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STUDY of the official vital statistics of England and Germany reveals the fact that the war has had a much more disastrous effect on the birth rate of Germany than on that of England. The comparison is between the German cities of Berlin, Hamburg, Leipsic, Munich, Dresden, Cologne, and Breslau, with a combined population of 6,000,000, and the English cities of London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheffield, with a population of over 7,000,000. The effects of the war on the numbers of births may be seen in the following table, which relates to the first six months of each year specified:

The direct effects of the war on births could not be felt until about April, 1915, and these figures do not reveal the actual loss of three years of war. But up to the end of last June these German towns had lost on the 1913 standard by the deficit in births a number practically equal to the whole of the births for that year, while the loss in the English towns was rather less than one-third of that amount.

If the loss in 6,000,000 population averages 60,000 a year, in the German Empire the loss in three years was nearly 2,000,000 potential lives. A German authority, Karl Doorman, gives the round figures of births in the German Empire for the years 1915 and 1916, and these show a loss on the 1913 scale of 1,165,000 up to the end of 1916. The percentage of decrease for the whole empire as shown by Doorman is on the 1913 scale 22.4 per cent. in 1915 and 40 per cent. in 1916. For the seven towns which have been chosen the decrease for the first half of 1916 is 39.2 per cent., a lower rate than that for the whole empire for that year and one that is sufficiently

near to the empire rate to warrant regarding it as substantially accurate as an index to the whole of the country. Applying the same method to the figures for the English towns, the potential loss in England and Wales for the same period is about 300,000.

It is stated further that the deaths in Germany independent of the losses in the field since the beginning of 1915 have exceeded the births by 600,000; hence the total population of the country, including the soldiers everywhere, is less today by 600,000 plus the deaths in the field, which are estimated at 2,000,000, making 2,600,000 total decrease. In England, on the contrary, the births yet exceed the deaths, estimated at an excess of 600,000 in the three years, which counterbalances the deaths in the field, so that England's total population as yet shows no actual loss.

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The Chief of the German General Staff, General Ludendorff, issued order early in September, 1917, in which he betrayed the necessity of economizing "human material." The order was as follows:

Chief of the German General Staff to the Armies Afield:

The consumption of munitions has remained constantly very high recently on the fighting fronts, in spite of the fact that the combative activity has generally diminished. In particular, consumption of shells for mortar and heavy field howitzers is much greater than production. This is serious. However, the superior direction of the army cannot issue a new general order for a further restriction in the consumption of munitions, because our losses on all the fighting fronts continue to be very high, and would become even higher if further general instructions were made.

Economy in men is even more important than economy in munitions. It is necessary to try and obtain an improvement on these two points. To this end it is necessary to use as carefully as is possible the munitions according to the order previously given on repeate occasions, and, on the other hand,

our methods

the tactics of ording to the

regulations given and the circumstances, so as to diminish our losses.

According to orders which we have seen and according to the complaints of the troops, it is no longer in doubt that we persist in our old ways of seeing things, and that we continue along these lines on certain occasions. These are in first-line positions-too severe fighting for the possession of ground, even a trench element which is of little tactical value, without importance and even disadvantageous to be defended; hasty counterattacks without information from the artillery; the too dense occupation of the first lines; the keeping too close of large reserves in the open when no attack is planned; too much artillery fire against positions where there is no enemy, such as destructive cannonading of empty trenches; useless barrage fire and cannonading, especially during the night, when there is not sufficient information for regulating the fire. LUDENDORFF.

(Signed)

It is believed that these figures are considerably within the mark, and that the permanent losses in the German Army in the three years are rather in excess of than below 4,000,000. The Allies' conclusion as to the actual German man power at the middle of September, 1917, was as follows:

Men actually employed in the army on the front, behind the lines, and in the interior...... Men incorporated and shortly available, forces left over from divisions in course of formation, and men in dépôts... Remainder of 1919 contingent and 1920 contingent

5,500,000

Ersatz-Reserve

1914 contingent..

...

1915

Landsturm first ban.

1,100,000

600,000

700,000

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quelled and three of the leaders had been executed. He gave only meagre details, but made the direct accusation that the Independent Socialists were responsible for the uprising by influencing the sailors through their propaganda; he named

specifically three Deputies, Vogtherr, Dittman, and Haase, as having been in conference with the leaders of the mutiny before the outbreak. The disclosure created great excitement and met with indignant denials from the accused. The Chancellor sustained von Capelle and corroborated his accusations.

