what is "gently." This question has been through English courts for centuries. They have come to a conclusion which the American courts generally adopt. This conclusion is that the owner may use whatever force is necessary to expel the trespasser, provided on the one hand that he does him no grievous bodily injury, and on the other that he uses no more force than the trespasser makes necessary.

For example: A goes into B's house, or barn, or on his land, and persists in remaining there, although B orders him away. B may lay hold of him, may summon help, and with as much help as he needs seize him, and if need be bind him hand and foot, carry him bodily off his premises, and then unbind him. Always on this condition, that he uses no more violence than is requisite to remove him, and that he avoids such measures as would do serious or permanent harm or endanger life or limb. But while B does only what is needed to remove A, and does this with sufficient care, if A by some accident is injured, B is not responsible, for it is A's own fault.

SECTION IV.

FARM-WAYS.

Of course an owner of a farm may make or unmake his own roads or ways at his pleasure. His neighbor has noth. ing to do with them, unless the owner give him leave to use them, and a right of way must be conveyed by a deed, in like manner as the land itself. If, indeed, his neighbor claims a right to use one of them, and under that claim uses it as he would his own for more than twenty years without the permis. sion of the owner, such neighbor might acquire a right of way by prescription. And if such rights of way become attached to a farm by prescription, whoever buys a farm buys with it those rights of way. But such a case would not often occur.

If a farmer sells a lot surrounded by the farm, he sells with it a right to pass to and from the lot. But the seller may mark out a sufficient passage to and from the land, and over that the buyer must go. And when a public highway is laid out which gives access to the lot, the buyer of it loses his right of passage over the seller's land, because this right is no longer necessary to his use and occupation of the lot.

SECTION V.

WATER RIGHTS.

The owner of a farm owns the ponds upon his farm and the running streams, so far as to make a reasonable use of them for his land, stock, or house. He may change the course of a stream on his own land, but he must not divert it from his neighbor's land, nor can he lead it into his neighbor's land elsewhere than in its natural channel. He may dam it up so as to make ponds on his own land, but cannot overflow his neighbor's land except for mill purposes under the local laws regulating such use of the water. If he does, his neighbor may enter his farm and remove the dam so far as to relieve his land from the overflow; and if the stream be obstructed by stones or rubbish on his neighbor's farm, he may go on his neighbor's land to remove the obstruction, and may put this on the banks of the He may dig anywhere on his own land, even if he cuts. off the springs which water his neighbor's land or supply his well or pond, for his neighbor has no property or legal interest in the waters which flow or stand below the surface of the land.

stream.

As the owner of a farm owns a stream or brook which runs through his farm; so if a farm bounds on a running stream that is not navigable he owns to what is called the thread of the stream, which is the middle of the main current, and may be on one side or the other of the middle of the stream.

SECTION VL

FIRE.

There is a principle of law applicable in a reasonable way to everyone, and to the ownership and use of all property. It is this: "A man must use what is his own so as not to injure his neighbor." This rule applies distinctly to a man's right to kindle fire on his land. A man who owns any land, much or little, may kindle what fire he will upon it and burn what he will in the fire. But he is always responsible for the damage his fire does if he were negligent in any way about it. It may be that his neighbor's fences or buildings are so near him that he could not build a fire upon any part of his land without endangering his

