tria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia -were not idle; they were empowered, and they fully intended, to take matters into their own hands. The congress had assembled in accordance with the Thirty-second Article of the Peace of Paris, consisting of four identic treaties between Louis XVIII. and the Four Allies, to which Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were accessories, and which restored to France her boundaries virtually as they were in 1792. This agreement not only outlined the main tasks of the congress, but in secret articles provided that all general European questions should be settled "on a basis agreed upon by the allied powers." In other words, the Allies were to decide all important matters; the function of the congress was to give its passive sanction to their decrees. On this principle-if on nothing else the four powers were a unit.

Talleyrand's Diplomacy

It was the main object of Talleyrand to break up this combination and secure for France her former influence in European affairs. In this he was assisted by the fact, already mentioned, that the coalition-less through generosity than through their unwillingness to see any other power strengthened by the crippling of France-had restored to that nation her old frontiers. Expecting little or no material gain from the congress, Talleyrand could afford to assume a lofty attitude and pose as the champion of high principles and the friend of small States.

When, on September 30, the French and the Spanish Plenipotentiaries were kindly invited to attend a conference of the Four Powers, Talleyrand at once launched his attack. Throwing aside a protocol, each clause of which began with the phrase, "The Allies agree," he professed his complete mystification as to the meaning of the term allies. The war was over, Napoleon at Elba-against whom, then, were they allied? He pointed to the public clause of the Paris Treaties which gave a voice in the congress to "all powers on either side engaged in the war." He pressed for an immediate opening of the general congress as the only authority from which

a special "steering" committee could derive its powers; and he threatened to leave the congress should his request be denied. After prolonged and stormy sittings of this inner circle, on Oct. 5 and 8, his policy gained at least a partial triumph by the concession that the Preliminary Committee should be composed of all the eight signatories of the Peace of Paris-France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, in addition to the Four Allies. Having thus demonstrated that France was not a negligible factor, and having secured a voice and vote in the main council, Talleyrand no longer concerned himself about a convocation of all delegates. The formal opening, put off till Nov. 1, was again postponed, and, in fact, never occurred; so that, in the paradoxical language of Secretary Gentz, the congress came into existence only by the signing of its final act.

The control thus exercised by the Committee of Eight, in which Spain, Portugal, and Sweden played but slight part, was a definite recognition of the principle which has since prevailed, that affairs of Europe should be under supervision of the major powers.

The

In the congress, however, the minor States were not without a voice. work, so far as it was not accomplished by informal conferences and discussion, was divided among committees. The main committee itself met but seldom, and then usually to pass upon the conclusions of subordinate bodies. Of these there were many, notably the Committee for a German Federal Constitution, Committees for the Italian States, the Swiss Confederation, the Netherlands, the Navigation of Rivers, the Prohibition of the Slave Trade. The membership of these committees consisted of representatives of both major and minor States whose interests were particularly concerned.

The Allies Divided

To complete the recovery of France and give her a virtual ascendency in the congress it was essential that the Allies should be divided among themselves and forced to seek her support. This came about less through the machinations of Talleyrand than through the inherent

T

HE congress which assembled at Vienna in September, 1814, after the Napoleonic wars, was the most important since that which had negotiated the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The diplomats gathered at the Austrian capital held in their hands the fate of some 32,000,000 "souls," to adopt the word then current-the population of States and provinces cast adrift at Napoleon's fall. It was their formidable task, assigned to them by the Peace of Paris, (May 30, 1814,) to establish "a real and durable equilibrium " after a quarter of a century of war. The importance of the congress may be measured also by its results, the undoing of which, it has been said, constitutes a major part of nineteenth century history.

Among royalty in attendance were two Emperors, Alexander I. of Russia and Francis of Austria, and the Kings of Prussia, Bavaria, Denmark, and Württemberg; while the vast halls of the Hofburg were thronged with sovereigns or some-time sovereigns of petty States, and with half the nobility of Europe. The rulers and Princes met each day before dinner to discuss the disposition of their property, and engaged in lively disputes, bargains, and exchanges, much like some immense family assembled to settle an estate. Their views, however, were not always consulted or regarded by the diplomats in actual control.

Each of the great powers was represented by four or more plenipotentiaries. Talleyrand, who had broken with Napoleon in time to gain favor with his Bourbon successor, headed the delegation of France. Castlereagh represented England until Februs y, 1815, when he was succeeded by Wellington. Prussia's chief delegate, Prince von Hardenburg, was, by reason of his deafness, always accompanied by the gifted von Hum

boldt, brother of the scientist. For Russia, the Czar was often his own spokesman, with the Polish Prince Czartoryski, Prince Nesselrode, and the Corsican Pozzo di Borgo as his chief advisers. Metternich, Austrian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, was President of the Congress and its most conspicuous figure. Each of these leaders was supported by a corps of political and military experts. In addition there were representatives of nearly every minor European State, of the Pope, the Jews, the Free Cities, the German Catholics, the banking and other business interests.

