In some of the states acceptance of the law is presumed unless notice to the contrary is given to the Industrial Board or other state officials having jurisdiction over the operation of the law. In others, the employer must file a written acceptance. He must then notify his employees of his acceptance of the law and post notices of such acceptance in his factory or other place of business; the acceptance of the employees is then conclusively presumed unless they give written notice to the contrary. Provision is also made for the subsequent withdrawal of assent.

In most of the states there are limitations to the application of the law. In a few, as in Louisiana, New York, New Hampshire, and Washington, it is limited to certain enumerated "hazardous trades or occupations; although in New York the list is so comprehensive that the limitation is more nominal than real. In other states the provisions of the law do not apply to employers of less than a specified number of employees, varying from two to ten, or of casual employees or outworkers. In others, as in Massachusetts, there is an express exemption of employers of domestic servants or of farm laborers.

Compensation is denied in many states, when the injury is due to the wilful intention of the employee to injure himself or another, or where it is due to his intoxication, or to his neglect to use safeguards against accidents, which are provided for him. Accidents due to serious and wilful misconduct " or to "wilful misconduct" are also excepted. Under the former clause it is held that the word "serious" applies to the misconduct itself, not to the actual consequences of it; accordingly not every breach of rules deprives the employee of compensation. The word "wilful" imports that the conduct was deliberate, and not merely a thoughtless act done on the spur of the moment, or as the result of some pressing emergency. But where a workman intentionally violates an express order made solely for the protection of employees,. and which he fully understands, he is guilty of "serious and wilful misconduct."

SECOND NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LIABILITY.

Even under the compensation law the employer is not the insurer of the employee's safety at all times or under all circumstances. His liability extends only to "personal injury sustained

by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment." This is the language of the Connecticut statute, and in substance it is found in the statutes of all the other states. On the other hand it is sometimes provided that when the injury is due to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer double the amount of the usual compensation shall be paid to the employee, and this clause, it is held, is not limited to acts done with the positive intention of inflicting injury, but includes reckless acts evincing utter disregard of consequences, and even persistent neglect to remedy dangerous conditions of which the employer has actual knowledge. In the English statute, and in those of a considerable number of the states, a further limitation is introduced the injury must be "accidental," or "caused by accident." The most important effect of these terms is in relation to claims for injury caused by disease. Where the word "accident" is not used, it is usually though not always - held that death or injury from disease is included. Thus, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts say, "It is clear that personal injury under our act includes any injury or disease which arises out of and in the course of the employment, which causes incapacity for work, and thereby impairs the ability of the employee for earning wages." Accordingly, it was held in that case that loss of sight resulting from an attack of optic neuritis induced by poisonous gases escaping from furnaces which the workman was tending was a personal injury" within the meaning of the act. In these states death or injury from "occupational diseases," such as lead poisoning, is placed upon the same level as that caused by external violence. On the other hand, where the word "accident" is used compensation for the effects of disease is denied, unless the disease results from some actual physical injury. The statutes of Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and Vermont exclude liability for disease in express terms.

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In this connection "the word 'accident' is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the term as denoting an unlooked for mishap, or an untoward event which is not expected or designed ;" and it is said that " where no specific time or occasion can be fixed as the time of the alleged accident there is no 'injury by accident' within the meaning of the act." Accordingly, when a workman after ten days' service in a bleachery

was affected by a rash caused by contact with damp goods it was held that he was not injured by accident. So, where, as the result of years of labor, a man finally breaks down and has to give up work. But in an English case it was held that where a man died from a disease called " anthrax" as the result of a specific poison absorbed in the course of his employment as a wool sorter, his death was accidental. And under the terms of an accident policy it has been held that death due to glanders contracted by a man in the course of his employment was accidental. The acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing disease or infirmity is an "injury caused by accident."