neighbor's property. Then it might be negligent in him to build a fire to burn brush anywhere, or he may build it of particularly inflammable and therefore dangerous material, or in a very dry time, or in a high wind, or too large a fire, or without watching it with the care that such a fire required to be reasonably safe. If he were sued for the damage it would be for a jury to determine, under the direction of the court as to the lav whether he was liable, and if so for how much. The cout would instruct the jury that the builder of the fire was not liable if he built it on his own land, unless there were circumstances of some kind which satisfied them that he had been in some way negligent, and that the damage was directly due to his negligence. Then would come the question, which is often very difficult because it must be answered by a well established rule, applicable not only to fire but in a great variety of cases, but which it is often very difficult to apply. This rule is that a wrong doer is always answerable for all the immediate or direct effects of his wrong-doing, but not further. If we apply this rule to a case of fire, the man who built one or tended one negligently would be answerable to his neighbor not only for a shed that caught, but for his dwelling-house, though that stood at some distance, if it caught fire from the shed. But he would not be answerable to a more distant person whose house caught fire from the first house. The reason of the rule is obvious. If the builder of the fire were answerable for the second house, why not for the third which caught from the second, and why not for a whole city? It is plain that there must be some limit to a wrong-doer's liability for the consequences of his wrong-doing. It must stop somewhere. If the man whose house or store is burned down becomes thereby insolvent, no one would say that the man who set the fire, however willfully or negligently, should be answerable to this insolvent's creditors for what they lose by him. As this man's liability must stop somewhere, the law says it stops with the direct and immediate consequences of his wrong-doing, leaving it to a court and jury to determine what damages were direct and immediate, and what were only remote and conse quential.

Farm buildings are sometimes destroyed by fire caught from

railroad cars.

The railroad companies are of course liable for all damage caused thereby if the fire arose from any fault of theirs or of persons employed by them. It would be the fault of the companies if they neglected to use known and entirely practicable precautions. Whether they would be answerable if wholly free from negligence and default cannot be answered from any ascertained and uniform law. Generally we think they would be answerable. In some States this is provided by stat

ute.

SECTION VII.

GAME ANIMALS.

We have in this country no game laws but such as are intended to preserve from wasteful destruction animals valuable for food or otherwise useful. It is a pity we have not more laws for this purpose, and that they are not better observed. Game animals which existed in great abundance almost everywhere in this country some years ago are now scarce everywhere, and in some regions destroyed, by the indiscriminate slaughter which has long prevailed.

A wild animal, whether beast, bird, or fish, belongs to nobody, and everyone may catch or kill it who can. But here again comes this question of the right to go upon the land. The wild birds on my farm are not mine. I have no better right to shoot or snare them than another. But no man has any more right to come on my land without my permission, to snare or shoot them, than for any other purpose. That is to say, he has no right at all. If a man stands in a road adjoining my farm and shoots a bird which is coming on my land I cannot say that he does me any wrong. But if the bird falls over the line he has no right to step a foot on my land to get the bird, and if he does so he is a trespasser.

It is common in some parts of our country to see signboards set up on the roadside, giving notice "no shooting allowed on these premises." The only practical meaning or effect of such notices is, that while one who walks peacefully over the land will not be prosecuted, one who shoots upon the land will be. But he cannot be prosecuted for shooting there or for killing wild animals there, but for being there without leave, that

is, for trespassing on the land. So the owner of the farm does not own the fish in his ponds or streams until he catches them, but no stranger has any right to come over his land to his grounds. If such ponds or streams reach a highway any man may stand in the highway and fish for them.

An animal that was originally wild, after it is caught and tamed is, with its progeny, as much property as a domestic animal.

SECTION VIIL

DOMESTIC ANIMALS.

They are as much the property of their owner as anything else which he owns. A farmer has certain rights to them and certain liabilities for them.

No one has a right to kill or injure them. If his neighbor's cattle trespass on his land he may impound them, being very careful to follow exactly the requirements of the law, for his ignorance or carelessness here may get him into trouble. Perhaps the difficulty or danger of making use of a remedy which may so easily be mistaken is one cause why impounding is not now so often resorted to as formerly. But the farmer whose land cattle trespass on may turn them into the road to go where they will. A kind regard for his neighbor would prompt him to give his neighbor such information as would enable him to recover his cattle, unless, indeed, they were notoriously breachy and their owner had been warned often enough. But one who turns them from his own land into the road is not bound to give this notice. For everyone who owns cattle is bound to keep them at home or suffer the consequences.

So it would be as to sheep, goats, swine, etc. As to hens, they cannot be impounded. Of course they can be driven away, but they must not be shot, even if their dead bodies were returned to their owners. It may be doubted, however, whether a jury—who determine all questions of damages in actions of trespass-would give much damage if their owner, who was in the habit of letting them get their food in his neighbor's garden, brought an action when their dead bodies were brought to him.

The owner of domestic animals is liable for any dam