These proposals were received with apparent approval by King Nicholas last Summer, but the actual decision was continually postponed. At last Mr. Radovitch, finding that a visit paid by the King to Italy in the Autumn had increased his tendency to evade the issue, presented a second memorandum on Jan. 11, 1917, couched in even more explicit terms than the first. The essential passage in this document runs as follows:

From the fall of the Serbian Empire [1389] to the present day, the ideal of the whole Serbian people has been union. Whenever this has appeared possible, we have seen Serbian monarchs who were ready to make sacrifices for the sake of unity. Never since Kosovo have we been so near to the realization of this

ideal.

If, unhappily, Montenegro is not capable, at this decisive moment, of offering effective aid in the struggle to realize an ideal which it has held for five centuries, your Majesty and your Government have none the less the duty to do all that is possible in this direction.

But it is clear that the most difficult question to regulate is the dynastic question, which alone at least, in the view of us Serbs-could interfere with the idea of unification.

Dynasties which only considered their own private interests might evoke difficulties, and would, by doing so, incur grave responsibility. Holding as I do the view that this is the only road to safety and union for all Serbs and even Jugoslavs, I take the liberty of begging your Majesty to send an autograph letter to H. M. the Emperor of Russia, declaring your willingness to take, as soon as possible, the necessary measures for reaching an accord with the Sovereign and Government of the kingdom of our brothers of Serbia, and also with the representatives of the other Jugoslav countries, in order to decide our unification and lay its foundations.

Attitude of New Cabinet

Mr. Radovitch's proposals were declined by King Nicholas, on the pretext that the time was not yet ripe, and

accordingly the Cabinet resigned. The Czar signified his disapproval of the King's separatist intrigue by conferring upon Mr. Radovitch the Order of the White Eagle. He was succeeded as Premier by General Matanovitch, while Foreign Affairs were intrusted to Mr. Tomanovitch, the son of a former Premier, and Finance to Mr. Ilitch, a Serb advocate from Croatia, and only recently a Montenegrin subject. It might have been expected that men who owed their position entirely to the King's personal favor could be relied upon to fulfill his behests, but there are limits beyond which men of honor cannot be induced to go. Annoyed at the activity of the Montenegrin Committee of Union, founded by Mr. Radovitch and other prominent exiles, the King insisted that his Government should address a note to the Allies, disavowing the committee and declaring that "the Montenegrins continue to regard the Montenegrin Government as the sole representative of their interests." To this demand General Matanovitch refused the assent of his Government in the following terms:

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The alliance gives us rights, but also imposes upon us duties. The principle of nationality is the basis of our struggle against the Central Empires, the formula for solving the future constellation of Europe. * * We unhappily are unable to fulfill our military duties, but we can and are bound to, remain inalienably faithful to the great principle for which our best sons have shed their blood. To accept this note, which officially proclaims separatism pur et simple for one part of our people, would be to disavow the alliance, to break the last thread which binds us to it, and force on a rupture of diplomatic relations.

The demobilization of the Montenegrin Army in January, 1916, lost us the friendship of Great Britain and aroused the suspicions of the other Allies, and even of our Serbian brethren. The political catastrophe which would be the infallible result of this note would mean the definite ruin of our country.

The reasons which serve as basis for the Government's policy are as follows: The status quo is no longer possible in the Balkans. The national conscience is awake and expanding in all sections of our nation. The idea of union has become the faith, the religion, of the masses. This faith has been created through the centuries by thousands of national martyrs. * Today it only depends upon

*

I am happy to learn of the glorious successes obtained by your heroic army, to which my admiration and enthusiasm go out. Greeting with all my heart its supreme chief, I hope that this same hand which is liberating Italian lands will soon be stretched out toward my unhappy mountaineers.

