is part of a

book, the authorship may inhere in the employer, if the design of the work is so far his as to make him the virtual creator and the actual writer a deputy merely; but the courts have held that he is not an author who "merely suggests the subject, and has no share in the design or execution of the work." In any case, however, the proprietary right, including the right to secure copyright, depends upon the contract, implied or express, between employer and employed, and the courts will decide this according to the common law of contracts. In the case of a book “with illustrations by John Leech," where Leech retained the copyright of the designs, though the publishers owned the wood on which he had drawn them, an English court held to a distinction between the copyright and the right to the material, and directed the publishers to waive their lesser right and surrender the cuts, in view of the circumstances of the contract. Most of the cases arising as to ownership are in fact issues at common property law and not at copyright law, (as the American case in which Mr. Clemens vainly sought to restrain the use of his name, Mark Twain," in a collection of his uncopyrighted papers, the court holding that whoever has a right to publish has a right to state authorship, though an author can restrain from the publication over his name of things he did not write,) and this summary does not undertake to present the laws of contract between author and publisher. The copyright is in the author, unless he has consented to part with it; but this consent may be implied in the circumstances of employment. The particular application of this general principle must be determined by the facts in each case.

When a salaried law reporter had been em