The siege of Sebastopol (1854) first upset all these accepted methods. This was a weak fortress, and it was thought that it would fall "after a short cannonade."* It unexpectedly withstood a siege of 349 days because the great Russian engineer, Todleben, made a bold use of "improvised defenses."+ Chain of External Forts Of course these defenses approached the recent solution of the problem of fortification; but this was obscured by criticism of the attack, just as the actual solution at Petersburg, ten years later, was ignored in the first mistaken criticism of our civil war. At first there was so strong an impression abroad of a war of undisciplined mobs fighting against one another that the real results of the civil war in finding the best weapons and methods were not realized until the present war. FIG. 12-THE ENCEINTE AND CHAIN OF the range of artillery that, even in the formal European schools, it became evident that the bastion should be pushed forward and made an outwork of the fortress. This was the origin of the later plan of the chain of external forts. Viollet le Duc, among others, had urged this upon the French Emperor, but in the atrophy and official demoralization of the Second Empire little was done, and the French fortresses were an easy prey in the war of 1870. The Germans reduced most of the French fortresses at their leisure by bombardment. Verdun, which was then of the type of fortress shown in Figure 10, a bastioned enceinte with a Vauban citadel, fell after fortythree days. Figure 12 shows Viollet le Duc's final scheme for the formal fortress, the enceinte and surrounding chain of forts and batteries. It will be seen at once The rifled gun had so greatly increased that this was the plan of Verdun at the * Hamley. † Sir George Clarke. outbreak of the present war. But something more than this arrangement of forts had given to the fortress the reputation of strength that scared away the first German attack in 1914. Revolution Due to Howitzers What made the empty threat effective was the artificial value that had been assigned to the new use of concrete and steel in the construction of the formal fortresses. So highly were these recent fortresses esteemed, as an adjunct of defending armies, that the German Great General Staff had not been able to realize the tremendous power over them. of their howitzer artillery. So revolutionary was this weapon that it is not strange its effectiveness was not considered sufficient to upset all the calculations of years. Only as recently as 1907 Sir Edward Clarke, the leading British expert, had declared that "the idea of breaching hidden casements by planting shells successively on a few square yards of area may evidently be dismissed as futile." Yet this is exactly what the Teutonic howitzer artillery has accomplished against all formal fortresses attacked by it. Every steel and concrete fort has proved to be a pent-house of destruction after a few of these deadly shells have been dropped upon it. At once this became so evident, from the experience of Liége, Namur, &c., that in September, 1914, Verdun and the other French fortresses were intrenched, and became merely sectors of the Petersburg intrenchments which are now strung along the western front. The chains of forts have been dismantled, and at the battle of Verdun in 1916 Verdun was no longer a fortress. It was nothing but the name of a system of trenches. Yet the name in the French mind meant the prestige of France, and for its defense they made the desperate stand that beat back the German attacks. The position in itself was of no more value than any other system of trenches. It will be remembered that Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux were no longer forts, but merely places in the lines of trenches. The great guns are no longer mounted in definite places. They are now scattered about on railway and caterpillar mounts, with every device of concealment and camouflage. The terrain is now a labyrinth of pits and trenches, with nothing left of the formal fortress. The whole structure of twentyfive hundred years has been overthrown in a few months. What France Is Doing for Serbians France, torn as it is by war, is supporting and giving refuge to 200,000 Belgians, furnishing them with the same kind of quarters as those allotted to French refugees from occupied territory; it has likewise gathered in many Serbians driven from their homes by the invader, and has set about preparing for the restoration of their unhappy kingdom by giving to Serbian youth the education best suited to the needs of national renaissance. A treaty signed at Corfu on Nov. 9, 1916, which the French Parliament has ratified, gives an official organization to this fraternal enterprise. It regulates the distribution of the young men among the universities and French normal schools, and arranges for the Serbian Government's nomination of Serbian professors to teach the literature, language, and history of their country. The treaty also provides for instruction of French students by these Serbian professors, exempts a certain number of Serbian students from the educational laws, and appropriates funds for their maintenance. This treaty is valid for three years and can be renewed for similar periods by tacit continuation. By Major Edwin W. Dayton Inspector