Sun-stroke, except under peculiar circumstances is generally considered as a disease. Frost-bites, too, have generally been held to be one of the natural incidents of a cold climate, not "arising out of the employment," and not "accidental" injuries. But when the nature of the employment is such as to expose the workman in a peculiar degree to the effects of heat or cold he may be entitled to compensation; as where a sailor, painting on the outside of a ship under a tropical sun, suffered from the effects of the sun's rays increased by reflection from the side of the vessel. So heat-stroke caused by working in front of a furnace is held to be an accidental injury.

If the original injury is one for which the employer is liable he will be liable also for the incidental results of the injury; as for example where death results from the use of an anesthetic in an operation rendered necessary by the accident. So, where a workman lost the sight of one eye by the spattering of hot metal, and at the hospital, in a fit of insanity caused by his injuries, jumped out of a window and was killed, it was held that his widow was entitled to compensation for his death.

Where a workman unreasonably refuses to submit to a safe and reasonable operation which will relieve or remove his incapacity to work at his trade, his incapacity thereafter is held to be the result of his refusal, and not of the original accident. In such case, however, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the operation would have effected the result claimed, and that the refusal was unreasonable. The workman may justify by showing that he acted under the advice of an honest and competent physician. The same principle has been applied

where the workman persistently neglects or refuses to conform to habits of life essential to his recovery.

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Again, the employee's injury must "arise out of his employment." It must be due to the character of the work in which he is engaged, or to the conditions by which he is surrounded, or the dangers to which he is peculiarly exposed while performing it. In the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: The injury arises out of the employment when then is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a casual connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury." "It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence."

Thus, while the employer would clearly be liable for injury caused by an accidental explosion in the quarry in which his employee was working, he would not be responsible if the employee was injured by a stray bullet fired from outside. So, it has been held that where a man engaged in working high up in the air upon the steel frame of a building was struck by lightning the accident was attributable in part to the exposed character of the place where he was working, and therefore due to his employment, but that when a factory operative was so struck he was not entitled to compensation as the conditions under which he was working exposed him to no special danger. An employer has been held liable for injury caused by the explosion of a steam boiler operated by a third party on the floor below that on which his business was conducted, on the ground that his workmen were necessarily exposed to this hazard while doing their work. So too, where the injury was caused by the bite of a cat habitually kept in the place of employment. And where the statute covers disease, the employer would be liable for the effects of an "occupational disease" such as lead or phosphorous poisoning, or a disease caused by bad drainage or other unhealthful conditions of the place where the employee was required to work, but not where the employee contracted an infectious disease, such as small-pox, from a fellow workman. Thus, where a boy in doing his work was required to use a

leaky boat and contracted pneumonia as the result of wetting his feet, he was held to be entitled to compensation. On the other hand, when a teamster became temporarily deranged while on the road and after driving about aimlessly a long distance from his usual route was found dead from exposure, it was held that there was nothing in the nature of his employment that exposed him to danger of temporary derangement, and that the injury did not arise "out of his employment."

Injuries suffered by an employee at the hands of third persons while in the performance of his duty are generally considered as arising out of his employment. For instance, where a paymaster was robbed of his employer's funds and killed while engaged in his regular duties; where a game-keeper was attacked and injured by a poacher; and where an engineer was killed by a stone thrown by a boy from a bridge under which the train was passing. So, where a checker employed by a merchant was assaulted and killed by a drunken fellow-servant who was known by his employer to be quarrelsome and dangerous when intoxicated; and where a foreman whose duty it was to keep order was injured while attempting to stop a fight between workmen. On the other hand injuries resulting from practical jokes played by one workman on another, or from rough play, or from a private quarrel between workmen are generally held not to arise out of the employment. So too, where the assault has no relation to the fact of employment, as when it is committed by a drunken stranger.

The fact that the injury would not have been suffered had the workman been stronger or in better health is immaterial. "An accident arises out of the employment," said the Lord Chancellor of England," when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of health." Accordingly, it was held that the rupture of an aneurism while the workman was tightening a screw-a work not involving excessive strain was an accident arising out of the employment; and so in a case of apoplexy brought on by over exertion. Finally. The injury to the employee must have been sustained "in the course of his employment." The liability in this