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subordination to the end in view, not to more or less systematic theories.]

When a vital position is taken it should be organized immediately, trenches dug, the artillery brought up in order to checkmate all counterattacks of the enemy. [The use of intrenchments, the employment of artillery to organize the ground won; trench warfare has made its appearance.]

The infantry seems not to understand the necessity of organizing itself in battle for long endurance. [The idea of the tactics of the long breath and even of a company organized for duration is substituted for the earlier idea of a war of movement and spirited offensive. Joffre appears as he is, a genius of stability.]

Throwing into line numerous and dense units, it immediately exposes them to the fire of the enemy, which decimates them, summarily stops their offensive, and often leaves them at the mercy of a counterattack. [Here already we have the grave danger of the counterattack. Now the counterattack, as the future will show, is the whole of this war.]

It is by means of a line of riflemen sufciently spaced and continually supported [how much in two words!] that the infantry, sustained by the artillery, should lead the battle, holding on in this way until the moment when the assault can be Judiciously delivered. [A reminder of the most beautiful French quality, judgment, discretion.]

The German cavalry divisions always go into action preceded by a few battalions in automobiles. Thus far the main bodies of their cavalry have never let themselves be approached by our cavalry. They travel behind their infantry, and from there send out cavalry detachments [patrols and reconnoitring parties] that seek the support of their infantry as soon as they are attacked. Our cavalry pursues these detachments and strikes against positions solidly held. [An exact picture of the tactics introduced by the German cavalry-also a lesson.] Our cavalry divisions should always have infantry support to strengthen them and increase their offensive powers.

The horses also should have time to eat and sleep; without that the cavalry will be worn out prematurely before having been employed.

The General Commanding in Chief.
J. JOFFRE.

[Upon the basis of this note there followed a regrouping of the French armies and the preparation of the offensive that saved France at the Marne. In another article M. Hanotaux continues:]

I have tried to indicate the origins of the battle of the Marne. It is admitted henceforth that what constitutes Joffre's

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glory is to have been able to parry the German plan of encirclement, based on the doctrines of von Schlieffen; to have parried it on the right by his army of the east, which stopped the enemy before the forest opening at Charmes, and, on the left, by his decision to transport a part of his troops from the east to the west in such fashion as to seize the mastery of events on the Ourcq and throw the Germans back upon the Aisne.

These gifts were won for history, but in order to appreciate all their value I wish now to try to compare the events that took place on the eastern front at the moment when those just referred to were taking place on the western front.

As we shall see, the German military chiefs applied the doctrines of von Schlieffen there also; but there they won success with them. The campaign in East Prussia presents a positive proof that fully confirms the negative proof of the battle on the French frontier.

The Russians in Prussia

Two Russian armies had invaded East Prussia; one, commanded by Rennenkampf, followed the great railway that binds Petrograd to Berlin by way of Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Allenstein, Eylau, on toward Thorn on the Vistula. While besieging or masking Königsburg, Elbing, Danzig, it counted upon occupying East Prussia and there awaiting the success of the general manoeuvre aimed against Austria by the Grand Duke Nicholas.

The other Russian army came from Warsaw and the banks of the Narew. It advanced from south to north in order to march, like the other, upon the Vistula in the direction of Danzig, there to join Rennenkampf's army and clear the way to Berlin.

The preliminary mission intrusted to the two armies of the north was singularly facilitated by the fact that Germany, not foreseeing so rapid a mobilization of the first Russian armies, had left on that frontier only three active army corps and some reserve formations. The two Russian armies-separately weaker than the German army-would be much stronger than it when once united. Unfortunately, they were not in

close communication with each other, being separated by the almost impenetrable region of the Masurian Lakes.

The first commander of the German army, von Prittwitz, advanced on the frontier before Rennenkampf; he was beaten at Gumbinnen on Aug. 20. Rennenkampf advanced as far as Insterburg on the railway north of the Masurian Lakes; he installed his army in East Prussia and threatened Königsberg. Meanwhile Samsonoff, coming from the Narew, was debouching to the southwest of the lakes and skirting them with the object of joining Rennenkampf near Osterode-Eylau.

The German army, which was still facing Rennenkampf near Gumbinnen, saw its communications menaced by this advance of Samsonoff. It beat a precipitate retreat, and von Prittwitz believed he had no choice but to retire behind the Vistula. The population was fleeing as far as Berlin.