The compliments to Italian prowess, altogether unexceptionable in themselves, were interpreted by the whole of Slav public opinion, and unquestionably intended by the King himself as a direct slight to Serbia and a peculiarly insidious bid for Italy's aid in frustrating Jugoslav unity. Fortunately, the record of King Nicholas is sufficiently well known in Rome to make the Consulta chary of giving more than a perfunctory support to the inveterate Balkan intriguer. His action, however, rendered a Cabinet crisis inevitable, and on June 5 General Matanovitch addressed a fresh memorandum to the King, explaining his reasons for accepting office last Winter and for now resigning.

The solution put forward by the late Premier, in favor of the union of the dynasties and alternative reign, seemed to me very complicated, unrealizable, and calculated to give rise to serious consequences. At that time I agreed with the opportunists, believing that this great work would have to be realized in the most advantageous way possible and with the least possible injury to existing historical foundations. For the rest, I was in entire agreement with my predecessors. The great events which are shaking the world open a new era in human history. Our

people is also ingulfed in the chaos of events. Montenegro could not es

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cape the general movement; and on the day when the barriers separating it for centuries from its blood brothers-and particularly from Serbia-had fallen, the Serbian problem of reconstructing the State had arisen of itself. The new situation demanded a new form of State; separatism, being in conflict with the spirit of the age, became impossible for the future.

The Government, he continued, accepted office on the understanding that a project of union should be prepared, ready to submit to Parliament for approval after the restoration of peace. More than once he asked the King's permission to proceed with the draft, but met first with evasion and on May 15 with a definite refusal. He wrote:

The annoying consequences of this have robbed us of the little prestige which was left to us: For your Majesty's refusal could only be interpreted in competent quarters as hesitation to pronounce openly on a question of international policy which divides the world into two opposite camps. Besides, your Majesty has seen fit to raise great and delicate political questions whose solution was contrary not only to the spirit of the Government program, but also to the Constitution of Montenegro.

The telegram to the King of Italy, the Premier concluded, was a denial of the Jugoslav ideal, such as the Government could not ignore, the more so as its dispatch without the knowledge of the Government was quite unconstitutional. General Matanovitch and his colleagues thus saw no alternative but to resign.

Abdication Openly Demanded

Mr. Ilitch went even further. In his letter of resignation he flatly accused the King of acting "in flagrant contradiction to the program of the Government," and added that in his opinion "the action of T. R. H. the Princes is not in accord with the interests of the royal house, with the obligations toward the Allies, and with the well-being and ideal of the nation." He even expressed the fear that "the end may be a collapse of the dynasty's prestige," and concluded by demanding in so many words that "the Petrovitch dynasty should abdicate in favor of H. M. the King of Serbia," as the sole conceivable means of avoiding a catastrophe." He not unnaturally

added that his letter might be treated as an act of resignation.

This dramatic action may be taken as a moral boycott against the dynasty on the part of all Montenegrins of any political standing. The new Premier, Mr. Eugene Popovitch, an old man of 72, is a native of Dalmatia, but has for most of his life been an Italian subject, and was for many years Montenegrin Consul General in Rome. If he is scarcely known to his nominal compatriots, his colleagues are entirely unknown and sub

ordinate officials, who have never played any political rôle and are mere creatures of the King. The most striking proof of the discredit which he has brought upon himself is the refusal of the Allies to admit his representative to the recent conference in Paris.

Disregarding all hints, King Nicholas was unwise enough to give to the press a statement to the effect that Mr. Popovitch was the Montenegrin delegate to the conference, who none the less remained outside.

T

ODAY, thanks to the upheaval at Petrograd, many documents destined to remain forever hidden

among the secret archives have come to light. The explanations they furnish are as unexpected as they are valuable. Public opinion, ignorant of the truth, had accepted the most natural explanation and had attributed the two capital faults to the Government of Bucharest; but now, to the general stupefaction and indignation, it became evident that, far from being guilty of carelessness and want of foresight, Rumania was the victim of a terrible plot hatched in Berlin in concert with the men of the old régime at Petrograd, enemies of the cause they were called upon to defend.

