war England entered the war at midnight. Germany on this day declared against France, Belgium, and England. In the outlining of the historical facts cited above no account has been taken of the emotional phase of the situation, out of which has grown a mass of evidence from which it will be extremely difficult to separate the true from the false. We are dealing now with history. What has been cited above indicates the questions at issue. They are still unsettled, insoluble in the heat of conflict. A recent report seems to strengthen the general belief that the war was the result of a deep-laid plan of the Central Powers, which are represented as having held a conference some weeks before the ultimatum of Austria to Serbia, in which all the possibilities were discussed. It is said that when a few days after this meeting Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg became convinced that England would enter the war, he wished to withdraw, but it was too late. Among the Allies a settled belief has grown that the German plan involved nothing less than world conquest; that the invasion of Belgium included the plan of obtaining possession of Dunkirk and Calais, whence as a base, and by the aid of submarines, the commerce of the world could be controlled, and whence an expedition could separate the armies of Belgium and France and obtain possession of Paris. Whether this ambitious scheme had a place in the minds of the German military party or not, we can, with the evidence at hand, but leave in the realm of conjecture. Legend of the Belgian Francs-Tireurs Investigations of the Belgian Documentary Bureau indicate who is responsible for it or whence it emanates; yet the leading newspapers of Germany and Austria, including the official organs, have published long analyses of it and given it the benefit of wide publicity." The German pamphlet accuses the Belgian Government of having instituted, on Aug. 8, 1914, a commission of inquiry "with the object of throwing light upon the violations of international law in Belgium." It pretends that there could not then be any question of violation, as Germany had only just crossed the frontier. [The frontier was crossed on the 3d.] The Belgian Government, it adds, had therefore gone faster than the events. But, either through negligence or through disdain for the truth, a few pages further along the pamphlet cites extracts from the Belgian press reporting the burning and pillaging of the first Belgian towns by the imperial troops. 66 The German pamphlet then accuses the Belgian Government of having organized that famous war of francstireurs, exciting the civil population to rebel against the conquering soldiers. It pretends to find proof of this in the royal decree of Aug. 5, which, according to the Belgian Documentary Bureau, I called into action the reserve regiments of the Civil Guard, and which corresponded with the general call of a nation to arms, issued through one or two Belgian newspapers of the same date." The argumentation of the pamphlet, fantastic in its smallest details, confuses the calling of the Civil Guard reserves with the organization of a war of francstireurs. The Belgian Documentary Bureau goes on to give the antecedents of the Civil Guard, its rules and objects since its creation. It verifies the date and the calling of its inactive members to arms by the decree of the King on Aug. 5. It is shown that there was here no measure of illegal revolt, but a call foreseen in the laws of the guard. But Germany scorns these distinctions. The German pamphlet continues to accuse the Belgian Government of inciting the civil population to take part in the hostilities. Now, that accusation falls of its own weight when one examines the State telegrams addressed on Aug. 4 to the administrative authorities of the 2,600 communes of the country, reminding them of the duties of the civil population in time of war. Besides, the official advice was reproduced daily by the press. Upon what documents, then, is the accusation based? Upon certain wild stories in the allied press, which gave way, in the first hours of the war, to partisanship, to the demand for legends, to the popular thirst for heroism and exaltation. With a view, evidently very human, to singing the praises of our soldiers and the courage of communities basely attacked, we at that time created the Romanesque and the fantastic. Witness the episode of the "Battle of the Francs-Tireurs of Herstal": Two thousand German soldiers, arriving before the arms factory at Herstal, were greeted by a hail of bullets. All the houses, even the smallest, had been transformed into veritable fortresses. Barricades had been thrown up in the streets. The women and children supplied the fighters with ammunition. Repulsed at first, the Germans returned to the charge; then the women poured boiling oil and water on the soldiers, who rolled on the ground, howling with pain. * The Belgian Documentary Bureau adds with reason: "This story is really too sensational to be true." Nevertheless, Germany took note of these newspaper tales, and a part of its accusation is based on them. Since then we have reached a stage of greater modesty and more exactness. The accounts of pillage, thefts, and combats in the cities and the open country are written with names, dates, and details, after the manner of official statements. We have learned that phraseology is a dangerous thing in the hands of those who mutilate even a language. If one follows the series of studies de- voted to the legend of the Belgian francstireurs, one finds that the Belgian Documentary Bureau has devoted itself, throughout its notes, to refuting the German accusations, sometimes so inconsistent, with dates and precise facts of undeniable validity. Furthermore, on the subject of combats in which Belgian civilians are represented as taking part, the bureau denounces the sensational unreliability of certain Belgian journals, as exemplified in passages taken from their columns; it shows how they "illustrated with false photographs" the accusations in the German pamphlet. Finally, it cites before the allied and neutral public the German White Book of May 10, 1915, on the warfare of Belgian civilians, contrary to the law of nations. What bearing has this new White Book on the subject? Does it furnish serious and unpublished documents on the pretended culpability of the Belgian civil population? No; it is nothing but a piece of propaganda, a "copious repetition of grievances long since known and refuted." The Documentary Records then take up the study of the facts themselvesthe fight of the people of Dinant, the case of the curate of Battice, the official protest of Bishop Heylem of Na De nos drapeaux amis qu'un même souffle éploie. Quand sur les étendards de ce peuple géant Il a vu pour sa cause et pour la cause humaine Des champions du Juste Accourus s'immoler sans regret et sans peur. Dites à ces vaillants de la mort volontaire A Former Ambassador's Analysis of Official Documents Convicts the German Emperor of Forcing the War By David Jayne Hill David Jayne Hill, United States Ambassador to Germany from 1908 to 1911, in the subjoined article-prepared for THE NEW YORK TIMES-has made a new and close analysis of the official reports bearing on the commencement of the war, with the result that he definitely convicts the German Emperor of having caused the great conflict. The Kaiser's acts in the initial crisis, especially as seen now in the light of his recently published telegram to President Wilson, show that Wilhelm's later professions of sympathy with the idea that "in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right" are insincere. L I.-Germany's Plan to Localize the Confliet ET us address ourselves to the standard of conduct by which the German Government wishes to be judged, namely, by the nature of the Kaiser's efforts to preserve peace. First of all, allow him to speak for himself. This he has done in his personal telegram to the President of the United States, written on Aug. 10, 1914, first published in August, 1917. It is in substance a detailed statement of the Kaiser's reasons for not desiring the mediation of the President with a view to ending the war and a justification of his desire to continue it. In this telegram the Kaiser's first point is a complaint against England, which had entered the war on Aug. 4, after the invasion of Belgium. The charge is made that Prince Henry had informed the Kaiser that King George V. had empowered him to give verbal assurance "that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia." The belief that England would take no part in a Continental war had other grounds than the alleged assurance of the King, for as is well known the German Embassy at London had assured the Kaiser that the internal condition of British affairs absolutely precluded such participation. Although it is officially denied in England that the assurance given by Prince Henry was ever authorized by the King, it is certain that Prince Henry was in London and that he conversed with George V. The most charitable interpretation of the conversation is that one or the other did not understand the scope of the inquiry made or the implications of the answer, for the journey of Prince Henry was undertaken before there was any actual casus belli and when it was apparently possible that the Austro-Serbian controversy, in which England had no direct interest, might be settled in a judicial manner. The Kaiser's Early Intentions The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was presented on July 23, and the reply of Serbia was not received at Vienna until the evening of July 25. It was on Sunday, July 26, that Prince Henry, as he informs us in the telegram he sent to King George on July 30, after his return to Berlin, was received by the King at Buckingham Palace. For the message the King had sent to the Kaiser, whatever it was, Prince Henry says in his telegram, "William was very thankful." So far as the Prince's language is concerned, we might suppose the message was that in case any danger of war should arise the King would use all possible means to help in preserving peace. But the Kaiser assures us in his telegram to the President that this was not the message he had sought and which Prince Henry had said he was "thankful for." The grateful communication, according to the Kaiser, was that France and Germany, Russia and Austria, might fight it out without any interference on the part of England. Before the Serbian answer was known, therefore, Kaiser William was not only expecting a general Continental war, but he was arranging to confine it to these four powers, a situation which would give to the Central Powers every advantage and the prospect of speedy triumph. Until July 30, then, the Kaiser, as he himself informs us, was looking for a conflict of arms in which England would take no part. What he was "thankful for," according to his own version of the King's message, which may have been a mistaken one, was not that England would assist in preventing war, but that he could have it on his own terms. This was all he had sought. For peace he had spoken no favorable word. Giving Austria a Free Hand Did he know of the contents of the Austrian ultimatum before July 26, when Prince Henry had his conversation with King George? He may not have dictated the note, but he already knew its contents and had approved them. From the beginning of the conflict [reports the German White Book] we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone. * We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war and toward convincing the other powers that AustriaHungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defense, forced upon her by the conditions. It was also known that Serbia, otherwise helpless, would ask for a hearing by the other powers, particularly Russia, which was to be denied her. On the 26th Russia was warned by the Kaiser that any military measures to defend Serbia from an armed attack by Austria would be followed by German mobilization, and that German mobilization "means war." It was distinctly declared that an attempt on the part of Russia to secure the independence of Serbia as a sovereign State "would unchain a European war." The alternative presented to war was abject submission to the subjugation of Serbia, as the annexa dors of Germany, France, and Italy under his Chairmanship. But, the Kaiser then believing that England's intervention was not to be seriously considered, the German White Book asserts: We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal. Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations of Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers. That is, the "understanding" impressed upon Russia was that any intervention to prevent the attack of Austria upon Serbia would be answered by war, while that impressed upon Austria |