There was a great sensation in the headquarters of the German General Staff, which had staked everything on the western front, and which at that moment (Aug. 20-22) still had some painful fighting to do at Charleroi, in the Ardennes, and on the Lorraine frontier, so that it did not feel any too sure of victory.

The Coming of Hindenburg

It was in this hour of peril that a dispatch, dated at Namur, went to seek at Hanover in a tavern where he was smooking his pipe and drinking his habitual bock an old, retired General, Hindenburg, and named him at one stroke the commander of the army on the eastern front. For his second in command they gave him Ludendorff, who, leaving Namur with all necessary instructions, came to seek him at Hanover. The two men took the train together in the night of Aug. 22, studying their maps on the journey, formulating their plan, and writing their orders.

Far from thinking of retiring behind the Vistula, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to resume the offensive against the Russian armies, attacking them separately while they were still divided by the Masurian Lakes. Hindenburg first

turned his attention to Samsonoff's army, which had come from Warsaw and the Narew, and which most directly menaced his communications. Samsonoff was an impetuous man; having excellent troops, he was full of confidence, and was marching straight ahead; he was just the man to fall headforemost into the trap that his enemy was setting for him.

This was the trap: Hindenburg had arranged his troops in a vast semicircle formed by the lines of hills on each side of Allenstein, the one toward Usdau on the west and the other toward Willenberg on the east. The Twenty-second German Army Corps, at the entrance of the semicircle, at Soldau, on the railway from Warsaw, received an order to engage Samsonoff's army, and to retreat while fighting, thus luring it as far as possible into the curve of the German lines. At the proper moment the two sectors of the semicircle were to close in upon Samsonoff, envelop and crush him; it was Schlieffen's manoeuvre, the extension of the front and the action of both wings.

Samsonoff entered the semicircle in pursuit of the Twenty-second German Corps, the Twenty-second fell back, Samsonoff followed, forcing it westward, and finally establishing his headquarters at Allenstein. He believed he had won a victory. His right, finding no enemy forces before it, extended itself northward and reached the Petrograd-Berlin railway near Rastenburg.

Samsonoff's Army Trapped

The position of Samsonoff may be compared to that of the classic runner, with his right hand stretched high in the air toward Rennenkampf, the body in full career, but the left foot delaying in the rear toward Usdau. It was exactly at this moment when Samsonoff was hurling himself forward, that Hindenburg, beginning the real manoeuvre, seized him by that left foot. A German force, coming partly from Thorn, and reinforced by all the units available, appeared at Usdau and threw itself against the communicating lines of Samsonoff in the direction of Soldau.

Samsonoff failed to grasp the meaning of this movement, and went on pursuing his idea of breaking the German

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SCENE OF THE BATTLES OF TANNENBERG AND THE MASURIAN LAKES

realized what was happening. He tried to snatch himself out of the trap; he evacuated Allenstein in haste and rushed toward Soldau to open a way toward the Narew and Warsaw. It was too late. Hindenburg's right wing had entered Soldau. The doors of escape were closed one after the other. In the swamps and network of little lakes Samsonoff's army was surrounded. It fought heroically, a hopeless fight. Even surrender, if it had been desired, was impossible. After the incredible efforts of five whole days of battle there remained only the shattered fragments of a great army, strewn about in the trackless maze of swamp lands; troops wandering through the woods, units mixed in a hopeless mob, cannon mired in the stagnant water, regiments formed from soldiers of all arms, the most vigorous débris gathered up by the most energetic officers in order to break through the circle by charging at random!

Some divisions got through. Others clung in rags to the thickets of thorn trees, or wandered in circles, completely lost. Samsonoff did not wish to survive the disaster; he placed himself in the first ranks and was killed by a shell, which also struck his Chief of Staff. Thus ended what the German historians call emphatically "the greatest battle of destruction in history." They all give the credit to the strategic teachings of Schlieffen. I have before me a German brochure explaining the battle of Tannenberg with diagrams; its title is "From Hannibal to Hindenburg," and it contains this sentence: "It was Schlieffen who before his death dictated the whole plan of the great war against France and Russia."

