With accessions from the privateers to swell the numbers of the pirates on the seas, merchantmen were still forced to carry arms after the treaties of 1815. But in the long years of peace that followed, with the extension of commerce and the growth of trading colonies in all parts of the world, the refuges for pirates decreased rapidly.

An interesting account of the extirpation of pirates in the West Indies, by Rear Admiral Caspar Gooodrich, U. S. N., has been appearing in the recent Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute. The islands of the Pacific also became peaceful settlements, and by degrees the former haunts of piracy became safe for peaceful commerce.

The destruction of pirates in Borneo by the British Navy, aided by Rajah Brooke, made an end of the last communities which may be said to have systematically engaged in piracy. After this the pirate became a furtive wan

derer upon the seas, with no refuge except by concealment. There were a few ports where the pirate might trade and refit, by connivance with corrupt officials or smugglers, but this was a heavy drain on the booty, and the Jolly Roger became an unprofitable flag to sail under. Even such unreliable havens grew more and more dangerous, with no wars to divert the attention of the navies and coast guards, and the avowed pirate, the rakish craft of story, disappeared from the seas. Armed Ships of Later Days

Yet, far along through the nineteenth century it was necessary for merchantmen to be armed on certain voyages. The Red Rover was no longer to be dreaded, but in the Eastern seas, and even in the Mediterranean, a ship becalmed was in great danger.

The peaceful small craft of the native coasts frequently became pirates at such opportunities, and there were many desperate fights and many tragedies long after the actual pirates had disappeared from the seas.

The writer well remembers the time when a couple of serviceable guns amidships were considered necessary for such voyages, and these guns were not for appearances, but the crews were trained to handle them to prevent native craft from using sweeps to close in on a becalmed ship and overpower her.

These latest of the old armed merchantmen were often also painted with the white streak and many dummy ports to imitate men-of-war, as shown in the picture of the Stamboul. This camouflage, in addition to the actual guns, was a great protection, as can be imagined. The man-of-war also used to imitate the merchantmen by painting out its ports, giving a slovenly guise to its rigging, and thus inducing this kind of gentry to attack the man-of-war-of course with disastrous results to the pirates! The U. S. S. St. Lawrence made use of this last ruse to lure to destruction one of the few privateers sent out by the South in the civil war.

With the advent of steam, the increased use and policing of the sea and the civilization of the coasts from commercial settlements, these last remnants of piracy disappeared. Privateering had been abolished by the Declaration of Paris, (April, 1856.) "Privateering is and remains abolished." In our civil war the Confederates attempted to revive this practice; but they had no ships of any ability to keep the seas, and this attempt was short lived. Consequently, at the dawn of the twentieth century it is fair to say that an armed merchantman was as much an anachronism as a galleon.

The idea of converting the great liners

into auxiliary warships in times of war had been adopted, especially by the British and German Navies, but these were to be essentially warships. Their status is sharply defined by The Hague Convention, (1907,) and it will be evident from the following extracts that these ships are not to be considered armed merchantmen, but improvised warships pure and simple.

"A merchant ship converted into a warship" must be "under immediate control and responsibility of the power of the flag which it flies." It must "bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality." Its "commander must be duly commissioned" and its crew subject to military discipline." It must "observe the laws and customs of war," and the belligerent must as soon as possible announce conversion"in the list of warships." It will be seen at once that all this is outside of the definition of an armed merchant

man.

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In international law the status of a ship is determined by its employment, and it has been established that merchantmen are allowed to arm for defense only. Such an armament does not abate their rights as traders engaged in lawful commerce. It is also established that, although an armed merchantman may re

sist an attack by an enemy ship, only a man-of-war can attack a man-of-war. It must also be noted that any act of resistance against a man-of-war forfeits all the rights of the merchantman to immunity from sinking as a peaceful trader. Keeping these principles in mind will help the reader to understand the real status of an armed merchantman.