General, N. G. N. Y.; Secretary, New York Army and Navy Club T IX. The Battle of the Somme HE opening of 1916 was an anxious period for the Allies. France had held fast at Verdun against the most terrific attacks, but gradually the assailants pressed in closer, until at the end of May it seemed that even the heroic devotion of that marvelous defense must succumb. The world began to fear that England for some reason was unable to create the much-needed diversion in the north. Contemporary writers are contending that the Allies deliberately delayed their northern offensive in order to compel the enemy to maintain strong armies along the whole front to meet the attack which every one knew was soon to come. It seemed that their well-known superiority over the Germans in both men and munitions ought to have made it possible to make strong feints at several places, in addition to launching a real attack on a great scale. Verdun, although an important link in the frontier defenses, was not, after all, a place whose loss would have been fatal to France. The moral effect, however, of a German success at Verdun might have been a serious matter. Such a result would have renewed Teuton hopes, and would certainly have disheartened many of the neutrals weary of waiting to see the Germans defeated. Whatever the real reasons may have been, it is safe to say that the Allies delayed their northern attack to the very last moment if the diversion was intended to save Verdun. When they did strike, however, their attack was on a scale both in extent of front and duration of effort far beyond anything they had previously undertaken on the western front. A remarkable feature was the great part played by the French, who proved their ability to develop a major offensive on a wide front while continuing to hold the defenses at Verdun with forces strong enough for frequent counterattacks. The vitality of the French after the trying defense of Verdun was one of the surprises of the war. The weeks immediately preceding the great attack in Picardy seemed full of promise for the Allies. In June Italy had checked the dangerous Austrian attack on the Trentino, and in the first week of the same month Brusiloff began the attack on Galicia and Bukowina which threatened to crush Austria. The struggle had raged steadily in Flanders and Artois through two hard years. Whenever the thunder of guns quieted elsewhere in Europe, Asia, or Africa, attention always returned to Ypres, Loos, Souchez, Vimy, Hulluch, and the Labyrinth, where the war gods never ceased to gather their steady toll of British, French, and German lives. A little further to the south lay Picardy, the Santerre, a sobriquet reminiscent of the old wars, when the fair fields were the sang terre of a hundred bloody campaigns. But since the Autumn of 1914, when Castelnau and Maud'huy had won the race for the coast by extending and covering the allied left flank, the lines which congealed then into the intrenched positions in Picardy had been the quietest of all. Germans in the Ascendency London had been whispering for months about the "great push" which was to come, but all through the Spring there was very little activity along the British front, except for mine explosions and tunneling, mingled with small trench raids. In April, May, and June there were a number of brilliant small exploits, but mostly distinguished as sharp counterstrokes recovering trenches which the Germans had stormed. There was a noticeable lack of initial attack, and the best that could be done appeared to be the prevention of any large permanent gain by the enemy. If the gage of mili tary supremacy was to be the ability to maintain the initiative it had to be confessed that the decision would rest with the Germans. The great attacks were theirs in Russia, the Balkans, and at Verdun, while in the east their defenses had been much more than negative successes in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. Only in Armenia had victory rested with the Allies when the Russians took Erzerum and Trebizond. In June the Italians just managed to stop the Austrian attack in the Trentino. It was high time for the Allies to force the rôle of the defense upon the Germans. The saving of Verdun was an immediate and obvious necessity, but demonstration of an ability to maintain a successful aggressive campaign against the enemy was a greater and more important need. The situation was realized and the Winter and Spring had been used to perfect the equipment necessary for a great offensive. Both England and France poured men and munitions into the sector north of the Somme, where the enemies faced each other on a wide curve running from the river east of Maricourt and west of Mametz, Fricourt, La Boiselle, Ovillers, Thiepval, Beaumont, Hamel, Serre, Gommecourt, and Monchy to the railway from Bapaume to Arras. Above Thiepval the Ancre crossed the battle front, flowing south to join the Somme back of the French front. As the battle developed into its later stages the shallow valley of this little river was the scene of long, hard battles about Grandcourt, Pys, and Miraumont. South of the Somme, just before the great battle opened, the Germans scored some gains at Frise and Dompierre, which indicated their appreciation of the fact that a storm was brewing