Hungary was that no interference with her humiliation of Serbia would be permitted.

Then, on July 30, came the great disappointment, which Kaiser William frankly sets forth as a personal grievance, and even as a breach of faith on the part of England. "On the 30th," states the next point in his telegram to the President, "my Ambassador in Lon"don reported that Sir Edward Grey, in course of a 'private' conversation, told "him that if the conflict remained local"ized between Russia-not Serbia-and "Austria, England would not move, but "if we mixed' in the fray she would "take quick decisions and grave 66 measures, i. e., if I left my ally, Austria, "in the lurch to fight alone, England "would not touch me."

Here was a turning point. The war between Germany and France, Austria and Russia was then to be blocked. Kaiser William was no longer " thankful.” Matters were taking a serious turn. There might be no war at all under these new conditions. Germany's bluff of Russia on the 26th was called by England on the 30th.

To comprehend what this meant to the Kaiser's plans it is important to note what had been occurring in this interval.

Germany Against Peace

On July 27 the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg:

Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavored to induce him to accept the Britis proposal for action in favor of peace, ich action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the situation. Jagow refused point blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador.

Russian Orange Book, No. 39. On July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed Sir Edward Grey:

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at

On the same day, July 29, Czar Nicholas telegraphed to Kaiser William:

I am glad you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity, as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

German White Book, No. 21.

Now follows the telegraphic correspondence of the two Emperors, very actively prosecuted during July 29-31, consisting on the side of the Czar in urgent appeals to the Kaiser to moderate the military procedure of his ally, Austria-Hungary, and on the part of the Kaiser in emphatic demands upon the Czar that he take no military action to stay the attack of Austria upon Serbia, but to remain passive.

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The one important observation to be made with regard to the mediation which the Kaiser undertook between Austria and Russia is that in the German White Book, published in August, 1914, to show Germany's attitude before the declaration of war by Kaiser William, although the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar is published in full, there is not one word of any attempt on the part of the Kaiser to influence the action of Austria-Hungary against provoking a conflict with Russia! The part Austria was to play had been already arranged, and the support Germany was to give was fully understood. There is no documentary evidence that the mediation Kaiser William had professed to be engaged in ever actually occurred. The Kaiser's rôle consisted solely until July 30 in flashing his sword in the face of the Czar, with the determination that Europe should have nothing to say about it.

matter of no importance. The German White Book purports to give the entire telegraphic correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar, but there is in it no allusion to a suggestion by the Kaiser similar to the British proposal or of that proposal itself in any form. No proposal was made by the Kaiser to the Czar except unconditional abstention from any intervention on behalf of Serbia under penalty of a European war. The British proposal referred to by the Kaiser as opening the door for peace was never at any time or in any form communicated by the German Government to the Czar or the Russian Government!

The Kaiser himself, as we shall soon see, expressly states that he was about to send the British proposal to the Czar, but did not send it. He left the Czar in ignorance of the open door of peace and closed it by a declaration of war.

Sir Edward Grey's Proposal

The British proposal was never publicly referred to in Germany until Nov. 9, 1916, when Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg justified his Government against the charge by Sir Edward Grey by informing the Reichstag that on July 30, 1914, he had sent the following instruction to the German Ambassador at Vienna:

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Should the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse all mediation, we are fronted with a conflagration in which England would go against us, and Italy and Rumania, according to all indications, would not be with us; so that with Austria-Hungary we should confront three great powers. Germany, as the result of England's hostility, would have to bear the chief brunt of the fight. The political prestige of Austria-Hungary, the honor of her arms, and her justified claims against Serbia can be sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. We therefore urgently and emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider the acceptance of mediation on the proposed conditions. Responsibility for the consequences which may otherwise arise must be extraordinarily severe for AustriaHungary and ourselves.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government," he continues, "acceded to our urgent representations" by giving its Ambassador in Berlin the following instructions:

I ask your Excellency most sincerely

to thank Herr von Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the information given through Herr von Tschirschki, and to declare to him that, despite the change in the situation which has since arisen through the Russian mobilization, we are quite ready to consider the proposals of Sir Edward Grey for a settlement between us and Serbia. A condition of our acceptance is, of course, that our military action against Serbia should meanwhile proceed, and that the English Cabinet should induce the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization directed against us, in which case also we, as a matter of course, will at once cancel our defensive countermeasures forced upon us in Galicia.

The Chancellor does not, however, profess that this answer was sent to Russia.

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Talk of Mediation

Confessedly, it was fear of England that on July 30 changed the attitude of the German Government. "Should the "Austro-Hungarian Government refuse "all mediation we are confronted with a conflagration in which England would go against us." The mediation which had up to this point been refused was now advised by the German Government. Responsibility for the circumstances "that may otherwise arise must be ex"traordinarily severe for Austria-Hungary and ourselves," concludes the note. Let us see, then, how Germany acquitted herself of this responsibility:

While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar the next morning [that is, the 31st of July] to inform him that Vienna, London, and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from H. E. the Chancellor that on the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian Army, which was, of course, also meant against Germany; whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.

That report, without waiting for confirmation, although it was known that weeks would be required for an effective Russian mobilization against Germany, put an end to all Germany's efforts for peace.

Regarding the time of receiving this report the Kaiser's mind was evidently in some confusion. In his telegram to the President he says "in the morning," but in his telegram to King George of July 31 he says: "Your proposals coin

cide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire fleet and army." (Telegram No. 3.)

Czar Kept in the Dark

An entire day thus passed and Nicholas had not been informed by the Kaiser of the British proposal. But he had received from the Czar the following telegram, dated at 2 o'clock that day:

I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries, and the peace of Europe.

On that same day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to all Russian Embassies and Legations the following message to be delivered to all Governments:

If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a ques

tion of European interest, she admits that the great powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.

All for Peace But Germany

Austria also, at the same time the reply was made to the British proposals, sent this to all embassies and legations:

Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and we hope that they may lead to a general understanding.

At the same time Sir Edward Grey, in a telegram, declared:

If Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and to the go length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.

On that very day, apparently before the Austrian reply had been received, the German Government sent an ultimatum to Russia which it was known it was technically impossible to accept, and the next day, the twelve-hour limit of time not having been observed, on Aug. 1, war on Russia was formally declared.

What rendered war inevitable, according to the Kaiser's statement, was that on July 31 a general order of mobilization was issued by the Czar. It mattered nothing that it would require weeks to render the order really effective as against Germany, and that the Czar had assured him, in a telegram dated 2 P. M. of the day war was declared:

I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of

God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply.

German White Book. No number.

Not content to meet Russian mobilization with German mobilization, which the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was assured by the German Ambassador even on Aug. 1" did not mean war," (Russian Orange Book, No. 70,) and wholly ignoring the Czar's expressed belief that "these measure do not mean war" and his disposition "to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace," the declaration of war was