Fear of Auxiliary Cruisers

From these definitions it can be seen that in the twentieth century, following established usages on the seas, there was no use for arms on a merchantman. Pirates and privateers had disappeared, and there was no object in arming against a man-of-war. Yet Great Britain had announced an intention of arming merchantmen. This was not a defense against U-boats, whose ravages had not been foreseen, but it was to protect merchantmen against the class of converted warships which has been described.

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surd to meet the contingency of con"siderable numbers of foreign armed "merchantmen by building an equal "number of cruisers."

As a matter of fact, nothing of the kind happened in the present war. The German commerce destroyers which did so much damage were, for the most part, regular cruisers of which the location should have been known and against which it was folly to arm merchantmen. But, expecting raids from these extemporized cruisers, Great Britain early in the war armed many of her merchant steamers and notified the Secretary of State of the United States that these armed merchantmen would use our harbors.

Status Carefully Defined

The. British Government carefully defined the status of these ships in notes culminating in the following, which may be said fairly to describe the essentials of an armed merchantman before the complications brought about by the submarine. The note is from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State: BRITISH EMBASSY, Washington, Aug. 25, 1914. Sir: With reference to Mr. Barclay's notes Nos. 252 and 259 of the 4th and 9th of August, respectively, fully explaining the position taken up by his Majesty's Government in regard to the question of armed merchantmen, I have the honor, in view of the fact that a number of British armed mechantmen will now be visiting United States ports, to reiterate that the arming of British merchantmen is solely a precautionary measure adopted for the purpose of defense against attack from hostile craft.

I have at the same time been instructed by his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to give the United States Government the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for defense, that they will never fire unless fired upon, and that they will never, under any circumstances, attack any vessel. I have, &c.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

The German Government promptly assumed the position that the purpose of such armament was "armed resistance "against German cruisers. Such a re"sistance is contrary to international "law, because a merchantman is not per"mitted military defense against a man"of-war: such action would entitle a man-of-war to sink the merchantman "with her crew and passengers.'

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This contention was half true and half false. It was true that the act of resistance against a man-of-war forfeited the immunities of a merchantman, but this act of resistance did not in any way make an outlaw of the resisting ship. The tendency to apply the law of "franctireur" is evident here. This inexorable ruling that a civilian who offers armed resistance to military forces forfeits his

*Promemoria of the German Government, Oct. 13, 1914.

life cannot be stretched to apply to the merchantman as the civilian of the sea.

The extreme application of this would be that a duly commissioned motor boat might hold up a huge armed steamer, and any act of resistance would make that ship an outlaw liable to destruction by any other warship. One of our Judges in an important case declared that the law was founded on common sense.

International law on the sea, especially, may be so described as the product of generations of the common sense of the world in questions of right and wrong on the seas.

The American Secretary of State at this time (1914) very properly decided that such ships were to be treated as regular merchantmen, in so far as their armament was to serve exclusively for purposes of defense. As the submarine had not then been developed as a commerce destroyer, there was not much made of the matter, and thus the position of the armed merchantman remained unchanged.

Complications Due to U-Boats

But with the astonishing leap of the submarine into the rôle of the most efficient commerce destroyer that has ever been seen, all this was ended. At once, from the very nature of the U-boat, there arose a mass of complications such as never before had been known in international law on the seas.

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The following change in directions to British armed merchantmen, early in 1915, shows vividly the immediate effect of the use of the U-boats against commerce on the seas: "If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day, and "it is evident to the master that she has "hostile intentions, the ship pursued "should open fire in self-defense, not"withstanding the submarine may not "have committed a definite hostile act, "such as firing a gun or torpedo."*

The Germans maintained that such orders were equivalent to arming merchantmen for attacks on submarines, and then followed the involved controversies over the use of the U-boat. A great deal of this is outside the province of this article, but one way of keeping the mind

*Feb. 25, 1915.

clear in this matter is to remember the established standing of the armed merchantman as described.