As a result of the disclosure the movement by the opposition to force the resignation of the Chancellor for failure to support the peace plans of the no annexationists failed. Two days later it was announced that von Capelle had resigned, but this was not confirmed up to Oct. 18. The Reichstag adjourned until December, with the political pot seething and a general impression that the days of Chancellor Michaelis were numbered. He was criticised for lack of firmness and was charged with failure to develop definite leadership over any of the conflicting groups.

A former Lieutenant in the German Navy, Rudolph Glatfelder, made public Oct. 16 a circumstantial story of the mutiny, which he declared he personally witnessed and participated in. Earlier in the war he had been exchanged by the Russians as an incapacitated prisoner, having been captured from the German cruiser Magdeburg at the bombardment of the Russian port, Libau, Aug. 4, 1914, in which engagement he lost an eye. Germany he joined the Social Democrat group, known as the Marxian Internationalists, who have resorted to I. W. W. tactics to strike a blow for German democracy.

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He stated that the mutiny was originated by a group of German revolutionists operating in Switzerland. In May, 1917, 149 revolutionary spies, of whom 85 were women, had been sent to German naval stations to foment the disaffection among the sailors. Glatfelder said he was the head of a group that operated at Wilhelmshaven. He asserted that there was located there a hospital with 20,000 patients, known as "repulsive cases," mere human remnants, whom the authorities kept there in concealment,

leaving their families under the impression that they were at the front; he said there were fully 200,000 such repulsive casualties in the empire.

The dead, he added, are buried at sea; as many as 700 have been dropped overboard in one day from the "death ferry." Late in June the crew of a "death ferry " shouted defiantly that the victims were unwilling sacrifices and "would have damned their souls before offering them to the Kaiser." A serious riot ensued; the Captain and four of the crew were overpowered and thrown into the sea; the officiating parson aboard was shot. The crew was overpowered at length, tried, and executed.

This was the beginning. On July 30 8,000 sailors were assembled on the parade ground at Wilhelmshaven to listen to speeches upholding the policy of the Government in the war to offset the socialistic propaganda. As they marched by the platform the Admiral in charge asserted that one of the marching marines had sarcastically smiled at him, whereupon one of the naval officers jumped from the stand and struck the marine in the face with his gloved fist. At once the 8,000 sailors and marines turned on the officers present like wolves and literally tore their bodies into shreds, killing fifty or more. A bloody riot followed; one of the forts took sides with the mutineers and engaged in a bombardment with the ten other coastal forts. The rioters meanwhile began their work of destruction, and in a few hours had blown up four large uncompleted warships in the harbor and burned two Zeppelins, besides warehouses, sheds, wharves, &c. Before the mutineers could reach their ships many of them were mowed down by machine guns. They were at length overpowered by the loyal troops, who were summoned in tens of thousands, and the ringleaders were tried and executed.

It was announced on Oct. 16 that the three Deputies who were accused of fomenting trouble would be prosecuted in the criminal courts.

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S a resident of France from the beginning of the war until a few months ago there stand out in my memory four war cries, each marking an epoch in the development of the French spirit. They are:

"France d'abord!" (France first!) "Jusqu'au bout!" (Unto the end!) "Coute que coute!" (Cost what it may!)

"On les aura!" (We will get them!) How that first watchword, "France first!" comes back to one as expressing the spirit of the Summer of 1914, the period of mobilization and upheaval. It appeared in the newspapers, it was printed on stationery, it was on every lip; and, more important, it was in every heart in those early days of danger.

Everything unessential had to give way. Resolutely and gladly the country subjected itself to a policy of elimination. Museums and theatres were closed at once. Expensive shops and luxurious hotels found that they belonged to a life that had ceased to exist, and, one by one, they shut their doors. The sale of absinthe was prohibited, and the cafés of Paris were closed at 8 P. M.

France lived in those days in a state of patriotic exaltation akin to religious frenzy. Dancing and music were suppressed by public accord. One could not even sing or play the piano behind closed doors in one's own home unless it was the "Marseillaise" or some other patriotic

air.

Then came the Autumn, with the news of the human toll France had paid in the retreat from the border and the glorious stand at the Marne. Came, too, the numbing realization that the war, which had been counted on to end by Christmas, must be fought through the Winter. The patriotic exaltation that had carried France through the early weeks was gone, but in its place grew a sterner, deeper courage. It found expression in

two words, made dynamic by use in a message to the people of Paris by General Gallieni. Called upon to serve as Military Governor of the capital when the Germans were just outside its gates, General Gallieni responded:

"I have received the mandate to defend Paris against the invader. This mandate I will fulfill jusqu'au bout!”