Irrefutable evidence shows that the date of the declaration of war and the plan of campaign were forced upon Rumania by the Government of Petrograd, presided over by Messrs. Stürmer and Protopopoff. It is superabundantly proved that these men, who came up against the gentle obstinacy of Nicholas II. every time they tried to convince him of the necessity of concluding " a separate peace," had no other object in view

than to put their country into the position of being forced to do so.

The check of the Rumanian intervention, on which many fine hopes were founded, seemed to serve their purpose to perfection. It has been proved now that the offensive of Brusiloff had come to a full stop at the beginning of August. And, still more, his armies were running the risk of being outflanked. Arrested at the passes which debouched into the Hungarian plain by the army of Koewess, General Brusiloff had been obliged to turn the front of his armies to the northwest-toward Lemberg-thus exposing his flank to the divisions which Hindenburg was bringing up against him.

Plan of Petrograd Plotters

A complete defeat of the Russian armies, for which they would have been responsible to the Emperior, to Russia, and to the Allies, would not have suited these men. The defeat of Rumania, which they could impute to the inefficiency of her army, would lead equally to the same end, without compromising their personal prestige. At any price it was necessary to turn away from the Galician front the storm which was threatening.

So the plan they conceived was put

into execution. On July 1 the Imperial Government sent to the Rumanian Government the now famous ultimatum, the brutality of which is equaled only by its perfidy. It was the first document of a correspondence with which the revelations of General Iliesco in the Matin have made us acquainted-revelations completed by the publication of Count Czernin's last report in the Austrian Red Book and loyally confirmed by the men of the new régime in Russia. Nothing is more distressing than the reading of this correspondence. On one side the constant reminders of promises, the despairing remonstrances; on the other the haughty, sometimes even injurious, tone, the feigned assurance. "Now or never," says the Russian ultimatum which forced Rumania into the war, "for it must not be hoped that we shall again permit the Rumanian Army later on to make a military promenade and enter Austro-Hungarian territory in triumph."

It was impossible for the Rumanian General Staff to resist the imperious orders of their powerful neighbor, especially as at that moment no help could be hoped for from England or France, both distant and both entirely absorbed by the battle of the Somme. Despite their heroic efforts and their daily successes, the British and French armies had not yet succeeded in their principal object, the relief of Verdun, against which Hindenburg was at that moment preparing his last attack with formidable forces. It was impossible to hope that, under these circumstances, France and England would oppose the wishes of the Russian Government, especially as they were expressed in terms which left no other alternative than to advise the Rumanian General Staff to come to an understanding with the Russian command. France gave a last proof of her solicitude for Rumania in pledging herself to come to her help by a general offensive of the Saloniki army, which should begin eight days before the date of the entry of Rumania into the campaign.

Sarrail's Army Checkmated

The desire of France to help this new ally was so sincere that M. Briand, then President of the Council, breaking all

precedents, went so far as to announce in the Chamber the projected offensive of the Orient forces. The treason which unfortunately surrounded this army on all sides rendered it impossible for General Sarrail to carry out this plan at the opportune moment. Warned by the proGermans of Athens of the impending attack, the Bulgarian Army made the first move, and, attacking on both flanks, obliged General Sarrail to regroup his forces, which paralyzed his movements. Thus the Rumanian General Staff remained alone to face the Government of Petrograd.

Obliged to yield to the Russian ultimatum and to declare war on the day fixed in it, they asked the Russian higher command for their co-operation in the plan of campaign worked out by them, showing how impossible it would be, with the sixteen divisions, which represented the whole army, lacking heavy artillery, completely unprovided with machine guns, to cover the 600 kilometers of the Danubian front and at the same time attack on the 700-kilometer front of Transylvania. They proposed taking possession of the bridgeheads of Rustchuk and Sistov in order to guard against a passage of the Danube. To hold in check the 200,000 Bulgars, reinforced by several Turkish divisions, whom the Rumanian General Staff knew to be concentrated against the Dobrudja front, they asked for the help of seven or eight Russian divisions. Thus assured against all danger on the southern front, they might, in liaison with the left wing of Brusiloff's army, invade Transylvania with some chance of success. Before all, they insisted on the delivery of 400 machine guns which the Russian Government had promised to hold in readiness on the frontier, so as to be able to deliver them the day Rumania should declare war.

