permitted to use the father's automobile for purposes of his own. On the other hand when a man had bought an automobile for the general use of his family, which was operated only by his minor son, and his wife had general permission to use it without special request, it was held that the son when taking his mother to ride was acting in accordance with the general instructions of his father, express or implied, and that the father was responsible for his negligence.

Nor is it sufficient that the general relations of employer and employee subsist between the parties. The automobile owner is not in all cases responsible for the acts of his chauffeur. It is only when the latter is acting within the scope of his employment -when he is acting under his employer's directions or in the performance of his business that the employer is responsible for his acts or his negligence. Thus, when the chauffeur goes in his employer's automobile on a pleasure ride or on his own business the employer is not responsible. So, when a chauffeur was sent by his employer on an errand and he went first in another direction for a purpose of his own and there met with an accident it was held that his employer was not liable to the person injured. So also, when one borrows an automobile the owner is not responsible for any accident while it is under the control and management of the borrower.

As these powerful machines would endanger the safety of other users of the highways unless managed with care and skill their use has been subjected to regulation in nearly all of the States the machines must be registered and numbered, the operators licensed, the speed limited, the use of lights regulated etc. These statutes vary greatly in their provisions and are constantly changing; it would be impracticable for us to give even an abstract of them sufficiently full to be of practical value. At the same time it is extremely important for every owner and operator of an automobile that he should not only be thoroughly familiar with the laws of his own state on this subject, but that before going into another state he should ascertain what the laws of that state require, especially on the subjects of registration, operator's license and speed limits. By so doing he may save himself great annoyance and expense from unintentional violation of law. Copies of the laws on this subject can usually be

obtained by application to the proper authorities at the state capitol.

The most important of these statutes are those requiring the registration of automobiles and the display upon them of the registration numbers. The results of failure to register-aside from the penalty imposed-depend upon the terms of the statute. Thus, for example, under the earlier statute of Massachusetts such failure was treated only as evidence of negligence, but under a later statute which provides that no automobile shall be used on a highway that is not registered as required by law it is held that the operator of an unregistered automobile is a mere trespasser on the highway and that other users of the highway have only the duty not to injure him by wantonness or recklessness. Accordingly in such cases it is held that none of the occupants of the automobile can recover in case of accident, even if they were not aware that it was not registered.

Failure to obtain an operator's license, on the contrary, is held to be only evidence of negligence, and does not of itself deprive the operator or the owner of the right to recover for any injury due to the negligence of another where want of skill on the part of the operator himself did not contribute to the accident. The same principle is applied in other cases of breach of statutory regulations such as the failure to carry lights or to conform to the law of the road. If an accident is due wholly or in part to the failure to conform to any such regulation the motorist will be held liable in damages to the person injured; and if he himself or his machine is injured and such failure on his part has contributed to the accident he will be unable to recover damages, even when the accident resulted primarily from the negligence of the other party; but where the accident is in no part attributed to the failure to comply with the law, such failure will be no bar to his recovery. This doctrine of contributory negligence applies also to all other kinds of negligence as well as to the failure to comply with statutory regulations-where the party claiming damages has, himself been guilty of negligence he cannot recover.

The statute usually requires that the motorist shall always have with him when operating his machine both the certificate of registry of his automobile and his operator's license, and failure to do so subjects him to a penalty.

An automobile may be insured against damage or destruction by fire whether occasioned by any external cause or by ignition or explosion in the machine itself, against loss or damage while in course of transportation by land or water, against injury from collision with other objects or other accident, and against theft.

The owner may also be insured against claims for damages for death, or for injury to the persons or property of others, occasioned by collision with his machine.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS.

Under the common law an employer was responsible for accidental injuries suffered by his employees only when the accident was due to some negligence on his part, or on the part of some one to whom he had entrusted the superintendence of his business. In an action for damages resulting from such an accident not only was the employee required to prove the fact of the employer's negligence but the employer might, among other things, plead in defence, (1) contributory negligence—that is, that the accident was due in part t the negligence or carelessness of the employee; (2) voluntary assumption of risk-that is, that the employee, knowing that there were certain dangers incident to the work in which he was to be engaged, voluntarily entered upon the employment and thereby assumed the risk of any injury not directly traceable to the employer's negligence, and (3) the fellow servant doctrine—that is, that the accident was due to the carelessness or negligence of a fellow employee for whose conduct the employer was not responsible.

The results of this system were extremely unsatisfactory. Both the theory of the employer's negligence as the ground for compensation to the employee, and the defences which the employer was allowed to set up, whatever may have been the case at an earlier day, are admittedly inapplicable to modern industrial conditions.

The first changes in the laws merely increased in certain respects the employer's responsibility, making him answerable to his employees for the acts of other employees entrusted with the duty of superintendence, and for defects in the machinery and appliances furnished for the performance of the work. This was the origin of the "Employers' Liability Laws," which we have already considered (ante p 872).

These laws, however, failed to effect the object desired. On the one hand there were a very large number of industrial accidents not directly traceable to the negligence of either the employer or the employee, and for which the employee therefore could recover no compensation, while in any case the expense of prosecuting the employee's claim usually absorbed a large part of any sum finally recovered. On the other hand there was no

established rule for compensation, and the employer often had to pay excessive sums awarded by sympathetic or prejudiced juries. There resulted a growing sentiment that compensation for industrial accidents should be put upon an entirely different basis and that the best practical way of dealing with the matter was to treat such accidents as incident to the business, making the employer primarily responsible in all cases, without regard to the question of negligence. In this way compensation for injuries would form a regular part of the cost of conducting the business and would ultimately be paid by the public as a part of the cost of production. An essential part of the plan also was the establishment of a definite basis for compensation for injuries of different kinds, the amount in each case depending upon the character and the degree of the injury. The result is the "Workmen's Compensation Laws." Laws of this kind have now been enacted in more than half of the states in the Union. While they are all based upon the same general principles, they vary widely in their scope and in their details. It would be impracticable to give them in full in a work of this kind, but we give here a general view of the subject, followed at the end of the chapter by brief abstracts of the laws of the several

states.

FIRST - THE SCOPE OF THE LAW.

In only a few states have the Workmen's Compensation Laws been made absolutely obligatory. In a large majority it has, for constitutional reasons, been made optional with the employer, in form at least, whether to accept the provisions of the law or not. We say, in form, because in every such case the law is so drawn as to put at a distinct disadvantage any employer who does not accept it. This is usually done by providing that the employer who does not adopt the compensation system shall be deprived of the three special defences above mentioned, but that this provision shall not apply to those who accept it. Where the employer accepts, his employees are put to a similar election, for if they choose to stand outside of the law their employer may set up any of the above-named defences against them. By accepting the compensation law both parties waive all other legal remedies and consent to to be governed exclusively by its provisions.