"Unto the end!" The soldiers repeated it through gritted teeth as they settled down to hold, from the North Sea to the Vosges, a line of trenches which during that first Winter were little more than drainage canals (which did not drain) and were as yet inadequately provided with heat or shelter.

"Unto the end!" The civilians repeated it as they faced the gigantic problem of sustaining their soldiers and organizing the country for a protracted war.

Spring found the line still firm and the Entente Allies beginning an offensive which, it was then hoped, would sweep the Germans from France.

A new phrase began to appear in the press-"Coute que coute!" (Cost what it may!) It became a watchword. Better pay any price and get through with it. A grim and heroic resolution, but it proved impossible of realization. What had been looked forward to as the great offensive had to be slowed down to await better artillery, more ammunition.

A year later another slogan came into prominence. The defeat of German ambitions at Verdun, and the proof during the Summer of 1916 that at last the Entente Allies had an offensive which could advance against German intrenchments, gave rise to a new sentiment. France had always been hopeful. She now became confident. To voice this new-born attitude she began to popularize a soldier saying of which General Pétain had made use in an order to the troops at Verdun. "On les aura!" (We will get

them!) became the most widespread slogan of the war.

In addition to watchwords which have been associated with passing epochs of the war, there are others, serious and amusing, in which popular philosophy has been crystallized. One of these owes its origin to a drawing by the cartoonist Forain, published early in the conflict, in which a soldier in the trenches is represented as saying to another, "If only they hold out!"

"Who?" asks his companion.
"The civilians!" is the answer.

"If only they hold out! ("Pourvu qu'ils tiennent!") is quoted again and again by persons writing on the war, and each succeeding month adds to its weight in revealing the importance, in a modern struggle of any length, of the effort and spirit of the civilians.

Artists have found inspiration in another phrase, “Arise, ye dead!" ("Debout, les morts!") The story is that a trench held by French soldiers was entered from one end by Germans, making a surprise attack. A dozen of the French fell, dead or wounded, in the fighting, and the rest, believing themselves outnumbered, finally fled. As the Germans advanced to take possession of the trench one of the men, lying prone before them, rose to his knees in a supreme effort, grasped some hand grenades, and, hurling them at the enemy, shouted to his companions stretched on the ground about him, "Arise, ye dead!"

Several among the wounded responded to the heroic cry, and the Germans, frightened at this almost supernatural occurrence, fell back, though not before the Frenchman who initiated the attack had been killed.

Turning from the heroic to the commonplace, one must not forget to mention the ubiquitous phrase, “C'est la guerre," a standing comment and excuse in France since the war. Sometimes it expresses a philosophical recognition of conditions. Sometimes it is an attempt to cover up personal shortcomings. If you complain to your groceryman that his prices are too high, he shrugs his shoulders and replies, "It's the war." If you scold your laundry woman for dropping a sploch of ink on your best shirt, she falls back on

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Then there is "Taisez-vous! vous! Les oreilles ennemies vous écoutent," which may be translated, "Don't talk! Be on your guard! The ears of the enemy hear you." This was placarded all over France as a warning. It is not certain that it accomplished any good in that direction, but it has furnished a deal of amusement and taken its place among the sayings of the war.

The slang of the war comes next to the slogans as interpretative of the psychology of the conflict. The word to which first place should be given from this standpoint is "embusqué." It means literally "in ambush" or "in hiding,"

but since the war the word has been popularized as a noun to describe men who have been mobilized, but have made use of influential friends to get them a billet well away from the firing line.

The contempt which the French feel for that type of man may be judged from the fact that to call a man an embusqué is the supreme insult. A woman was recently fined for calling a policeman an embusqué, even in the heat of argument.

At the other end of the pole from the embusqué is the poilu. The explanation has been set forth that poilu, or hairy, as a nickname for the French fighting man is not due to the fact that he is without benefit of barber, but goes back to the time when there existed a body of soldiers who wore hats of hair, from which they came to be known as poilus. As they attained a reputation for great bravery and hardihood, the name came to mean a supersoldier.

Whatever be the historical derivation of the word, it is certain that the average Frenchman uses the term in its literal sense to indicate one whose beard is unshaven and whose hair is unshornin other words, a man who has been long enough at the front to become acclimated. The word did not come into general use until some months after the war began. The slang term for a private of the line at the outset of the conflict was piou-piou.

The respect, almost reverence, attached to the word "poilu " in France today un