The armed merchantman, in the common sense of the applied law, was armed for defense against pirates, privateers, and small fry among the men-of-war. Pirates and privateers had disappeared, and cutters and such small deer were also extinct. Consequently, for practical purposes, as the first months of the war proved, the armed merchantman was useless. Resisting the ordinary man-ofwar was out of the question-and there was nothing else in sight.

Submarine Outlawry

Suddenly there appeared the U-boat, the most extraordinary combination of weakness and strength ever devised. Obviously here was a warship that might be resisted, and its double life above and below the water made it something to which all existing laws could not be applied. It was plain at once, from the makeup of the U-boat and the limitations of its crew, that the submarine could not carry out the prescribed program of visit, search, taking off the crew, putting on board a prize crew-or else destroying the prize. This, with the added element of its great vulnerability, made it evident that there must be some modifications of the existing rules.

If the Germans had attempted to reach a solution of this problem in accordance with the common sense of sea usage, and with due regard for ordinary humanity, Germany might have retained some of the respect of the world. It is idle to consider in what manner these rules might have been drawn, because the German Government has deliberately chosen to throw aside all dictates of humanity in the use of the submarine. It has made no attempt to deserve the good opinion of the world. The chosen policy of the German Government is ruthless destruction of ships, enemy and neutral alike, without any decent regard for the lives of the passengers and crews.

When the official representative of Germany cold-bloodedly advised sinking without trace the Argentine ships, it was evident that there was no limit to the

cynical cruelty of the present German Government. Argentina had been specially friendly to Germany, yet this Government of Germany treated the friendly nation as few of the most hardened of

the old pirates would have treated their friends. In fact, the merchantman is now armed against tactics that would have disgraced the worst of the pirates in their own eyes.

recently lifted the veil of mystery which shrouded the story of submarine UC-12. The story begins in May, 1915, a very short while after the declaration of war by Italy upon Austria. It will be remembered that, in spite of the alliance in arms between Austria and Germany, Germany was not included in the declaration of war, and remained outwardly, at all events, on friendly terms with Italy until August, 1916.

There was, however, plenty of ground for supposing that the friendliness of Germany was outward only, and that she was in reality secretly aiding Austria in every possible way. Toward the end of June, 1915, the Italian minesweepers, while performing their daily task near one of the Italian naval bases in the Adriatic, suddenly came upon a new form of secret destruction, consisting of a barrier of twelve mines in the water.

They were carefully cleared away and the mine-sweepers continued day after day their accustomed work, when suddenly another barrier of mines was found in very much the same position. It was not difficult to guess how the mines got there; they could only have been placed there by a submarine, which was able to cruise below the water and in secret to lay her deadly eggs. The Italians determined that the next attempt on the part of the submarine should be less successful, and should, on the other hand, result in her own destruction.

They had to wait for some time and possess their souls in patience until March 16, 1916, when the enemy submarine ventured once again into the waters of the naval base to lay another batch of eggs. She ventured in, but

this time she did not make her escape silently and unobserved, for she fell a victim to the Italian mines which were lying in readiness for her. A loud explosion made it known to the Italian watchers that their plan had succeeded. That might have been the end of the story of the UC-12, an end which has doubtless come to many another U-boat during the present war.

But the enterprise of the Italian commander of the naval base gave a fresh turn to the story and brought to light facts which proved the duplicity of Germany once again. The water in which the submarine met her fate was not particularly deep, and a brilliant idea occurred to the commander of attempting to salve the vessel and to send her out repaired, refitted, and re-equipped as a unit in the Italian Submarine Service.

It was not an easy task to undertake, for the commander knew well that the sunken submarine almost certainly carried her usual cargo of mines. After divers had first been sent down to ascertain where the submarine lay and the condition in which she was, she was cautiously fished up to the surface a broken, tangled mass, apparently quite useless. It was not, however, until she reached the surface that her previous history began to be understood. She then stood revealed as the UC-12, built in Germany at the Weser Dockyard by the firm Ditta Siemens Schuckert.

It was now clear that while Germany