While the chief diplomats dealt with the more important problems, their subordinate colleagues took up the yeoman labor of the Congress, attending committees, drawing up agreements, and carrying out details. According to the "Memoirs" of Gagern, much of the work was accomplished by a small group of men, including Gentz, who was Secretary of the congress; Wessenberg of Austria, Dalberg and La Besnardière of France, Clancarty of England, and von Humboldt.

Methods of Metternich

Con

To amuse and also to distract the assemblage, Metternich provided a continual round of military spectacles, hunts, theatricals, concerts, fêtes, and balls. spicuous among the celebrations was a gorgeous ceremony commemorating the martyrdom of Louis XVI. The Czar in particular took keen delight in these festivities. They cost the bankrupt treasury of Austria over 30,000,000 florins, but they gave the Austrian minister free play for his favorite policy of diplomacy by intrigue.

"Le Congrès danse," remarked Prince de Ligne, "mais il ne marche pas." But the diplomats of the Four Allies-Aus

tria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia -were not idle; they were empowered, and they fully intended, to take matters into their own hands. The congress had assembled in accordance with the Thirty-second Article of the Peace of Paris, consisting of four identic treaties between Louis XVIII. and the Four Allies, to which Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were accessories, and which restored to France her boundaries virtually as they were in 1792. This agreement not only outlined the main tasks of the congress, but in secret articles provided that all general European questions should be settled "on a basis agreed upon by the allied powers." In other words, the Allies were to decide all important matters; the function of the congress was to give its passive sanction to their decrees. On this principle-if on nothing else the four powers were a unit.

Talleyrand's Diplomacy

It was the main object of Talleyrand to break up this combination and secure for France her former influence in European affairs. In this he was assisted by the fact, already mentioned, that the coalition-less through generosity than through their unwillingness to see any other power strengthened by the crippling of France--had restored to that nation her old frontiers. Expecting little or no material gain from the congress, Talleyrand could afford to assume a lofty attitude and pose as the champion of high principles and the friend of small States.

When, on September 30, the French and the Spanish Plenipotentiaries were kindly invited to attend a conference of the Four Powers, Talleyrand at once launched his attack. Throwing aside a protocol, each clause of which began with the phrase, "The Allies agree," he professed his complete mystification as to the meaning of the term allies. The war was over, Napoleon at Elba-against whom, then, were they allied? He pointed to the public clause of the Paris Treaties which gave a voice in the congress to "all powers on either side engaged in the war." He pressed for an immediate opening of the general congress as the only authority from which

a special "steering" committee could derive its powers; and he threatened to leave the congress should his request be denied. After prolonged and stormy sittings of this inner circle, on Oct. 5 and 8, his policy gained at least a partial triumph by the concession that the Preliminary Committee should be composed of all the eight signatories of the Peace of Paris-France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, in addition to the Four Allies. Having thus demonstrated that France was not a negligible factor, and having secured a voice and vote in the main council, Talleyrand no longer concerned himself about a convocation of all delegates. The formal opening, put off till Nov. 1, was again postponed, and, in fact, never occurred; so that, in the paradoxical language of Secretary Gentz, the congress came into existence only by the signing of its final act.

The control thus exercised by the Committee of Eight, in which Spain, Portugal, and Sweden played but slight part, was a definite recognition of the principle which has since prevailed, that affairs of Europe should be under supervision of the major powers.

The

In the congress, however, the minor States were not without a voice. work, so far as it was not accomplished by informal conferences and discussion, was divided among committees. The main committee itself met but seldom, and then usually to pass upon the conclusions of subordinate bodies. Of these there were many, notably the Committee for a German Federal Constitution, Committees for the Italian States, the Swiss Confederation, the the Netherlands, the Navigation of Rivers, the Prohibition of the Slave Trade. The membership of these committees consisted of representatives of both major and minor States whose interests were particularly concerned.

The Allies Divided

To complete the recovery of France and give her a virtual ascendency in the congress it was essential that the Allies should be divided among themselves and forced to seek her support. This came about less through the machinations of Talleyrand than through the inherent

weakness of a coalition held together, like the Allies in the present war, chiefly by a sense of common danger. In this case the rock upon which the coalition split was the fate of Saxony and Poland. In 1813, independently from the other allies, Russia and Prussia had entered into a compact by which Prussia agreed to turn over her share of Poland to Russia, in return for compensations elsewhere. In accordance with this bargain, Prussia now asserted her claim to Saxony, which was already occupied by her forces. Both these transactions Talleyrand saw fit resolutely to oppose, utilizing Austria's fear of a greater Prussia planted on her immediate frontiers, and the objections of both Austria and England to immense Russian acquisitions toward the west. Briefly, the diplomatic tangle resulted in a secret offensive and defensive alliance, Jan. 3, 1815, of France, Austria, and Great Britain against the northern powers.