whose force they desired to judge by reconnoissance in the region where they doubtless anticipated it would break. Earlier in the Spring they felt out the French positions in the region of Roye and Albert, but the perfection of their fortifications in the chalk hills of Picardy made the Germans confident that any allied effort there was doomed to certain failure. They had not been idle while real fortresses, with deep-sunk refuges for the garrisons in time of bombardment, and artfully concealed machinegun nests only to be disclosed when attacking infantry presented a worth-while target. General Haig's Preparations While the Germans were digging in, General Sir Douglas Haig was improving roads, building military railways, dugouts, field hospitals, and magazines. More than a hundred pumping plants were installed to provide an adequate supply of water from many new wells, and when the engineers were not boring wells they were driving mines under the enemy's front line works. General Sir Henry Rawlinson commanded the troops assigned for the attack, with his left flank below Gommecourt and his right in touch with the French above Maricourt. On this front of less than fifteen com miles the British had five corps, with a reserve army lying ready behind. The co-operating French army, (the Sixth,) formerly that of Castelnau, was manded by General Fayolle, and comprised three corps of war-tried veterans, including the famous Twentieth, which at Verdun had won great fame in Douaumont and Avocourt. While these great armies, with their enormous artillery equipment, were being assembled it was essential that the German air scouts should be prevented from discovering the location of the concentration. Apparently the allied airmen won the control of the air in Picardy, for the Germans were for some weeks brushed out of the sky over that area. Through the latter part of June both British and French batteries began to bombard the enemy lines along the whole front, through Picardy, Artois, and Flanders, and it is believed that the enemy was led to expect the attack much further north than the Somme sector, probably somewhere between Albert and Arras. Rain in the last week of June delayed the operations for several days, but more than seventy trench raids were made, in addition to a number of gas attacks and mine explosions. As the battle was planned, the British objective was the high ground between the Ancre and the Somme, through Thiepval, Longueval, and Ginchy, in the direction of Combles. The French were to attack below Combles and across the Somme. As the northern part of the British objective was commanded by the enemy positions on the further side of the Ancre, it became necessary to increase the scope of the British assaults by extending the attack to include Gommecourt, five miles above Beaumont Hamel. Beginning of the Great Battle At 7:15 on the morning of July 1, 1916, the bombardment reached the utmost fury. At half after the hour there was a pause for a few seconds, and then the bombardment shifted to a barrage, and on a front of twenty-five miles the allied infantry leaped from their trenches and rushed to the attack. The immediate objective of the British infantry (six divisions) was the high ground bisected by the Ancre, and despite the utmost gallantry these brave troops were doomed to a costly defeat. The fortified villages of Thiepval, Beaumont Hamel, Serre, and Gommecourt had withstood the hurricane of shell fire and remained practically impregnable. The extraordinarily deep shelters for both men and machine guns enabled the garrisons to return to the surface when the assault developed in time to sweep the advancing lines with rifle and machine-gun fire. Back of the villages the German artillery had excellent observation posts on high ground, and the ranges were figured with mathematical precision. Just before the assault the heavy German guns fired a cloud of six and eight inch high explosive shells into the British front line trenches, and their shrapnel barrage moved with the troops as they advanced. At Beaumont Hamel a mine which had been seven months digging was exploded under an enemy redoubt, which was blown to pieces with all the ground about it. Nevertheless the German battalions showed splendid morale by immediately getting their automatic rifles and machine guns into effective action. The British regiments advanced in many successive lines, and in spite of terrible losses some detachments penetrated deep into certain parts of the enemy positions. None, however, were able to hold the ground gained, and by nightfall the remnants of those splendid divisions were back in the old British trenches. Of the groups which fought their way into the German lines nearly a thousand were captured by the enemy, and even on the next day some others succeeded in fighting their way back. Further south, where perhaps the Germans had not anticipated the attack, real successes were scored. Mametz and Montauban were taken, as well as the outlying defenses of La Boiselle. Fricourt was seriously threatened, and below Thiepval the Leipsic redoubt fell into the hands of the British, which proved a great point of vantage in the later operations. On July 2, about noon, another division was hurled at Fricourt, and that well-nigh impregnable fortress was taken. |