Battle of Masurian Lakes

For reasons that have not been explained Rennenkampf had remained motionless at Insterberg while Samsonoff was getting himself crushed at Tannenberg, two marches away. On hearing the news he felt the danger that now menaced himself. He adopted measures against it, but measures directly inverse to those of Samsonoff, and, in a different way, no less unwise. Samsonoff had attacked headlong and without manoeu

vring. Rennenkampf resolved to defend himself where he was. He supported his right on the sea at Libau, his left on the Masurian Lakes at Lötzen; he fortified his centre on the Berlin-Petrograd railway, along which he expected Hindenburg to approach. He threw up earthworks all around him, and made of the space between Allenburg and Lötzen an enormous redoubt, in which were crowded four army corps. Thus prepared and equipped, in a position that seemed to him impregnable, he waited.

At only one point he thought of a sort of countermanoeuvre. Orders were given that fresh troops from Grodno should advance along Hindenburg's flank in the direction of Lyck, and should fall upon the German right wing in case it tried to debouch to the east of the Masurian Lakes.

Hindenburg, in spite of the difference of situation, undertook to repeat against Rennenkampf the manoeuvre that had just succeeded against Samsonoff. It is always the great idea of Schlieffen. The battle began on Sept. 6 and coincided exactly with the French battle of the Marne. Hindenburg had received from the western front two corps, the Eleventh and Guard Reserve, besides a division of cavalry. Thus he took all the reserves that the interior could furnish, and he threw every man of them into the battle. The troops went into the conflict wearied by terrible marches, but, thrilled by the triumph of Tannenberg, they had faith in their victory.

Hindenburg began with a feint. On his left the Königsberg garrison, reinforced by the sea route, made a sortie and threatened to cut off Rennenkampf in the direction of Tilsit. But the real attack was made on the right the next day, Sept. 7. Mackensen, von der Goltz, von Morgen, von François debouched by all the roads from the Masurian Lakes, advanced upon Lötzen, Gross Gablick, Goldhap, and undertook to cut off Rennenkampf from the Russian frontier. It was the manoeuvre of encirclement. The German right wing, ceaselessly reinforced, fought a series of terrible battles that lasted four days.

Here appeared the happy results of

the somewhat tardy manoeuvre which Rennenkampf had improvised; the fresh troops, the Third Siberian Corps and the rest debouched from Grodno. There followed an hour of anguish for Hindenburg, which sufficed to save Rennenkampf. The latter, assailed on both flanks and at the centre, did not do as Samsonoff had done; he did not become stubborn. Profiting from the hour of hesitation produced by the manoeuvre on his left, he retreated. His centre had been subjected to terrible assaults; he had lost his foothold at Allenburg, Gerdauen, Gumbinnen. He was barely in time. His army regained the frontier after a most painful retreat.

Here Hinderburg's success was incomplete. Schlieffen's system provides only for absolute crushing. Rennenkampf escaped. I cannot give the details of the military operations-they can be found in my "History of the War." But the point I am making is in the comparison of the

operations on the west and east fronts. Samsonoff took the offensive without manoeuvring, Rennenkampf stood on the defensive almost without manoeuvres, while Joffre, who knew his business, was manoeuvring all the time. He took the Schlieffen system on its weak side, that of rash extension of front. The Germans, held back first at the breach at Charmes, were finally beaten on the Marne.

Thus was obtained the greatest reversal of fortune, perhaps, that history has ever seen. The Yser, Verdun, the Somme, are the daughters of that initial thought. The battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes throw light for us on the battle of the Marne. The Schlieffen system succeeded on the one hand and failed on the other. The manoeuvre of Joffre was one of the most beautiful intellectual operations of military genius in all time; it is a magnificent expression of French genius.

How Lorraine Was Saved in 1914

Told by Maurice Barrès

Of the French Academy

Among the valuable historical sketches called forth in France by the third anniversary of the Marne was one contributed by Maurice Barrès to L'Echo de Paris, describing the little-known battle in which General Castelnau hurled back the German invasion east of Verdun, two weeks before the Marne battle. The essential portions of the article are here translated for CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE.

Ο'

UR enemies could believe themselves masters of the world in August, 1914. With what proud confidence they advanced after Sarreburg, after Morhange, after Charleroi! And yet they were stopped so hard and so definitely that they never tried to seize Paris, or Nancy, or the passage of the Moselle. Let us recall those days of our extreme peril and understand by what virtues of our soldiers and commanders, by what complete unity of the French people, we obtained that miracle of victory.

Visiting Lorraine to help my fellowcountrymen celebrate at Rozelieures, at Gerbéviller, at Mesnil-sur-Belvitte, the great deeds done by the armies of Castelnau and Dubail, I traversed daily the

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