Rumania Forced Into a Trap

The answers of Messrs. Stürmer and Protopopoff to these proposals left Rumania no longer any doubts as to the extent of the sacrifce demanded of her. They were opposed to all operations on the Danube, declaring that they had been categorically assured that the Bulgarians would lay down their arms. They took

entire responsibility for it. On no account were hostilities to be directed against them. For the same reason they judged it absolutely useless to comply with the request for seven or eight divisions: "Who is threatening the Dobrudja front?" said a message coming from the Russian higher command. And when the Rumanian General Staff insisted on certain information, according to which about eight Bulgaro-Turkish divisions were advancing toward this front, a new message arrived, which said that two divisions might be put at their disposal. These indeed arrived. One of them was composed of Serbian, Croatian, and Czech prisoners belonging to Austrian regiments captured in Galicia. As to the machine guns, not one could be procured, and it was only later that M. Protopopoff confessed that he had not been able to deliver them because they had been placed on the roofs of the houses in Petrograd to put down the threatening revolution.

These messages were well calculated to dispel the last illusions of the Rumanian Government. It is hard to conceive that they could have been blind enough to I believe that, with their sole resourcessixteen divisions, summarily armedthey would succeed not only in conquering vast extents of territory, but also in keeping them, when they could already hear the tread of the Bulgaro-Turkish armies, reinforced by three German divisions under Marshal Mackensen, advancing toward the Danube, and when, in the north, an army of élite, with material of crushing superiority, was preparing, under the command of Falkenhayn, for a crushing counteroffensive.

A Tragic Alternative

The Rumanians were thus placed before the tragic alternative of risking the fight under conditions in which defeat with all its terrible consequences-was nearly certain, or of resisting the Russian ultimatum and, in this case, giving up all hopes of the union and emancipation of the race, resigning themselves to become to Germany what the Asiatic monarchies of old were to the Roman Empire. They chose the first alternative, trusting to the honor of the Brit

ish and French Governments that they would take account of the immense sacrifice Rumania was making.

The beginning of the campaign could seem brilliant to those who judge only by appearances, but the fears expressed as to the bad faith of the Bulgarians were not long in being realized, and the Russian assurances on this subject speedily proved fallacious; the Dobrudja was attacked by large forces. This part of the immense front of 1,300 kilometers had now to be defended, and the divisions called back from Transylvania, where, at the first bound, sweeping before them the Hungarian troops, they had reached Sibin.

The Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Divisions, withdrawn in haste and sent, under the command of General Averesco, to the Dobrudja, retrieved the situation by a brilliant success, thus avenging the check of Turtukai. But by this the Transylvanian campaign was compromised. For the last time the Rumanian Government made a moving appeal to their ally, enumerating in detail the strength of the enemy and showing that only the immediate dispatch of considerable reinforcements could give hope of resisting the two armies with which Falkenhayn and Mackensen proposed inclosing Rumania as in a vise. How was it possible, indeed, for the Rumanian Army, left to its own resources, to resist thirty-seven divisions, with a superior armament, twenty of which belonged to the élite of the German Army, when a great power like Italy, whose army had given proof of such brilliant qualities, had nearly yielded to the attack of thirtythree divisions composed exclusively of Austro-Hungarians? But M. Stürmer could now hardly stop in the disastrous course he had taken. He confined himself to prescribing a regrouping of the Rumanian forces still left to themselves.

Gallant but Hopeless Fight

From the end of September, with all the energy of despair, the army retreated step by step, defending the passage of each river; first the Jiul, where, after a magnificent effort, it succeeded in retrieving the situation by destroying the Eleventh Bavarian Division, killing