Russia and Prussia receded, and in the end got less than they bargained for. But it was only upon Napoleon's return from Elba that the powers were able to patch up their differences, hasten negotiations, and reach the terms set down

in the final act. This was signed June 9, a week before Waterloo.

The Balance of Power

The principles applied in the territorial and other adjustments then agreed upon are more significant than the changes themselves. The chief aim throughout was to establish a safe equilibrium or balance which should protect Europe against the ascendency of any one power or even any probable combination of powers. The means employed to this end was a system of buffer States, especially on the French frontier-Belgium and Luxemburg joined to Holland as a protection for England and the German States, the Kingdom of Sardinia re-established in Western Italy with the addition of Genoa, the Swiss Confederation again set up as a neutralized State, the German Confederation created as an element of safety in Central Europe.

So far as compatible with this policy, the principle of legitimacy, or hereditary right, was respected, though there were inevitable violations and sacrifices. Regard for this principle was in a sense respect for the spirit of nationality, which at that time manifested itself chiefly in the form of loyalty to a ruling

house. But the national principle was violated in the short-lived union of Catholic Belgium and Protestant Holland, in the complete failure to redress the wrongs of Poland, in the turning over of the Genoese Republic to the House of Savoy, in the acquisitions of Austria in Italy and of Prussia in Saxony, and in a general tendency to shift populations, like cattle, from one ruler to another, without regard for popular consent.

In certain other respects the congress was more progressive. It guaranteed the Germanic Constitution, which in turn provided that Constitutions should be granted to the States in the Confederation. In response to the insistent demands of British sentiment, it took a definite stand for the prohibition of the slave trade. As an important step toward freer commercial intercourse among nations, the Committee on the Navigation of Rivers set up the principle of free peace-time navigation on streams forming boundaries or flowing through more than one State, and established codes for the navigation of the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Meuse. This precedent was followed later in the system of international control for the lower Danube, and is applicable to present-day problems of water routes and trade channels.

"World Safe for Kings"

The predominant spirit of the diplomats at the congress, however, was reactionary, and out of sympathy with the more liberal thought of the age. Their desire for a permanent peace was no less genuine than that of statesmen today, but it was a peace the watchword of which might have been, "a world made safe for Kings."

Hence, in spite of the Czar's liberal enthusiasms and England's admiration of her own form of government, the tendency of this congress-a tendency even more strongly manifested in the congresses of the next decade-was opposition to popular government as the chief danger which threatened the status quo. In the words of the Hungarian historian Reich, The congress introduced that system of reaction, of obscurantism, of police persecution, that made the period from 1815 to 1848 one filled with the most shameful outrages against the lib

66

erty of the people." The Five Powerswhich Metternich euphemistically called the "moral pentarchy "-attempted, under Austrian leadership, to stifle liberalism wherever it appeared and in whatever form. Their task, foredoomed to failure, was to pour living national organisms into a rigid unchangeable mold. Aims of Entente Allies

The aims and ideals of the Allies today are in this respect fundamentally different from those of the victors in the Napoleonic conflict. Whereas Napoleon, at least in his earlier campaigns, had behind him the forces of democracy, these forces are now combined against the last exponents of autocratic rule. Even if the diplomacy of the coming peace set.tlement should lag behind the spirit of the times, its every act will be subject to the pressure of public opinion to an extent undreamed of a century ago. The press at the time of the Vienna Congress was merely an instrument which statesmen could employ to play upon public opinion, if the effort were thought worth while. At the Algeciras Conference of 1906, on the other hand, it is said that there were more newspaper men present than there were diplomats. The next peace congress will presumably be thrown open to the scrutiny of the world.

It is safe to assume, therefore, that a world "made safe for democracy" will be something very different from the political system devised at the Congress of Vienna. There is reason to suppose that the next peace conference will exercise as much restraint toward the defeated powers as was shown toward France after the elimination of Napoleon; that, while adopting the principle of nationality, it will make an effort to break down commercial and other barriers between nations; that it will seek to establish, not a fixed order, which is impossible, but machinery that will reduce international friction in the accomplishment of those changes inevitable in national growth and decay. In the attainment of these ends the Congress of Vienna offers abundant counsels in avoidance and has put the sign "No thoroughfare over some old and wornout roads.